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SUM M A R Y
The history of analyses of scale and the conventional reductionist
methodology are briefly recounted in the first chapter of the thesis. A
detailed examination is then made of the theory of economies of scale
and its development since the days of Adam Smith. A comprehensive survey
shows that the description provided by conventional economic theory is
quite unrealistic, and has been dictated by the demands of Neoclassical
ideas of equilibrium. It is shown that the available empirical evidence
does not easily allow conclusions to be drawn about the optimal scale of
plants or enterprises.
A simple simulation model then demonstrates that static economies of
scale alone are insufficient to determine "optimal" scale - dynamic
diseconomies depend upon environmental context and uncertainties of
forecasting future demand.
The question of technological change is closely bound up with issues of
scale. The principle of bounded rationality is applied to deduce some
conditions about the nature of technical change using Heiner's
"Reliability Condition". The existence of "technological heuristics"
(such as a bias in favour of scale-augmenting innovations) is predicted.
The argument is illustrated with the use of a computer simulation of
successive process innovations in a stylised chenical plant.
Conflicting ideas about "optimal" scale in electricity generation,
papermaking, brewing and cement manufacture are examined. These views
are found to be explicable by borrowing the theory of fourfold cultural
bias from the field of social anthropolgy.
An Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns (EMIR) is developed as a
computer simulation. This model demonstrates that the restrictions
imposed by conventional economic theory can be overcome in a dynamic
economic model; economies of scale and technical change are married with
plural rationalities to provide a range of findings on industry
structure. Market share is found to be a more important determinant of
industrial success than economies of scale.
EMIR is used to demonstrate the phenomenon of technological "Lock-In";
important policy choices may be determined by small random events as
critical points. Market selection mechanisms cannot be relied upon to
optimise, whether in scale decisions or other important policy choices.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the use of plural models to go
with plural rationalities in the analysis of policy issues.
Chapter 1: Single Vision or Multiple Perspectives? A Systems
Approach to Problems of Scale
1. INTRODUCTION
The original purpose of this research was to provide assistance to
decision-makers faced with "Problems of Scale". That is, it was
initially conceived in terms of developing and improving specific
analytical techniques to help decide how large new elements of
productive capacity should be. This might have been built upon the
textbook "U-shaped" scale-cost curve, possibly identifying the
circumstances under which it would be applicable, and the additional
factors which should be considered in employing it.
However, examination of the theoretical basis of this potential tool for
the decision-maker revealed serious problems. The assumptions
underpinning this approach were found to be wholly inadequate. The
concept of the "optimum" scale of operations was not useful in the face
of considerable technological, economic and perceptual uncertainties. It
has become clear that questions of technical change, of the beliefs or
"culture" of the organisation concerned, and of the sheer
unpredictability of the environment are all significant.
The research has therefore developed away from the original focus on the
immediate problems of the decision maker, to try to develop a new
understanding of the scale problem. The insights gained have been
combined to produce an evolutionary model of the processes invol ved.
This new simulation model shows that theory need not be hide-bound by
the restrictive assumptions employed in the past. It provides a tool for
analysing industry development which has enabled some important
conclusions to be drawn, both for the policy analyst and for the
individual industrial decision maker.
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The thesis also considers, in the final chapter, the methodology used
for studying scale problems, and some general lessons which can be drawn
for other major problems of industrial and social choice.
2. HISTORY
The problem of determining the appropriate scale of a new production
plant has always been with us, but it has reached an increased degree of
prominence and controversy in recent years. This is partly because the
inbuilt belief of many planners and designers that increased size is
necessary for economy and market dominance has received a number of
recent shocks, and partly because of the reaction against giantism
summarised by Schumacher's famous phrase "Small is Beautiful".
The Venice arsenal of the fourteenth century is sometimes ci ted as an
example of an early factory, although in fact it was simply a collection
of craftsmen and artisans working independently under the same roof. The
factory system evolved through the Industrial Revolution as a means of
concentrating workers and specialised machinery for the purposes of co-
operati vel y carrying out complicated, mul ti-stage manufacturing
processes. Perhaps the archetypal factory form was reached with the
giant Ford car plant which in the early 1920's employed over 60,000
people and eventually produced millions of vehicles.
The vertically-integrated Ford works required enormous quantities of raw
materials; it could only come into being in the age of mass
communications- railways for transport of inputs and outputs, and the
telephone for the management of geographically separated but
interdependent functions. The giant "manufactory" had the effect of
concentrating the population and was a force for rapid urbanisation
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, posing new
social problems. De-skilled production line workforces had to be
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organised in large numbers, and Fordism created the conditions for the
creation of mass trades union movements. The management of the new
industrial armies posed novel problems, as did the need to be responsive
to changes in the huge new national and international markets which
products such as the model-T Ford had themselves created. Bureaucracy,
as old as the Pharaohs, found its apotheosis in the great Soviet GOSPLAN
industrial blueprints. Thus a whole range of new and complex,
interlocking and connected problems are raised by the great increases in
scale which have surged through the last two centuries.
The reasons for the increasing resistance to the idea that "big is
better" during the last two decades are similarly complex. In part, the
rapid expansion in demand in many areas of the economy during the late
1950s and 60s allowed scale mistakes to be swept under the carpet;
plants too large for the market this year would be fully-utilised next,
so why worry. The worldwide economic contractions beginning in the mid-
70s, exacerbated by rising commodity prices and by the oil price shock
of 1974 in particular changed that situation drastically, making
planning errors much more visible- and more expensive. General increases
in the post-war standard of living in the industrialised countries
initially fuelled demand for mass-produced goods, but saturation
stimulated desires for more differentiated products produced at smaller
scale in different ways.
Faith in "Big Science" has been weakened: for example, the optimism of
the early '50s which speculated that nuclear-generated electricity
would be so cheap that it wouldn't be worth metering it, has dwindled to
the point that, in the USA at least, nuclear energy was being seen as
uneconomic in competition with cGnventional sources even before the
near-disaster of Three Mile Island. In Britain new super-ministries such
as the Department of the Environment matched the monolithic nationalised
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industries, and all were labelled "bureaucratic", "out of touch" and
"inefficient" in the popular mind by 1980. In the late 1980s the
political agenda of Right and Left talks about reducing the power of the
State, decentralisation, and privatisation. In the Communist world the
reaction against centralised planning, unaccountable bureaucracy and
inefficiency has been even stronger. Finall y, the publ ic image of the
giant mul tinational corporations has not been improved by publ ici ty
surrounding operations in some Third World countries.
The problems of scale are many and complex. Firstly economic efficiency-
is it true that bigger plants are always cheaper to build and run? Even
if they can be built at a lower cost per unit of output, many managers
attest to the reality of the problems mentioned above- problems of
retaining effective control over the giant factories, and of being able
to effect real strategic change in large international organisations.
Secondly there are technical problems in always seeking to build the
biggest plant; technology can be pushed to the limit, or even beyond;
reliability and underperformance have been found to be problems for some
new giant installations.
Thirdly, there are difficulties associated with building production
units which account for a large proportion of their relevant market.
Risks are greater than when a number of smaller plants are operated
because of the "all your eggs in one basket" syndrome, and flexibility
is reduced. Forecasting becomes much more important, particularly when
larger units tend to have longer planning and construction lead times.
Finally, a quantum leap in size often brings into play qualitatively new
factors which were not a problem s t the previous scale of production.
Setting up a small workshop to build automobiles is one thing; planning
a Detroit factory is quite another, involving problems of securing raw
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materials, arranging dedicated transport facilities, massive
recruitment, buying hundreds of acres of suitable land and and raising
immense amounts of capital. These are qualitatively different from
finding a small site, arranging a loan with the bank and placing an
advertisement in the local paper. Complexity is often bound up with
scale, and neither are respecters of disciplinary boundaries.
3. PREVIOUS APPROACHES
There is little in the literature to help the planner decide on
appropriate scale in circumstances where there is rapid technological
change and a turbulent economic environment. Part of the difficulty lies
in the fact that most of the research undertaken has been strictly
disciplinary in nature, whereas in reality a broadly inter-disciplinary
approach is needed.
Three main disciplinary approaches have been explored in the past.
Firstl y there has been much discussion of "economies of scale" in the
economics and business studies disciplines. (See Gold (1981), and the
next chapter.) Secondly, sociologists and organisational behaviourists
have been engaged in a rather different study of the relationship
between the size and the structure of organisations (Dewar and Hage
(1978), Dale (1982)). Managers have faced a trend towards giantism in
their organisations, both state-owned and private. Thirdly, engineers
have long been involved with the practical problems arising from the
ever-increasing sizes of buildings, bridges, machinery, vehicles,
factories and other production units. Indeed it seems that the scale of
almost every area of human activity has been growing since history
began. However, the perception that all these special ist areas
confronting the difficulties arising from "scaleup" problems might have
some common elements which would repay study in their own right has only
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come about very recently.
The first serious interdiscip 1inary approach to the subject was in a
research project at the International Institute of Applied Systems
Analysis, initiated by Rolfe Tomlinson in 1978. A paper under the title
''Determining Appropriate Scale for Production Plants" was prepared by
Cantley and Glagolev (1978) in the same year, in which they reviewed the
current state of knowledge and made an initial attempt at structuring
the field. This paper was used to help in planning an international
conference held in 1979, which was the first time that representatives
of the different disciplines involved (from many countries) got together
to discuss the issues invol ved. The proceedings of that meeting were
subsequently published (Buzacott, Cantley, Glagolev and Tomlinson 1981).
Subsequently a multidisciplinary research effort was initiated in IMRAD
at the University of Warwick with the aid of a grant from the Leverhulme
Trust under Rolfe Tomlinson and David Collingridge of the University of
Aston. This thesis is largely a result of work carried out on that
project.
4. METHODOLOGY
Approaching such a complex research area as Problems of Scale demands
an appreciation of the past attempts to understand scale, and of the
reasons why they have been at best only partially successful. This in
turn requires that we look at the methods which have been used to tackle
these questions. Some features of the philosophy underlying past
methodology will be discussed in this section, and counterposed with the
emerging "Systems" model of the world. Many themes identified in this
Section will return in later chapters.
It seems to me that the essential. thing past approaches to the scale
problem have in common is that they are essentially reductionist. This
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element will be examined first.
The method of reductionism was first articulated in Western thought by
the French philosopher and mathematician Renee Descartes. The
reductionist approach to a complex problem is to divide it up, or reduce
it, into a set of constituent elements. These simpler elements may be
much easier to understand and analyse, and their behaviour as separate
units is likely to be far more comprehensible than that of the original
whole. If not, then the division into smaller and simpler parts must be
continued further until this is possible.
The Age of the Enlightenment made powerful use of this means of
understanding the world, and the reductionist scientific method has
ultimately proved to be one of the most successful cultural innovations
in human history. Perhaps its most impressive achievements were made in
combination with another profound discovery- that mathematics could be
employed to describe and explain events in the natural world. Newton's
invention of the calculus led to a brilliantly simple and elegant model
of the motion of the bodies of the Solar System.
This model can be taken as a symbol of the triumph of the Enlightenment.
The movements of Sun, Moon and planets, sometimes seen in the past as
capricious and signifying the wanton and uncontrollable character of
Nature and God, could now be predicted from a few simple laws from which
there were no deviations. The natural world was like a piece of
clockwork machinery. The stars traced out their orbits against a single
set of coordinates set down by God (and parametrised by Newton). The
former sat, omniscient, needing only rare interventions to ensure the
perfect running of the Uni verse, whilst the latter could predict the
future with mechanical confidence. (Laplace later asserted, under
pressure from Napoleon, that God was not really necessary- the model was
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so complete that no intervention was required.) The Harmony of the
Spheres gave way to a perfect equilibrium system in which history was
redundant- all that was needed was the position and velocities of the
bodies to determine their futures.
The world, then, could be interrogated by the reductionist approach,
described by mathematical and deterministic laws, and could be
predicted, at least in principle. The way was clear for the development
of a vast body of physical science which stood intact at least until the
beginning of this century.
This was not to everyone's liking, we may observe in passing; a few
cranky mystics and madmen have always railed against progress in every
age:
"May God us keep
From Single vision and Newton's sleep~"
exclaimed William Blake. To Blake the sterile operation of Reason alone
was insufficient for comprehending the world, and the reductionists and
mathematicians were aspects of Urizen ("your Reason"), a kind of Devil-
figure.
The successes of reductionism, and of rationalist scientific thought
generally, have led to the application in the social sciences of the
same kinds of methods which have succeeded for so long in the physical
sciences. Complex problems in the human world could, it seemed, be tamed
by the grand alliance of reductionism and mathematics. The behaviour of
the economic and social universes could be mapped and measured, and
their futures predicted and optimised by Newton's descendants. The
social sciences enthusiastically embraced the language, philosophy and
methodology of physics.
Here, however, serious problems have arisen, and they apply to Problems
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of Scale as much as to anything else in the human "sciences" area. One
difficulty arises from the subject matter. The social sciences deal very
much with people's perceptions and values- in other words, with things
which cannot be directly observed. Indeed, are these "things" in the
usual sense at all? The reductionist approach has been tremendously
successful, but yet it carries within it the seeds of its own
destruction. Reducing a problem to its constituent parts is all very
well, but what happens when the really interesting thing is the
relationship between the constituents rather than their individual
properties?
For example, it is quite possible to reduce a motor car to its
components and give a description of it in those terms. But that does
not tell us the really important things about the car- for example, what
it was for. Describing a carburettor, a spark plug, a piston, and a fan,
will only take us so far if we are not told that they join up in a
particular way to make a motor. In turn, descriptions of motor, chassis,
transmission, steering and tyres are incomplete unless it is known that
they can be joined to form part of a transportation system (which
includes roads, facilities for fuelling, and so on). Reductionism is
excellent for analysis but it is not terribly good at assisting
understanding by itself. Furthermore, the scientific foundations which
seemed to justify the approach are no longer as secure as they once
seemed.
Just at the moment that social science took on the mindset of Classical
physics, physics itself started to undergo catastrophic change, with
results which are still not very widely understood. Newton's single
frame of reference had to be abandoned for Einstein's mul tiplicity of
relative frames. Determinism, even in principle, has been subverted by
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quantum mechanics. The detached observer sitting outside the wor1d-
machine has gone, and consciousness itself, according to some accounts,
has become an operator in wave mechanics. Indeed, some of the most
brilliant physicists now sound more like the mystics and cranks of the
Enlightenment. (See for example Bohm (1980) and Capra (1975).)
The result is crisis for the philosophies which justify many of the ways
in which we go about seeking knowledge and the ways in which we use that
knowledge. It is a crisis in the Kuhnian sense a1so- the old paradigm is
under threat, and the new has not clearly established itself. There are
some pointers to the way that things may go, although in some ways it
is easier at the moment to describe the "New Paradigm" in terms of what
it is not rather than what it is. In what follows I shall try to
identify what seem to be the most interesting and important themes,
particularly with regard to an Applied Systems approach to Problems of
Scale. Jantsch, Prigogine and Allen have been among the most significant
thinkers here, though it is crucial that no single one has a monopoly or
a clear pre-eminence in the "invisible college" of the New Paradigm.
(See: Jantsch (1980), Jantsch and Waddington (1976), Prigogine and
Stengers (1984), and Allen et a1 (1985).)
The first and most important element of the new approach is that it is
anti-reductionist. It concerns itself with the emergent properties of a
system; that is, with precisely those effects which are caused by the
operation of the whole, and which deal with the relationships between
the parts, missed by the reductionist approach. Emergent properties are
phenomena of the whole which are qualitatively different from the
behaviour of the parts and could not be predicted by considering the
behaviour of the parts alone. An example would be a very simple sing1e-
cell organism. This can be described in terms of its constituent organic
molecules, but the important things about it- its limited ability to
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move, to ingest food, to respond to certain external stimuli- could
not, or at least not in a useful way.
The human social and technical systems we are concerned with in Problems
of Scale are often highly complex and multidimensional. Indeed, one of
the most important facets of scale problems in general is the
introduction of complexity per se when scale has exceeded some limit.
The problem with complexity is that it is hard or even impossible to
predict all forms of behaviour- cognitive processing ability will always
have some kinds of limits.
The principle of bounded rationality says simply that it is not possible
to know everything about all but the most trivial of systems. There will
always be suprises, always be aspects of behaviour which we could not
predict. Bounded rationality is, in one sense, already conceded by
reductionism- for if everything about a system were knowable then there
would be no need to take it apart to understand it. The system as an
ordered machine which the omniscient observer can perfectly comprehend
has to give way to an altogether messier and less satisfying situation,
in the same way that Classical physics has had to accept an ul timate
bounding of its capabilities by the discovery of the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle.
Given bounded rationality, one can only have an incomplete picture, or a
partial perspective on a situation. It may be that there exist multiple
_perspecti ves, and therefore pI ural rationalities, just as the single
Newtonian frame of reference has given way to the (infinitely) mUltiple
frames of the Einsteinian Theory of Relativity. Newton's "Single Vision"
is no longer adequate, and the commonsense view that there is more than
one way of looking at everything is captured by the idea of mul tiple
perspectives: different people may structure their perceptions of a
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situation in quite different ways. (Plural rationalities goes further,
and says that different cognitive structural patterns arise consistently
in particular ways and for particular reasons.) There is a very wide
literature here; in management and OR mention should be made of Linstone
(1984) and Mitroff (1983). An introduction to the plural rationalities
program will be found in James, Tayler and Thompson (1987), and
references therein. Heavyweight philosophical support for the general
viewpoint is provided by Goodman (1978).
Anthropologists have long been familiar with structured partial
representations of reality- they call them myths. A myth, in everyday
usage, is something which is not true. On the contrary in this context,
a myth is a story or a symbol which captures some essential partial
truth. Jungian psychologists use a similar concept, that of archetypes.
Applied to systems theory and management, we see myths and archetypes
as convenient ways of explaining and communicating different aspects of
the very complicated social, economic and technological problems which
we encounter.
A lot of "Old Paradigm" thinking is concerned with the notion of
optimality, particularly where numerical and mathematical analyses have
been applied to complex systems. One or a few numerical measures of
performance or desirability are to be maximised by manipulation of the
system. However, even where this is possible in principle, the problems
of bounded and plural rationalities make optimisation a very difficult
objective to reach in practice. Firstly, it is difficult to optimise
when uncertainty and restrictions on information mean that knowledge is
so bounded that prediction of behaviour (and understanding of the
behaviour of the system as it occurs) is problematical. Secondly,
multiple perspectives may carry with them mUltiple optimisation
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criteria, and it may not be possible to satisfy them all simultaneously.
(Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for showing that, in
general, it is not.) In many complex systems optimality may be a
chimera, and its pursuit futile or counterproductive.
Complexity has been mentioned frequently above, and it is the attitude
to complexity which lies at the heart of the alternative approach. The
challenge is not to reduce it away, but to look it in the face, and
accept the restrictions on knowledge and the ambiguities that it poses.
An exploratory mode of investigation often has to be undertaken rather
than a rigorously analytical one; archetypal models or "meta-models" are
used to investigate selected aspects of a problem and to throw light on
a particular chosen perspective.
Complex systems have other properties which contradict the single vision
approach. The relationship between chance and determinism has been
highlighted by some. The old view was of the system as a machine, in
which behaviour was mechanistically predictable in theory (even if
bounded rationality actually prevented it). Of course there are a great
many things which are predictable in the wor1d- we would not exist
otherwise. However it appears that, contrary to what Einstein believed,
God does play with dice, and just as some sub-atomic behaviour can only
be described by a quantum theory which demands a high degree of
indeterminacy, so chance can play an important role in the behaviour of
many systems.
In particular it is not uncommon for a system to reach a bifurcation,
where there is a choice between two stable paths of development. The
choice may depend on very small events which are effecti ve1y random;
once it has been taken the system continues deterministically along the
selected path. An important consequence is that "history matters":
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micro-level events can affect macro-structure, and the future
development path depends on the past in a much deeper sense than in the
"timeless" Newtonian celestial mechanics. (An introduction is given by
Eigen and Winkler (1975). A more mathematical treatment is given by
Arthur, Ermoliev and Paniovski (1986), whilst bifurcations in human
systems are Erwin Laszlo's subject (1985).)
Perhaps the most crucial leap in understanding which has to be made is
that away from the "commonsense" idea of equilibrium. Many things around
us which have structure- plants and trees, animals, each other, the very
atmosphere- appear to be in some sort of equilibrium. Yet this is an
illusion wrought by the myth of single vision, which insists on seeing
the world as a machine. Machines, our own creations, often are in
equilibrium, but natural systems almost never are. The human body is a
far-from-equilibrium system, both thermodynamically and chemically. It
requires constant change, particularly a steady flow of air, water and
food, to maintain its extraordinarily complex degree of self-
organisation. The fact is that almost no interesting systems are
equilibrium systems.
(The organic metaphor has been very popular with the General Systems
movement, and does indeed offer a powerful dialectic to the systems-as-
machines metaphor. However, the organic model is only one possible
metaphor- the principle of multiple perspectives must still be applied¢
See Morgan (1986).)
Moreover, it is self-organisation combined with chance which permits the
emergence of evolution. If the world is a machine we can extrapolate its
behaviour into the future, and so too the lower-order system problems we
are faced with more immediately. Machines do not evolve and their
qualitative behaviour does not change. Real systems, organic or social,
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can evolve and their behaviour can go through transitions to different
states. (See especially Jantsch (1980). On the phenomenon of self-
organisation in biochemical systems see Nicolis and Prigogine (1977).)
5. THE THESIS
The problem facing the industrial planner is ''Howbig should it be?" On
the surface, this is a question to be answered by deploying various
analytical tools, and by the judgement of seasoned practitioners. But
analysis requires inputs and assumptions; in the case of scale
decisions, assumptions about economies of scale, about changing
technology, about the effects on the competitive environment of
following particular courses of action.
The pre-analysis stage is less clear-cut but in some ways more
significant: are there economies of scale? How can we be sure, and how
accurately are they determined? If there are economt es of scale, does
this not imply that every industry will eventually be taken over by a
single giant firm? If there aren't, what is the explanation for the
historical processes which have led to the explosion in scale discussed
in section 2? Why are there disagreements about the advantages of large
scale?
The thesis is developed through the following argument:
In Chapter 2 the most important reductionist approach to scale is
examined: that of conventional NeoClassical micro-economics, a fine
example of the single-vision approach. Its development from the time of
Adam Smith is traced forward to the work of Alfred Marshall, in which
the theory of "increasing returns" (which include economies of scale and
technological change) was essentially dynamic and organic. After
Marshall, however, the twin demands of equilibrium analysis and the wish
to construct mathematical models of microeconomic interactions led to
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the complete removal of increasing returns from the scene. The theory.
which assumes perfect information for all actors. has become almost
completely static. and is confined within the straightjacket of the U-
shaped cost curve (another optimality construct).
The evidence supporting the theory is examined. and it is found to fail
satisfactorily to account for the size and growth of firms and
industries. It seems that more behavioural and evolutionary accounts of
economic behaviour are needed- accounts which incorporate bounded
rationality. and which allow for change and disequilibrium to a much
greater degree. The traditional description of economies of scale is
found to be deficient- for example. cost curves can be found which are
not U-shaped at all. It is concluded that it is not easy to determine
the existence of economies of scale in any particular situation. and
still less to be confident of the optimal scale of plant or enterprise.
Furthermore. even if we assume that the existence of economies of scale
is unproblematic. we have to consider the effects of the production
unit's scale on its relationship with its environment- reducing the
problem to the capital costs of the plant is not sufficient. A simple
simulation model of dynamic diseconomies of scale is introduced in
Chapter 3. which shows that the "optimal" scale of operation in a
changing and uncertain world depends upon environmental context. This
model abstracts the most important supply and demand features of a
1 arge-sca 1 e production si tua t Lo n , and shows how "common-sense"
optimality notions are easily overturned.
In Chapter 4 the other aspect of increasing returns- technical change-
is tackled. The principle of bounded rationality is applied to deduce
some necessary conditions about the nature of technical change using
Heiner's "Reliability Condition". which deals with how consistent
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intelligent behaviour should be in the face of uncertainty. Innovation
is a search procedure with uncertain outcome (contrary to the
NeoClassical assumptions). Search is constrained, and is guided by
heuristics; the attempt to realise economies of large scale operation in
production has been an important technological heuristic in the past.
The idea of technical change as a constrained search procedure is
illustrated by a model in Chapter S. Fictional production plants are
successively built, with the aim of improving the production technology
used and reducing the cost of output. In this model ill ustration the
costs of output fall as more plants are built, in a fashion similar to
the familiar "learning curve" phenomenon.
In Chapter 6 some fundamental disagreements about the optimal scale of
operation in the electricity generation, brewing, papermaking and cement
manufacturing industries are examined. It is argued that views about the
"optimal" scale are often irreconcilable, being based on different
premises and viewing "the facts" in very different ways. The theory of
fourfold cultural bias from social anthropology sheds some very
interesting light on these disputes.
Chapter 7 draws together all the elements of the argument. EMIR, an
Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns, attempts to overcome the
limitations of the conventional economic approach to scale questions.
EMIR is not a simple model, but represents an attempt to provide a
better description of the behaviour and evolution of industries under
conditions of increasing returns, innovation and incomplete knowledge.
The model is described in detail in Chapter 8. Its findings, given in
Chapter 9, include:
-that increasing returns are the norm and not the exception, and
that EMIR shows that such complexities are not beyond the reach
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of investigation;
-predictions of the determinants of industry structure;
-predictions of the influences on the development of large- scale
plants;
-an assessment of the merits and risks of pre-emption as a
competitive strategy;
-that the competitiveness of an industry is not affected by the
availability of technological economies of scale to the degree
expected, but rather by other dynamic factors;
-that under conditions of increasing returns, market mechanisms
cannot be relied upon to select optimal technologies or scale
options.
In Chapter 10 EMIR is used to provide confirmation of Brian Arthur's
thesis that important technological choices may be "locked-in" by the
bifurcations of trivial random events. This application of the model is
particularly interesting because it lies beyond the scope of
conventional economic modelling methodology.
In Chapter 11 the conclusions are presented and the argument summarised.
The implications are particularly drawn of the finding that market
selection mechanisms cannot be relied upon to optimise. This has
considerable consequences for decision-making in an uncertain world with
room for plural views and in which there are increasing returns to
scale.
The new systems approach deals in qualitati vely different features,
findings and modes of description from the classical scientific method.
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Very complex problems must needs be approached in an exploratory manner,
and the merits and demerits of the kinds of small models presented in
the thesis are discussed. The exploratory approach is most appropriate
to the pre-analysis stages of scale planning, where assumptions can be
investigated and ''worldview''scenarios experimented with.
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Chapter 2: The Development of the Theory of Economies of Scale
"There has lately been an increasing tendency to believe
that the larger an organisation becomes, the greater the
efficiency it almost automatically develops. Another view,
perhaps slightly less widespread, is that for each industry
there is one only optimum size of firm."
Cadbury (1935)
"Popular beliefs are seldom a safe guide in economics, and
here they are especially suspect"
Stigler, quoted in Teitel (1975)
"Economies of Scale" are often invoked as an argument in favour of
bigness. The contention of this chapter is that, as a generalisation,
the issue is much more complicated than it is often presented to be. The
theory of economies of scale is traced from Adam Smith and before,
whilst an account is given of the empirical research on the subject to
the present day.
The microeconomic theory of scale has been subjected to a thorough
critique by Gold (1981), and, as far as he goes, I have little to add.
However I will use the subject matter to draw out some of the points of
the preceding chapter, concerning the complexity of scale issues, the
forces encouraging increases in scale, and the qualitatively different
kinds of arguments used by the early theorists.
1. EARLY CONCEPTS- THE DIVISION OF LABOUR
1.1 Adam Smith
Many writers on "economies of scale" begin by referring to Adam Smith
and his famous discussion of the division of labour in pin-making- so
much so that it has almost become a cliche. In point of fact, the idea
of improved efficiency through specialisation of tasks was not original
to Smith; probably the earliest reference comes from Plato's ''Republic'':
'\fuichwould be better- that each should ply several trades,
or that he should confine himself to his own? He should
confine himself to his own. More is done, and done better
and more easily when one man does one thing according to his
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capacity and at the right moment. We must not be surprised
to find that articles are made better in big cities than in
small. In small cities the same workman makes a bed, a
door, a plough, a table, and often he builds a house too ....
Now it is impossible that a workman who does so many things
should be equally successful in alL"
(George, 1972)
A larger market permits greater specialisation, and thus yields
potential benefits in the production process. Plato's laws stipulate
that no craftsman be permitted to work in both wood and stone at the
same time, because of the presumed loss of excellence this would entail.
As Routh (1975) points out, Adam Smith was not the first economist to
set out the principles of division of labour; he was preceded by over a
century by Sir William Petty (1623-87), who indeed originated many
strands of modern economic theory.
" the gain which is made by Manufacturers, will be
greater as the Manufacture itself is greater and better.
For in so vast a City Manufacturers will beget one another,
and each Manufacture will be divided into as many parts as
possi b1e, whereby the Work of each Artisan wi 11 be simple
and easie."
(Hull, 1899)
In "The Wealth of Nations" (Smith 1791; Jenkins 1948) Adam Smith was
writing of a society being carried along by rapid industrialisation. It
is surely significant that he begins his path-breaking treatise with the
celebrated chapter on the division of labour, and indeed with the words:
"The greatest improvements in the productive process of
labour, as well as the skill, dexterity and judgement with
which it is applied, seem to have been the effects of the
division of 1abour~
The importance of this factor in economic growth is emphasised by the
later remark that division of labour:
"..is generally carried furthest in those countries which
enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement."
Smith analysed the manufacture of pins, and noted that it could be
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decomposed into about eighteen different operations. Whilst one workman
"not educated to this business" would be hard pressed to make even one
pin in a day, a small factory employing ten men could yield a daily
output of about twelve pounds, or 4,800 pins per man. This vast
improvement is due to three factors: the increase in skill and
dexterity in each workman, who can more successfully master his
specialised task; the saving of time previously lost transferring
between operations; and thirdly "the invention of machinery which
replaces hard labour and enables one man to do the work of many".
Thus the di vision of labour yields not only the static ad vantages of
specialisation, but also dynamic advantages through (in modern parlance)
"labour learning" and technological improvements via "learning by
doing". Smith gi ves as an example of the latter the invention of the
automatic regulator in early steam engines (although this story is
probably apocryphal). It would be only a mild exaggeration to say that
Adam Smith used "dIvision" (of labour) as a verb in an acti ve sense,
denoting dynamic progress rather than a passi ve description of
organisational or work structure. Certainly G B Richardson's (1975)
interpretation of Smith suggests that his was an explicitly evolutionary
economic theory.
Leijonhufvud (1986, p 210-12) makes the distinction between horizontal
division of labour, Le. Plato's craftsmen specialising in particular
trades, and vertical di vision, as where Smith's pin-makes di vide the
sequential operations between themselves. The former is a question of
minimum economical scale of operation, and often results in an increase
in the worker's skill. The latter case economises on both capital inputs
(since the same tools will be required as if only one were employed,
with the difference that all will be used simultaneously) and labour
inputs (since no worker needs to be proficient in all stages of the
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manufacture any more). Vertical division of labour therefore tends to be
de-skilling and leads to increasing returns to scale of operations.
Smith's insights were further developed by the scientific talents of
Charles Babbage (1832). The Lucasian Professor of Mathematics made
detailed studies of work processes more than half a century before F W
Taylor. He confirmed Smith's reasoning, and adduced a further principle
yielding advantages for manufacture on a large enough scale to permit
division of labour:
".. the master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be
executed into different processes, each requiring different
degrees of skill and force, can purchase exactly that
precise quantity of both which is necessary for each
process; whereas, if the whole work were executed by one
workman, that person must possess sufficient strength to
execute the most laborious of the operations into which the
art is divided."
Specialisation allows more efficient utilisation of resources,
particularly of labour, and Babbage estimated that this factor alone
reduced the cost of manufacture of pins by a factor of three and three
quarters. Babbage went on to consider the "Causes and Consequences of
L F ."arge ac tor aee", which include the use of "large capitals", i.e.
machinery, better materials utilisation, and the possibilities of a kind
of vertical integration, eliminating middlemen.
J S Mill (1832) contributed the idea that greater numbers gave possible
advantages through cooperation and combination of labour. 'Simple'
cooperation is demonstrated by the fact that two men can lift a weight
which one cannot; 'complex' cooperation is Smith's division of labour.
Mill considered the relative merits of manufacture on large and small
scales, and noted that in England there was a rapid substitution of
large for small establishments. Besides the technical causes, Mill saw
also that the rise of the joint stock company was an influence in the
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growth of large scale manufacturing.
Others, for example Jevons and Wicksteed, added to and elaborated these
concepts. However, I will pass over them to the beginning of truly
modern economics, and to the person who could be considered its founder,
the economist described by a later critic (Stigler, 1941) as "almost
incomparably superior to his immediate predecessors and his early
contemporaries": Alfred Marshall.
1.2 Alfred Marshall
Marshall continued the observational tradition of the early economists
and, though a gifted mathematician, eschewed complex analytical
techniques. His "Principles of Economics", first published in 1890, was
clearly inspired by the success of Darwinism in the latter half of the
century and, to quote Stigler again, "almost every subject in the
'Principles' receives its exposition in terms of evolutionary change".
Stigler doubts the "expedience" of this, but on the contrary Marshall,
in a preface to the eighth edition of his conceptually unchanged
masterpiece (1920), says that "the Mecca of the economist lies in
economic biology rather than in economic dynamics", and that, despite
the frequent use of the word 'equilibrium', his work is "concerned
throughout with the forces that cause movement". Despite his
considerable contributions to equilibrium theory in economics, Marshall
most certainly did not regard it as the be-all and end-all.
The evolutionary and dynamic nature of Marshall's thought is nowhere
clearer than in his discussion of Industrial Organisation (Book IV of
''Principles''). Marshall was fascinated by:
"..the continuity in change of the living process in all its
forms and phases and its effects on the structures and
patterns of organisation- a great and badly neglected
unifying thought- by means of evolutionary selection."
(Foa, 1982)
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His introduction to consideration of di vision of labour is concerned
with setting out a "general rule" on organismic development "whether
social or physical", involving increased subdivision of functions and
increasing interconnection between them- in a sense anticipating Von
Bertalanffy's "General Systems Theory" (1968), by more than sixty years.
Special isation of tasks led to increased ski 11 and opportuni ties for
mechanisation. Marshall saw that this in turn led to the creation of
new kinds of jobs, some indeed integrating previously separate work
functions (see e.g. his discussion of innovations in the printing
industry, section 5, ch IX of Book IV). The potential for mechanisation
meant that there was a tendency to increase the scale of manufactures,
and this in turn meant that there was a further potential for division
of labour of all kinds, "especially in the matter of business
management".
It is clear that Marshall (and his predecessors) saw the advantages of
scale as residing in the potential for task specialisation and improved
work organisation, in the possibilities of using and 'inventing'
specialised production equipment, in the acquisition of skill in the
manufacturing process, and in certain other functional improvements- for
example, Marshall describes how the large manufacturer may be able to
afford extensive advertising and the employment of salesmen. '~conomies
of Scale" (a phrase not coined until the 1930s) do not derive
automatically from sheer size, but from the potential for improvements
in organisation and technology which size brings. In this respect
Marshall is very 'modern', clearly recognising the distinction between
'science' and useful technology, and the importance of 'learning by
doing':
'~periments on a laboratory scale or with small mechanical
models have as a rule but little commercial value, until
they have been fortified by practical proof of their
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efficiency on a working scale."
"Industry and Trade" (1919) p 244
A sympathetic reading of "Industry and Trade" can even find evidence
that Marshall recognised the existence of the modern theory of
innovation and the product life cycle (Utterback and Abernathy 1975) in
his discussion of the bicycle industry:
"...when bicycles first came into vogue, every year brought
some striking change in their construction and their methods
of manufacture ... But now a cycle firm with adequate
capital, administrative capacity and assiduity, can
manufacture at a comparati vely low cost for general
consumption an ordinary cycle, that is immeasurably superior
to those made by the first leaders of the industry ...Thus
improvements in the methods and products of a partially
standardised industry goes together with a certain decline
in the place held in that industry by the high faculties of
initiative: they are apt to be overshadowed by the more
commonplace faculties of orderly administration and
commercial skill; combined with large resources held perhaps
in joint-stock ownership."
The Marshallian system distinguished between two sources of increasing
returns- internal economies and external economies. The former are what
are now known as 'economies of scale', whilst the latter derive from the
effects of the scale of the industry as a whole, in terms of
specialisation of tasks between firms, locational economies, and general
synergistic effects- as exemplified by the growth of the engineering
industries in the Birmingham area. This conceptual division was partly
moti vated by the need to explain why, if an industry were subject to
"increasing returns", it did not become dominated by a single
manufacturer. The existence of external economies could explain the
continuation of competition under increasing returns. Marshall also
resorted to arguing that the forces which led to the creation of large
firms would enable new firms to quickly supplant them, due in part to
the "decay of entrepreneurial faculties" as the original founders
retired.
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These kinds of defence became increasingly necessary during the 1920s.
Ultimately they were judged to be inadequate as the Walrasian theory of
price equilibrium put considerable strains on the notion of 'increasing
returns'. Marsha 11 died in 1924, and many of his most cherished ideas
perished shortly afterwards (at any rate, they 'went underground' for a
long time). The major casualties were Marshall's insistence on the
importance of economic dynamics (despite his own substantial
contributions to equilibrium theory), and his aversion to elaborate
mathematical treatments of economic problems.
2. THEORETICAL CONFLICTS
Marshall provided a rich description of "increasing returns", in which
scale change is clearly only one factor which cannot be separated from
associated considerations of technological change, organisation of
production and changes in factor inputs, i.e. changes in the proportions
of labour and capital needed for manufacture at different levels of
output.
("Increasing returns" means that marginal returns increase with scale.
Thus static economies of scale are an example of increasing returns,
since raising the scale of output reduces the cost of each unit of
production, and raising scale still further reduces the cost of the
extra (marginal) units of output further also. However "increasing
returns" also covers a number of other economic effects, e.g, the modern
"learning curve" phenomenon in which costs are often reduced with
increases in cumu1ati ve output over time. Cumulative technological
learning is a similar source of increasing returns. Arthur (1987) shows
that there are often "increasing returns" to the adoption of new
technologies, arising from learning effects (again); from informational
factors (adoption is more likely as a technology becomes better-known);
and through interrelatedness with other technologies or infrastructure.
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Thus "increasing returns" covers a wide range of static and dynamic
forces.)
Marshall set out his ideas in language which emphasised change and
dynamics rather than equilibrium and statics. On the other hand,
equilibrium theory demanded a very restrictive theory of scale changes,
requiring no alterations in factor input proportions or in technology.
Whether these conditions could ever be fulfilled, even in theory, will
be discussed below; the fact is that they became the orthodoxy and have
remained so until very recently. The reasons why this has happened,
according to Gold (1981):
" are not rooted in any demonstrably more effecti ve
insights into the ad vantages and disadvantages of larger
scale operations, or the factors determining such results.
Rather they have been motivated by placing a higher priority
on integrating this sector of theory into the larger
framework of production and distribution theory."
But this is to run slightly ahead of the developments. The 'cost
controversies' of the 1920s saw the beginnings of the undermining of
Marshall. John Clapham (1922a) in the so-called 'empty boxes' debate
attacked the utility of the concept of 'increasing returns', pointing
out that:
"•. we do not, for instance, know under what conditions of
return coal or boots are being produced~
He inquired whether any of the 'Great Analytics' could indeed determine
the answer. He argued that the restrictive definition of scale changes
should be avoided on the grounds that:
".. we never can know what proportion of ...efficiency is
due to organisation resulting from mere size and what to
invention."
(That problem still dogs the economic theory of scale economies).
Clapham's elegant and witty assault was answered by Pigou's (1922)
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equally amusing intervention on behalf of the growing body of
'Ana1ytics'. However. Clapham's claim about the inseparability of
technological effects was not refuted in the subsequent melee (Clapham
1922b. Robertson 1924). Nor was Marshall's point about changes in
factor proportions effectively countered:
"The quan tities cannot be taken
changing methods of production call
unskilled and skilled labour of. "proporUons.
out exact1 y. because
for machinery. and for
new kinds and in new
("Principles" Book IV Ch 13)
Indeed. at the same time that this theoretical dispute was beginning to
erupt. the observational approach. in the shape of the work of J M Clark
(1923). was providing additional support for Marshall. Clark both
emphasised the importance of invention and research as a specialised
function in its own right carrying advantages for the entrepreneur large
enough to sustain it. and also pointed to the possible physical
economies of large mechanical units. Kotany (1922) provided an analysis
of such effects (Clark drew on empirical observations from the US
railway industry) by setting out elementary geometric justifications for
improved efficiency from larger machinery- for example. that heat loss
from a large steam engine should be less than that from a small engine
because of the greater proportionate volume enclosed by a given surface
area. Crude as these arguments are (and both Clark and Kotany were
careful to point out that such geometric relationships are invariably
subject to limits on their range of applicability). they nevertheless
set up formidable obstacles to explaining how factor proportions could
always be maintained in scale changes. when an important source of
increasing returns was the supposed capital-saving possibilities of
larger equipment.
But there were telling arguments on the side of the Ana1ytics too. In
particular. Marshall's explanation of the co-existence of competition
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and increasing returns was found seriously wanting, and the notion of
'external economies' was criticised. A telling blow was landed by Piero
Sraffa (1926) attacking the logical consistency of the external
economies idea. Stigler (1941) argues that Marshall failed to
satisfactorily account for the continuation of competition in a
(supposedly) equilibrium framework, correctly pointing out that the
evidence on the 'decay of entrepreneurial facu1 ties' which, Marshall
held, would cause large firms to fail through atrophy of the competitive
spirit before they grew to dominate the market, was very much against
him (Steind1, 1945, adds weight to this case). Stigler also criticised
him for logical inconsistency in failing to adhere to the doctrine of
fixed factor proportions. Marshall was, in the view of the Ana1ytics,
too imprecise to fit properly into their theoretical framework (Viner
1931).
There was a further difficulty, which lay in Marshall's fixation on
economies and neglect of diseconomies of scale. Equi 1ibrium theory
needed the existence of a U-shaped long run cost curve; in other words,
there must be decreasing returns past some optimum scale of production:
Fig 2.1: The U-Shaped Cost Curve
cost
of
production
scale of production
A rearguard action was fought by Allyn Young (1928) on behalf of the
recent ly deceased Marshall. Where Sraffa had sought a way out of the
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problem of competition by asking economists to abandon the assumption of
perfect competition, Young set out a bold statement in favour of a
dynamic economics, arguing that:
" the counter forces which are continually defeating the
forces which make for economic equilibrium are more
pervasive and deeply rooted in the constitution of the
modern economic system than we commonly realise."
The counters to equilibrium were changes in the organisation of
production and cumulative technological progress. Young fashioned a
redefinition of 'external economies', removing them to the industry
level, away from individual industrial environments, and emphasising
dynamic productivity growth. He took Adam Smith's theorem that "the
di vision of labour is limited by the extent of the market" and argued
that the reverse was also true, that the extent of the market depended
in part on the division of labour. Thus a process of disequilibrating
feedback produced increasing returns. It is striking, as Blitch (1983)
points out, that there is no place for increasing returns in modern
competition theory, when historical industry studies stress their role,
and economic historians regard them "as a major factor in the industrial
development of Britain and the United States". That is, historical and
observational study suggests that innovation, division of labour and
specialisation, and the realisation of economies of scale all playa
crucial role in the evolution of modern industries and economies.
Traditional economic accounts cannot or will not incorporate these
elements and resort instead to arguments based on shifts in factor
prices.
I have gone into this question before launching into the main subject-
matter because I wished to show that neither Marshall's observational
insights nor the instincti ve desire for a dynamic economic framework
which he shared with Young were refuted. Rather, certain other elements
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of Marshall's formalisations were found lacking, either through
inadequacies in explaining actual competitive behaviour, or
inconsistencies with the rigour of equilibrium price theory. This
theory was in the 1920s a strapping youth, generally regarded as a great
success. Young was ignored, partly for these reasons, partly because of
his unfortunate early death, and partly, as his pupil and notable
intellectual supporter, Nicholas Kaldor puts it, because his paper was:
".. so many years ahead of its time that the progress of
economic thought has passed it by ••.Economists ceased to
take any notice of it long before they were able to grasp
its full revolutionary implications."
(Kaldor 1972)
Young's argument was not appreciated because equilibrium theory itself
was not sufficiently understood. General equilibrium theory, Kaldor
says, cannot cope satisfactorily with technological progress, and he
goes on to say (1972) that:
".. it is evident that the co-existence of increasing
returns and competition- emphasised by Young and also by
Marx, but wholly excluded by the axiomatic framework of
Walrasian economics- is a very prominent feature of de-
centralised economic systems but the manner of functioning
of which is still a largely uncharted territory for the
economist."
Until very recently Kaldor himself has been relatively isolated, with
only occasional contributions on the "neo-Marshallian" side (see perhaps
Jones 1933, Wiles 1952, Balassa 1961). Fifty years on, there are signs
of a resurgence in evolutionary economic thinking, represented by
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982), fighting under the banner of
Joseph Schumpeter, and by the "neo-Austrian" school (Kirzner 1982, Shand
1984). Until Marshall, "increasing returns" had a place in the
thinking of every major political economist, along with and tied up in
concepts of technological change, in the most central theories of
economic progress. That place was denied upon the death (literal and
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metaphorical) of Alfred Marshall, and it remains to be seen whether it
can be restored.
This is not to say that the restrictions imposed by equilibrium theory
are due to the ignorance or stupidity of economists; obviously not. It
seems to me that they are due to the methodology, to the kinds of models
and tools employed by the Analytics, in this case the method of static
equilibrium analysis, for:
"the axioms of equilibrium theory were originally chosen in
order to secure the desired result ..• its authors were
motivated by the belief that they were only laying the
foundations of an explanation of how a market economy works,
an initial stage of the analysis which is in the nature of
'scaffolding': it has to be erected before the permanent
building can be built, but will be removed step by step as
the permanent building nears completion. However, since
Walras just wrote down his system of equations over 100
years ago, progress has definitely been backwards not
forwards, in the sense that the present set of axioms are
far more restricti ve than those of the original Walrasian
model."
Kaldor (1985)
There has been a preoccupation with mathematical formalism at the
expense of empirical verification; a recent authoritative survey
concluded that:
"The 'equilibrium' story is one in which empirical work,
ideas of facts and falsifications, played no role at alL"
Weintraub (1983)
3. TEXTBOOK THEORY
3.1 The Cost Curve
The classic formalisation of economies of scale in equilibrium theory
was provided by Jacob Viner's (1931) "long-run cost curve". The short-
run cost curve was defined as the relation between cost and volume of
output not allowing for any change in the scale of plant, whilst the
long-run curve was the envelope of all the possible short-run curves
(i.e. all those curves attainable by building plants of different
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sizes). The 'long-run' was:
" long enough to permit each producer to make such
technologically possible changes in the scale of his plant
as he desires."
Figure 3.1.1: The Long Run Cost Curve
Cost
Short run cost curve
/ r /\j I \ // I\ i/
i_/\ I Long run cost curve,
Output
It was assumed that the LRCC would be U-shaped or more precisely, this
was deduced from the 'laws of return'. To be fair to Viner, he pointed
out that the shape of the curve would be an 'empirical question', but
the assumption of an optimum size beyond which increases in the scale of
the enterprise would yield decreasing returns was crucial to equilibrium
theory. This assumption, as noted above, explained the possibility of
maintaining several competitors in a given industry situation.
Some of the more subtle implications of this formalisation are analysed
by Gold (1981); I shall only mention the starker ones. The assumption
of fixed factor proportions is maintained. There is also an assumption
of no substantial technical change, despite the rather misleading term
"long-run". As Pratten (1971) notes, there is an inherent assumption of
'given' technological knowledge, and, as is to be expected in a
neoclassical framework, the entrepreneur chooses the scale of production
on the basis of perfect knowledge of the results, thus obtaining minimum
cost for the output desired.
However, Clifford Pratten's detailed studies of the sources of technical
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economies of scale led him to the contrary conclusion that assumptions
of given technical knowledge are "difficult to sustain in practice", and
indeed that:
"•• it is no longer always possible in practice, to isolate
the economies of scale and economies attributable to
technical progress •••It is therefore vitally important to
consider the relationship between scale and change,
otherwise we should be considering the effects of scale in a
'Canute economy', a fruitless exercise."
(Pratten (1971)
Yet this is exactly what has happened; Huettner (1974) observes that "no
diagram, chart or graph ever depicted more than one LRAC curve".
Economists have al ways forced the data to fit on one curve (Huettner
1973). As an example of this, Huettner reviews cost studies in the
electricity generation industry (Johnston 1960, Lomax 1952, Olson 1970)
and shows how they have imposed upon the same cost curve plants of
different vintages and technologies. Thus changes in technology have
been ignored, suggesting that the effects of technical change may have
been misrepresented as scale economies.
I will examine the 'empirical question' of whether the LRCC is in fact
U-shaped presently, but at this point the sheer austerity of the
'orthodox' formulation should be pointed out. Not only is technical
change barred, but there is really no convincing explanation attached to
the neoclassical concept to show where the economies of larger scale
production (if any) might come from. The best we get is F H Knight's
(1921) statement that:
"The fact of limited divisibility is responsible for all
differences in the economies of operation of establishments
of different sizes."
Limited divisibility of factor inputs becomes a catchall. Not merely
are "indivisibilities" such things as one-off overheads due to set-up
costs (largely effects on the short-run curve in any case), but in fact
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any improvement due to changes in organisation or utilisation of
equipment. Thus the introduction of a completely new production process
at a large scale of output, which would be uneconomic at lower outputs,
would come under this heading. The analytical value of
"indivisibilities" in this sense is practically zero. In a famous
series of exchanges Edward Chamberlin denounced this usage of
"indivisibilities" as tautologous (1948). The discussion, conducted in
the pages of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, got into rather a
tangle on the questions of what constitutes a tautology, and whether it
has a use, and what can legitimately be called a factor input (McCleod
and Hahn 1949, Chamberlin 1949).
Chamberlin argued that specialisation of function could not be reduced
purely to Hindi visibil ities", and pointed out that if more "co-
ordination" were needed to maintain larger units then the unchanged
factor proportions condition would simply lead to dis-economies of
scale, assuming that 'management' was to be considered a factor input.
Chamberlin got the better of the argument, and Leibenstein (1955) showed
that the assumption that perfect di visibi lity of factor inputs would
eliminate economies of scale was quite incorrect. There could still be
'indi visible acti vities', yielding genuine economies. Kaldor (1972)
(who opposed him at the time) admitted much later that Chamberlin had
been correct. Schwartzmann (1958) summarised the verdict on Knight's
definition:
'~e consequence has been a meaningless theory. It provides
no generalisations concerning sources of varying returns."
As Gold (1981) points out, Stigler revised the early edition of his
"Theory of Price" to say (1952) that "examples of technological
indivisibilities are relatively rare In the great majority of cases,
then, a productive service is capable of continuous physical variation".
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Gold further highlights the fact that, although Pratten (1971) considers
indi visibilities in his important empirical surveys of economies of
scale, he provides only a theoretical discussion unsupported by concrete
technical examples.
3.2 Explanations of Scale Economies
These weaknesses, as Schwartzmann says, do not mean that we have no
theory of economies of scale. On the contrary:
"The theory consists of the general isations pertaining to
the advantages of specialisation, of certain technological
processes such as assembly lines on stamping machines, and
the problems of managing large enterprises. Were these
Marshallian categories emphasised rather than
'indivisibility' the methodological problems which have been
examined here would not have arisen."
Schwartzmann (1958)
Away from the straitjacket imposed by equilibrium theory these factors
had not been ignored or completely devalued; for example Stigler (1951)
claims that:
"The di vision of labour is not a quaint practice of
eighteenth-century pin factories; it is a fundamental
principle of economic organisation."
By 1930 an additional source of economies was receiving increasing
attention, namely the possibilities of greater proportional output from
larger machinery and equipment. This shift of emphasis towards laws of
'increased dimensions' and away from 'division of labour', which has
been sustained throughout the twentieth century, is due at least in part
to the increase of what Gold (1979) calls 'capital-dominated' and the
decline of 'labour-dominated' industries and processes. (Blaug (1963)
shows that it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the
'myth' that technical change had a necessarily labour-saving rather than
capital-saving bias was exploded). That is, whilst in Adam Smith's day
it was more often the case that output was limited by the quantity and
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quality of labour that could be organised for production, today the
limiting factor is usually the capital stock deployed- the addition of
extra labour results in little or no increase in the output or
efficiency of a modern petrochemicals plant or steelworks, for example.
Boulding (1941) introduced allometric arguments to explain why different
sizes of equipment give different proportionate outputs:
"•• a flea can jump over a scale model of the Capitol,
scaled down to the size of a flea. If a flea were as big as
a man, however, it could not jump at all. Its legs would
break. This is due to the fact that the strength of muscles
and bones is proportional to their cross-section, which is
an area. The weight of an object is proportional to its
volume 00"
Boulding suggests analogies with business enterprises and organisations.
(See also Naroll and Von Bertalanffy (1956)). Care must be exercised
with these kinds of argument- as will be shown below in the discussion
of the evidence for the so-called "six-tenths rule". However, there is
no doubt that these kinds of relationship do yield genuinely varying
returns to scale, and indeed they are probably now the most frequently
cited source of scale economies.
To return to the U-shaped cost curve again- where is the relevant
evidence? At the same time that Viner was working out the theory,
Robinson (1931) was developing a detailed argument to show where
decreasing and increasing returns at the level of the individual firm
came from. Many of the propositions Robinson advanced are frequently
still repeated, so it is worth enumerating them.
In keeping with the spirit of contemporary theory, Robinson talked of
the "optimum" size of firm, although he did not allow himself to be
hedged in by theoretical restrictions to a serious extent. On the side
of the ad vantages of scale, the usual discussion of pin factories is
enhanced by reference to the production line for the Model T Ford- 7,882
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operations, according to Henry Ford- and to the 'Integration of
Processes' by machines. The 'Economy of the Large Machine' resides in
the geometric relationships alluded to above, and to the fact that a
large firm can supply sufficient work to keep big and expensive
equipment occupied. For the same reasons the large firm is better able
to maintain the efficient balance of processes between successive stages
of production. Further economies are derived from massed reserves
(inventories of spare parts) and standardisation of components.
There are also potential economies of large scale organisation, Robinson
be 1 ie ves, through specia 1 isa tion of managerial functions (e.g.
personnel, market research). Larger firms are believed to find it
easier to raise capital, and to gain better terms in their materials
purchasing. Similarly, the possibility of affording large-scale
advertising and marketing personnel, combined with more rapid stock
turnover and potential for great product range are advantages of selling
on a large scale.
If there are technical diseconomies of large scale production then,
given the neoclassical assumption that we realise that they exist, they
can be avoided by building multiple small units of plant (this point was
noted by Viner at the very outset). Therefore, any sources of
decreasing returns must be due to diseconomies of large-scale
management, and indeed these are the limits to scale Robinson discusses.
Problems of coordination, loss of flexibility, and the dangers of
bureaucracy are outlined in some detail. The advantage of small
decision-making units is stressed, and there is mention of the problem
of motivating workers (and managers) in the large firm.
However, and this will be a recurring cry, Robinson felt that far too
little attention had been paid to empirical studies of the variation of
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returns with size:
".•we know far less than we ought to know about the extent
of the economies of scale. How much does a firm's cost of
production increase if it is, say, 25 per cent below the
optimum size? Is it a matter of 2.5 per cent? Is it a
matter of 10 per cent?"
3.3 Lack of Empirical Evidence
Little substantial progress was made in answering these kinds of
questions for some time. Thus Blair (1948) remarks that:
"•• it is a matter of amazement that so little effort has
been directed toward examining this fundamental problem in
the light of factual data .•.. The explorer in this field
stands, indeed, on barren ground."
And, again, a survey of the evidence by Caleb Smith (1955) produces the
finding that:
"Based on the survey, the conc 1 usion is that the
generalisation that available empirical information supports
are (sic) indefinite and disappointing."
Walters (1963) found that the existence of economies of scale was 'only
clearly established for public utilities', and concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to decide whether long-run cost curves were U-
shaped or not.
Thus it was that on the one hand Smith could conclude that:
".. there is no substantial evidence that the long-run cost
function for plants does not continue to decline up to the
largest sizes found in practice."
whilst others could continue to hold to the view that long-run cost
curves were U-shaped- for example a note by Viner (1950) asserted that:
"I know of no convincing evidence that the optimum-
efficiency size •.•is not quite moderate for any industry
of any appreciable size."
What evidence there was seemed to rest against the U-shaped cost curve;
a report by the US National Bureau of Economic Research (1943) showed an
L-shaped cost function for all but one (grocery retailing) of eight
industries considered, and studies reviewed by Moore (1959) suggested a
similar conclusion in the majority of cases. Wiles (1952) argued
ferociously against the dominant orthodoxy on technical knowledge as
well as against U-shaped cost curves, which he ascribed to "a confused
and nai ve belief in the diseconomies of large management". He
threatened the "wreckage of general equilibrium theory" ("it is all in
Marshall" he exclaims in a footnote) and asserted that:
"The conclusion appears inescapable: the doctrine of the
optimum size of the firm must be abolished; it is quite
wrong."
Wiles provided considerable evidence, in the shape of empirical cost
curves for both plants and firms, to support his position. He is
surprisingly rarely cited- perhaps because of his theoretical heresies.
On the other side of the argument, J M Blair (1948) produced a number of
sets of figures showing that total firm costs of production were U-
shaped for Bakeries, Rubber Tire manufacture, and the production of
mixed fertilisers and superphosphates. All these early studies tended
to be of variable quality; for example one of those reviewed by Moore
(1959) included 15 estimates of scale economies by the Harvard Economic
Research Project. Of these 15, 8 relied upon only 2 plants, 2 on 3, 2
on 4, 1 on 5 and 2 on 6; with such paucity of data, standard errors of
cost estimates must be very high.
Hindsight, benefiting from the studies carried out once the lacunae in
empirical studies were realised, enables us to conclude that in fact
long-run cost curves at the plant level are generally L-shaped rather
than U-shaped. (See in particular the Cambridge Uni versity studies:
Pratten and Dean (1965), Pratten (1971), Silbertson (1972), and the
international comparison work of Scherer et al (1975) and discussion
below) .
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3.4 Criticisms of the Cost Curve
Before considering the general body of the studies of economies of
scale, however, some wider points are in order. Firstly, the assumption
that the long-run cost curve is smooth (whatever its overall form) is
not always or necessarily true. Moore (1959) points out that the curve
may be 'scalloped' due to the very fact that the fixed factor
proportions condition is rarely fulfilled in practice:
"Among other reasons, economies of scale arise because the
proportions among inputs change as scale of plants change
••• In other words, the 'scale line' may have 'kinks' in it
as the size of the plant expands."
This means that, even if the curve is basically L-shaped it may contain
more than one point of 'minimum' cost- as was indeed found by Scherer et
al (1975) in the case of the manufacture of paint and of batteries.
This resulted in the coexistence of small and large plants, medium-sized
plants either tending to disappear or "leap forward to larger and more
efficient scale". Similar possibilities have been explored by Alan
Bollard (1983) for the brewing, cheese-making, waste-paper and plastics
recycling, brick-making and other industries. A wide range of factors,
including different technologies, transport and marketing costs, and
product differentiation, lead to wildly varying concerns having broadly
similar costs of production- but for very different reasons.
A second underlying assumption of the cost curve is that it relates to a
planned output of only one product. In reality this situation is very
rare; even 'flow' production processes such as chemicals manufacture
usually have a range of possible product mixes from the same equipment.
Cockerill's study of the international steel industry (1974) found that:
".• the minimum efficient scale of plant for the manufacture
of steel products depends both upon the process by which the
crude steel is produced and upon the product mix of the
final total output. Hence we may expect several output
scales to be optimal according to the technical and market
factors assumed."
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Thirdly, there is the idea that the existence of a minimum cost point is
sufficient to establish the existence of an optimal scale of operations.
This is equivalent to stating that the entrepreneur's objective is to
minimise costs. When economic theory directly addresses the question,
however, it is generally recognised that the objective is to maximise
profi ts, and that the two things are by no means equi valent. Thus the
minimum cost point may not represent the 'optimum' size of enterprise.
These considerations demonstrate that, even to the extent that the
traditional cost curve can be held to be a reasonable approximation to
the real world, it is, as Jewkes (1968) puts it:
"..a great gap in logic and a vast misunderstanding of the
dynamics of industry, to suppose that there is one optimum
size of firm and that the only thing that matters is the
size of the biggest firms."
Yet, according to Gold (1981), this assumption that there is some
optimal size of production, is about all that is left of the
"traditional approach" to the theory of scale economies. It may be felt
that I have to some extent set up straw men to attack in this discussion
of the "traditional approach". This is true, in as much as increasing
numbers of researchers dealing with the empirical evaluation of
economies of scale have been adapting and abandoning many of the
theoretical restrictions and simplifications placed upon them by the
'Ana1ytics'. To that extent the published literature on economies of
scale has become far more sophisticated and less hidebound in the last
quarter century.
The Ana1ytics are also attempting to come to grips with the difficulties
which increasing returns to scale present for the competitive
equilibrium. The theory of 'Contestable Markets' takes account of the
mu1 tiproduct firm and allows for the existence of flat-bottomed, as
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opposed to U-shaped, long run cost curves (Baumol, Panzar and Willig,
1982; Baumol and Braunstein, 1977). This does at last seem to be an
attempt to remove some of the 'scaffolding'. At the risk of seeming
churlish, however, it must be said that Marshall would not have approved
- Baumol et a1 sti 11 have both feet planted in the furrows of
equilibrium analysis, ignoring possibilities of evolutionary change.
Moreover, the whole is accomplished with the aid of chapter after
chapter of mathematical equations of quite baroque abstraction.
There is no clear al ternati ve to the theory which emerged sixty years
ago, despite the accumulation of evidence of weaknesses in that theory.
To some 'Analytics', indeed, it would seem that nothing has changed- for
example, the eleventh edition of Samuelson's ''Economics''(1980) still
maintains the requirement of fixed factor proportions. Lipsey's
'Positive Economics' (1979) professes a more empiricist route than many
economic textbooks, and yet still retains the U-shaped cost curve for
both plant and firm- although it now goes so far as to admit that this
is merely an assumption for the latter. I have yet to find an
introductory text which does not feature the U-shaped long run cost
curve, usually in the form of a diagram, nor yet one which can bring
itself to the point of confessing the extent to which empirical
investigations disprove the assumption. Moreover, the U-shaped cost
curve assumption has spilled out into other areas, e.g. introductory
texts in Production Operations Management. It would not be totally out
of place to recall Piero Sraffa's "famous criticism" (1926)- and apply
it to the theory that was victorious half a century ago:
'~at its foundations are less solid than those of the other
portions of the structure is generally recognised. That
they are actually so weak as to be ~nable to support the
weight imposed upon them is a doubt which slumbers beneath
the consciousness of many, but which most succeed in
silently suppressing. From time to time someone is unable
any longer to resist the pressure of his doubts and
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expresses them openly; then, in order to prevent the scandal
spreading, he is promptly silenced, frequently with some
concessions and partial admission of his objections, which,
naturally, the theory had implicitly taken into account~
4. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
4.1 Bain and Other Pioneers
Thus, even after the Second World War there were serious shortcomings in
the theory of returns to scale, both conceptually and in the lack of
supporting evidence. As we have seen, the situation was such that
economists could choose the facts to suit whatever policy prescription
they chose. Bain (1956) remarked on the fact, that, whilst American
economists were writing in support of open competition and anti-monopoly
positions, their British colleagues, particularly Robinson, Florence and
Steindl, were taking the opposite stance:
'~ese British writers are much more likely to be concerned
with explaining the failure of firms in unconcentrated
industries to take advantage of the allegedly manifest
advantages of very large-scale operations (citing
deficiencies of capital markets and the like) than with
documenting their assertions relative to the supposed
advantages of large scale."
Bain himself was one of the pioneers of sound empirical research in the
field. His methodology for cost estimation was based on the use of
questionnaires for managers and engineers in each of the industries
studied, backed up from other diverse sources- for example trade
journals. His study of about 20 industries in the USA (1956) was
intended for the analysis of competition and the so-called "barriers to
entry" that the existence of scale economies are believed to impose in
certain industries. Bain was therefore most concerned with the
evaluation of minimum efficient scale (normally abbreviated to m.e.s.).
This is variously defined by different researchers; the most widely
accepted definition is Pratten's (1971), that m.e.s. is the size at
which any subsequent doubling of plant scale would yield further cost
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reduction of no more than 5%. Bain found that m.e.s. was generally a
small share of the industry (in the USi) and that the economies of
multi-plant operation were slight (a detailed discussion of the presumed
sources of and evidence for multi-plant economies will follow later in
this chapter).
Some observations on methodology would be appropriate. It was soon
realised that firm's accounting data, even where they provided
ostensibly relevant information, were misleading for comparative
purposes. Firms may deliberately under- or over-capitalise for a
variety of reasons- construction cost overshoots or other mistakes may
be hidden in this way, for example. In particular there are certain
sectors, like the electricity supply industry in the USA, where it is
advantageous to over-capitalise because pricing policy is based upon
rate of return on capital. Furthermore, because professional accounting
bodies do not generally impose strict comparability controls on cost
accounts, comparisons between companies, or even between plants of the
same company, or between costs of production at the same plant at
different times, are hazardous to say the least. The best one could do
is hope that there were no systematic biases related to plant scale or
firm size- yet it is not hard to think of reasons why there might be,
particularly in industries with only very few companies (see also
Huettner, 1974).
4.2 Estimating Scale Economies
The questionnaire or "engineering estimate" method, including interviews
and searches of published materials, is generally accepted as the most
reliable means for estimating cost curves for plants and for whole
companies. Given a reasonable number of independent estimates this can
be quite an effective method, although it too is subject to certain
problems. For policy-making the most critical situation requiring an
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estimate of m.e.s. is often the case where monopoly or near-monopoly
holds- and here there may be only one or two estimates. Moreover, there
is, as Gold (1981) remarks, a tendency to regard the present largest
size as optimal:
"••compare the minimal estimates of the prospecti ve gains
from scale and technological improvements in the US steel
industry •• and the long continued insistence of industry
spokesmen that it is technologically equal to the best, with
estimates of the superior performance levels already
achieved by the major Japanese steel mills (Gold, 1979)."
Whilst the method might be good for determining costs of plants within
the current size range, beyond that range it may be much less reliable.
Estimates may be strongly influenced by the conservatism or the optimism
of managerial expectations. The m.e.s. turns out to be equal to the
largest current plant with striking frequency. There is perhaps some
justification for this, as often particular technical problems have to
be sol ved before plant scale-up can be achieved. In a sense one can
only claim what has been actually tried out in practice as 'state of the
art' technology. Put this way, it is clear that untried possibilities
cannot be fairly accounted for. A critical theorist could reasonably
object that the method therefore amounts to no more than well-informed
guesswork, possibly biased by management's future intentions.
The most notable studies of this kind have been by Bain (above), by
Pratten's group at Cambridge (Pratten and Dean, 1965; Pratten, 1971;
summarised by Si 1bertson, 1972) who examined 25 UK industries, and by
Scherer et a1 (1975), who studied 12 selected industries in the US, UK,
France, W Germany, Italy and Sweden. These studies include analysis of
the relevant industry structure, and a careful discussion of the sources
of economies cited by interviewers and found in the literature, as well
as numerical cost estimates. These wide-ranging and thorough studies
constitute the best body of knowledge on the existence of economies of
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scale. They confirm that long-run cost curves are largely L-shaped, at
least at the plant level. Precise estimates of the degree of economies
available and the sensitivity of m.e.s. estimation to errors are
slightly less reliable (Gorecki, 1978). Comparing successive studies
suggests that m.e.s. increased rapidly in many industries during the
1960s; therefore it would be unwise to assume that either Pratten's or
Scherer's estimates are still applicable.
A large number of other studies, usually concentrating on one industry
in each case, have been carried out in the last twenty years using
essentially similar methods of data collection. These are reviewed
below under various headings of industry group and method of analysis.
Other wider ranging studies worthy of mention here are those of Huettner
(1974) on electricity generation, cement making and steel, and the
collection of estimates from UN sources by Teitel (1975). This paper
also contains an excellent summary of other published research.
Besides 'engineering estimates', there ha ve been two other strategies
employed for examining scale economies, both relying on data provided
from national industry censuses such as the US Census of Manufactures.
These data sources give various sorts of information about employment,
value of output, certain costs, and capitalisation (varying between
sources). This information is divided up according to the Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) at varying levels of aggregation, known as
the two-, three- or four-digit SIC codes. A study at the two-digit
level will typically divide the US economy into some twenty or thirty
sectors; at the four-digit level there may be three or four hundred
classes. Within each sector firms will be grouped according to
employment or output in size classes to preserve confidentiality,
although full firm or plant size data sometimes becomes available.
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4.3 The Survivor Test
One application of this data has been in the so-called 'Survivor
Technique', pioneered by Stigler (1958). (Saving (1961) credits J S Mill
with the idea, but I haven't found any evidence of this.) Stigler
argues that the determinants of the optimum size of plant or firm (he
considers both) are so complex that an analytical approach based on
questionnaires must be permanently handicapped, in particular because of
the subjective nature of the estimates obtained even when all relevant
factors have been considered. Stigler attempts to cut the Gordian knot
by arguing that, if one size of plant has cost advantages over another,
then if we compare observed industry size distributions over time we
will see a shift towards the 'optimum' size and away from sub-optimal
scale. Such time-series comparisons thus provide an 'objective'
evaluation of relative real costs in the actual environment with which
the firm is faced.
The technique enjoyed a brief vogue, and Stigler's work was followed up
by Saving (1961), Weiss (1964), and Shepherd (1967) in the US and by
Rees (1973) in the UK. However it has fallen out of favour as a number
of serious problems have been pOinted out. In practice researchers were
having to make judgements on optimality based upon shifts of fractions
of a per cent of output between size classes in some industries, so that
small trends could lead to freakish interpretations- size groups of
little significance being declared 'optimal' whilst groups accounting
for almost the whole of an industry's output were ignored. It was not
always clear what the best performance measure was- relative or absolute
changes in value-added, or value of shipments, or employment were all
considered, leading to conflicting concl us ions between studies. The
well-established tendency for larger plants to be more capital intensive
is a source of potential bias in the US studies, where the Census
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classifies size on the basis of employment.
Furthermore, misleading classifications lead to firms being incorrectly
compared when they are not in the same business. Bain (1969) lists a
range of factors which can account for the survival of small
establishments, which include location factors, government subsidiaries,
restricti ve practices, factor prices varying across the country, and
other.
Finally, even if all these methodological objections could be overcome,
there are flaws in principle. There is the familiar point, as put by
Shepherd (1967), that "survival may reflect higher revenues rather than
lower costs". More than this, the 'survivor technique' produces results
which are of small normative significance, for it is a serious error to
assume that evol ution 'optimises'. As Shepherd puts it, "What is, is
not necessarily what ought to be". Although Gold (1981) still expresses
an interest in the method, Shepherd (1967), (1979) and Bain (1968),
(1969) have cast severe doubt on 'survival-ability', and it must be
reported that the survivor technique has failed its own test.
4.4 Production Functions
The other main use of Census data has been the recurrent attempt to fit
them to Cobb-Douglas or other production functions. Production function
analysis has been the dominant means of tackling questions of increasing
returns and other econometric problems in the last forty years. The
production function has the advantage of relating input factor
quantities to output quantities without needing cost data. Under
certain fairly weak assumptions the existence and degree of economies of
scale can be inferred from an estimated pr,oduction function (Walters,
1960). The simplest and most widely-used formulation is due to Cobb and
Douglas (1922 - see also review by Walters, (1963», relating output (Q)
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to input factors, typically labour (L) and capital (K) by:
a1 a2
Q = k.K .L
where k is a constant related to the level of technology, and aI, a2 are
the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labour inputs
respectively. This is clearly a ruthless simplification; the most
serious shortcoming is perhaps the imposition of the condition of
homotheticity, i.e. that there are constant rates of change of returns
at all outputs. Received wisdom suggests that economies of scale in
fact decline after some scale of plant for any given state of
technology, and the Cobb-Douglas formula does not allow for the
exploration of this possibility.
In practice, this theoretical restriction has been matched by the same
kinds of problems with the census data as handicap the survivor
technique. Information on inputs is usually not in the form required,
and some highly ingenious estimation methods have had to be devised to
get the data into a usable state. More than this, however, there is the
problem, as pointed out by Moroney (1972), that:
"Individual manufacturing plants typically produce several
commodities, and in this circumstance the very notion of a
plant's homogenous physical output is a conceptual fantasy."
Further, a notable study of the US automobile industry which did take
account of different product mixes found that scale economies and
diseconomies varied substantially for different production
possibilities, yielding paradoxical results when the data were forced
into the more usual single-measure descriptions (Friedlander, Winston
and Wang 1983).
Finally, there is the prob lem of a,ggregation- plants producing
dissimilar products being lumped together even in the four-digit SIC
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classes, let alone the two-digit stratification more frequently
employed. Given that recent single-industry studies have repeatedly
shown the existence of different production functions for different
production processes within the same industry, and have even suggested,
contrary to the usual neoclassical assumptions, that these may vary
between firms (see Joskow and Rose, 1985), this degree of aggregation
presents serious problems.
Nevertheless, a number of exercises of this kind have been carried out,
by Murti and Sastri (1957), Yeh (1966) and Williams and Laumas (1984) on
Indian data at an approximately two-digit level of aggregation; by
Griliches and Ringstad (1971) for Norway; by Brown and Poplin (1962) on
historical American data (1890-1956) and by Shan (1965) for the local
Census of the Commonwealth (state) of Massachusetts; by Ferguson (1967),
Hildebrand and Liu (1965) and Moroney (1972) on the US census of
Manufactures at the two-digit level; and by Miller (1978a), (1978b) at
the four-digit level on the same source.
The problems with these studies are exemplified by Moroney's (1972)
comparison of his results with those of Ferguson (1967a) and Hildebrand
and Liu (1965). The exponents for the eighteen different classes
(examples: "chemicals", "Nonelectrical machinery", "Transportation
equipment") are compared. In only one case do the three studies agree
on the basic question of whether there actually are economies of scale,
never mind the degree of any such economies. Griliches and Ringstad
(1971) and Miller (1978a) are marginally more convincing with their more
detailed breakdown, finding economies of scale in most sectors.
The problems of aggregation and mis-specification remain, however, and
are blithely ignored by many r'esearchers.. Ferguson (1967a) finds some
'curiosa' in his results, and, although remarking that they could be
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explained by "assuming" the existence of two distinct technologies in
some of the sectors, one being more capital-intensi ve and possessing
greater economies of scale, he prefers to explain the aberrations in
terms of demand and supply considerations.
The two figures below illustrate the possible effects of differing
technologies on functional estimates. In Figure 4.4.1 (a) there are two
distinct production technologies, each exhibiting increasing returns,
yet showing decreasing returns when regression analysis is applied to
the aggregate data. Figure 4.4.1 (b) shows the reverse case.
Figure 4.4.1: Estimation errors through aggregation
o
o
(a) (b)
Finally, almost all of the above studies use the simple Cobb-Douglas
production function. Williams and Laumas (1984) set out to test some of
the assumptions behind the C-D by employing a more complex formulation,
the translog production function (see Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau
(1973) and applications: Lau and Tamura (1972) and Christensen and
Greene (1975». They found that "models based on a Cobb-Douglas
production technology are inappropriate for all industries in India".
By implication, they are probably inappropriate in many other cases.
It is difficult, therefore, to avoid the conclusion that these studies
have been of little value, due to the quality and level of aggregation
of the data, and because of mis-specification of the production function
itself.
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5. ENGINEERING STUDIES OF SCALE INCREASES
As remarked earlier, there has been a trend towards explanations of
economies of scale based upon notions of the 'economies of Large
Machines', as Robinson put it. Thus the most frequently-cited reference
on economies of scale in the last fifteen years has been Haldi and
Whitcomb's (1967) study of cost-scale relationships for various items of
process equipment, based on geometric/allometric rationalisations.
These have now taken the place of Adam Smith's pin factory as the ritual
explanation of increasing returns to scale, and for that reason are
worth an especially close examination.
5.1 Engineering Production Functions
The engineering approach was initiated by Hollis Chenery (1949) who
proposed "a method by which engineering data may sometimes be used to
approximate the production functions of economic theory in the
industrial field". The production function was originally used for
econometric analysis of national economies; Chenery used it to fit data
on individual plants supplied from engineering estimates. This analysis
led to the standard formulation of cost-output relations of the form:
A
y = KX
where y is the cost of plant, X its capacity, and K a constant. The
exponent A is often quoted as 0.6 or 0.7, justified by the observation
that this is the same as in the equation relating the surface area to
the volume of vaguely spherical tanks or containers or other items of
process plant. This exponent should strictly be 2/3, so the relation is
variously known as the "2/3 power law", the "0.6 rule" or the "six-
tenths power law".
The most widely-known studies in the economics literature are Bruni
(1963) and Raldi and Whitcomb (1967). They attempted to fit the power-
law to a wide range of items of process equipment, and found a wide
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range of exponents. In general, the median exponent for items of
equipment was around 0.6, and for whole plants around 0.7, although
little indication is given of confidence intervals.
A slightly earlier study by Moore (1959) had examined deductions of
similar relationships from a range of war-time and other less well-known
and unpublished sources on whole plant economies, and suggested, in view
of the lack of statistical significance of much of the material, that
"the results must be viewed with scepticism". This drew an interesting
and revealing response from two engineers working in chemical economics,
S Schuman and S Alpert (1960), who asserted that:
"The fact is that in every case of our experience in the
chemical and petroleum industries, large plants can be built
at a lower unit cost than smaller ones."
The gist of their argument was that it was difficult to prove a rigorous
mathematical relation between cost and output, but that they knew very
well that the power law could be applied as an approximation. They gave
a detailed cost breakdown of various items (pumps, valves, piping),
required for water-pumping plant over an 'output' range of a factor of
1,000,000. A previous study by Alpert (1959) on the costs of metal
milling machines was cited in support.
Moore, in a reply (1960) pointed out that the figures for the pumping
equipment showed varying returns to scale at different points in the
size range. He noted that there were:
"•• diseconomies of scale in two areas (pumps and val ves)
for the largest scales of plant. Also the coefficient for
total plant materials does not parallel closely any of the
five major process areas. This means, of course, that these
areas do not expand together in any regular way but rather
that unbalanced expansions take place".
It should also be added that the Alpert (1959) estimates for milling
equipment and lathes show a similar variation of rates of return at
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different scales. The impression is that, whilst the allometric
relationships are in some sense true, they are seriously simplified by
forcing them to fit a single (homothetic) cost equation.
5.2 The "0.6 Rule"
At the risk of labouring the point, reference to the engineering
literature quoted by economists as a justification bears out this
perception. Schweyer (1955) credits Williams (1947a), (1947b) with the
original use of the "six-tenths law". Wi 11iams and Chi 1ton (1949)
collected a wide range of estimates for items of chemical engineering
equipment such as pipes, drums, tanks, pumps, compressors, motors, and
so on, and for 36 different types of complete chemical plants (Chilton,
1950). Again a very wide range of exponents was found both for items of
equipment- 0.48 to 0.87 by Williams (1947a) and 0.33 to 1.02 by Chilton
(1950)- and for whole plants. In addition, some log-log plots of cost
vs performance began to curve up at the upper limits of size, showing
declining 'economies of scale'.
The fragility of these relationships is illustrated by three separate
estimates of the exponent for "tanks". Williams (1947a) finds the
expected 0.59 (near two-thirds), but Wi 11iams (1947b) gets 0.48.
Meanwhile Dickson (1947) finds an exponent of 0.70. A hasty
intervention by the Editor of 'Chemical Engineering' reveals more
complications without really explaining the differences in the
estimates:
".. tanks wi11 ordinari1y increase in she11 thickness with
increase in diameter. This is necessary to maintain a
constant unit stress in the shell material, since the unit
stress in a thin cylinder is proportional to both the
pressure and the diameter. Therefore the weight of the
ma teria 1 wi 11 increase more rapid 1y than the increase in
surface area and the cost might be expected to increase more
rapidly than the 2/3 power of the ratio of volumes. Against
this is the fact that the cost per pound of tank for
fabrication, handling and installation decreases markedly as
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the size increases "
Subsequent chemical engineering work confirms the impressions received
from these studies. The numerous estimates of Aries and Newton (1955)
show exponents rising at the top of the scale range, as do those of
Guthrie (1970), who draws 'cost curves' for plant on very few
observations for each type, producing exponents ranging from 0.38 to
0.83. Chase (1970) explains that non-linearities are quite frequent and
that the six-tenths law is for quick, preliminary estimates only.
Bauman (1964) repeats this warning, and cautions against extrapolation
to unfamiliar processes or plant capacities. Matley (1984) repeats that
cost lines will curve upwards at the limits.
Those economists who have looked for deviations from the simple cost-
capacity equation seem to have found them- e.g. Walley and Robinson
(1972), and Norman (1979), who found that the "0.6 rule" could only be
used as a "local approximation" to the degrees of economies of scale in
cement production. The message that the six-tenths power law, whilst
representing a fundamental physical relationship, nevertheless hides
considerably more than it explains, has unfortunately not penetrated to
everyone yet- another recent study in a process industry tested for this
relationship and commented that "the estimated coefficient (is) not
significantly different from 0.6667" (McBride 1981). One wonders if the
fact that 2/3 has no decimal expansion gave the author methodological
problems.
6. DETAILED STUDIES AND NEW INSIGHTS
The introduction of engineering-based studies into the pursuit of scale
economies, although leading to over-literal acceptance of what are only
'quick and dirty rules of thumb', has nevertheless led to a deepening of
insight in many respects. In particular, it has led to a re-appraisal
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of what I will argue is an intimate link between scale change and
technological progress. The addition of empirical studies of the
technical sources of economies of scale and theories of technological
progress have enriched current thinking on increasing returns, although
this "neo-Marsha11ian" strand has not yet been woven into the fabric of
modern economic orthodoxy.
6.1 Technical Change and Scale Change
To return to engineering production functions for a moment. Chenery's
(1949) pioneering efforts attracted considerable attention among
economists for a while, but this died down quickly because, as Pearl and
Enos (1975) put it, "all but the simplest processes defied such
exhausti ve descriptions" Le. the decomposition of all elements in terms
of a single performance equation. However, this formulation did provide
a means of measuring technological progress and evaluating its direction
and results, as Pearl and Enos demonstrate. Chenery himself provided
useful insights into technological change in pipeline transportation,
showing how increases in working stresses and experience with large
diameters, coupled with a basic scientific discovery of a change in
expected gas behaviour at very high pressures, altered his production
equation.
'~e effect on the production function of these two changes
together, is to shift the equilibrium solution from the
minimum thickness with large diameter (i.e. low pressure) to
very high pressures (and smaller diameters) for rates less
than 200 million feet per day."
Pearl and Enos (1975) applied the same method to similar pipeline
technology, considering the effects of improved labour organisation in
laying pipes, better pumping control techniques, and improvements in
pipe quality and maximum diameter through the invention of spiral
welding techniques. They concluded that:
"On the output side, technological progress has been seen to
58
reduce costs (measured in constant prices) at existing rates
of output, and to expand the range over which economies of
scale can be achieved; on the input side to economise on all
factors of production, and to reduce the possibilities of
factor substitution",
and that "technological progress has economised on resources, not
exploited shifts in their relative prices".
These observational studies emphasise the importance of experience and
cumulative introduction of innovations. They are distinctly heterodox,
at least by implication; take for example Chenery's statement that:
"In a sense technological change is involved whenever a new
motor is designed, even though no new engineering principles
are involved, merely because the outcome is uncertain."
- the last four words contradict the neoclassical assumption of perfect
knowledge and hence of "optimisation" ("Clark's neoclassical fairy
tale"; Ferguson (1967b». The idea of scale-augmenting technical change
is likewise outside the bounds, and reduction of factor substitution
possibilities is a blow to the Cobb-Douglas production formulation which
theoretically allows labour-capital substitutions in either direction.
Work reviewed in the preceding section is also entirely consistent with
the concept of technology changing with scale; recall particularly
Moore's comments on the example of water-pumping equipment supplied by
Schuman and Alpert (1960). Later studies fill in the picture
considerably. Walley and Robinson (1972) point out that "different
limitations will occur at different capacities". The effects of
technological limits in process plants are considered by Ball and
Pearson (1976). Limits take a number of forms, including resistance to
pressure and temperature, and requirements for structural changes or
expensi ve on-site fabrication beyond certain thresholds of physical
size.
Changing limits are also associated with changing processes at different
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scales, e.g. Huettner (1974) on electricity generation equipment:
"Small plants and large plants frequently utilise different
parts of the technological spectrum of an ostensibly common
process. For exampl e, the largest steam-power plants
operate at higher pressures and temperatures and hence make
more use of high-temperature metallurgy."
Dover and Watson (1982) examine the interaction of constraints and
process changes in the scale-up of cement manufacturing plant, and
Cantley (1979) in Ethylene plants. Buzacott (1980) discusses scale and
process choice in the steel industry, as does Stewart (1985) in the
cement industry. Hughes (1971) shows how the development of electric
power has involved innovations which successfully surmounted
'insuperable' barriers with surprising regularity.
Particularly interesting is the work of Richard Levin (1974), (1978),
who has built on a number of the engineering studies to produce a theory
of 'scale-augmenting technical change'. He argues (following Pearl and
Enos) that changes in factor prices cannot explain the massive increases
in plant scale in many process industries (e.g. steel, cement).
Starting from the proposition that:
".. from an engineering standpoint, 'how to build it bigger'
is recurrently seen as a potentially fruitful area for
innovati ve acti vity"
he proposes a theory of change aimed at overcoming bottlenecks in the
production process and shifting to new processes when "insignificance
effects" imply little potential for further cost reduction. Levin's
case is documented by evidence from process changes in the manufacture
of sulphuric acid, ethylene and ammonia. Greenberg, Hill and Newburger
(1979) have proposed a more detailed model of process change and applied
it to the ammonia production industry. One of the most interesting
predictions of such models is that (Levin, 1978):
"At any moment, the character of an industry's technology
plays an important role in determining the rate and
direction of future advance. The technology itself
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generates concrete, identifiable problems upon which
engineers and applied scientists focus their innovative
efforts."
Levin particularly points to the possibilities of exploiting latent
economies of scale, improved process yield and reduction of maintenance
requirements as recurring technological problems. There are striking
parallels with the work of Nathan Rosenberg, whose study of technical
change in machine-tools and military and civil engineering (1974) finds
that:
" science and technology progress, in some measure, along
lines determined either by internal logic, degree of
complexity or at least in response to forces independent of
economic need ..•"
As Blair (1948) and Jewkes (1952) point out, it is not obvious a priori
that technological change must lead to increases in scale. The
development of electric power, precision tools, automatic control
equipment, lightweight materials and alloys, new welding techniques and
improved communications could all be argued to give opportunities for
reductions in scale. A full explanation would presumably need to
encompass "behavioural" influences; for example Gold's (1974) study of
scale economies in the Japanese steel industry suggests that increases
in blast furnace sizes "were not based on proposals buttressed with
persuasive technical analyses", but had more to do with less tangible
and less quantifiable managerial goals. Similarly, Ghemawat's (1984)
study of capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry
incorporates the view that:
" focusing on the static determination of prices in
homogenous industries is inadequate in explaining many
competitive interactions. More fruitful is a combination of
industrial organisation and the industry history approach
taken at business schools."
These questions, particularly with regard to the evidence as to the
causes of large firm size, are examined further in the next section.
61
David Huettner's (1974) study of economies of scale in electricity
generation, cement manufacture and steel-making suggests that
incremental and evolutionary technical change has benefited large plants
more than small. Hollander (1965) has studied incremental process
changes in Du Pont Rayon plants, and Derkx, Kammerman and Rijst (1978)
in steel plants. Buzacott and Tsuji (1980) show apparent 'law-like'
characteristics of growth of process plant. This is a controversial
area; Bela Gold (1981) is sceptical of such ideas arguing that, contrary
to their designation as 'learning effects', they in fact:
".• represent the effects not of cumulati ve repetition of
past practices, but of changes in: product designs;
product-mix; operating technology; management planning and
controls; materials quality; and labour capabilities and
incentives",
and that the concept means nothing more than "the summation of all
improvements regardless of causes". There must be some truth in this,
and surveys by Cantley and Sahal (1979) and Dutton and Thomas (1984)
show that all of the causes mentioned by Gold do play their part in
'learning' effects. (Changes in operating scale also seem to be
relevant to cumulative productivity improvements.)
6.2 Industry Studies
The kinds of engineering and technological considerations discussed
above carryover into many of the studies of economies of scale that
have been performed over the last twenty years, particularly in regard
to the question of the relationship between scale change and technology
change. Occasionally engineering concepts are used in surprising
contexts: Thomas (1969) documents studies of cost estimates for
computers that employ a 'six-tenths rule' type analysis of cost-
computing power relationships.
Production function analysis has been employed, quite respectably in
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terms of economic theory, in the analysis of public service economies of
scale. Cowing and HoI tmann (1982) provide a survey of cost function
studies for the provision of hospital services, mostly drawn from the
USA. Martin Knapp has studied UK public services provided by local
government- Knapp (1978) (sewage disposa 1), Knapp (1982) (crematoria).
See references therein for similar work in the USA. Watt (1980) has
looked for economies of scale in schools, and again provides references
to earlier studies.
Studies of economies of scale in transportation equipment have been
performed- see Jansson and Shneerson (1978) and Garrod and Miklius
(1985) for general cargo ships, and Keith-Lucas (1969), Nicol (1978) and
Dathe (1982) for air transportation. Such studies are inevitably
complicated by questions as to the appropriate level of analysis. For
example, a large supertanker may cost much less per ton of cargo
capacity and expend significantly less fuel- but on the other hand it
wi 11 require much larger, more compl ex and more expensi ve port
facilities. The same problems apply to the provision of airport
facilities for large aircraft. These kinds of 'system effects' apply
with great force in the electricity generation industry- see below.
Economies of scale have been examined in publishing, both for newspaper
(Rosse, 1967) and journals (Baumol and Braunstein, 1977). In each case
substantial economies were found.
Naturally enough, however, it is on manufacturing industry that most
researchers concentrate. The studies of Pratten, Scherer and their
colleagues have already been mentioned. Within manufacturing industry,
Maxcy and Silbertson (1959) made an early study of economies of scale in
car manufacture in the UK. More recently, Owen (1983) has done an
excellent study of the European car, truck and white goods industry.
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This study is worthy of attention for a number of reasons. Firstly,
confirmation is found for the view of cumulati ve technological
improvements, appropriable by the indi v idual firm. Secondly, as one
might expect, m.e.s. of plant is found to have risen since the Maxcy and
Silbertson study. Thirdly, Owen lends considerable credibility to the
concept of 'learning' as a 'dynamic scale economy'; in the case of cars,
for example:
'~otal company volume emerges as the most useful dimension
of scale in this industry, best able to elucidate scale
economies, to explain unit cost movements over time, and to
explain recent international patterns of costs~
Friedlander, Winston and Wang (1983) find that total firm size is the
best measure of potential scale economies in the US car industry.
6.3 Process Industry Scale Economies
It is on the very large scale process industries, such as steel, cement,
chemicals and electricity generation, that the greatest attention has
fallen, not surprisingly in view of the absolute magnitudes of costs and
relative advantages of scale posited, as well as the potential costs of
drastic errors. One suspects that the interest in ethylene plants, for
example- Woodhouse, Samols and Newman (1974), Cantley (1979), Betts
(1982)- has been in part due to the serious overcapacity problems in
that sector since the 1974 oil price shock.
A number of studies in the chemical industry have been mentioned. Lau
and Tamura's (1972) study of Japanese petrochemicals plants is notable
for its application of a production function technique which does not
assume homotheticity (constant rates of return to scale at all sizes of
plant). This study found strong scale economies to capital and, in
common with similar studies of automated ,process plants, extremely high
economies with respect to labour inputs. Materials and energy costs did
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not alter significantly with scale. Ghemawat (1984) found "learning"
effects in cost reductions over time in operating titanium dioxide
plants- relatively common in the chemical industry, a reminder that such
plants are not simply bought "off the shelf" like food mixers and
switched on- they have to be coaxed into performing. Reference to the
studies cited above (e.g. Cantley, 1979) will readily show that a
chemical plant is an exceedingly complex piece of equipment, with
hundreds or even thousands of pumps, furnaces, coolers, disti llers,
control systems, recycling circuits, etc. Whilst modern computer
control systems help considerably. The coordination of all the
operations and sub-processes is exceedingly complex and the optimum
operating configuration takes time to reach. In this sense, the
seemingly archaic arguments about di vision of labour- and J S Mill's
comments on "cooperation" of functions- are still applicable.
Norman's (1979) study of economies of scale in the cement industry
compares successive m.e.s. estimates (by Bain, Pratten, Scherer) and
finds a rapid increase in the period 1963-1972. As well as making his
own estimates, Norman points out the strong location effects in this
industry, due to the high weight/ val ue ratio of both product and raw
materials. McBride's (1981) study bears out the Levin thesis on scale-
augmenting technical change, pointing out that basic cement kiln
technology has not changed since 1925 and arguing that kiln sizes have
been able to increase drastically, due to improvements in rotation and
heat-maintaining techniques. Limited statistical support is
demonstrated for change in scale effects over time.
There are dissenting views, however, e.g. Sigurdson (1979) and Spence
(1980) argue that cement of an 'acceptable' quality could be
economically produced at very much smaller scales than the supposed
m.e.s. This would be achieved by re-adoption of an old process
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(vertical kilns replacing horizontal kilns).
Another process industry, brewing, has been studied in the UK by
Cockerill (1971), who also collected a wide range of published material
on the steel industry (1974).
The recent work of Bela Gold and colleagues at the Case Western Reserve
Uni versity has been motivated by a perceived need for "more systematic
and deeper analysis of the interactions of technological, economic, and
managerial factors," concentrating particularly on the steel industry-
Gold (1974), Boylan (1975), Gold, Rosegger and Boylan (1980). They have
drawn attention to the influence of managerial objectives and
expectations and Gold (1979) has proposed evaluative methods based on
concepts of 'factor dominance' and the analysis of the so-called
"network of productivity relationships".
6.4 Electricity Generation
By far the greatest number of studies of scale economies have been
carried out in the field of electricity generation. A major reason for
the abundance is the requirement in the USA for all electric utilities
to provide detailed plant-level information, which is published by the
Federal Power Commission. This yields a source of microdata of
unequalled quality, allowing detailed comparisons between hundreds of
plants over long time spans. These studies have been a testing ground
for the advance of the general modelling of production technologies,
according to Cowing and Smith (1978) who provide a detailed review of 21
econometric studies in the period 1947 to 1978. In parallel with this
mainly economics-based research there have been at least as many studies
by engineers working in the industry, with little apparent cross-
reference to the findings or the methodology of the economists- e.g.
Kirchmayer (1955) is a well-known engineering study, seldom considered
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in the economics literature. On top of these are contributions from
outside groups.
I will not review the whole of this literature here. (See James and
Tayler (forthcoming) for a more complete survey.) The progress of
econometric studies in the electricity supply industry can be traced in
the surveys by Galatin (1968), Huettner (1974) and Cowing and Smith
(1978). A wide variety of methodologies and assumptions have been used,
which in part account for the consistent disagreements that still exist
about the nature and level of scale economies. As Huettner and Landon
(1978) put it:
"In a real sense, a researcher studying scale issues is
frequently forced to choose which type of specification
error he prefers."
As a ruthless simplification it can be asserted that most studies in the
1950s showed the availability of increasing returns in generation, but
that later studies tend to imply that these returns decline rapidly for
many large plants. The fact that Ling (1964) and Galatin (1968) found
increasing returns to scale at all sizes, for example, may reflect the
fact that few very large units were included in their samples.
Discussions of the development of the fossil fuel technologies and the
difficul ties and barriers to scale-up of generating technology (Gray
1969; Tombs 1978) tend to gi ve indirect support to this view. A range
of studies suggest that scale economies may become exhausted at unit
ratings of between 300 MW and 450 MW- see Huettner (1973), Abdulkarim
and Lucas (1977) and Fisher (1982). Despite this, units have in fact
been constructed two and three times this size.
Generally, though not always, the effects of technological change have
been found to be important. Galatin (1968) found that "an important
feature of technological change has been the introduction of larger
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machines", whilst Cowing and Smith's (1978) survey finds that "the
evidence also suggests that technical change and ex ante scale effects
are interrelated". A recent study by Joskow and Rose (1985) finds
different scale/cost curves for different technologies, and documents
the fact that very large units are no longer being constructed. The
authors attribute this to poor operating reliability of very large units
and to the reductions in the rate of demand increase. The scale-
reliability relationship is also confirmed by Fisher (1982); the
implications for generation expansion policies are examined by Burness,
Cummings and Loose (1985).
The Joskow and Rose paper also confirms the existence of capital cost-
reduction due to experience effects for both operating utilities and
architect/engineers. Kennedy and Allen (1979) give a case-study
analysis of such effects, which form an important part of J C Fisher's
analysis (1982). Fisher believes that:
''The replication of a series of identical generating units
opens up an entirely new and profoundly different avenue for
reducing the capital cost of generating capacity. The
economy of scale assumes a new form, and manifests itself as
the reduction of cost that can be achieved through the scale
of operations in replicating large numbers of identical
units."
(A very similar argument has been advanced by Western (1979) for paper
mills; he argues that large numbers of a standardised small paper
machine would bring capital costs of production below those of the
'world-scale' giant machines which have been built.)
More than with almost any other industry, in public utilities the total
system or firm size is of greater significance than the plant size. The
need to support large reserve capacity in order to maintain supplies in
the face of fluctuating demand and occasional unit failure, the
economics of electricity transmission, and the hazards in predicting and
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meeting future increases in demand (which utilities are generally
obliged by law to do), make the evaluation of optimum firm size even
more difficult than usual. Again opinions vary, with some significant
recent studies placing optimum firm size (based on conventional cost or
production function analysis) quite low compared with the largest in
existence in the USA - e.g. Christensen and Greene (1975) and Huettner
and Landon (1978).
The dynamic effects of generation expansion problems on scale choice are
an interesting finding of some research on the economics of electricity
generation. Tsuji (1980) reviews the literature on expansion models
under uncertainty. A simulation approach has been used by some
researchers, e.g. at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (see Ford
(1980), Ford and Yabroff (1980), Ford and Youngblood (1982)). The
simulation models take account of the fact that larger units tend to
have larger planning and construction lead times, thereby incurring
greater relative financing costs, and making them more vulnerable to
errors in demand estimation. These considerations tend to increase the
advantages of generating systems based on small units even where those
small units suffer relative cost disadvantages in static comparisons.
See also Behrens (1985).
Least 'mainstream' of all (from the economics point of view) is Amory
Lovins (1976, 1977, Lovins and Lovins 1982). No doubt some would object
to the mere inc 1usion of a consul tant for 'Friends of the Earth' being
included in a survey with pretensions to serious analysis. Yet this
attitude is mistaken; as Gerhard Rosegger (1980), (a "respectable"
industrial economist) says:
"If the empirical evidence on scale effects in large
economic units were reasonably clear-cut, there would be
little room for controversy. As it is, however, we have no
standard by which to provide unequivocal evaluations;
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besides we are dealing with an issue that transcends purely
economic criteria and spills over into the political and
social scene."
Lovins' work is not strictly an empirical study of economies of scale in
the way that most economists would understand the term, for indeed it
insists that the political and social questions are an integral part of
the 'problem of scale'. It is also notable for emphasising completely
different technological problems, arguing for example that power for
heating is very inefficiently supplied by using very high temperatures
to produce extremely 'high grade' energy in the form of electricity to
be returned to 'low grade' heat of tens of degrees. This polarisation
between First and Second Law (of thermodynamics) efficiency is an
example of what could reasonably be called a different "paradigm"; for
Lovins the technology poses and generates a completely different set of
puzzles and questions, and shifts development to a completely different
path.
7. FIRM SCALE ECONOMIES
There is now a considerable body of evidence for the existence of
technical economies of scale at the plant level. The weight of the
evidence indicates that, within the size ranges of plants considered,
the cost curves are generally L-shaped. If the U-shaped cost curve is
to be rescued, then it will be through the demonstration of diseconomies
of scale with respect to management.
It is a commonplace that the general scale of production and
organisation at all levels of society has been subject to dramatic
increase (Eilon, 1979). This has provoked strong criticisms from some
quarters- e.g. Schumacher (1973), Sale (1980), Julien and Lafrance
(1983). Growth in the scale of techn9logy is often blamed (Jones,
1981). Yet, as far as firm sizes are concerned, this cannot be the
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whole story. Prais (1976) points out that, in Britain:
".. the hundred largest plants accounted for 11 per cent of
manufacturing net output in 1930 and exactly that same
proportion in 1968; during that same period ... the share of
the hundred largest manufacturing enterprises rose from 23
to just over 40 per cent".
He suggests that this implies that technological factors do not account
for the relative increase in firm sizes. Further evidence that plant
sizes have maintained a constant relationship to industry size is
provided by Simmonds (1969a), (1969b) for various kinds of chemical
plants, and by Martino and Conver (1972) and Sahal (1981) for
electricity generation. Bain (1956) and Scherer et al (1975) found some
statistical links between market size and plant scale. Thus at the
plant level there seems to be a case to support Smith's theorem that
"the size of the market limits the division of labour". However, the
growth in firm sizes implies the influence of other forces.
The study of industry structure is vast, as early studies such as those
of Sargant Florence (1948), (1962) have given way to increasingly
sophisticated conceptualisations. The effects of economies of scale on
structure are still matters for debate rather than accepted
relationships; for example Davies (1980) expresses doubts concerning:
".. the interpretation of past empirical work apparently
showing a strong relation between minimum efficient scale
and concentration ...this result may be misleading given
the potential problems of identification and measurement
errors associated with the statistical proxies often
employed to measure minimum efficient scale."
This being the case, what is the evidence for economies of scale for
firms- i.e. for mul tip lant as opposed to sing Le plant operation? And
what effect does the scale of management have?
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7.1 MultiplantEconomies
The major empirical study of multiplant operation, Scherer et al (1975),
found "an extraordinarily complex amalgam of technological
opportunities, institutional constraints, and behavioural adaptations".
If attention is directed solely at the division of labour between
plants, the evidence of substantial economies is sparse (Beckenstein
(1975) only finds savings of 2-3 per cent). Wahlroos (1981) suggests
risk spreading as an explanation of multiple operations, and Teece
(1982) analyses further possibilities. Multiplicity of production
equipment has not been shown to be a significant productive advantage by
itself, however. There are even examples where different companies
share the same plant - Vitorovich (1983) discusses the growth of joint
ventures in producing important car components such as engine blocks.
Scherer et al attempted, through their interviews in a range of
industries, to assess the importance of claimed advantages of size of
firms, and in particular they addressed the sources of economies
suggested by Robinson (1931). (See Section 3 above.) Very few were
found to be of any practical importance in the majority of industries;
for example the advantages of large-scale advertising were felt to be
very slight, except in brewing and possibly cigarette manufacture. The
advantages of larger size for materials procurement was assessed as
slight or non-existent in every case. The possibility of product
specialisation was found to be of moderate importance in the bearings
and refrigerator manufacturing industries, but, as the previously cited
work by Beckenstein suggests, even this effect was not important in
general.
7.2 Scale in Distribution
Studies of economies of scale in distribution have largely focused on
road transportation, and have been generally inconclusive. Smykay
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(1958) surveys studies on the US motor carrier industry, and concludes
that:
"Too much has been made of the cost of production side of
this problem. The assumption that shippers are purely cost-
oriented must be properly investigated as to its validity
..• it is too early to present dogmatic solutions to the
problem of public policy for this segment of the transport
industry."
An early study by Cadbury (1935) in the UK found no economies of scale
for large carriers and, in some cases, advantages of small over limited
mileages. Ko1sen (1956) found no advantages for large firms in
Australia, and Roberts (1956) reached a similar conclusion for the USA.
Chisolm (1959) found that economies of scale were of minor importance,
and that there were some diseconomies, in milk collection in England and
Wales (see also Walters (1961) and Chisolm's 'reply').
7.3 Scale of Management
'Management' is popularly associated with bureaucracy when it grows
1arge- witness 'Parkinson's Law' and the 'Peter Principle'. Scherer
found that large scale of management, even given the supposed advantages
of central specialised staff economies, was as often felt to be a
handicap as an asset. Robinson certainly thought this might be so;
Bannock (1971) and Blair (1972) almost take it for granted that large
scale leads to definite diseconomies in the efficiency of management.
Beckmann (1960) constructs a theoretical argument to the contrary.
However, as Cap10w (1957)points out:
'There is an almost universal belief that the administrative
and overhead components of any organisation increase out of
proportion to increases in its size. There are remarkably
few studies bearing directly on this point, however."
This sounds a little bit familiar. We are moving on to ground occupied
more by organisational behaviourists than by economists, and there is a
sizeable literature in that field, which has been surveyed by Keith Dale
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(1982). Some research in the management science area is suggesti ve of
difficulties with increased scale; for examples, Stachowicz et al (1982)
in coal mining, Smyth (1982) in postal sorting offices, and Stringer
(1982a), (1982b) in the control of large engineering construction
projects. These, however, deal with qualitative problems without giving
any comparable quantifications of the effect on the whole enterprise.
Shorey (1975) and Gill and Warner (1979) demonstrate that industrial
conflict, as measured by strike incidence, tends to increase with plant
size. Shorey found a slight negative correlation with firm size, which
was attributed to better personnel management- the effect here is not
c1earcut, because the largest firms also tend to have the largest
plants. Marginson (1984) found that disputes and strikes were
positively correlated to both firm and plant size in a large sample of
UK manufacturing concerns. Cason (1978) in a review of literature on
organisation size for managers suggests that smaller plants enjoy better
industrial relations generally.
McNulty (1956) found a linear relationship between administrative costs
and value of plant in the US electric power industry (1949-1953); this
implies constant returns to scale on the assumption that management was
as efficient at large scale as at sma11- which really begs the whole
question again.
7.4 Scale in Financial Administration
Perhaps the best-quality measures of the size-efficiency relationship is
provided by a series of studies of economies of scale in financial
institutions, whose "management" is the nearest equivalent to
"production equipment", although of course the introduction of new
technology may be expected to have a significant effect. These studies
encounter some methodological prob1ems- for example, when money is the
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business's 'fixed capital' and measure of costs, can a money measure of
output also be used? Benston (1972)concludes that production functions
(rather than cost functions) are the appropriate means, with 'output'
measured by numbers of accounts opened or loans made (rather than their
monetary value).
This problem has led to some wrang1es- e.g. Coates and Updegraff
(1973), Murphy (1976). Longbrake and Has1em (1975) note the diversity
of methodologies, which they believe accounts in part for the fact that
no clear consensus has emerged concerning the existence of economies of
scale in financial institutions.
Benston (1972) reviews earlier studies in the specialised banking
literature and finds significant economies of scale which he attributes
to use of lower-skilled labour, fewer processing and administrative
staff, and shifts in technology. He claims that the evidence is as good
as in public utilities. (Public utilities still have the best range of
empirical studies; however, as we have seen, it does not give an
unambiguous verdict). Taylor (1972) finds evidence for economies of
scale in large credit unions, based on cost-function analysis. Koot
(1977) says that production function analysis is methodologically
superior, and uses it to show that there are no economies with scale in
credit unions. Wolken and Navratil (1980) claim that Koot's equations
were wrongly specified, and recalculate, apparently showing small
economies of scale.
Houston and Simon (1970) find economies in life insurance costs. Bell
and Murphy (1968) and Murphy (1969) examine division of labour in
banking. Murphy fits a Cobb-Douglas function to demonstrate economies
of scale in bank trust departments. However Mullineaux (1978). whilst
finding economies of scale, casts doubt on the appropriateness of the
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Cobb-Douglas - as we might expect from research in other areas. Gough
(1979) finds no economies of scale in Building Societies; this was
challenged by Barnes and Dodds (1981), but Gough (1981) maintained his
position, and said that mergers could only be explained by managerial
theories of the firm, and not by efficiency arguments.
This is far from satisfactory, obviously; perhaps methodology is to
blame, possibly the wrong questions are being asked. Sutherland (1980a)
has an interesting hypothesis. He argues from some of these studies
that functional differentiation is responsible for reducing the extent
of economies of scale in organisations. For example, the Taylor (1972)
study of credit unions focused on size alone, whereas Koot (1977) looked
at 'activity variables', which, Sutherland argues, are proxies for
organisational complexity, and that is why the latter found decreasing
returns to scale. Sutherland develops his argument quite plausibly,
presenting evidence that electricity utilities with technological
di versi ty tend to have higher costs. He quotes work by Eslick (1970)
showing that the profitability of the top 500 US firms in 1959-61
declined as product diversity increased. See also Starr (1975),
Sutherland (1980b).
7.5 Innovation and Scale
There are two other frequently cited sources of economies from overall
size. The first of these is 'learning by doing'. Wilson (1975) and
Duchatelet (1982) show that the existence of the possibility of gaining
information allowing improvements in the production process through
increases in 'experience' justify an increased scale of operations even
where there are no static economies of scale. The controversy over the
sources of efficiency gains has already been alluded to. Some recent
examples of the effect in practice will be found in Dept of Prices and
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Consumer Protection (1978), Owen (1983) and Ghemawat (1985).
Secondly, there is what Scherer (1975) describes as "an ample if
acrimonious literature" on the question of whether small or large size
is most favourable for innovation. Scherer (1980) and Sahal (1983)
survey this field, which, like the organisation-size debate, is too
large to be covered here. The Schumpeter-Galbraith school of thought
holds that innovations are produced by large capitalist organisations,
but subsequent empirical studies have not entirely supported this claim.
Bannock (1971) asserts that:
"Many inventions right up to the present day continue to be
made under exactly the eccentric, romantic conditions on
which so much scorn has been poured by the Schumpeterian
school".
The problem of measurement is again inextricably tied up with this
debate, for how can one unambiguously determine what constitutes "an
innovation"? Numbers of patents are sometimes used as a proxy- but some
researchers have suggested that small companies patent more of their R
and D output, and that in any case some of the most commercially
significant innovations are never patented, in order to protect trade
secrets. Two recent empirical studies appear to go against the current
fashion by finding that 'inventive activity' increases with size (Soete,
1979; Link, 1980). However, c loser examination shows that' in venti ve
activity' is measured by expenditure on Rand D. The implied
assumption of equivalence between the two simply prejudges the answer
before the question is tested. Lunn (1982) and Kaplinsky (1983) urge
caution; Lunn says that:
"It is inappropriate to infer a specific relationship
between firm size and innovative output from observations on
the relationship between firm size and innovati ve inputs
until more is known about the production of innovation."
It is again possible that the wrong questions are being asked of the
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data. As Phillips (1971) suggests, the existence of large firms in
concentrated industries may be caused by their previous successful
innovations, which they were able to prevent competitors from
successfully reproducing. It seems that here, as with the management-
size question, an open verdict is the only fair answer to the question,
given the framework within which it is usually put.
7.6 Size and Profitability
One might argue, pace the 'Survi vor Technique', that since firm sizes
have grown relative to plant sizes, there must be some extra economies
they are tapping. This is certainly possible, but it does not seem
particularly likely on the evidence. Studies of the relationship
between size and profitability of companies have not supported the
existence of benefits of size, despite the possibilities of monopoly or
nearly-monopoly control for large firms. For example Whittington (1980)
finds that, if anything, the profitability of UK firms in the period
1960-74 declined with size, although this was compensated by greater
stability of earnings (possibly due to diversification). Amato and
Wilder (1985) find no link at all between profitability and size in US
manufacturing. (We should not forget, however, the fact that early
studies of plant level economies were marred by the aggregation problem;
it is possible that the same consideration applies in this case, or in
others mentioned in this section.) Poensgen and Marx (1985) analysed
data on 1487 West German manufacturing corporations for the period 1961-
75 and found a weak size/rate of return relationship. Their conclusion
was that:
n••• it is not size as such that determines whether a firm
is profitable or not, but the way it adjusts to size, copes
with it and uses the specific opportunities it offers."
It seems that explanations of the grow t h of firms will have to take
account of much more than just 'economies of scale'. It should be
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remembered that the typical business organisation of today is not merely
a scaled-up and more sophisticated version of that of Adam Smith's time.
Very simplistically, one may typify nineteenth century business history
as the story of single plant 'firms' moving from owner-management to
hired management, and of the beginnings of multiplant operation.
Improvements in communications and the growing importance of joint-stock
companies ha ve been significant infl uences.
turn of the century consolidated the trends.
Merger waves around the
However, by the middle of
the twentieth century companies were tending to diversify much more into
industries well away from their initial areas of expertise. Merger has
been a very significant source of increases in firm size, and it is not
at all clear that 'efficiency' per se has been the only or even the most
important motivation.
Newbould's (1970) study of the British merger wave of 1967-8 concluded
that financial factors were not important in the minds of senior
management, but rather "desires to move towards increased control of the
market" and "to achieve a reduction in uncertainty". The importance of
behavioural factors is underlined by Amihud and Lev's (1981) finding
that manager-controlled, as opposed to owner-controlled, firms were more
di versified and engaged in more conglomerate acquisitions (a l,though
perhaps more than one conclusion could be drawn from that). Prais
(1976) suggests that the massive shift to institutional share ownership
in the UK has been a significant factor due to preferential support for
well-known large companies. Whatever the exact truth, it seems clear
that many factors quite separate from purely economic calculations have
played an important part in the growth of large modern companies, and it
would be unsafe to conclude that they are big because they are
economically superior.
79
That economic cost optimisation need not be the driving force behind the
growth of firms is well illustrated by the case of the brewing industry
in the UK. Cockeri 11 (1976) describes the successi ve merger wa ves in
that industry and shows that a major force was the desire of the brewers
to protect themsel ves from 'outside' predators, whilst economic
arguments about improved efficiency and rationalisation to achieve
economies of scale were on the whole only used afterwards. The Price
Commission subsequently found that:
"•..large brewers have derived no apparent advantage from
larger-scale, more concentrated operations. Their costs and
prices are higher and their percentage margins lower than
those of regional and small brewers ... In other words, the
investment of these substantial sums has not improved the
position of either consumer or large brewer."
Price Commission (1977)
8. CONCLUSIONS
The orthodox economic framework for considering economies of scale
insists on the restriction of constant factor proportions and no changes
in technology. This came about because of the constraints imposed by
neoclassical equilibrium theory and not because of the demands imposed
by reality. Indeed, it has been shown that one of the most frequently-
cited sources of scale economies, the '0.6 rule', directly contradicts
the fixed factor condition by asserting the possibility of
proportionately reducing one factor input (capital) with increased
scale. The technological change restriction is equally inapplicable in
practice, and has been discarded by almost all empirical researchers
into scale economies. The neoclassical account is thus seen to be an
artificial abstraction of no practical value either for econometric
study or for prescriptive decision-making. The implications for
equilibrium theory of the demonstrated artificiality may be far-
reaching.
Similarly, the widely-maintained assumption of U-shaped long run cost
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curves is refuted, at least at the plant level. The concept of the
'optimum' size of plant is not always upheld, as examples have been
given where the cost curve is 'scalloped', having more than one minimum
point. Moreover, the determination of the optimum size rests on the
assumption that cost-minimisation is the goal of the firm. As Walley
and Robinson (1972) point out,
"•• as a means of optimising an in vestment decision it is
completely wrong .•• A study of plant capacity should aim
not at minimising costs, but at maximising profit or the
utilisation of resources such as capital and labour".
The close link between scale changes and technological changes has been
highlighted by many empirical studies. No good study of economies of
scale in industry would now neglect to take account of differences in
process technology. Moreover, many studies explicitly assume vintage
effects, i.e. improvements in capability between different generations
of plant. The interdependence of the scale and technology factors is
summarised by Pratten's (1971) conclusion that:
"It is often very difficult to distinguish accurately, the
part of increases in productivity for new vintages of plant
which are attributable to increases in scale and those which
are attributable to other causes, partly because technical
progress often takes the form of eliminating the obstacles
to building larger plants."
In industries which have been studied over several decades there tends
to be evidence of large increases in the 'minimum efficient scale' of
plants. The importance of 'scale-augmenting technical change' has been
explored by a number of studies, and it has been suggested by some that
the exploitation of latent economies of scale has been what might be
termed a 'paradigm' for engineering improvements and research effort.
Turning to the efforts made to measure economies of scale, it is quite
clear that the high levels of aggregation of many earlier studies have
rendered them almost totally worthless. Later studies concentrating on
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the actual production technologies concerned in individual industries
have been much more fruitful, and have indeed led to developments in the
field of econometrics. The validity of some of the simpler formulations
used for measurement of scale and technology effects has been called
into doubt. In particular, almost every researcher who has explicitly
tested for the possibility that the widely-used Cobb-Douglas production
function does not give a good fit have found that other specifications-
for example the nonhomothetic translog function- are superior.
Similarly, the frequently invoked "six-tenths rule" gives only a first-
order approximation to capital scale economies. The scale exponent is
found to fall in a wide range with a median val ue between 0.6 and 0.7.
Careful inquiry into the empirical sources almost always shows that the
exponent increases towards 1.0 at the top of the size range considered.
Decomposition of cost elements tends to show that, even with such
apparently straightforward instances as the construction of cylindrical
tanks, simple geometrical surface area/volume arguments do not give a
full explanation of cost variations. Thus, whilst there can be little
doubt of the cost benefits of scale-up in many practical engineering
problems, we should beware of generalisations derived from engineering
'rules of thumb'.
Despite the shortcomings of many empirical studies there can be little
doubt that substantial economies of scale are available at the plant
level in a wide range of industries. However, the number and complexity
of factors involved means that consensus on the actual levels and extent
of such economies is not easily achieved. Studies are often based on
engineering estimates of what is feasible, which may be conservatively
biased towards the status quo, thus ignoring the potential for further
improvements in larger plants, or alternatively may optimistically
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minimise the technological uncertainties inherent in any major scaleup
before it has actually been tried.
The electricity generation industry and the financial services industry
have both been claimed to be areas where the existence of economies of
scale is very well-established. In the latter case it is easy to find
studies which directly contradict that claim. Even in the electricity
supply case, which accounts for a very large fraction of all published
studies of scale effects, wide divergences of opinion exist. These may
be partly due to methodological disagreements. Nevertheless, it is
quite clear that even in this industry it is relatively easy to find
studies to back up any point of view, despite the number of studies
carried out (or perhaps because of the numbers of studies carried out).
There is therefore some justification for the view that 'economies of
scale' has been used as a rationalisation rather than as a means of
analysis. As Schmemner (1976) says:
"In sum, 'economies of scale' is vague enough to provide
easy justification for any number of decisions on plant
capacity. Because it is so vague, its usefulness to
managers is minima1."
Michael Thompson has suggested that in another sense its usefulness to
managers is maximal in that it allows justification of particular views.
of the world and the making of decisions on other than objectively
analytical grounds (personal communication).
At the level of the organisation, studies of 'economies of scale' are
again of little practical value on the whole. A wide range of causes of
economies or diseconomies of scale of business organisations are
variously claimed. Empirical studies tend to be scanty, murky and often
contradictory. Methodological disputes ~nd fundamental differences of
opinion are not uncommon. There is a widespread belief in the
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inefficiency of large scale administration, but the evidence in the
economics field is as scattered as the evidence for plant-level
economies was fifty years ago. Explanations of the causes of large
firms will probably have to include behavioural factors.
A comprehensi ve 'Economic Theory of Scale' is sti 11 out of reach. I
find Bela Gold's conclusion impeccable (1981):
".. effective development of the economic theory of sca1e-
and of other sectors of the economic theories of production
and costs- seems to require increasing knowledge about the
actual characteristics of the industrial operations about
which analytical models are to be developed."
It is only a return to the earlier observational tradition which has
allowed any progress in understanding scale effects to occur. It seems
clear that a dynamic vision holds out the best hope of providing a full
account of the phenomenon of increasing returns, despite the formidable
analytical problems that changes in technology and a dynamic rather than
a static theory wi 11 pose. To these must be added some notions of the
behavioural constraints; arguments "as if" cost-minimising optimisation
in a world perfectly understood by every manager were true will not
explain how industries behave, nor tell us how they ought to behave. In
short, we need what Nelson and Winter (1982) call "an evolutionary
theory of economic change".
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Chapter 3: A Simple Simulation of Dynamic Diseconomies of Scale
In this chapter we will examine the way in which static scale economies
are affected by a range of dynamic factors. The usual measures of
economies of scale deal with the capital cost of an item of plant or
equipment. This view encompasses only a static cost figure, and ignores
questions such as whether capacity will be properly utilised over the
lifetime of the plant. The possible pitfalls of this approach are
pointed out in the case of large petrochemicals plants by Walley and
Robson (1972).
This chapter wi 11 discuss some "dynamic diseconomies of scale",
introduce a simple model designed to explore them, and present
illustrative results of some preliminary investigations with the model.
It will be shown that even when substantial capital economies of scale
exist for constructing production plant it may be more efficient to
build "suboptimal"-sized units.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the model is not industry-specific we will refer to "units" of
plant or equipment, which might signify whole factories, or other
production systems e.g. electricity generators.
"Static" economies of scale means that relative capital costs decline
with increasing size of production units, at least within certain
limits. However, other characteristics of the production system change
with increasing scale as well. In general, lead times for construction
and planning of units increases with size. This factor leads to several
effects which may militate against building very large units:
The earnings effect. Small units with short lead times will tie up cash
unproductively for shorter periods, costing less to finance, and
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starting to earn a return sooner than large units.
The forecasting effect. Inevitably, forecasts of future demand are
inaccurate, and they are in general less accurate the further forward
one is forced to look. Units with shorter lead times will have an
advantage because there is a reduced chance of being surprised by
changes in the environment. Gross over- or under-capacity are less
likely, and so risk is lower.
The control effect. Short lead times also mean that past undercapacity
mistakes can be corrected more easily, and a production system based on
small units should show less of a tendency towards overcapacity. (For a
discussion of these effects, with particular reference to the
electricity supply industry, see Ford (1980) amd Ford and Youngblood
(1982).)
There is obviously a step effect arising from trying to match a smooth
demand curve to a step-function formed by adding units of discrete
sizes. Clearly there will not be a perfect fit, but smaller units imply
smaller steps and a better approximation.
These effects arise from external causes as well as from the
characteristics of the production technology. There is often also a
purely internal force at work. The learning effect comes from the fact
that costs of constructing identical capital goods tend to decrease as
more units are built. This cost reduction is captured in the "learning
curve" or "experience curve" (Dutton and Thomas 1984).
2. THE SIMULATION MODEL
In the model, an imaginary industry is faced with the problem of
bUilding and operating capacity in order to meet an exogenously
specified demand. There is only one decision-maker, only one "company",
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in this industry. The company is given a single scale of units to
operate, and the purpose of the simulation is to compare the results of
different choices of unit scale given identical decision rules and
demand curves. There are no competitive interactions, and demand is
completely inelastic.
This is a simple operational/financial model. In each successive time
period our "company" incurs costs for units of capacity under
construction, and receives revenue for demand satisfied, less fixed
costs for all units in operation. A simple forecasting model is used to
predict future demand up to the construction lead time of the size of
units being considered. Simple decision rules are used to determine
whether extra capacity is ordered or units are retired from service.
(See Appendix 3B for the full specification of the model.)
The units have a range of attributes which can be altered independently
of the model. Scale and lead time are the most obvious of these
attributes. Capital costs, which are spread out evenly over the
construction phase, are arranged so as to show static economies of
scale. The model employs a 90% learning curve for capital cost reduction
with respect to completed units of capacity. That is, for every doubling
of the number of units constructed, the cost of each unit falls by a
factor of 0.9.
There is another important element in the model, relating to financial
performance. It is assumed that the company has a "bank account", which
gains interest when in credi t and is charged when overdrawn. This is a
fairly crude way of taking account of the costs of money. It has been
found that in many situations interest charges form a significant
fraction of the firm's costs in the simulation run.
The model is implemented in the BASIC programming language to run on a
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microcomputer. (The program listing is Appendix 3C.)
3. EXPERIMENTS ON CAPACITY-FITTING PERFORMANCE
As already stated, the model was originally conceived with the intention
of studying diseconomies of scale. However, rather than attempting to
represent the complex characteristics of any particular industry (by
introducing "real" demand curves, estimates of scale economies, lead
time, reliability, capital intensity, cost of money, and their
variations over time) it was felt important to attempt to gain some
insight into the working of some of the different effects of scale
described in the first section. For this reason we will present some
indicative results on financial performance, and then go on to discuss
the causes of performance variation by using the model to illustrate the
effects of varying lead times, etc.
Fig 3.1: Demand Scenarios
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The aim is to see how varying scale and lead time affect capacity
fi tting (and hence financial performance). Three demand scenarios are
used: rapid growth followed by sudden "catastrophe" and decline; steady
and then accelerating growth; and steady and then declining growth.
These three scenarios are captured by the three demand series RED1,
BLUE2 and BLUES (Fig 3.1). They are listed in Appendix 3A.
Units of fi ve different sizes were employed, and this standard set of
units is described in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Unit Specifications
Scale (Output) Lead Time Cost per unit
of output
100 24 380
200 27 329
400 33 284
900 45 240
1500 54 215
The third column of Table 3.1 shows that there are significant economies
of scale over the whole range of unit sizes. Nevertheless Table 3.2,
which gives the final "bank balance" for each run in every demand
series/scale option, shows that the practical outcome favours small
units in the RED1 and BLUE2 scenarios, and gives ambivalent results in
the BLUES scenario. The ambivalence is due mainly to the relatively low
level of demand in BLUES, which means that the discreteness of the units
of supply becomes even more important. The final demand level is about
2800, which is satisfied with little waste by two units of 1500, but
with substantial inefficiency by four units of 900. Hence the poor
result for the system based on unit sizes of 900. Because the other two
scenarios have higher overall demand levels this kind of effect, though
still present, is relatively less important.
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Table 3.2: Performance of different unit scale in three scenarios
Unit Scale Final Balance in Scenario
RED1 BLUE2 BLUES
100 -288 -161 -7
200 -248 -80 33
400 -391 28 47
900 -921 -30 -99
1500 -1141 -102 80
(All balances in '000 currency units from model)
Thus whilst a scenario of permanently accelerating growth (BLUES)
confirms the strategy of building the biggest possible units to achieve
maximum scale economies, in other environments earnings are maximised
with units of scale 400 (modest and declining growth - BLUE2) or 200
(growth followed by collapse - RED1). Exact financial outcomes in any
particular case will obviously depend upon the relation between capital
and other costs, and other parameters; for ease of comparison the levels
of over- and under-capacity are used hereafter.
Clearly the diseconomies of scale represented in Table 3.2 must be due
to dynamic effects in the model, the most important being the
forecasting and step effects. Table 3.3 shows the cumulative under- and
over-capacity for each simulation run, and the total mismatch is plotted
in figs 3.2 and 3.3. Total error is shown to increase with increasing
unit scale and with increasing unit lead time; the two are covariant
(refer to Table 3.1).
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Table 3.3: Standard Simulation Runs Capacity Mismatches
Scale Lead Undercapacity Overcapacity Error Sum
Time
RED1 Demand Series
100 24 38544 8950 47494
200 27 39790 14095 53885
400 33 53109 22615 75724
900 45 78691 51697 130388
1500 54 86299 88704 175003
BLUE2 Demand Series
100 24 28948 544 29492
200 27 32824 920 33744
400 33 42157 1652 43809
900 45 58140 3636 61776
1500 54 77473 6768 84241
BLUES Demand Series
100 24 4414 3535 7949
200 27 5646 6366 12012
400 33 8194 9515 17709
900 45 14515 19836 34351
1500 54 24300 18521 42821
Fig 3.2: Standard Runs, Absolute cumulative capacity error vs. Scale
error
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Fig 3.3: Standard Runs. Absolute cumulative capacity error vs. Lead Time
error
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How much are the dynamic diseconomjes related to scale, and how much to
lead time? A way to tackle this question is to fix all unit lead times
(and hence forecasting horizons) to the same distance, and see how
errors vary with scale alone. The results of setting all lead times to
24 and 33 (corresponding to the normal lead times for units of scale 100
and 400 respectively) are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 respectively, and
are plotted in Figs 3.4 and 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Fixed Lead Time = 24
Scale Lead Undercapacity Overcapacity Error Sum
Time
RED1 Demand Series
100 24 38544 8950 47494
200 24 34412 14917 49329
400 24 33668 25574 59242
900 24 34811 65417 100228
1500 24 48450 110855 159305
BLUE2 Demand Series
100 24 28948 544 29492
200 24 29824 920 30744
400 24 31211 1507 32718
900 24 36177 3273 39450
1500 24 42302 7598 49900
BLUES Demand Series
100 24 4414 3535 7949
200 24 5092 6013 11105
400 24 6532 9853 16385
900 24 11712 11633 23345
1500 24 19065 23786 42851
Fig 3.4: Capacity Errors for Constant Lead Time = 24
error
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Table 3.5: Fixed Lead Time = 33
Scale Lead Undercapacity Overcapacity Error Sum
Time
RED1 Demand Series
100 33 55193 26498 81691*
200 33 51369 12074 63443
400 33 53109 22615 75724
900 33 52114 60219 112333
1500 33 53200 105105 158305
BLUE2 Demand Series
100 33 39371 566 39937
200 33 40048 944 40992
400 33 42157 1652 43809
900 33 45919 3114 49033
1500 33 50567 6863 57430
BLUES Demand Series
100 33 6135 3456 9591
200 33 7098 5019 12117
400 33 8194 9515 17709
900 33 14209 14130 28339
1500 33 18048 24269 42317
* This is correct; due to decision rule for retiring units
allowing withdrawl of only one unit at a time.
Fig 3.5: CaQacitI Errors for Constant Lead Time = 33
error
160000
+
+ A = RED1
+ B = BLUE2
+ C = BLUES
+
+
+ A
+
+
+ A
+ A
+ A
+
+ B
+ B B B
+
+ C
+ C
+ C C
+
A
B
C
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +o scale
o
94
Study of the separate under- and over-capacity errors in Table 3.4 and
3.5 reveals a significant pattern. Overcapacity varies considerably more
with unit scale than does undercapacity, which in some scenarios appears
to be totally independent of unit size. This result is quite explicable
when it is realised that overcapacity errors due to poor forecasts can
be rectified by simply retiring units, whilst overcapacity errors cannot
be erased in a similar fashion. Much of the undercapacity error will be
due to forecasting errors, whilst the overcapacity will be due to the
"step effect". Examination of the BLUES, declining growth, scenario
confirms this; forecasts will anticipate higher demand than is actually
realised, so there should be no undercapacity due to forecast errors.
The results show that both undercapacity and overcapacity vary
approximately linearly with scale, confirming this hypothesis.
(Lest it be thought that the forecasting errors produced by this
simulation are excessive, it may be noted in passsing that Abdulkarim
and Lucas (1977) show that the UK C.E.G.B made forecasting errors of
fi ve-year forward demand ranging from -11.3% to +28.8% over the period
1947-1970.)
This idea can be taken further by fixing unit scale at 400 and varying
the lead time; see Table 3.6 and Fig. 3.6. These show that overcapacity
stays constant or even declines with increased lead time (for the
reasons just described), but that undercapacity, again largely a product
of forecast error, increases rapidly with lead time.
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Scale
RED1
400
400
400
400
BLUE2
400
400
400
400
BLUES
400
400
400
400
Table 3.6: Varying Lead Times, Scale Fixed
Lead
Time
Demand Series
24
33
42
54
Demand Series
24
33
42
54
Demand Series
24
33
42
54
Undercapacity Overcapacity Error Sum
33668
53109
66869
83740
25574
22615
20774
16445
59242
75724
87643
100185
31211
42157
51357
62157
1507
1652
1652
1652
32718
43809
53009
63809
6532
8194
10465
12071
9853
9515
8586
6191
16385
17709
19051
18262
Fig 3.6 Capacity Errors for Scale = 400, varying lead times
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Of course the above dicussion ignores costs, and units constructed but
never used due to inadequate and over-optimistic demand forecasts still
have to be paid for. Nevertheless, there.are situations- for example an
electricity supply system- where overcapacity can be expensive, but
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undercapacity might be catastrophic.
These results suggest that there are clear disad vantages accruing to
production systems based on large and long lead-time units. It is
sometimes argued that such disadvantages may be ameliorated or solved
completely by improved knowledge of the future. The implication is that
it is only the lack of good forecasting techniques which leads to the
problems of capacity planning with large scale units.
This point of view can be examined with the model by running the
simulation with not merely a better forecast, but with a perfect
forecast. Table 3.7 gives the simulation results when the decision rule
was gi ven complete knowledge of the future demand rather than just a
forecast to work with.
Table 3.7: Standard Runs, Perfect Knowledge
Scale Lead Undercapacity Overcapacity Error Sum
Time
RED1 Demand Series
100 24 883 6588 7471 16%
200 27 1391 12696 14087 26%
400 33 2600 20105 22705 30%
900 45 5148 51054 56202 43%
1500 54 22050 19955 42005 24%
BLUE2 Demand Series
100 24 1736 1032 2768 9%
200 27 3036 2132 5168 15%
400 33 6539 4034 10573 24%
900 45 13785 9681 23466 38%
1500 54 24032 14828 38860 46%
BLUES Demand Series
100 24 1499 1119 2618 33%
200 27 2953 2074 5027 42%
400 33 6445 4566 11011 62%
900 45 11499 10520 22019 64%
1500 54 21795 20516 42311 99%
The last column gives total error as percentage of the total
error accruing when forecasting was employed (see Table 3.3).
This experiment shows two interesting things. First of all, it
demonstrates that, except in the cases of the smallest units, even
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perfect knowledge of the future still leaves appreciable errors, which
are entirely due to the step effect.
The second and more interesting result comes from comparing the total
error given perfect knowledge with that when imperfect knowledge makes
it necessary to forecast. This is done in percentage form in the last
column of Table 3.7. Now, even though the large units have a longer lead
time, and by implication poorer forecasts, it still turns out that the
percentage is much smaller for the small units. In other words, improved
forecasting leads to a proportionately greater improvement in
performance in a system based on small units than in a system based on
large ones.
Of course a relati ve improvement is not an absolute improvement. The
largest unit size shows greater absolute improvement given perfect
knowledge. However, the remainder of the size range does not show a very
great difference in improvement when the need to forecast is abolished.
Table 3.8: Improvements with Perfect Knowledge
Scale Sum of mismatches between forecast horizons:
o and 24 o and 33
RED1 Demand Series
100 40023 74220
200 35242 49356
400 36537 53019
900 44026 56131
1500 117300 116300
BLUE2 Demand Series
100 26724 37169
200 25576 35824
400 22145 33236
900 15984 25567
1500 11040 18570
BLUE5 Demand Series
100 5331 6973
200 6078 7090
400 5374 6698
900 1326 6320
1500 540 6
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Table 3.8 shows the absolute differences in performance gi ven perfect
knowledge compared with the two sets of runs which assume constant lead
time for all unit sizes. These show that, except in the worst possible
case (the largest units and the "least predictable" demand curve), there
is greater scope for absolute improvements for systems based upon small
scale units.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It should be re-emphasised that this model contains drastic simplifying
assumptions when considered as a representation of most real-life
industries, most notably in the absence of competition and elasticity of
demand. Nevertheless, the diseconomies it demonstrates will always be
present at the roots of any more complex model of industrial behaviour,
and in this sense the model's conclusions about dynamic diseconomies are
more generally applicable:
1) The model has illustrated the existence and importance of the step,
forecasting and control effects as dynamic diseconomies of scale.
2) Under the assumptions of the model, it has been shown that these
effects can lead to advantages for systems based upon small units,
even where there are strong economies of scale of the static kind.
3) Leaving costs aside, and concentrating only on errors in fitting
supply to demand, it has been shown that overcapacity in a system is
a product of unit size, whilst undercapacity tends to be the result
of forecasting errors attributable to long lead times.
4) Even where the problems of forecasting are ignored, it has been shown
that there will still be significant errors in capacity fitting in
model systems based upon large units.
5) Finally, it has been demonstrated that, other things being equal,
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there is not much greater scope for performance improvements from
superior forecasting techniques in model systems based upon large
units than in systems based upon small units.
A full investigation of the model of dynamic diseconomies of scale is
not pursued further. A full analysis would demand that the 63 runs
performed and described above be expanded upon, with investigation of
the effects of using different forecasting parameters. However, the
significant result 'is that the model has already shown circumstances in
which, even where there are appreciable economies of scale to be gained
by building large production units, this need not be the optimal
strategy.
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Chapter 4: A Simple Formalisation of Technical Change
It is already clear that we cannot proceed with purely static models.
Chapter 2 has shown that issues of technology are closely bound up with
issues of scale; thus to study scale change we must also have an
understanding of technical change, which is another very important
potential source of "increasing returns". In this chapter some ideas
about innovation will be developed, which are illustrated in the
following chapter.
The conceptualisation and representation of technical change is a
difficult problem. The conventional production function formalisation
certainly has its uses, but does not allow progression beyond the idea
that technical change is exogenous to the economic system. It is also
somewhat removed from the realities of the process of production. In
Chapter 2 it was seen that, if theory has trouble with realistically
portraying scale changes and technical innovation, it has even more
difficulty with the many instances when the two effects are compounded.
There are few conceptual tools lying around waiting to be picked up. It
is necessary to begin almost from first principles. Here some very basic
and simple ideas about the engineering processes under Lyfng technical
change, and the conceptual processes of those engaged in innovation, are
developed into an analogy. This analogy converges with ideas current in
the sociology of technology and recent studies of innovation. However it
arrives by an unusual (and original) route.
The simple formalisation developed here leads to some testable
hypotheses. Furthermore, it can be used in a much more detailed economic
model of the increasing returns arising from economies of scale,
technical change, and the interactions between the two.
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1. LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS
What are the determinants of the capabilities of a technology or of a
piece of physical equipment? What governs, for example, the maximum
speed of a train, the fuel-efficiency of a generator, or the capacity of
a chemical plant? And what are the rules (if any) which determine the
changes in performance as a technology "evol ves"?
The limits to what is technologically possible at a given time can take
many forms. At the most fundamental level, we have limits and
constraints imposed by simple physical laws; for example, the laws of
thermodynamics dictate the impossibility of building a perpetual motion
machine. Other examples include the maximum possible chemical reaction
rates, energy conversion efficiencies, or evaporation temperatures.
Another set of constraints is imposed by materials and their strength,
compressibility, resistance to deformation, tendency to fatigue and
fracture, and so on. The raw material inputs or fuels for a process or
engine similarly constrain the possible outputs from the process or the
power delivered by the engine.
There are other constraints which relate to the technological artefact
as a whole; for example, its reliability, tendency to breakdown and
maintenance needs. (The lifetimes of the brick linings of cement kilns
showed a tendency to seriously deteriorate in the first very large-
diameter kilns, a problem which had to be solved by the introduction of
new materials.) There are also constraints invol ved in the construction
of artefacts. An example is the current limit on the size of the towers
used in certain chemical plants due to the impossibility of transporting
them from the workshop to the plant site.
There are also some more nebulous constraints- for example difficulties
of control with high outputs or temperatures or speeds, or arising from
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a multiplicity of units requiring coordination. Limits in such cases
are less well-defined and clearly introduce the capabilities of human
operators or of computer systems, which are more subjective. (This is an
example of the problem of bounded rationality.) Van Wyk (1985)
discusses a range of possible limits to technological capability,
including those listed above.
Any complex technological artefact is made up of a large number of
components, each of which wi 11 be subject to a set of these kinds of
constraints. Furthermore, the artefact is not merely a random
construction of its components; it must be assembled in a particular
way, and the parts must be in proportion to one another. The
characteristics, limits and potential of anyone component will have an
effect on some or all of its neighbours, and hence on the performance of
the whole. For example, a turbine generator may be capable of
delivering 100 MW, but if the boilers supplying steam are too small, or
if the cables and transformer to take the generated current are
inadequate, then the potential capability of the turbine will never be
realised. A balance between components is necessary for 'optimal'
performance, and the balance may have to be achieved with respect to
several variables at once.
Limits may change with time. New materials or alloys may be discovered
with superior performances. New techniques of construction may be
developed- for example Pearl and Enos (1975) show how the invention of
spiral welding greatly improved oil pipeline technology. The
capabilities of electronic control systems may be improved by faster and
more powerful electronic hardware or improved software. It even happens
that scientific 'laws' are modified- Chenery (1949) shows that a basic
scientific discovery relating to gas behaviour at very high pressures
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changed the possibilities inherent in pipeline transportation.
The arrangement of components may also be changed over time.
Rearrangements may be relatively minor, as with the introduction of
multiple planetary coolers in place of single rotary coolers in some
modern cement plants. There may also be major morphological changes in
the technology of the type discussed by Zwicky (1967)- for example a
wide range of jet engines have been patented which use different
arrangements of parts and operate in different media with different
propellants. Another example of a major rearrangement, from the cement
industry, would be the change from stationary vertical kilns to
horizontal rotating kilns.
So we have the notion of a technology defined in terms of its parts,
each subject to a set of constraints. In addition, the whole artefact,
and logical sub-assemblies of it, will be subject to constraints set up
by their internal relationships- the balancing problem- and by the
technically feasible arrangements that are possible between them. All
these constraints are liable to change over time as "knowledge", at a
number of levels, increases. The possible performance and cost of the
artefact can be expressed in terms of the components and of the
relationships between them.
2. A MATHEMATICAL ANALOGY
This description suggests the analogy of a mathematical progamming
model. A mathematical program consists of a number of variables, which
are subject to a set of constraints, and which have to be optimised with
respect to some function known as the objecti vee A lot of effort has
been expended on sol ving mathematical programs, and a fair amount is
known about certain classes of problem.
The first and most important characteristics of mathematical programs is
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that they are in general very difficult or impossible to solve exactly.
Even small and simple problems can take a long time to optimise without
the use of computers. In the special case of linear programs, exact
solution is possible in general. A linear program has the property that
each constraint equation and the objective function are formed by adding
or subtracting multiples of the problem variables to a constant term.
We can define a solution space to a program by attributing a dimension
to each variable in the problem and then drawing boundaries on a graph
corresponding to the constraints. For example, consider the simple two-
variable problem:
maximise 2X + Y
subject to X > 0
Y > 1
X + Y < 3
The solution can be found graphically by drawing the "solution space" of
feasible solutions to the above problem, and inspecting it for the
optimum value of 2X + Y:
" /' // ,-
.' ",,</ --~ ...' ..... / //'. "... y = 1
-" ' . ./ ./
'/-----------------:(~--..----
1 2 3~/ X
solution
space
-?
The solution space is defined by the unshaded area. The maximum value
of 2X + Y can be found by drawing successi ve lines 2X + Y = (constant)
for increasing values of (constant). The line representing the largest
value of (constant) with at least one point within the solution space
corresponds to the optimal solution.
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For a linear program, no matter how large, it is possible to find the
optimal solution by a method which is analogous to constructing an n-
dimensional space (where n is the number of variables defined by the
problem) and exploring the boundaries of the solution space for the
optimal solution- even when n is as large as 100 or 1000 or more.
However, if the problem is non-linear, then this method breaks down. In
fact, no method exists which guarantees a solution to a general non-
linear problem, unless literally infinite computing power is available.
Difficulties are posed by the introduction to the problem of:
a) non-linearities in constraint equations caused by terms involving
mUltiplying two or more variables together, e.g. X * Y or terms
invol ving powers of a variable, e.g. X2 or y1/3.
b) similar non-1inearities in the objective function.
c) the existence of non-continuous variables, e.g. variables which
take only integer values.
There seems to me a strong intuitive link to be made between the notion
of technological limits and the idea of constraints in a mathematical
program. This generates the idea of a technological 'solution space'
corresponding to the ma thema tica 1 so 1u tion space, the idea of
'feasibility' being associated naturally with both concepts. The
objective of a technological artefact is to maximise its performance
(subject to some cost constraint) or to minimise its cost or other input
needs (subject to some performance requirement).
To make this more concrete, consider a highly simplified chemical
process plant with six main subunits (see Figure 2.1).
The major component of the 'plant' is a reaction furnace (3), which is
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Figure 2.1; A Stylised Chemical Production Process
1. Feedstock
Blender
2. Compressor
3. Reactor
Furnace
4. Fuel
Injector
6. Distiller
fed with feedstock which must be blended (1) and then compressed (2).
Fuel must be injected (4) to support the reaction, and the.exhaust gases
must be removed and purified (5). The final product must be cooled in
the distiller (6).
We can visualise many interdependencies within even so simple a system.
The total output can never exceed the capacity of the blender,
compressor, furnace or distiller. To maintain the required reaction
heat needs a large enough fuel supply, but if the output of exhausts
becomes too great the filter will not be able to cope. Output from the
furnace may depend on temperature, pressure, and the correct blend of
inputs, whilst the dimensions and thickness of furnace walls will affect
cubic capacity, heat resistance, pressure resistance, and so on. Each
subunit wi 11 have separate requirements for labour, power, automatic
control, and cost.
Thus the output of such a plant would be a fairly complicated function
of a number of the other variables governing the dimensions, capacity,
etc, of the subunits. Each subunit would have a cost for any given
size, capacity, etc, specification which would be itself a fairly
complex function of that specification. Some units would show economies
of sca1e- for example the furnace, if idealised as simply a hollow
cylindrical container, would be subject to the "two-thirds power law".
On the other hand, some units would show diseconomies of scale, the
compressor being a case in point. Finding a minimum cost configuration
for a given output will therefore be a non-trivial task, particularly if
there is a range of possible reaction temperatures and pressures and
possible variations in feedstock mix.
Of course, it is not suggested that it w?u1d actually be possible to
perform this kind of analysis in detail for any complex piece of
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technology; hundreds or thousands of variables would be required, and a
similar number of constraint equations. Estimation of the coefficients
and terms in the equations and objective would be a very risky business
too. However the parallels between a very large (high-dimensional) and
complex mathematical program may yield some interesting insights for the
study of technological change, through consideration of qualitative
properties of the progam.
It is clear that a technological artefact is a solution to a highly non-
linear program. Non-linearities of types a) and b) above (variables
multiplied together, and raised to powers and fractional powers) will be
the rule rather than the exception, for two reasons.
The first is that the artefact's holistic properties are more important
than the sum of the properties of the individual components, and changes
in one sub-unit will have implications for others. Thus effects will
tend to be multiplicative rather than additive, and there will probably
be a number of multiplicative "interaction" terms in both objective and
constraints. Secondly, many relationships and properties of the
technology will depend upon allometric relationships. (See e.g. the
discussion of the use of power laws in estimating costs of various items
of production equipment in Chapter 2, section 5.) Such relationships
automatically lead to the introduction of power exponents on variables
(e.g. XO.6 for the 'six-tenths rule').
Non-1inearities of type c) may also be present- a description of the
cement plant with planetary coolers would need a variable stating the
number of coolers used, which could only be integer-valued. The result
is a hypothetical mathematical program with a very large number of
variables and a pathological state of qon-linearity. How can it be
solved?
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The theory of mathematical programs says that there is no real hope of
solving it. No hope, that is, if by 'solving' we mean 'finding the
optimum feasible arrangement'. What we must do is to find a heuristic;
that is to say, a method of finding successively better approximations
to the optimum, although we will probably have no way of knowing how
close we are to the optimum or whether we have reached it. We thus
commit oursel ves to a search procedure within the solution space. (We
hope to stay within the solution space- otherwise we find that our
latest artefact doesn't work.)
3. SEARCHING AND LEARNING
This idea of heuristic or search behaviour for technological improvement
is not new in economic theory (see for example Nelson and Winter (1982)
Chapter 11 and references therein). It does represent a clear break
from the Neoclassical formulation which assumes perfect knowledge. We
have to search because we cannot instantly identify a global optimum.
Any combination of technological 'variables' which has not been tried
before is in some sense an experiment, and its outcome is to a greater
or lesser degree uncertain. As Chenery (1949) puts it:
"In a sense technological change is involved whenever a new
motor is designed, even though no new engineering principles
are involved, merely because the outcome is uncertain."
The search model thus carries the implication of "learning by doing", in
that knowledge is advanced by the carrying out of a cumulative series of
experiments. It also implies that another assumption of Neoclassical
economics must be abandoned, namely that all actors have full and equal
access to all existing technical possibilities. Nelson (1980) argues
eloquently that this cannot be the case under "learning by doing", since
different actors perform different "experiments". One may also argue
that technical knowledge gained in this way is to some extent non-
communicable even between actors who cooperate, since in practice much
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of the 'knowledge' is implicit rather than explicit, and is contained in
management or engineering 'routines'- regular but not necessarily
conscious patterns of behaviour. A similar point is made by Cantley and
Sahal (1979) in answer to the rhetorical question ''Wholearns What?".
The Neoclassical formulation works on the principle that technological
progress exploits shifts in input factor prices. The mathematical
program analogy has more to say about technical change (see below), but
can subsume this account. For the costs of the inputs will either
appear in the objective function or in one or more constraint equations.
The former case will mean that a change in input prices will alter the
'gradient' that the search pattern wi 11 seek out wi thin the solution
space, while the latter implies that a change in prices will alter the
shape and extent of the solution space itself. In both cases the
'optimal' solution may (or may not) be al tered, and the search pattern
mayor may not change course within the solution space.
Attempts by Roberts (1983) and Venezia (1985) to set out formal
explanations of the origins of the traditional learning curve employ
similar arguments to those above. Roberts explains efficiency
improvements in machinery in terms of rearrangements of standard parts
under the assumptions that:
a) each part has a multiplicative effect on the overall performance of
the whole, and
b) the search procedure is such that there is a 'filter' to eliminate
those parts of the solution space yielding a value of the objective
lower than a certain fraction of the current best achieved, Le.
there is some way of telling that some possibilities are stupid
and preventing purely 'random' experiments from being performed.
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A simple computer simulation has been constructed to illustrate this
learning process in a succession of stylised 'process plants' with six
main subunits based upon the earlier example (Figure 2.1 above). The
'temperature', 'pressure' and 'reaction rate' of the process were
determined by various characteristics of the six units. The precise
equations governing performance are known only to the computer, and the
operator must construct a series of plants with the aim of reducing
capital costs. The performance of each plant is reported in detail by
the simulation, and the operator must work towards improved performance
and lower cost on the basis of these successi ve reports. The resul ts
have been encouraging in the sense that even with such a simple 'plant'
of only six components learning-curve-type regularities did appear. The
model is described more fully in Chapter 5, and its operation is
discussed there. The program listing is provided in Appendix SA.
It should be noted that my model and that of Roberts assumes that there
are no changes in the overall constraints, either in the structure of
the constraint equations or in the values of the coefficients. The
turning of an invention (new scientific knowledge) into an innovation
(new technological artefact and the know-how to use it) will often alter
the analagous mathematical program in the way that changes in factor
prices do. For example, the substitution of a new material for an old
one may change constraint coefficients relating to strength,
temperature, resistance, conductivity, cost or other considerations.
More fundamental innovations may change the structure of the constraint
equations and the variables which appear in them, e.g. the introduction
of centrifugal compressors in the manufacture of ammonia (see Greenberg
et al (1979)). 'Basic' innovations would tend to alter the form of the
objecti ve function as well- for example a process innovation may be
introduced for that very reason, a capital-intensive process with
111
substantial economies of scale often being preferred to a process
dominated by material s costs. See Levin (1979) for discussion, and an
example from the manufacture of sulphuric acid.
4. TECHNOLOGICAL HEURISTICS
Thus far, the analogy has been drawn between a technological artefact
and the solution to a very large, many-variable and non-linear
mathematical program. There is the added complication that we have to
sol ve it in the knowledge that the problem may be changing over time,
partly through the alterations we are making, and partly through
external fluctuations beyond our control (as in 'demand-pull' theories
of technical change). A precisely-determined mathematical problem of
this kind, with exactly specified structure and known coefficients, has
a general degree of difficulty of complete solution that can be regarded
as impossible. The analogous technological situation, where knowledge
of structure and values is less perfect and where both may be changing
over time, can only be more difficult and less tractable. The answer in
the mathematical case is to develop a heuristic search procedure, and it
has been suggested that a search model of innovation is the appropriate
technological counterpart. One of the most interesting questions is to
see what the analogy will suggest about the nature of possible and
profitable heuristics for the improvement of technological capabilities.
In devising a heuristic we are faced with the problem that it is hard to
know in advance what general method for obtaining successively better
sol utions will be the best. There will be many possible heuristics
available at any given time. Equally, at any point in a sequence of
search 'trials', there will be many plausible next tries. Here is yet
another layer of uncertainty- what is to~e done?
A simple argument by Heiner (1983) gives a partial answer to this
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question. He shows that it is rational for an individual faced with
choosing between uncertain courses of action to deliberately restrict
his or her choices to a small subset, and that in fact:
"an agent's overall performance may actually be improved by
restricting flexibility to use information or to choose
particular actions".
Not only is bounded rationality inevitable- it may actually be usefuf.
(Simon (1978a, 1978b) seems to come close to this idea in the context of
procedures for solving complex mathematical problems, which he uses as a
metaphor to link research in artificial intelligence with economics.)
Heiner's argument runs as follows. Consider an agent with a particular
possible set of actions, and consider the situation when allowing the
flexibility to choose an extra action might improve the agent's
performance:
At certain times (depending on exogenous factors ~ the new action will
be advantageous and at other times it will not. Let the probabilities
of the right and wrong times to select the action be xW and 1 - xW
respectively.
In an uncertain world the agent will not necessarily select the new
action at the right time. Let the conditional probability of choosing
the action at the right time be r(U), where the uncertainty U = u(p,~)
depends on exogenous factors ~ and the agent's perceptual abilities p.
Let the gain in performance from choosing the action at the right time
be GW.
Similarly, let the conditional probability of choosing the action at the
wrong time be w(U) and the resul~ing loss be L~.
Then the expected gain from allowing flexibility to choose the extra
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action is
x~. G(~. r(U)
and the expected loss is
(1 - x~). L(~. w(U)
Thus gains outweigh losses (on adopting the extra action) if
x~. G~. r(U) > (1- x(~). L(~. w(U)
or if
r(U)
w(U)
L(~ • 1 - x(~
>
G(~
which is the Reliability Condition.
Greater uncertainty reduces r and increases w, making violations of the
Reliability Condition more likely. Thus in situations of greater
uncertainty it is less likely to be rational to select the extra action,
and more likely to be rational to choose the more restricted set of
actions.
In the context of the search for technological improvements we can
interpret the exogenous factors ~ as a combination of the structure of
the 'mathematical program' (Le. the constraints imposed upon the
technology, and the objective it must seek) and the current state of the
technology (i.e. the position within the 'solution space'). Greater
uncertainty corresponds to a more complex technological problem; most
technological problems can be considered to be highly uncertain, as we
have seen above.
Heiner has a strong claim to make from his analysis, namely that greater
uncertainty:
"will further constrain behaviour to simpler, less
sophisticated patterns which are easier for an observer to
recognise and predict. Therefore, greater uncertainty will
cause rule-governed behaviour to exhibit increasingly
predictable regularities, so that uncertainty becomes the
basic source of predictable behaviour."
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Common sense might suggest that more complex and uncertain situations
would lead, on the contrary, to less regular and less predictable
behaviour. Heiner has shown, in a stylised mathematical world, that it
is actually preferable to deliberately exclude certain possibilities.
In the language of the mathematical program, that means that it is
better to concentrate on a small set of heuristics, to follow a search
pattern which deliberately excludes a wide range of possible paths, and
to concentrate attention on only relatively few variables at a time.
The heuristics idea is applicable at more than one level. In the most
general sense it implies that the same aspects of problems will tend to
be tackled first, and that particular ways of solving recurring
technological problems tend to be employed. At a more specific level,
when faced with the problem of improving successi ve generations of a
particular artefact, it suggests that it will be more profitable to try
to change relatively few features of a design at a time. Perhaps the
overall form will be kept recognisable similar, and marginal changes are
tried in some components. Sustained progress in solving a complex
technological problem is only possible when sufficient variables are
kept constant for comparisons with previous efforts to be made. Only
then is learning possible.
It is my contention that a number of writers on technology and
innovation have recently pointed to examples of just this type of
regular behaviour in the realm of technological artefacts:
At the 'micro'level, we have what Sahal (1981) calls "the principle of
technological guideposts". This states that the basic or fundamental
form of an artefact is only rarely subject to substantial change.
Improvement is sought by means of increm~ntal change rather than through
total revision. Sahal presents evidence to suggest that the 'essential
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features' of the farm tractor have been fixed for 40 years; that the
design of rock drills was essentially determined in 1897; that the
inland steamboat reached its ultimate form in 1840 and was unchanged for
the rest of its days; that modern passenger aircraft are still in many
respects following the design conventions of the early 1930s; and that
the modern electric motor owes its genesis to the design of 1910.
The importance of incremental innovation has been recognised by many
people, but Sahal has pointed to the apparent preservation of form.
(Waddington and Thom have used a similar concept of developmental
'chreods' to map the development of biological form- see Thom (1983).)
In the language of the mathematical program, search effort is
concentrated on changing parameters but not structures of equations.
Removing or adding a single expression in an equation may drastically
reshape the solution space, whereas small changes to coefficients will
usually only deform it slightly. In the language of technology, we can
either redesign every artefact from scratch, so that every new
development is a prototype, or we can take certain design principles for
granted, and concentrate research effort on improving certain selected
aspects of performance. Heiner's argument articulates which course is
generally preferable, and why.
Sahal points to the persistence of form in the development of
technologies. Others have suggested that the actual nature of the
search for improvements follow regular patterns; that is, the particular
kinds of behaviour innovators engage in have common elements. Rosenberg
(1969) cites developments in the machine tool industry and in military
and civil engineering, and finds that:
"An important common denominator running through these
examples is the persistence with which firms attack what, at
any gi ven time, they regard as the most restricti ve
constraint on their operations. This suggests that it may
be possible to formulate a microeconomic approach to
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technical change in terms of a bottleneck analysis."
Rosenberg's observation is entirely consistent with the mathematical
program analogy. If we accept that the innovation process involves the
devising of means to overcome present constraints, then this is
equivalent to finding a way of relaxing the constraint equation which
most strongly bounds the solution space. Rosenberg is suggesting that
this strategy is being consistently followed in preference to others
that might be possible, e.g. looking for totally new processes or
attacking several constraints at once. Of course it may not always be
known for sure what the most important constraints are. Heiner's
argument says, however, that in an uncertain situation it is reasonable
and desirable to exclude some possibilities, so what is important is
that there is some consistency in approach to the technological (or
mathematical) problems. This consistency may be 'arbitrary' in the
sense that we cannot be objectively certain of its correctness, and
indeed it may be determined by any number of 'extraneous'factors. This
analogy, therefore, does not exclude the possible influence of
sociological factors on the innovation process.
Rosenberg goes further than just pointing out that a certain search
strategy is frequently employed. He suggests that this leads to the
result that
"Science and technology progress, in some measure, along
lines determined either by internal logic, degree of
complexity or at least in response to forces independent of
economic need ••.this sequence in turn imposes significant
constraints or presents unique opportunities which
materially shape the directon and the timing of the
inventive process." (Rosenberg 1974)
This theme has been taken up more recently by Dosi (1984) with his
concept of a "technological paradigm", which he defines as:
"a 'model' and a 'pattern' of solution of selected
technological problems, based on selected principles derived
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from natural
technologies."
sc ience s and on se 1ec ted material
(p 14)
" .•. a technological paradigm (or research programme)
embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of technical
change to pursue and those to neglect •.. Technological
paradigms have a powerful exclusion effect: the efforts and
the technological imagination of engineers and of the
organisations which they are in are focused in rather
precise directions while they are 'blind' with respect to
other technological possibilities." (p 15)
At an even wider level of generality, Perez (1983) has emp l.oyed the
concept of a 'technological style' which consists of:
"a kind of 'ideal type' of production organisation or best
technological 'common sense' which develops as a response to
what are perceived as the stable dynamics of the relati ve
structure for a given period of capitalist development ••.
more and more branches of the economy will tend to apply the
prevailing technological style understood as the most
rational and efficient way of taking advantage of the
general cost structure."
She suggests that the widespread use of microelectronics will represent
such a 'technological style' just as the use of steam power did in the
Industrial Revolution. Interestingly, Perez is of the opinion that
organisation for factory mass-production and economies of scale was the
dominant identifiable style of the last fifty years or so.
5. SCALE INCREASES AS INNOVATIONS
Can the ideas about constraints and heuristic searches be applied to the
process of scale change? To answer this question, we must have a more
concrete idea of what some of the regular search patterns, 'paradigms'
or 'styles' are like. One researcher with specific ideas is Richard
Levin who discusses technical change in the chemical industry (1978).
Levin believes, like Rosenberg, Dosi and Perez, that:
"At any moment, the character of an industry's technology
plays an important role in determining the rate and
direction of future advance. The technology itself
generates concrete, Ldent.Lf Lab Le problems upon which
engineers and applied scientists focus their innovative
efforts."
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Levin suggests that recurrent areas of effort in the chemical industry
centre on the three goals of improving reaction rates, decreasing
maintenance needs, and exploiting latent economies of scale. He
discusses three routes to increasing scale. Firstly, the case where
there are significant economies to be had from increasing the size of a
major element in the process plant- for example reaction furnace which
accounts for a large portion of the capital costs of the plant.
Allometric considerations would imply that, if certain barriers or
constraints can be overcome (e.g. strength of materials, heat loss
problems), then substantial savings can be made. The second case is
where there are 'bottlenecks'in the production process, and innovative
effort naturally concentrates upon their eradication. (See also Ball
and Pearson (1976).) The third case is due to which Levin calls
'insignificance effects', where the elements of capital cost in total
cost are so low that any scale economies in plant are insignificant when
compared with the total. The only way of overcoming this problem is by
switching to a completely new process with greater capital intensity.
As an example of the first kind of innovation Levin cites the
introduction of centrifugal compressors in the manufacture of Ammonia
which allowed substantial scaleup in the mid-1960s. (Greenberg et al
(1979) support this analysis.) McBride (1981) suggests that much
innovative activity in the cement industry since 1925 has been aimed at
removing obstacles to increasing rotary kiln size.
The second kind of innovative activity, the removing of bottlenecks, is
exemplified by Levin from the manufacture of Ethylene, where steam
turbine and compressor sizes, use of multiple furnaces (i.e.constraint
on maximum furnace size) and site fabrication problems have all
conspired to limit plant sizes in the past.
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The third innovation type, aimed at removing 'insignificance effects',
is represented by a change of basic process in the manufacture of
sulphuric acid to a technique employing cheaper raw materials and
possessing greater economies of scale (whilst being more capita1-
intensive)•
There is in fact a good measure of agreement that considerable
innovati ve effort is directed towards the problem of "how to build it
bigger" in many industries besides chemicals manufacture. Hughes (1971)
describes how electric power engineers have consistently overcome
barriers to scaleup of generator sizes in order to reap further
economies of scale. Gold (1974) shows how Japanese steel companies
introduced successive innovations in methods of raising top pressure and
blast temperatures, adding oxygen enrichment to the process, and fuel
injection, in order to increase their blast furnace outputs.
Ball and Pearson (1976) provide a conceptual description of scaleup in
terms of overcoming technological barriers and constraints. More than
most other scholars, they develop the idea of the importance of
allometric relationships between the different parts of a plant or
production process. That is, a change in scale always results in some
non-linear changes in production relationships, e.g, a change in scale
of a particular chemical reaction may make it exothermic (it gives off
heat) instead of endothermic (requiring heat to continue).
Finally, it is very often the case that an innovation which raises the
possible scale of operations also has an effect upon the minimum scale
of operation. This was the case in the example of centrifugal
compressors quoted by Levin above- they were simply not economic at
small scales. Whilst vertical cement kilns are not feasible for large
outputs, neither are rotary kilns economically useful at a small scale.
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Joskow and Rose (1985) show that sub-critical and super-critical steam
turbine technologies for electricity generation haye different
efficicent scales; the latter are best over 600MW, but are decidedly
inferior at 300MW. Thus innovation may raise minimum scale as well as
maximum scale.
6. IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of consequences of looking at technical change in the
way outlined here. In the past there has been a sharp discrepancy
between the economist's conception of technological progress, depending
upon the construction of a number of statistically determined production
functions, and the technologist's analysis of innovation at the
engineering level (Amendola 1983). There are several problems with the
'moving production function' view of technical change, and with the
debate between the so-called 'demand pull' and 'technology push'
explanations of innovation.
It is not my intention to discuss these problems here. (For an overview
see Elster (1983); detailed criticisms will be found in e.g. Nelson
(1980), Sahal (1981) ch 2, Dosi (1984) ch 2.) It is my contention
however that this stylised model is capable of incorporating the
competing views of technical change, explaining at the same time how
technological evolution is affected by the environment (changes in
coefficients in the objective), and at the same time following a dynamic
of its own. It is sufficiently rich to be able to encompass an
explanation of the 'learning curve' phenomenon, and more general ideas
of cumulative technological progress. At the same time, it lends itself
quite naturally to the description of technological 'guideposts' for
design and 'paradigms'of innovation search. Its disadvantage is that
it is too detailed and complex to be of much use in quantitative
measurement of technical change in most concrete cases.
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However, supposing that we were able to make a simplified analysis of a
family of technological artefacts in this way, what would we expect to
see in succeeding generations? The first thing is that we would
anticipate that the basic structural relationships between the major
parts of the artefact would remain the same. Minor process innovations
would result in alterations in parameters, but the main equations
(constraint and objective) describing the technology would remain the
same. For example a steam boiler might have a set of well-defined
relationships between its size, length of tubing, operating temperatures
and pressures, etc. A minor innovation might improve the heat-carrying
capacity of the boiler tubes; the same general set of equations would
still govern the relations between the parts, with small changes
reflecting the extra heat capacity. An increase in operating temperature
or boiler capacity would have a very similar effect on performance as
before.
Secondly, a major innovation would produce a significant change in the
formal description. So much so, that such a change could be used as a
definition of major technological innovation. An example might be the
switch to super-critical steam technology boilers (in which temperatures
of over 100 degrees Centigrade are employed), or to a different fuel
source (oil or nuclear instead of coal). In these cases the equations
relating given temperatures to operating steam pressures, or the scale-
output relationship, could be drastically changed.
(Recall also the research of Chenery (1949) into pipeline transportation
technology discussed in Chapter 2, section 6 and in section 1 of this
Chapter above; a scientific discovery about gas behaviour at high
pressure, coupled with improvements in stress resistance in materials,
led to a dramatic shift from large diameter-low pressure systems to
small diameter-high pressure designs.)
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Thirdly, we would expect to see residual incremental change and
improvement over time Le. "learning effects". Any artefact which is not
an exact copy is, in at least a limited sense, a technological
experiment. Moreover, experience in operating a technology will lead to
suggestions as to how it may be improved, generating better
'experiments'when the next unit is planned. These improvements will not
always be explicable in terms of specific innovations (although they may
be linked to them). The technologist will observe and realise that
certain constraints are not important to a particular artefact and can
be locally ignored. For instance, it may be seen that a boiler never
operates anywhere near its temperature and pressure safety limits; the
next such to be constructed can safely have thinner walls. This is not
innovation, in the sense of a new idea; it is experience leading to a
saving and a mapping out of the technological solution space.
Fourthly, due to the fact that knowledge acquired through experience is
not always directly appropriable, there will be asymmetries in
technological capability between different 'owners' of technological
knowledge e.g. different firms will have different input-output
relations for their plant. (This is of course implicit in most, if not
all, conceptions of cumulative progress.) Different boilermakers will
not have carried out quite the same sequence of experiments; as a result
they may favour slightly different arrangements of components, the use
of different grades of materials and different machining processes, even
if they do not possess patentable advantages over one another. These
will lead to subtly different areas of the solution space being occupied
by different actors.
The heuristic attack on the technological problem means that:
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"the course of technological improvement, at least in the
form of process innovation, is not nearly so arbitrary and
unpredictable as economists of an earlier generation
believed."
(Levin, 1978)
One of the great problems of general equilibrium formulations in
economic theory is the treatment of technological change. My view is
that what is needed is a dynamic and evo 1utionary economic theory. I
find it difficult to see how economic statics could provide the tools
for such a theory; on the other hand, how can one formulate endogenous
technical change using production functions without specifying all
possibilities in advance? This simplified model may provide a more
realistic metaphor for endogenous technical improvement.
7. CONCWSIONS
The most important element in the analogy I have drawn is the heuristic,
which has been deduced as a logical necessity arising from the
intractable complexity of the problem (mathematical or technological).
The idea of an exclusion principle in dealing with complex problems is
not new; indeed I suspect that Herbert Simon's "bounded rationality" was
first formulated by a route similar to that used here. The idea that
there are consistent "boundednesses", which may take alternative forms,
has been less widespread, and Heiner's recent contribution seems to go
at least one step beyond Simon. Moreover, the approach employed here
demonstrates that the different "technological paradigms" can arise
solely through the nature of the technology itself. (It is of course
likely that many other exogenous factors will influence the choice of
paradigm and affect its subsequent development.)
The work of Levin and others suggests that one frequently employed
technological heuristic is the pursuit of scale increases. The
existence of cultural biases for and against large scale has been
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discussed by Michael Thompson (1985) (and see Chapter 6 following). We
can speculate that the cultural bias affects the choice of technological
heuristic and encourages its progress. The combination of these two and
their interplay opens up the possibility of a cultural theory of
innovation. For example, Utterback and Abernathy (1975) have proposed a
model of process and product innovation linked to the life cycle of a
technology which is linked with organisational form and managerial
attitudes and imperatives. It is clear from their description that they
envisage different technological heuristics applying at different stages
of the life cycle, for example focussing on maximising functional
performance at the beginning of the life cycle, and on minimising
production cost via productivity gains and realisation of economies of
scale in the mature phase of the cycle.
Finally: the idea that there are certain invariants in the evolution of
technological forms is not original, as I have shown by reference to
the work of Sahal, Dosi, and others. Their (multiply independent)
discoveries have been produced by a combination of empirical observation
and an extension of the ideas of Thomas Kuhn, historian and philosopher
of science, who first defined the notion of the "Scientific Paradigm".
In -this chapter the necessity of a technological heuristic is deduced
from the nature and complexity of the problem facing the engineer or
technologist, and not from any social processes. That is not to say that
these may not be relevant; the argument advanced here should be seen as
complementary to those of Dosi et a1. The heuristic (paradigm,
guidepost) is the product of social processes, technological complexity,
and perceptual and cogni ti ve boundedness. It is interesting that its
existence can be predicted from an essentially mathematical argument, as
well as by the other routes.
In the next chapter these arguments are made more concrete and briefly
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illustrated by the use of a simple simulation model! The idea of
innovation as a search process wil be used again in presenting a much
more complex model of scale change, technology choice and competition in
Chapter 7 onwards.
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Chapter S: Technological Learning Simulation
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of technological progress presented in Chapter 4 is that of
an uncertain search procedure within an area bounded by current feasible
technical limits. The adoption of a basic technological configuration
allows experimentation within that form, as the constraints are tested
and new sections of the possible solution space are explored. Some
elements of a technology may be combined in new ways, but the need to
adopt technological heuristics means that the search process is always
constrained.
It is difficult to demonstrate this process briefly by producing rea1-
life examples. Here a short-cut illustration is developed by invoking a
simple computer model of the evolution of a fictitious technology
relating to the manufacture of some basic chemical product. The
technology is arranged so as to exhibit the non-linearities discussed in
Chapter 4. The specific details of the technical relationships are
generated by the computer for each set of innovation "experiments",
presenting the operator wi th the task of exploring the technological
"space" to develop superior production plants.
2. THE MODEL
The model is as described in Chapter 4, section 3. There are six main
subunits in the imaginary production process: the feedstock blender, the
compressor, reaction furnace, distillation unit, fuel injector, and
exhaust system (Fig 2.1).
The full mathematical specification of the technology is given at the
end of this Chapter. (The corresponding computer program is in Appendix
SA.) It is arranged as follows. The major element of the production
process is the reaction furnace. The "constructor" must specify the
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volume of the furnace, and the thickness of its walls (its cost is a
function of the two, with scale economies). These together determine
capacity, temperature and pressure resistance of the furnace.
The sub-units which feed in an out of the furnace are then specified in
terms of their maximum capacities. The constructor must also specify the
compressor pressure, fuel injector f10wrate (which determines maximum
operating temperature), distiller and exhaust capacities (complicated by
the fact that multiple units may be employed), the efficiency of the
blender unit, and the type of process control system which is to be
employed.
All of these elements jointly determine the maximum operating
temperature, pressure and throughput of our imaginary production system,
constrained by the parameters selected for the components. The
relationships between the elements of the process are in many cases non-
linear, fulfilling the conditions described in Chapter 4 section 3. (See
model specification at the end of this Chapter.) Reaction temperature,
pressure, f10wrate and blend are combined with the type of process
control system selected to determine the output of the production unit:
Output = K * Flow * (Temp/1000) * (1-0.S/Pressure) * Blend * Control
There are many interdependcies within the system. The total output may
never exceed the capacity of the compressor, furnace or distiller.
Maintaining the required reaction heat needs a sufficient fuel supply,
but if the output of exhausts becomes too great the filter cannot cope.
Output from the furnace depends upon temperature, pressure and the
correct blend of inputs, and the dimensions of the furnace walls affect
cubic capacity, heat resistance and pressure resistance. Each subunit
has requirements for power.
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Costs are attached to each component, both capital charges and running
costs. Each subunit has a cost for a given size, capacity, etc. Some
units (e.g. the furnace) show economies of scale; some (e.g, the
compressor) exhibit diseconomies. Finding a minimum cost configuration
for a given output is therefore a non-trivial task, particularly since
there is a range of feasible reaction temperatures and pressures, and
possible variations in feedstock mix.
The results of successive innovations are output by the program in the
following table:
, Control type auto
, Total output 923
, Operating Temp 935
Plant no. 5
Yield 92.3%
Operating pressure 8.80---------------------------------------------------------------------
Vol Thickness , Flow% Pressure% Temp% Cost, Furnace 1000 5.20 100.0 99.4 86.9 1324270, Blender Coef£. 0.95 100.0 133739, Injector Rate 18000 100.0 232541, Distllrs 3 Length 180 ' 96.9 96.9 113830, Exhaust Capacity 100 , 77.3 64733, Compo 8.80 Flow 1000 , 100.0 100.0 36848
, Control unit 125000---------
, Electricity cost 264079 Capital cost 2030970
, Cap. cost/Unit 2201 Av. LR Cost 683
The top section of the table shows what control system has been
selected, the operating temperature and pressure, and the process yield
and total output. The bottom section details capital costs per unit of
output, and average cost per unit (which includes interest charges and
depreciation on the capital costs, feedstock, and power). The middle
section reports on the sub-unit characteristics i.e. their sizes,
pressure rating and costs. The columns headed ''Flow%'',''Pressure%''and
"Temp%" show to what extent the relevant component is being utilised
with respect to its flowrate, pressure and temperature resistances. Thus
in the above example the furnace is operating at 86.9% of its maximum
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permitted temperature, but at 99.4% of its possible press~re and 100% of
its f10wrate constraints. The exhaust system is coping with 77.3% of its
maximum possible output.
3. THE SIMULATION PROCESS
The operator receives a series of prompts from the computer asking for
the specifications for a new "plant". The operator is aware of the
general structure of the technology, but at the beginning of each run
the basic parameters of the model are reset by using random variables.
Thus the general kinds of input-output relationships are known, but they
cannot be calculated exactly in ad vance. Gi ven the complexity of the
basic equations (considerable non-1inearities) and the number of unknown
variables, the operator is faced with a significant degree of
uncertainty. This can only be reduced by a series of "experiments" as
the different components of the plant are optimised to one another.
This can best be explained by referring to a short series of plants from
one particular run, which follow on from the table given above
(representing the fifth such "plant" in a series of 23):
---~-----------------------------------------------------------------, Control type auto
, Total output 937
, Operating Temp 935
Plant no. 6
Yield 93.7%
Operating pressure 9.64---------------------------------------------------------------------
Vol Thickness , F10w% Pressure% Temp% Cost, Furnace 1000 5.80 100.0 100.0 81.9 1353970, Blender Coeff . 0.96 100.0 150342, Injector Rate 18000 100.0 232541, DistUrs 3 Length 175 , 99.7 99.7 111287, Exhaust Capacity 85 , 73.8 57630, Compo 9.80 Flow 1000 , 100.0 98.4 39554, Control unit 125000
--------, Electricity cost 289353 Capital cost 2070320
, Cap. cost/Unit 2209 Av. LR Cost 670
Plant no. 6 represents a small incremental change from no. 5. The
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blender coefficient has been raised from 0.95 to 0.96, and the reaction
pressure raised by increasing the compressor rating from 8.8 to 9.8 and
increasing the thickness of the furnace walls from 5.2 to 5.8. Redundant
exhaust and distillation capacity has been marginally reduced compared
with plant 5. The result is a slight capital cost saving on these
elements, and a rise in the process yield from 92.3% to 93.7%; the plant
output rises from 923 to 937. Total capital cost per unit of product is
slightly higher (because of the more expensive furnace), but overall
costs decline from 683 to 670 per unit output, mainly because of the
improved efficiency, and thus better use of feedstock.
, Control type auto
, Total output 950
, Operating Temp 935
Plant no. 7
Yield 95.0%
Operating pressure 10.17
Vol Thickness ' Flow% Pressure% Temp% Cost
, Furnace 1000 6.20 100.0 100.0 78.9 1373760
, Blender Coeff. 0.97 100.0 178012
, Injector Rate 18000 100.0 232541, Distllrs 3 Length 150 ' 75.6 75.5 131432
, Exhaust Capacity 75 ' 67.0 52894
, Compo 10.40 Flow 1000 ' 100.0 97.8 41184
, Control unit 125000---------
, Electricity cost 305152 Capital cost 2134820
, Cap. cost/Unit 2248 Av. LR Cost 657
Plant 7 repeats the experiment by again increasing blending efficiency
and reaction pressure. Exhaust capacity can be reduced again as the
yield has improved. The number of distillation units is increased by one
as an experiment. There is again a slight improvement in yield to 95%,
with a consequent gain in output and decrease in overall costs. Capital
costs are sti 11 rising, however, and the proportion of capital costs
taken up by the furnace is falling. This is the only element of the
plant which has significant economies of scale.
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Thus economic arguments suggest that to maintain cost reductions it is
necessary to increase the furnace size. Plant no. 8 represents a
potential doubling of capacity by increasing the furnace volume to 2000.
Furnace thickness is increased slightly to relax the pressure
constraint; the distillation and exhaust capacity are increased less
than proportionately with the increase in scale to improve their
utilisation. The result is that capital costs per unit of output fall by
about one quarter; overall average costs are reduced from 657 to 611.
, Control type auto
, Total output 1901
, Operating Temp 935
Plant no. 8
Yield 95.0%
Operating pressure 10.30
Vol Thickness ' F1ow% Pressure% Temp% Cost
, Furnace 2000 6.30 100.0 100.0 78.2 2148220
, Blender Coeff. 0.97 100.0 244910
, Injector Rate 36000 100.0 462445
'DistUrs 3 Length 275 ' 82.4 82.4 216186
, Exhaust Capacity 120 ' 82.7 74204
, Compo 10.40 Flow 2000 ' 100.0 99.1 78948
, Control unit 125000
---------
, Electricity cost 617796 Capital cost 3349910
, Cap. cost/Unit 1762 Av. LR Cost 611
The series of plants continued in this run (results not shown further).
Plants 9 and 10 raised the process yield to 97% by improving the blender
coefficient, and the furnace wall thickness was further increased to
maximise reaction pressure. Plant 11 saw another big scaleup, by a
factor of three this time. The following two plants saw an attempt to
experiment with changing the reaction temperatures; this was not
successful and costs rose slightly before another path for improvements
was tried.
This short sequence of fictitious plants' should make clear that, even
with such a simple model, the innovator is faced with a fair degree of
uncertainty about the exact outcome of design decisions; the
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interactions between the components cannot all be foreseen. The major
alternatives are to make small, incremental adjustments to try to match
sub-units more effectively; to try to improve the yield of the process
by e.g. raising pressure or temperature; or to make major "leaps" by
e.g. substantial increases in scale. The risk with the latter in
particular is that an efficient balancing of the process at a smaller
scale may be disturbed by the allometric nature of the process and
production equations.
4. RESULTS
The simulation has been tried several times with the operator set the
task of reducing average costs of production over time. The plot below
shows this process in operation for the complete sequence described
Figure 4.1: Logarithmic Plot of Production Costs from Successi ve
Simulated Plants
log(cost)
3.1
+
+
+
+ *
+
+
+
-+ *
+ *
+
+ * *
+
+
+
+
+
+
* * * * * * * ** * *** **
+ ~*
+
+
+
+
+
+
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2.5 log(plant number)
o
133
above; log of overall costs is plotted on the vertical axis, and the log
of the plant number on the horizontal.
This looks like a very good "learning curve" relationship, and indeed
regression of log(cost) against log(plant number) plus a constant gives
an excellent fit, with an R2 of 0.975. In the spirit of the discussion
on scale increase and innovation in Chapter 4, it can be asked what
proportion of this "learning" is in fact due to increases in scale.
Table 4.1: Results for a Simulated Series of Plants
Plant Total Capital cost Average Cost
Number Output per unit per unit
output output
1 762 2568 1071
2 862 2344 814
3 889 2256 763
4 910 2226 705
5 923 2201 683
6 937 2209 670
7 950 2248 657
8 1901 1762 611
9 1921 1763 587
10 1941 1819 567
11 5823 1290 514
12 5569 1316 552
13 5742 1268 547
14 11484 1054 525
15 11645 1102 495
16 11645 1073 492
17 11696 1084 508
18 11737 1090 528
19 11617 1071 480
20 11576 1063 469
21 23092 912 460
22 23149 919 455
23 23195 950 453
A simple regression again gives an interesting answer, when we compare
capital costs with output and plant number:
Log(Capital Cost) = 4.14 - 0.257 * Log(Output) - 0.049 * Log(Plant No.)
Capital Cost here is per unit output. This equation shows strong
economies of scale (as is largely determined by the model
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specification). The Plant No. variable is significant at the 1% level,
and suggests "learning curve" cost reductions as above. R2 for this
regression is over 0.995.
This particular run is fairly typical; two other runs using different
sets of randomised technological parameters produced equally good cost-
plant no. regressions, with R2 of 0.994 (28 plants) and 0.973 (23
plants). In one of these, the slope of the learning curve was
significantly different from that of the other two.
5. DISCUSSION
This simulation does not constitue a rigorous mathematical proof. It
depends upon the input of a human innovator for its technological
changes. Yet that is also one of the sources of its importance; for so
does the real-life innovation process. This model stands as a metaphor
for that process; it has three important qualitative products:
Firstly, it demonstrates emergent behaviour of the kind predicted. The
model is constructed from a consideration of the arguments about
constraints and balancing of processes, and the search through a set of
"solutions" to the technological problem of (e.g.)minimising production
costs emerges as a result. The operator does seem to be obliged to
devise simple heuristics for the search process, for example moving the
solution in the direction of increasing reaction pressure, scaling-up
and then sorting out distillation and exhaust unit efficicent
uti1isations, etc. The heuristics are not clearly demonstrable in a
repeatable way, for they are to some extent subjective - just as in real
life.
Second 1y, a most significant emergent pattern is the extraordinarily
good "learning curve" of average costs from successive plants. Roberts
(1983) derives the common mathematical expression of the "learning
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curve" using two assumptions:
1) Improvements to each individual element of the production process
will have a multiplicative effect upon the performance (output) of
the unit;
2) The search for improvements in the arrangement of the elements is
carried out with the aid of a "filter" so that possibilities which
are very much worse than the present system are automatically
rejected (although marginally inferior choices are permissible).
Thus the search procedure is not completely random; we might say
that a very simple ''heuristic''is at work again.
This process plant construction model seems to fulfil the criteria set
up by Roberts very well. Nevertheless the accuracy with which the
resul ts fit the standard learning formulation is striking. Such very
high correlations are surprising. There has been considerable puzzlement
in the past over why learning effects should fit the usual mathematical
formulation (or any mathematical expression, for that matter). A
simulation is not concl usi ve proof by any means, but I believe that
these results indicate that the Roberts argument is on the right track.
This simulation has provided an illustration of the search process, in
which the operator "filters" out poor options.
Third and lastly, the interrelationship between cost reduction through
technical improvements and through exploitation of scale economies has
been illustrated. In Chapter 2 the difficulty of separating the two
effects in practice was alluded to (see Ch 2 section 6.1); there and in
Chapter 4 (section 5) the issue of scale increase as an important form
of innovation was developed. The model illustrates this process. It has
yielded statistical relations between scale, capital productivity and
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learning over successive technological combinations, showing how both
scale and innovation contribute to cost reductions irithe simulated
technology.
The model developed in this chapter depends upon human, subjective input
for its operation. In the next Chapter some interesting issues relating
to subjectivity and bounded rationality are discussed.
Annexe: Model specification
FURNACE
Cost = I1 + I2 * F1ow2/3 * Thickness + I3 * Thickness + I4 * F1ow2/3
Temperature Resistance = IS + I6 * Thickness
Pressure Resistance = I7 + KS * Thickness
Yield = I9 * Control * Blend * (Temp 1 1000) * (1 - 0.5 1 Pressure)
Output-= Flow * Yield
The temperature and pressure resistance of the furnace is dependent upon
the thickness of its walls. Its cost depends upon the thickness and upon
the surface area of the furnace, which is proportional to the 2/3 power
of_its volume (and hence f1owrate). The yield increases with temperature
and pressure (and also blend and control coefficients); the improvements
through increasing pressure diminish.
COMPRESSOR
Cost = Cl + C2 * Pressure3/2 + C3 * Flow + C4 * Pressure * Flow
Electricity Consumption = Cs + C6 * Flow * Pressure2
Cost and power consumption increase more than proportionately with
increasing pressure, implying that very high pressures become
uneconomic. This seems a reasonable assumption.
137
BLENDER
Cost ~ D1 + D2 * Flow + D3 / (1 - Blend)
This equation implies that moderate improvements in blend efficiency are
relatively inexpensive, but that approaching a blend coefficient of 1.0
becomes increasingly costly.
CONTROL
Cost = 5000 Manual
= 45000 Auto
= 125000 Computer
Value of Control = 0.95, 1.00, 1.05 respectively
INJECTOR
Cost = F1 + F2 * Rate1.1
Temperature = 1000 * (1 - F3 * Flow / Rate)
These relationships suggest moderately more than linearly increasing
costs with increasing reaction temperature.
DISTILLATION
Cost = N * (G1 + G2 * Length), where there are N distillers of length
Length each
Capacity = G3 + N * G4 * Length - Temp * Flow / N1/2
There is a fixed cost for each distiller, plus an amount proportional to
its length. Its heat capacity depends upon the total size of the set of
distillers, but increasing their numbers has a less than proportionate
effect upon overall heat exchange efficiency.
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EXHAUST
Cost = Hl + H2 * Flow
Capacity = Flow * (1 - Yield)
These are simple linear functions.
AVERAGE COST (for the whole production process) is given by
0.1 * (Capital Cost) + L1 * (Electricity Use) + L2 * Flow * (1 - Yield)
Ki, Ci, Di, Fi, Gi, Hi' Li are constants generated by the program at the
beginning of each simulated series.
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Chapter 6: Plural Rationalities - A New Approach to Ideas of Scale
"If the empirical evidence on scale effects in large
economic units were reasonably clear-cut, there would be
little room for controversy. As it is, however, we have no
standard by which to provide unequivocal evaluations;
besides we are dealing with an issue that transcends purely
economic criteria and spi lIs over into the political and
social scene."
-Rosegger (1980)
1. A LARGE AND COMPLEX PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction
In this Chapter I shall introduce and outline the theory of "Plural
Rationalities". This theory is used to make sense of some controversies
about "optimal scale" which were encountered in the course of the
literature search and interview work which I carried out as part of the
Aston-Warwick Scale Project. This framework is not in the main my own
work (although I have contributed to it); it is introduced for the sake
of the overall argument, and is needed as a building block for the model
to be introduced in Chapter 7.
As stated in the Declaration preceding Chapter 1, the argument developed
here has been outlined in different forms in Thompson and Tayler (1986)
and in James, Tayler and Thompson (1987a), (1987b).
1.2 Scale and Complexity
The question of seal eis, it was suggested in Chapter 1, an extremely
complex and mul ti-dimensional problem. Many factors ha ve to be taken
into account when deciding upon the scale of a new plant or factory.
Moreover, many of the factors which make the decision particularly
difficul t are inherently unquantifiable. Whilst economists have paid
considerable attention to the concept of economies of scale, and it is
certainly true that in many cases an increase in size will lead to
savings in capital costs per unit of output, there are many other
relevant factors than costs which may impinge upon a scale decision.
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Often a ''world-scale''plant will embody a measure of novel or innovatory
technology- indeed there is a sense in which a change in scale always
involves a change in technology. Behaviour near the limits of current
knowledge is never entirely predictable and may give rise to major
surprises, pleasant or otherwise.
The scale of the production equipment may have implications for the
scale of the relevant human organisation, and the way in which it is co-
ordinated and controlled. The scale of what may be only one element in
the production chain may have implications for the other units in the
system, and changes in one may give rise to "system effects" elsewhere.
There are less tangible considerations of social organisation and
behaviour - how do people feel about working in a very large-scale
enterprise or at a giant plant? "Alienation" is one response (as
portrayed by Charlie Chaplin in "Modern Times"). Lastly, there may be
environmental arguments against building a large plant - because of
possible pollution - or there may be arguments against spreading
pollution out by dotting small units around the landscape.
The problem is thus far from trivial, involving as it does a
multiplicity of considerations and holding a number of ways of making
the wrong decision. Complexity and multidimensionality often inhibit
precise, quantitative analysis.
1.3 Economic Analysis
Economic theory has a very straightforward approach to the optimum size
of the production unit which is embodied in the so-called "U-shaped
long-run cost curve". Costs decline until some optimum point is reached,
after which they begin to rise again as difficul ties of large-scale
management (for example) set in. The only difficulty is to find the
optimum, least-cost point, which sounds like a reasonably tractable
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problem.
The U-shaped cost curve has become very popular, featuring in almost
every elementary text on microeconomics, and appearing in many other
areas besides - for example in production engineering and operations
management texts. However, a close examination of the theoretical and
empirical foundations of this construct reveal that things are not
nearly so c1earcut as all the neat diagrams suggest. The evidence tends
to show that the U-shaped cost curve is the exception rather than the
rule; many cost curves have been found which are L-shaped or J-shaped,
and examples can be produced of "W-shaped" cost curves with mu Lt Lp Le
"optimum" points. Moreover the quality of the econometric data subjected
to this kind of analysis has not always been very high, and decisions
about the shape of the curve and the position of the "optimum" have been
reached on the basis of very few observations. (Refer to Chapter 2 for
details.)
Despite the apparent certainty with which many declare their faith in
the existence of economies of scale (or, in a smaller number of cases,
the diseconomies of scale), the evidence is not always there. Yet there
are many true believers, and not merely amongst academics- far from it,
in fact. How can this be?
2. SOME PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES
I now briefly describe some problems encountered in studies of large-
scale industries. These are drawn both from academic and other published
studies, and from interviews which I conducted in the course of the
Aston-Warwick Scale project research. The examples have certain things
in common: they represent capita1-intensi ve industries in which
substantial capital economies of scale are usually claimed; they are
industries in which there exists a greater or lesser degree of dissent
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about the optimal scal e of plant; and they number amongst their
"dissidents" people who possess considerable and relevant technical
expertise in the field. (Interviews are listed in an Annexe to this
chapter.)
2.1 Electricity Generation
In most industrialised countries, electricity is supplied by a network
of large-scale power stations, whether nuclear- or fossil-fueled. Over
the last 30 years especially, engineers have seen the exploitation of
"latent" economies of scale as one of the most important forms of
technological improvement, and considerable research effort has been
directed to this end. Single units with outputs of over 1000 megawatts
have been constructed, feeding to enormous power grids, and relying upon
a similarly huge intrastructure to keep them running.
Some energy scientists, however, have come to believe that this system
has not led to the provision of "least cost" electricity, not least
because of the supposed unreliability of the largest units. The
inflexibility of a system predicated upon such large individual
components has been questioned, and the long lead times and high design
and development costs (particularly for the nuclear stations) has led,
it is claimed, to serious dynamic inflexibility.
The "Energy Establishment" in the UK does not accept these claims,
insisting that "big is best". In the USA some utilities have accepted
these arguments, at least in part. Indeed there are some reputable
figures in the US energy industry who see the problem of cost reduction
in terms completely opposite to the UK CEGB.
"The replication of a series of identical generating units
opens up an entirely new and profoundly different avenue for
reducing the capital cost of generating capacity. The
economy of scale assumes a new form, and manifests itself as
the reduction of cost that can be achieved through the scale
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of operations in replicating large numbers of identical
units."
-Fisher (1982)
The economics literature on optimum scale in electricity generation was
surveyed in Chapter 2; it was concluded there that plants and systems
had been built which were larger by a considerable margin than had been
shown to be economically necessary at any stage. It was also pointed out
that it is possible to select research papers justifying almost any
scale strategy for power production.
2.2 Pulp and Paper Manufacture
The conventional view is that the manufacture of paper requires enormous
and very expensive plant, and that scales of output of the order of
100,000 tonnes/year are necessary for competitiveness on cost grounds.
Fabio Gobbo, industry analyst, says that
"The first relevant characteristic of the pulp and paper
industry is the existence of considerable technological
economies of scale."
-Gobbo (1981)
But this view is not endorsed by the former CEO of Reed Engineering
Services Ltd, Mr Arthur Western, who was interviewed in the course of
our research:
"Several manufacturers of paper machines were asked if they
could provide information which would enable the optimum
machine capacity to be established ...Surprisingly, none of
the suppliers contacted could give this information without
a costly investigation which they were not prepared to
undertake. The assumption was that bigger and faster must be
more economic, but no facts to support this assumption were
available."
-Western (1979)
Western not only found that the industry could not justify its
insistence that "big is beautiful", but came to the conclusion that
optimum scale was to be reached at a much lower level- around 35,000
tonnes/year. Modular paper machines should be built to a standard
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design, which would cut design costs and spread overheads, and result in
less production downtime.
Discussions with other people in the industry emphasised that Western
and his views are controversial. However, it was generally agreed that
his technical abilities were amongst the best and that his knowledge of
the industry was first-rate.
2.3 Brewing
The economics literature asserts that the brewing of beer enjoys
considerable economies when carried out at a large scale. (Cockerill
1971.) Brewing is often quoted as a classic instance of the economies of
increased dimensions and of manpower savings through scale. The
existence and importance of these economies of scale were strongly
affirmed by members of senior management of two major UK brewers with
whom we had discussions.
Yet if there really are these substantial economies of scale, how can it
be that the Price Commission report of 1977 found that:
"large brewers have derived no apparent advantages from
larger-scale, more concentrated operations. Their costs and
prices are higher and their percentage margins lower than
those of regional and small brewers. In other words, the
investment of these substantial sums has not improved the
position of either consumer or large brewer. This casts
serious doubt on how efficient the investment has been."
It is also notable that during the 1970s large numbers of "micro-scale"
brewers re-emerged, producing beer on a cottage industry scale. This was
partly a case of genuine product differentiation: craft brewers filled
up the "real ale" niche of the market left by the move of the major
brewers into the mass-production keg beer. However, if scale economies
are of such crucial importance in this, industry, it is puzzling that
some producers have survived on annual outputs of under 10,000 barrels
when the industry leaders seem to need to build plants with outputs in
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the millions.
2.4 Cement Manufacture
The cost of producing cement is dominated by the cost of the capital
equipment employed. The most important element of capital equipment is
the kiln in which the raw materials are fired. Modern cement manufacture
in the West relies upon giant slowly-rotating horizontal kilns up to
125m in length. According to the literature and to engineers we have
interviewed these are subject to substantial economies of scale, due to
the increased dimensions effect.
However a small number of engineers, mostly working on projects for the
Third World, believe that the most efficient scale of production of
cement is a couple of orders of magnitude smaller. They advocate a
return to an older technology involving much smaller vertical kilns.
These would be particul&rly economic, it is claimed, in countries with
relatively poor transport or low population density, due to the low
value to weight ratio of the product. The scale-cost curves drawn by the
two sets of engineers (see e.g. Sigurdson 1977) look something like
this:
Figure 2.4.1: Plural Scale-Cost Curves for Cement Manufacture
Scal
j
Cost
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2.5: Managerial Myths?
These are by no means isolated examples; other instances can be culled
from the literature of management adopting definite scale strategies
under conditions in which the "objective" technical and economic "facts"
were unclear. For example Gold (1974) made a detailed study of scale
economies and forces dictating expansion plans in the Japanese steel
industry up to the early 1970s. He found that plants were being
constructed in significant excess of the maximum size at which scale
economies were available:
'~epeated inquiries concerning why Japanese managements kept
approving substantial increases in the scale of blast
furnaces despite the absence of strongly supportive
technical data elicited several explanations. But their
common theme was that the basic drive for such increases was
generated in most cases by managerial aspirations."
-Gold (1974) p.10
The role of faith rather than analysis in arriving at scale decisions is
implicitly acknowledged by former leI chairman Sir John Harvey-Jones:
"One of the things that has gone is the belief in economies
of scale .••I am a small is beautiful man rather than a big
is best man at the moment."
-Harvey-Jones (1983) p.925
It is as if managers have decided to build large-scale production units
not because of objective certainty of the economic rightness of this
course of action, but through a firm faith in the ad vantages of size.
Harvey-Jones's former "belief" in economies of scale at the time held
that status of a "Myth of Scale" - a guiding principle beyond proof or
falsity. In Beck's words:
"There is evidence that in some places the "scientific"
approach to decision-making is largely treated as a part of
that great institution called the "corporate rain dance".
Real decisions are taken as they always have been - on the
basis of personal feeling, judgement, nous - and perhaps a
measure of bias."
-Beck (1983) p.8
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3. RESOLUTION OR RATIONALISATION?
What can be made of these cases? How can it be that experts hold such
differing and apparently incompatible views on the optimal scale of
operations in their industries? How are we to resol ve the dilemna of
choice in such situations, when there do not even seem to be overlaps
between the margins of error of estimate between the protagonists? It
may be that we will do better by avoiding a decision between the
different points of view, and choosing instead to look at the problem in
a different way.
"Classic" O.R./Decision Theory methodology says that we should list all
alternative policies, and select the preferred option from among them by
using some clearly-defined (ideally, quantifiable) choice rule. But here
there is considerable debate about what the alternatives actually are,
and what weights should be attached to them. Moreover different actors
sometimes have very different choice rules; e.g. environmental groups
regard cost considerations as only one of a range of relevant criteria
in assessing power station proposals.
An alternative approach must therefore be taken, and one possible route
is.to shift the analysis a step further back and to ask, not what result
the choice rule prescribes for policy, but what processes have generated
the differing choice rules and contradictory certainties about the world
in the first place. This is to adopt the idea of "plural rationalities".
3.1 Plural Rationalities
Herbert Simon introduced the idea of bounded rationality - that it is
not possible to know everything about the world. People do not see
everything - it is as if we go around wearing blinkers which only allow
us to see part of the landscape before us',or coloured sunglasses which
exclude some colours. The notion of plural rationalities goes a step
148
further. It asserts that there are systematic ways of bounding
rationality, so as to perceive certain things and to exclude others.
Plural rationality says that there are different ways of including and
excluding "facts" from one's vision - as if we had a choice of blinkers,
or a choice between glasses which filtered out red light or blue light.
Could this be what is going on in managers' and engineers' perceptions
of the optimal scale of the production system? It is as if some wear
filtering glasses which only allow them to see the advantages of large
scale, and others wear glasses which only permit the disadvantages of
bigness to shine through. Thus they are aware of (sometimes) completely
different sets of "facts", and employ very different eva Iuation
procedures in their appraisal of the "best" scale of operation.
There is a family resemblance between this argument and the use of the
Heiner Uncertainty Principle in Chapter 4, which suggested that
technology is likely to progress along well-defined and demarcated
routes. In this case we are examining the general problem of scale,
which, as we have seen, goes well beyond even the difficulties of
technological uncertainty. If the Uncertainty Principle is applied again
we can see that this very messy question of scale is highly likely to
generate strong and firmly-held opinions simply because of the existence
of uncertainties. We should expect the emergence of rigidly-pursued
scale strategies (which of course will have to be "justified" by
deploying suitable technical and economic arguments). The question is,
what forms can these scale biases take?
It so happens that there is a ready-made theory which deals in a formal
way with the bounded rationalities. This set of concepts comes from the
discipline of Social Anthropology, and is know as the "Grid-Group"
theory, or the "Theory of Cultural Bias". (See Douglas (1982) for a
collection of articles on the theory from its original anthropological
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context.)
3.2 Alternative Worlds
The theory of cultural bias posits four basic forms of social
organisation, known as the Hierarchist, Entrepreneur, Sectist and
Ineffectual. (These terms are heavily value-laden; I will often refer to
them by using roman numerals only i.e. IV-III-II-I respectively.)
Not only are there are four elementary forms, but there are only four.
They are the products of " Grid" and "Group"; crudely, these two
variables indicate whether the individual is more or less constrained or
has considerable freedom of action, and whether the individual belongs
to a collective or not. The four biases may be thought of as the
possible answers to two questions: "prescribing or prescribed to?", and
"Lndf vidualist or collectivist?".
I-Ineffectual
The indi vidual who is prescribed to is one who must accept the
rationality of fatalism. Passive acceptance of events is matched by an
inability (or a belief in an inability) to affect the individual's
circumstances. The Ineffectual is found at the margins of institutional
formations. Neither resources nor needs can be managed to any
significant extent.
II-Sectist
Those belonging to a group which does not have ranks, grades and
distinctions must needs be egalitarians. Such a group must have a
boundary, and maintain its coherence not only through collective action
but also through criticism of those outside that bound. (Hence Douglas's
rather pejorati ve label of "Sectist".) Sects prescribe to non-members.
Natural resources are seen as fixed and depleting, so needs must be
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managed.
III-Entrepreneur
The low-Group individualist operating in pragmatic isolation adopts the
market rationality. Everything is negotiable or can be obtained through
free exchange and competition. Social exchange occurs via personal
networks centred on the individual. The individual's skills and timing
are crucial; both needs and resources can be managed.
IV-Hierarchist
The Hierarchist belongs to a highly-structured group which prescribes
rules, ranks and distinctions upon its members. Management of the group
as a whole, if necessary subduing the needs of individuals to those of
the collectivity, is the key to success. Needs are fixed by the
Hierarchy, so resources (and the world in general) must be controlled
instead. This requires long-term planning and tight organisation, which
can lead to the archetypal bureaucratic formation.
Figure 3.2.1: The Four Cultural Biases
High Grid,
I - Ineffectual IV - Hierarchist
Low Group -------------------------+----------------------- High Group,
III - Entrepreneur II - Sectist
Low Grid
The usefulness of this typology lies in the fact that there are
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associated with each preferred form of social organisation a set of
views of the world- like the "Managerial Myths" in the case of scale
decisions- and cogniti ve styles. It is these which are of greatest use
to our understanding of scale problems, rather than the kinds of
organisational forms we look at.
In order to preserve the status quo, each social being has to see the
world in a particular way in order to continue to justify his or her
preferred form of social organisation and cultural biases. These
justifications lead to wor1dviews which constitute the "cognitive
blinkers" referred to above, informing and shaping interpretations of
"the facts" of a situation. Conversely, the adoption of a particular
cogni tive stance or of an impression of how the world is wi 11 tend to
force certain actions, and hence encourage the adoption of a particular
one of the four biases:
I-Ineffectual
Inability to manage one's situation forces passive acceptance. This
fatalism in turn encourages the wor1dview that the environment is
essentially random; neither good nor bad, the world is like a "cosmic
one-arm bandit". Conversely, the only sustainable response to a truly
random world would be ineffectual acceptance.
II-Sectist
A fragile world of depleting resources in which we must tread carefully
to avoid upsetting the balance of Nature justifies the permanent social
criticism of the Sectist. The need to justify the exclusive boundaries
of the egalitarian group, on the other hand, necessitates the discovery
of great dangers in the outside world and fragility of the exterior
system, reinforcing in turn the urgency of proselytising to the
unconverted.
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III-Entrepreneur
The energetic pragmatic Entrepreneur is hampered by few rules or
regulations: everything has its price, and anything is possible given
the will and the skill. The world is his oyster; in contrast to the
Sectist's pessimism, this world view optimistically holds that the world
is benign and resources are abundant. Again, if the environment of this
social actor is indeed highly favourable, then he will be keen to avoid
regulations and prescriptions which hamper freedom to take advantage of
the abundance, and to adopt an enterprising and exploitative approach to
life.
IV-Uierachist
Control is only necessary when there is something to be controlled which
has a chance of going wrong. The Hierarchist justification is a world
which will yield goods for all if managed carefully, but in which great
care must be taken to avoid upsetting any applecarts. This need for care
and management extends to social organisation as well, which must be
controlled by procedures and rules, and maintained by clear definitions
of sub- and superordinations in status.
The views of the world embodied in these plural rationalities can be
expressed in yet another way. in terms of "Myths of Stability". by
little diagrams of a ball on a landscape. The ball represents the state
of the system which the different worldview-holders wish to manage. (The
system might be the natural environment, some larger social
organisation, or indeed a firm or an industry in a commercial setting.)
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Figure 3.2.2: The Myths of Stability and the Cultural Biases
IV-Hierarchist
I
;;:~;; :~
) : 0 : \
II-Sectist
Perverse/Tolerant
(stable within limits)
Ephemeral/Unstable
I-Ineffectual III-Entrepreneur
Capricious/Lottery Benign/Abundant
In the III-world of the Entrepreneur the ball is in the bottom of a
bowl, and however it is disturbed, it always returns to rest at the same
place eventually. This is global stability. The reverse is true of the
II-world of the Sectist, where the least disturbance will consign the
ball (and the system it represents) to oblivion. The I-world of the
Ineffectual has no macro-structure; disturbances may produce better or
worse results, but the outcome is indeterminate. The IV-world is a
combination of II and III: stable within limits, and unstable if control
is lost and the ball/system strays beyond the prescribed area.
The following Table 3.2.1 sets out some of the characteristics of the
cultural biases, showing (1) the preferred or typical pattern of social
origin, (2) attitude to scale, (3) dominant form of rationality, (4)
attitude to natural resources, (5) preferred system characteristics, (6)
strategies for dealing with power, and (7) games (in Von Neumann's
sense) in which they play:
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Table 3.2.1: Characteristics of the Four Cultural Biases
IV-Hierarchist
1. Nested (hierarchical)
bounded group
2. "Big is Best"
3. Bureaucratic
4. Resources can be managed
for the benefit of all
5. Systems must be designed for
maximum controllability
6. Centralisation
7. World is a positive sum game
(within limits)
I-Ineffectual
1. Marginal
2. Scale is imposed
3. Passive and Fatalistic
4. Resources are a lottery,
appearing and vanishing
randomly
5. Systems are inherently
chaotic, but ideally they are
_designed for "copeability"
6. Marginalised
7. World is a zero sum game
II-Sectist
1. Egalitarian bounded group
2. "Small is Beautiful"
3. Egalitarian
4. Resources can only be depleted,
and therefore conservation is
essential
5. Systems must be designed so as
to have the least vulnerability
6. Decentralisation
7. World is a negative sum game
III-Entrepreneur
1. Ego-focussed network
2. "Appropriate" Scale
3. Pragmatic and Exploitative
4. Abundant resources can be
harnessed through skill and
effort
5. Systems must be designed for
flexibility and fluidity
6. Networking
7. World is a positive sum game
It is clear that the systemisation of worldviews drawn from the Grid-
Group theory can be applied more generally than just to look at
individual's biases. Wider attitudes and preferences may be studied with
the aid of these insights. The theory has been applied recently to the
analysis of a number of problems in applied systems management,
including: disposal of hazardous waste, the risks invol ved in the siting
of liquefied natural gas plants and other forms of risk (Douglas and
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Wildavsky 1982); official policies towards poverty (Thompson and
Wildavsky 1986a); information processing in organisations (Thompson and
Wildavsky 1986b); the management of the Himalayan ecosystem (Thompson,
Hatley and Warburton 1986); the criticism of energy futures modelling
(Thompson 1984); and attitudes to environmental policies (James, Tayler
and Thompson 1987).
These studies demonstrate the versatility of the theory as an
explanatory metaphor for plural rationalities when applied outside its
orginal territory of social anthropology. Similar fourfold typologies
have been employed by other researchers; a good popular example is
Handy's "Gods of Management" (1985), which indeed shares a common
intellectual ancestry with the Grid-Group classification. A different
but analogous fourfold model which converges with that of Douglas has
been taken up by a number of social psychologists and management
writers, particularly in the USA (e.g.Mitroff and Kilmann (1978», at
least partly inspired by C.G. Jung. (He in turn possibly obtained the
schema through study of the Hermetic tradition - the Medieval
alchemists.)The recurrence of similar or identical fourfold patterns is
a fascinating motif - see Tayler (1985), where the analogies between
many such fourfold patterns are analysed.
4. AN EXAMPLE
How does all this help? An immediate (and conveniently clear-cut)
example is afforded by the contrast between the CEGB and the
environmentalist group "Friends of the Earth", who are excellent
examples of the Hierarchist and Sectist biases respectively. The former
is a structured, monolithic bureaucracy, the latter a left-leaning,
anarchic/democratic group. The CEGB has a very firm line in favour of
large scale, centralised production units, whilst the environmentalist
groups believe in small-scale, decentralised plants which need far less
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infrastructure. (They are also passionately opposed to nuclear
developments, of course.) The CEGB is a purveyor of official optimism
whilst stressing the need for long-range planning, whilst FOTE
constantly warn of the dangers of making long-term assumptions about,
say, the safety of nuclear waste dumps.
These polarities are all aspects of the same thing, and it should be
stressed that they constitute an interlocking system of beliefs which
depend upon, and are sustained by, one another. The cultural theory
shows why the one group perceives the advantages of large scale power
systems in one way, and why the other sees only the disad vantages. The
very elements which the environmentalists criticise - capital intensity,
large scale, inflexibility, heavy infrastructure demands - are the very
things which the CEGB policy analysts see as desirable, leading as they
do (in their eyes) to an "optimised" energy supply. The environmentalist
criticism of lack of resilience does not start from the same premises,
and is indeed quite outside the world view of the UK utility planners.
This analytical framework allows us to begin to understand the
fundamental differences of opinion which are found about the value of
large or small scale production systems. Of course not every situation
which is encountered - indeed not all of the examples recounted above -
is as straightforward as the energy debate, because real-life industry
decisions are not taken against a background of dispute between such
obviously different institutions as the CEGB and FOTE. The cognitive
aspects of the four biases are much more important than the social forms
in which they are enacted, in general.
This example illustrates the scale biases of two of the worldviews. The
Sectists are inclined towards small-scale technological solutions, and
are cautious towards ''BigScience" and high technology. The Hierarchist
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tends towards large-scale organisation, so large-scale technology
presents no problem, and indeed provides a justification for maintaining
centralised and rule-governed social systems. It also matches the
tendency to control and to forward planning. The Ineffectual can have no
significant scale biases, whilst the Entrepreneur is happy to examine
any possibilities that are presented. This openness to novelty means
that technological innovation is particularly welcome to the
Entrepreneur.
Table 4.1: Scale Attitudes of the Four Biases
IV-Hierarchist Favours large scale projects, adopting a 10ng-
term optimising approach
III-Entrepreneur Favours technical change and "satisficing"-
whatever scale is most convenient
II-Sectist Suspicious of large-scale projects and high
technology; takes a more cautious path
I-Ineffectual Has little chance to express preferences, and
will employ strategies at random
Of course, when applied to the management wor1dviews of competing
industrial companies, the biases are not so all-encompassing as in the
case of the CEGB-Environmenta1ist debate. In the latter case the
differences of perception are based upon very deep and fundamental
social and political (and, in some cases, quasi-religious "Nature
Mysticism") views. In applying plural rationalities to management
decision-making it must be recognised that these more universal values
will be to a great extent common to all participants, and the
differences between them will extend only to those things which form the
basis of competition: the production technology, the design of their
organisation, their long-range planning and assumptions about their
business environment, and so on. Thus-a very cautious, small-scale
oriented enterprise could be identified with the II-wor1dview, and a
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firm which aims to control the market by confidently constructing giant
production plants most naturally associates with the IV-worldview.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Although there is a considerable body of accepted wisdom about the
economies of scale, and firm beliefs about their existence in the
industries we have studied, there is nevertheless some appreciable room
for dispute. People with substantial technological and commercial
expertise, some of them at very senior levels in their industry, can be
found to have contradictory views about the optimum scale of production.
Instead of immediately trying to resolve the conflicts in favour of one
side or the other, it is interesting and useful to approach the problem
from a perspective of plural rationalities. This perspective explains
the differences of opinion over "the facts", and allows us to think in a
structured way about the possible al ternatives. The ''Grid-Group''theory
from social anthropology provides a useful tool for understanding the
plurality of views about "optimum" scale. It also facilitates explicit
modelling of different worldviews and scale biases in a more detailed
and realistic model of the evolution of scale.
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Chapter 7: EMIR- An Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns
"Instead of building a model of a particular system in terms
of the salient features of the moment, it may be more
informative to study generic models and the way that their
constituent elements cluster, grow and structure according
to the series of "folds" that their interactive mechanisms
impart to them, and the attributes which emerge for
different branches of solution ...a good model must be a
metamode1"
-Allen et al (1985)
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the application of "traditional" methods
of analysis based upon an imitation of the methods of Victorian science
was inappropriate to the complex "problems of scale". A particular
example of such reductionist methods was examined; the orthodox
economist's account of the economics of scale and of increasing returns
was found to be lacking. Among the reasons for this were the
difficulties of reconciling the theoretical constructs of equilibrium
analysis with the realities of genuinely "increasing returns" due to the
existence of economies of scale and the possibilities of technical
change. ("Increasing returns to scale" means that greater benefits
accrue the greater the scale of operations. Economies of scale are an
example, where costs of production per unit reduce with increased
scale.) It was also seen that bounded rationality and plural
rationalities would have to be taken into consideration in any superior
description of the evolution of scale.
First of all, a new description or model must go beyond the confines of
a static equilibrium approach. Secondly, it must incorporate the
findings of the considerable body of empirical research on scale
reviewed in the second section of the thesis. It must have a reasonable
representation of the evolutionary process of technical change, not
leaving it out as some exogenous variable. The new model must also be
able to encompass a portion of the available plurality of wor1dviews and
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strategies available to the economic actor, not assuming away the very
important human and cognitive factors in the scale process. Finally, any
improved description must allow us to ask questions of it, and ideally
permit experiments to be conducted with it. This chapter introduces the
new model.
1.1 Objectives
The objectives in devising this new model are therefore threefold, and
correspond to three distinct interests:
1) The theorist wishes to have a theoretical framework which is more in
tune with reality, and which will stand up despite the abandonment of
fifty years' worth of microeconomic assumptions;
2) The policy analyst wishes to know '~y do things (firms, production
units, plants) become big?" The (neo-classical) theorist's answer has
been "It must be because big is more efficient" - but it is not clear
that this conclusion is not just the consequence of the old assumptions.
3) The decision-maker wishes to know what to do next. Can a new model
produce better decisions, by giving new insights into the dynamics which
lead to particular industry structures?
1.2 Summary
The structure of EMIR ("Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns") is
set out in detail in the next Chapter. The following is a brief overview
of its structure and function.
The model consists of a number of firms building production units to
meet future demand. The key element of the simulation is the decision to
build capacity; this involves a choice of scale, a forecast of the
future, and a selection of technology, all modified by the decision-
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maker's worldview. New capacity may be added to meet excess forecast
demand, or to replace old capacity made inferior through technical
change, or a combination of the two.
The price received for output depends upon relative supply and demand,
demand being the only exogenous variable in the model. Different demand
scenarios can be run through the system. Production units have an
initial capital cost, and incur other costs when they are operated.
Plants do not last forever; after ten periods (years) have elapsed, they
have a small probability of being written off in each subsequent year.
Firms may run up debts in order to build new capacity, and will have to
pay interest charges if they do. Firms making profits are assumed to pay
di vidends. There are limits to allowable gearing ratios Le. debt to
asset value proportions. If a firm has no plant operating and has
substantial debts then it is declared bankrupt and disappears from the
simulation.
The production technology employed may change. Firms search for better
techniques, and may also try to increase or reduce the possible scale of
plants they build in the future. Technical change is a search procedure
within limits (as set out in Chapter 4). Most technical change is
incremental, but it is possible to set the model so that on rare
occasions completely new technologies are discovered. Technology is not
a free good, immediately and costless1y available to all economic
actors; it is "owned" by its discoverer, and embodied in its owner's
production units.
Production technology is defined in the model by a set of "co-ordinates"
(K,L,V,MAX,MIN) which state what kind of production plant may be
constructed. The size of a plant must" lie between MAX and MIN. The
initial capital cost of building the plant depends upon K, and the costs
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of operating it upon L (which determines fixed overhead costs) and V
(which sets vriable cost per unit of output). Firms improve their
technological possibilities by searching for new sets of co-ordinates
which will either allow them to build bigger plants (larger value of
MAX), build plants more cheaply (lower value of K), run them more
cheaply (smaller L or V), or some combination of these.
Firms' behaviour, both in the innovation search process, and in their
reactions to their forecasts, performance and competitor's actions, are
partly conditioned by their "worldview". There are four possible
worldviews in the model, and they are embodied along the same lines as
in the "Surprise Game" (Thompson and Tayler 1985). The worldviews have
been introduced and discussed in Chapter 6. In the experiments to be
discussed in the following Chapters, only two of the worldviews are used
(the II-Sectist and IV-Hierarchist).
1.3 Nelson and Winter
This model is in some ways similar to those of Nelson and Winter (1982).
Indeed, it was inspired by their bold step out of the traditional
economic mainstream in an attempt to provide realistic economic theories
of technical change and development. The approach taken here is intended
to be in sympathy with the spirit of Nelson and Winter's "Evolutionary
Economics". However, EMIR is more ambitious than any of the models yet
described by these two pioneers: they have not tackled the problem of
economies of scale with respect to plant size, they do not deal with
competing strategies or "world views", and their descriptions of
technical change as embodied in the models are (perhaps intentionally)
less complex than those employed in EMIR.
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2. APPRECIATIVE DESCRIPTION
In Chapter 9 a series of experiments with EMIR is described. For the
rest of this chapter we will concentrate on the qualitative aspects of
the model.
"Appreciati ve description" is Ne I son's phrase for a description which
incorporates those features of a situation which accord with real life.
Not necessarily very technical, this kind of description is concerned
with realistic qualitative behaviour of a system- for example, do our
model firms behave in a way which might be recognised by businesspeople
who are not economists (as opposed to satisfying the rigorous but
unrealistic constraints of the theoretical economic description).
First of all, consider a short-term "cycle" of behaviour displayed in
the model. There is a constant cycle of short-term dynamics, based
around the interaction of supply, demand and price. (See Chapter 8,
section 3.1 for details of the pricing model.) Figure 2.1 shows, for
part of a simulation run, the way that short-term cycles occur in the
model.
Figure 2.1 shows periods of high and low utilisation, which lead to
relatively high and low prices. The utilisation is driven by forecasting
of demand, which sometimes overshoots and sometimes undershoots.
However, as can be seen from the plots of industry capacity and market
demand, the deviations of supply from demand are continually being
remedied by either ordering of new plants, or retiring of surplus
capacity. For example, the industry at t=5 has too little capacity; this
is remedied by significant additions at t=11, 12 and 13. At t=17 too
much capacity is available; a small amount is retired at t=18. At t=24,
t=30 and t=33 random plant failures probably account for the capacity
reductions. The cycle of causality runs: "High utilisation leads to high
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prices. High prices encourages investment in new plant. Addition of new
plant reduces prices. Low prices make some plants unprofitable.
Unprofitable plants are retired. Removing capacity leads to high
utilisation."
A description of the model's long-term behaviour could be pitched at a
number of levels. Here I will concentrate on the growth process, of
firms and of technologies. "Increasing returns" could be crudely
expressed as "The more you have, the more you get". This is indeed an
important feature of EMIR.
The firms begin the simulation run in an identical state - all have the
same capital and the same kind of plant, and possess exactly the same
technological capabilities. After only a few time periods, however, the
first asymmetries occur - a new plant is bui 1t by someone to meet an
anticipated increase in demand. It may be that the new plant is larger
than the pre-existing ones, or that it embodies some slightly superior
technology. Sooner or later one or more of the firms attains some kind
of cost advantage over the others, through economies of scale or through
improved production technology.
When this happens the industry begins to take on a dynamic all of its
own. The superior firm(s) are more likely to be able to build plants
than their inferior competitors. This is because they are more
profitable and are therefore less likely to be constrained by a large
debt; because, perhaps having built more production units already, they
have acquired some superior technological capability ("Learning through
Doing"); or because they ha ve bui 1t more plants and therefore have a
large market share, which can be rationalised by the construction of a
single giant plant which will reap substantial economies of scale and
further improve the firm's cost advantages.
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This process continues; those who have more are able to build more,
further improve their technology (because it is necessary to build a
unit to discover the true parameters of a novel technique), and further
reduce their costs (thus improving their profits). Meanwhile, the
remainder are constantly being pre-empted by the superior firms, who can
accept lower levels of prospective capacity utilisation. Thus they
rarely get the chance to build, so their own technological improvements
are few and far between, and market share drops, giving fewer
opportunities for "economy of scale" rationalisations. Old plants begin
to fail through the age effect, and, as the industry average production
cost falls, so does the price level. The inefficient firms lose their
profit margins, and in some cases begin to operate at a loss.
Two things can happen to the weaker firm. The most drastic is
bankruptcy. The firm may have taken on a large debt in order to finance
its capacity, but low margins mean that it does not even cover interest
repayments. This wi 11 further reduce its abi 1ity to introduce new or
larger units. Eventually its existing capacity will be retired, either
through old age or, more likely, because it is unable to make a profit
on operating its production units. The weight of debt then produces
insolvency.
Alternatively, the firm may escape the debt trap, though nevertheless
sustaining losses. It becomes non-operational for a while, having no
production units but carrying little or no debt. Its salvation will come
through imitative innovation, since unprofitable firms can try to copy
the techniques of the most successful. Thus the survivors of the
competitive process acquire some of the advantages of the winners, and
successful technologies are diffused throughout the industry.
This pattern is even more pronounced if radical innovations are
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discovered. A really good novel technology brings about what Schumpeter
called "gales of creati ve destruction". The existence of a large cost
advantage for the new technology means that its owner can build new
capacity almost at will. As new units are introduced, they begin to
undercut severely the rest of the industry; previously highly successful
firms, committed to the old technology, lose money and market share. In
extreme cases the industry is completely taken over by the innovating
firm for a while, until others learn to copy the new technique of
production.
The following diagrams and graphs may give some idea of the typical
industry dynamics from EMIR; they refer to simulation run 16HTC4IV (a
run similar to the experiments described in the following Chapters).
They show time series data for demand, capacity and price (Figure 2.2);
firm total capacities over time (Figure 2.3: NB vertical scale is
logarithmic to better display proportions); firm sizes by Capital value
(Figure 2.4); and each firm's average production cost over time (Figure
2.5).
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Figure 2.2: Industry Demand. Capacity and Price for run 16HTC4IV
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Figure 2.3: Total Firm Production Capacities Over Time for run 16HTC41V
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Note that Figure 2.4 was produced by a different program from the
others, so that letters identifying firms in the plots do not all
correspond; firm "E" is the same in all three, however, and has been
highlighted in the graphs.
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Figure 2.4: Firm Sizes by Capital Value over time for run 16HTC4IV
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Figure 2.5 shows that the average production cost of firm E seems to
follow very closely a traditional ''LearningCurve" of improvement over
time. (Remember the vertical scale is logarithmic.) This interesting
finding is by no means unique amongst the simulation runs; indeed it is
quite common to find the more successful firms demonstrating apparently
"law-like" patterns of steady development. More could be said on this
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point; for the moment I will merely note that cost reductions have been
achieved by E with the help of economies of scale as well as of
traditional "factor shares" technical improvements. This is not uncommon
in real life; see Dutton and Thomas (1984), page 240.
Figure 2.5: Firms' Average Production Costs over time for run 16HTC4IV
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The development of technologies has been described almost as if they had
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an independent life of their own, and in a sense this is so. The
development of a technology (again from 16HTC4IV) is given in Figure 2.6
by a plot of K and L coefficients (note log-log scale). All firms begin
Figure 2.6: Technological Coefficients (K and L) for run 16HTC4IV
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NOTE TO FIGURE 2.6: Numeral s indicate mu1 tip1e occurences of a
technological pair (K,L). n@n is the· starting technology. Refer to
Chapter 8, sections 1.3 and 2 for description of technological
specification and the innovation process respectively.
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with the same production technology «(,L) = (100,50). Definite
trajectories of development appear to be manifested; in this case
innovation is initially in the direction of saving on labour costs
(moving right to left), but as the industry matures development goes in
the direction of lowering capital needs. Some abortive development paths
are not pursued; one wins through to bring about considerable cost
savings, roughly halving both ( and L.
We can go further and produce "learning curves" or "progress functions"
for production costs. Fig. 2.7 plots the cost of making a single unit of
output against cumulati ve numbers of production plants in the model
industry; this log-log graph is highly indicative of the typical
learning curve relationship. (The successi ve plants of one particular
firm are highlighted on the graph.) In this case, production costs per
unit of output steadily decrease as more plants are built.
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Figure 2.7: Prodn Cost (per unit output) of Successive Plants for 16HTC4IV
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Similarly we can see that maximum plant scale follows a fairly regular
development pattern; Figure 2.8 plots the sizes of plants constructed
over time compared with the total market demand. (Log plot of size and
demand again.)
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Figure 2.8: Plant Sizes and Industry Demand over time for run 16HTC4IV
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At the macro-level, these last three Figures (2.6-2.8)in particular are
of great interest, for they suggest that EMIR has produced certain
macro-regularities (forms of self-organisation?) which have been noted
by many observers. Figures 2.6 and 2.7'relate to ''ProgressFunctions" of
different kinds, whilst Figure 2.8 gives at least a hint that maximum
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Fig 2.9: Plant Size & Demand
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Fig 2.10: Plant Size & Demand
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plant scale at any time is related to overall industry size. This latter
relationship is not so well-established as the learning curve; it is
examined by Simmonds (1969), Martino and Conver (1972) and Sahal (1982).
Compare Figure 2.8 with Figures 2.9 and 2.10, which show the same
relationships·for US Basic Oxygen Steel Plants, and French cement kilns,
respectively. The general pattern is similar in all three cases. (More
examples could have been produced from these industries.)
Thus EMIR is a model which bears a good relationship with reality at
both the micro- and macro-levels. The assumptions about economies of
scale take into account the considerable empirical research in these
areas. The model of search for innovations is in accordance with the
arguments presented and tested in Chapters 4 and 5; in particular the
innovation procedure in EMIR is systemic and generated endogenously, it
is subject to uncertainty, trial and error, and is partly appropriable,
being relatively difficult to imitate. (This is in contrast to
conventional models which take innovation as given, perfectly known and
equally available to all actors.) The rules for generating and valuing
plant construction decisions have been compared with reality in at least
one industry and found to be adequate. The existence of plural
interpretations of the world has also been incorporated into the model.
In short, this is a genuinely dynamic and evolving economic model.
In the next Chapter the model is described in detail. In Chapters 9 and
10, experiments with the model are used to explore aspects of industry
structure and technological development.
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Chapter 8: Logical Description of EMIR Structure
In this chapter a detailed description and specification of the
Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns is given. A briefer and less
technical outline of the model was provided in the previous chapter. In
the two subsequent chapters, experiments with EMIR are described; for
the most part, these should be intelligible without a detailed reading
of this chapter.
1. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
1.1 Firms
(See Fig. 1.1 on following page.)
The stylised actors (or decision-makers) in the simulated industry of
EMIR are "firms". There are usually 4 to 16 firms in a simulation run.
The firms operate production plants to generate income. They have to
forecast future demand, and have the opportunity to build new plants to
meet future demand. (Demand is exogenously specified.) Loss-making
plants may be retired from use, and old plants are subject to a risk of
failure (and hence scrapping).
Apart from its operation of production units, the firm is defined by
three variables. The first of these is its Capital. This is set at
15,000 for all firms at the beginning of each run (arbitrary currency
uni ts). It is a measure of the assets of the firm. When a new plant is
built by the firm, the capital construction cost of that plant is added
to the firm's Capital; when a plant is retired or scrapped its capital
cost is similarly deducted.
The second defining variable is the Debt of the firm. This is "money"
borrowed by the firm to finance its operations. (The only costs which
firms incur are those of building and operating plants - see below.)
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figure 1.1; Attributes of firms in the Model
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When a plant is built, the construction cost is added to its owner's
Debt. (Retired plants are assumed to have zero scrap value, so Debt is
not compensated when a plant leaves service.) Net profit (income less
costs) is subtracted from Debt at the end of each period. Interest is
charged on Debt. (See section 3.4 below for further details.)
The third defining element of the firm is its Worldview. The concept of
the worldview was discussed extensively in Chapter 6. In EMIR the
worldview concept is used to determine the firm's strategy, which is
shaped by how the firm sees its business environment. World view affects
the firm's forecasting of the future, its risk-averseness, its bias for
or against capital-intensive projects, its innovation preferences, and
its effecti ve planning horizon. In the EMIR experiments discussed in
this thesis only worldviews II (Sectist) and IV (Hierarchist) are
employed. These two correspond to a conservative, and a more long-term,
large scale strategy respectively. The worldviews are discussed in
section 6.2 below, and are mentioned under other headings where they are
relevant.
Firms also possess technological capabilities, which they seek to
improve. A firm may hold three technologies at a time - see section 1.3.
1.2 Plants
A production plant is the physical embodiment of a particular technology
(section 1.3) at a particular scale of operations. It is defined by the
following:
Scale (size) The maximum number of units of output every
period. Plant scales typically vary from 40
to over 2000 in the runs to be described.
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Capital (construction) cost This is the tota 1 cost to the owner of
building the plant.
Labour(fixed) cost This is a cost which the owning firm has to
bear for each period the plant is operated.
It is an overhead cost, incurred regardless
of the utilisation of the plant.
Variable cost The extra cost of manufacture. This is
assumed to be things like raw materials,
energy, and variable direct labour. It is
only charged on that portion of the plant's
capacity which is actually utilised.
"Capital intensity" will be referred to below and in following chapters;
it is used in a loose (rather than strictly econometric) sense to mean
the ratio of Capital (construction) costs of a plant compared with the
other cost elements ~~ of theoretical maximum output. If the
maximum scale of output of a plant is X, then the capital intensity
under this definition is:
Capital cost / [Labour cost + Variable cost] (1)
where Capital, Labour and Variable costs are as defined above.
Firms assess the perceived "average production cost" of a plant for
ranking purposes (see below under "Decision Rules for Building New
Plants" - section 5). This assessment depends upon the worldview of the
firm, and is defined as:
1 * [Capital cost * C(wv) + Labour cost * (l.l-C(wv)) + Variable Cost]
X (2)
where
C(wv) = 0.15 (worldview = II Sectist) (3)
= 0.05 (worldview = IV Hierarchist)
180
Sectists place more weight upon capital costs, and Hierarchists upon
Labour costs. Thus a IV-Hierarchist will perceive a high construction
cost, low Labour cost plant as cheaper than wi 11 a II-Sectist. (See
Chapter 6 for justification.)
Plants do not have an infinite lifetime. After ten years they have a 10%
chance of failing and hence being scrapped in any given year. Their
expected lifetime is thus twenty years. Discounted cashf10w calculations
of a plant's worth (Section 5 below) are therefore done over a twenty
year horizon from completion date.
1.3 Technology
The nature of "a technology" has been explored in Chapter 4. In
accordance with the approach used there, a technology in EMIR is seen as
a potential "technique" for building a production plant within a
particular scale range. It was argued in'Chapter 4 that the assumption
that all firms have full and equal access to all prouuction technologies
was false. In EMIR, a technology is modelled as the property of a
specific firm (although it can be imitated by others once it has been
used by its owner). Firms may hold up to three technologies in their
"repertoire" at a time.
A technology in EMIR is defined by a quintuplet of variables (K, L, V,
MAX, MIN):
K = Capital cost coefficicent
L = Labour" "
V = Variable " "
MAX = Maximum plant scale for which this technology is usable
MIN = Minimum " " " " " " " "
A firm may choose to build a plant of scale X, which will have the
following characteristics:
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MIN = X = MAX (4)
Capital (construction) cost = K * XO•7 (5)
Labour (fixed) cost = L * XO•4 (6)
Variable cost = V * X (7)
There are therefore significant economies of scale with respect both to
Capital (construction cost) and Labour (fixed overhead).
The cost-scale relationships defined in (5), (6) and (7) are typical of
what Gold (1981) calls "capital-dominated" industries. For justification
of the "0.7" and "0.4" rule coefficients, and of the scale-invariance of
the variable cost component, see Tayler (1986) pp 21-31, and Chapter 2
herein, which give numerous references. See also Bruni (1963), Pratten
(1971), and Haldi and Whitcomb (1967) for a wide range of industries;
Norman (1979) for the cement industry; Lau and Tamura (1972) for
petrochemicals; and Cockerill (1971) for brewing. Further discussion,
and numerical examples, are given in Appendix 8H.
2. INNOVATION
All firms begin with the same technology. They have opportunities each
time period to innovate i.e. locate a superior (K, L, V, MAX, MIN)
quintuplet. There are three forms of innovation: incremental change,
innovation by imitation, and scaleup innovation (which may be considered
as another form of incremental innovation).
The principles expounded in Chapter 4 are used to model the innovation
process:
(a) innovations are to some extent unpredictable in their outcomes,
and the innovation process contains some random features;
(b) innovations are most likely to represent logical developments
based on existing techniques, rather than dramatically new
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relationships;
(c) innovations are the "property" of the innovator, at least for a
while;
(d) success in innovation is never guaranteed - it is essentially a
"tria1-and-error" process.
Chapter 4 argued that innovation strategies are conditioned by wor1dview
(or, more prosaically, by general business strategies). The bias of
innovations in the model is towards capital-saving (Le. capital cost-
reducing) changes for II-Sectists, and towards labour-saving changes for
IV-Hierarchists. It is also assumed that the more cautious II-Sectists
are more likely to be content to innovate by imitataion.
In the model, new technologies are generated by applying random changes
to existing technologies (usually the firm's own, but sometimes
others'). The innovating firm then decides whether to adopt the new
technology as one of its 'repertoire' of three techniques.
The random factors are to some extent arbitrary; it would be very
difficult to be sure exactly what they should be for any given industry,
even were data available. A certain amount of trial and error has been
used during the development of the model to find sensible rules which
gi ve steady but not too rapid technical progress. "Sensible" means that
an innovation is likely to produce a cost saving of around 10%, but not
of 50% or more. Similarly, a scaleup innovation could be a doubling of
maximum plant size, but not a tenfold increase. These orders of
magnitude seem more realistic compared with those observed for cost-
reductions and scale increases in such industries as cement manufacture
and bulk chemicals production. They ~lso lead to simulations which are
not too heavily-dependent upon chance events, as would be the case with
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more dramatic and rapid technological changes.
2.1 The Decision Process
The decision process is:
1. Imitation innovation will be attempted with probability (based on
random number selection) as set out in the following table:
Worldview Profitable Unprofitable
Probability of attempt
II 0.3 0.5
IV 0.1 0.3
In this context, "profitable" means "Average Rate of Return greater
than 0". Rate of Return is defined below (equation (38)). Thus II's
have a relative bias towards imitation, compared with IV's.
Profitable firms are more likely to be satisfied with their existing
techniques; unsuccessful firms are more likely to be willing to
attempt to imitate successful competitors.
2. If no imitation innovation is selected, decide whether to attempt
scaleup innovation. If the largest plant built so far (by any firm)
is 20% or more of current demand, then no scaleup is attempted.
Otherwise, let
M = Maximum of (No. plants operated by firm - 4, 0)
Then the firm will attempt a scaleup innovation with the following
probabilities:
World view Probability
IV
0.1 + M / 10
0.4 + M / 10
II
..
Thus a firm operating a large number of plants is more likely to
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fig 2.1; The Innovation Decision Process
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investigate the possibility of rationalising output by constructing a
larger plant. IV-Hierarchists are inherently more likely to attempt
scaleup than II-Sectists, it was argued in Chapter 6.
3. If neither imitation nor scaleup innovation is attempted, then an
incremental innovation will be tried. This last is the most likely
and common form of innovation.
The innovation process for a firm is summarised in Fig 2.1.
2.2 Incremental Innovations
An incremental innovation is one which results in a small improvement in
one or all of the technological cost parameters (K, L, V). Innovations
are generated by deciding which of the firm's existing technologies is
'best', and then producing a candidate for innovation, as follows:
The 'best' existing technology is selected (see below). Let this
technology be (K, L, V, MAX, MIN). Then an innovation is produced,
identified as (K', L', V', MAX', MIN') by:
Let [X] be a random variable uniformly distributed between -x and +x,
e.g. let [0.3] be a uniform distribution in the range [-0.3, 0.3].
IF worldview = II:
K' = K * (1 + [0.2])
L' = L * (1 + [0.2])
K' = K * (1 + [0.05])
L' = L * (1 + [0.25])
K' = K * (1 + [0.25])
L' = L * (1 + [0.05])
V' = V * (1 + [0.025])
with probability 0.4 (8)
with probability 0.1 (9)
with probability 0.5 (10)
(11)
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If worldview = IV:
K' = K * (1 + [0.2])
L' = L * (1 + [0.2])
K' = K * (1 + [0.05])
L' = L * (1 + [0.25])
V' = V * (1 + [0.025])
with probability 0.6 (12)
with probability 0.4 (13)
(14)
2.3 Imitation Innovations
It is assumed that once a technology has been implemented it may be
possible for others to imitate it. The knowledge that a particular way
of doing things is both possible and successful may encourage others to
try it out.
For an imitation innovation, the firm must first decide who to imitate.
It does this by looking for the firm with the highest Rate of Return,
measured by an exponentially-weighted moving average of (38). It then
assesses which of this firm's technologies is the best (see section 2.7
- "Evaluation of Technologies", below), and copies this, subject to
incremental changes. The technology imitated is (K, L, V, MAX, MIN), and
the new technology is (K', L', V', MAX', MIN') generated by:
K' = K * (1 + [0.1])
L' = L * (1 + [0.1])
V' = V * (1 + [0.025])
MAX' = MAX
MIN' = MIN
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(20)
2.4 Scaleup Innovations
A scaleup innovation is one which seeks to remove bottlenecks or
constraints to increasing scale, often with the objective of liberating
further economies of scale. Scaleup innovations are discussed in detail
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in Chapter 4, Section 5. The main reference is Levin (1978); others are
given in Chapter 4.
It is assumed that innovations of this kind not only raise the maximum
scale of operations, but also (possibly) the minimum scale at which the
technology is viable. A scaleup innovation attempt is simulated as
follows (notation as above):
K' = K * (1 + [0.05]) (21)
L' = L * (1 + [0.05]) (22)
V' = V * (1 + [0.025]) (23)
MAX' = MAX * (1.5 + [1.0]) (24)
MIN' = MIN * (2.75 + [2.25]) (25)
It is clearly possible to generate a scaleup innovation in which MIN' is
bigger than MAX'. If this happens, the innovation is a fai lure, and it
is rejected.
2.5 Radical Innovations
A radical innovation (which should be a rare event) invo1 ves a
completely new set of parameters (K, L, V, MAX, MIN), which are not in
any sense "near" the previous technology. Such innovations have been
modelled with EMIR, but do not form any part of the experiments in the
following chapters, so they will not be described further.
2.6 Uncertainty of Results
A key part of the argument of Chapter 4 was the element of uncertainty
in the innovation process. This is obviously implicit in the random
generation of incremental changes in equations (8) to (25). There is the
additional issue of "learning by doing" - a distinction between the
discovery of a design concept and its" practical application. This is
modelled by disguising the true parameters of an innovation by adding
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random factors, until the new technology is actually employed to
construct a new plant. Thus the "evaluation of technologies" (section
2.7) is performed with a slightly distorted perception. It is possible
both that inferior technologies may be accepted, and superior ones
rejected.
New technologies are perceived by the innovators as follows:
K" = K' * (1 + [0.1]) (26)
L" = L' * (1 + [0.1]) (27)
V" = V' * (1 + [0.025]) (28)
MAX" = MAX' * (1 + [0.1]) (29)
MIN" = MIN' * (1 + [0.1]) (30)
2.7 Evaluation of Technologies
Firms are faced with the problem of evaluating the results of an
innovation. They have to decide whether to keep an innovation, and
possibly discard one of their existing three technologies. This may be
an easy decision, but on the other hand one technology might be superior
at one scale of production and inferior at different scales. They
attempt to solve this problem by evaluating production costs at several
different plant scales - five in all.
The possibilities are shown in Fig 2.2 (overpage).
The algorithm for comparing two production technologies is to evaluate
costs at the following five scales:
1) If their MIN value (minimum viable plant size) is the same:
Evaluate which has least production cost at MIN scale - award this
technology one "point". "Production cost" is as defined above in
equations (2) and (3), and depends, upon the firm's world view.
Else
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Figure 2.2: Eyaluatjon of Technologies
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Small variations on these are possible, ..where MIN 1 = MIN 2, or
MAX 1 = MAX 2 (Cases A and B), or MAX 1 = MIN 2 (Case C).
Technology with lowest MIN gains one "point"
2) If MAX values are the same:
Award one point for least production cost at MAX scale
Else
Technology with higher MAX gains one point
3) Award one point for the least cost at the higher of the two MINs
4) Award one point for the least cost at the lower of the two MAXs
5) Award one point for the least cost at the plant scale which is the
midpoint of the scales used in 4) and 5)
The technology with the highest score is the "winner". (Half a point is
awarded for equal production costs.)
This means that necessary (but not always sufficient) conditions for a
technology to be judged "better" are to either:
A) have lower production costs at the endpoints and midpoint of their
common plant size range; or
B) be capable of building either larger or smaller plants than the
other, or both, and to have lower costs at some point in their common
range.
2.8 Rejection of Innovations
A firm may only have one untried technological combination in its
repertoire at a time. (This is so that it cannot attempt to improve upon
an innovation until it has actually tried it out, in accordance with the
argument of chapter 4.) If an innovation remains unused and untried by a
firm after ten periods, it is discarded. The reasons for this include:
(a) after a length of time the "technological frontier" will have moved
on; the innovation will no longer represent best practice;
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(b) it is assumed that "technology" is about the capability to produce
things. That capabiility resides in knowledge and hence people,
rather than things. Unused, the capability will decay;
(c) it is a simple assumption, which helps to keep the simulation
flowing, without firms becoming "stuck" due to their inability to
make technological improvements. After ten periods, the
unsuccessful laggard will often have to try to catch up by
imitation. (In practice in the model, not putting the innovation to
use is often a sympton of failure to build new capacity. This is
often both a cause and effect of poor performance.)
3. FINANCIAL ELEMENTS
3.1 Price-Setting
The demand for output from the plants which the firms operate is
determined exogenously. It is assumed that demand is not affected by
price, but rather that price is set in accordance with the relative
proportions of supply (Le. production capacity) and demand. Economic
theory often assumes that (in the short run at least) demand is a
function of price. Given that the intention of the model is to
investigate different demand scenarios, this assumption is dropped.
Instead, price is set such that:
Price = Average Production Cost * (0.25 + Utilisation) (31)
where
Utilisation = Demand / Capacity (32)
Average Production Cost = SUM(Production cost of plants) (33)
Total production capacity
Production cost of a plant = 0.1 * Capital construction cost
+ Labour Cost
+ Variable Cost at full capacity (34)
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This relationship implies that:
(i) prices fall in the long run if production costs fall; and
(ii) prices rise when demand rises in relation to supply, and fall when
capacity exceeds supply by a significant margin.
There are a number of complex issues surrounding the pricing
relationship. EMIR is not primarily a model of pricing strategy, and
(31) suffices for our purposes here. A number of points about (31) to
(34) are discussed in Appendix 8F.
(Note that the capital cost element is included in (34) for price-
setting purposes only. The actual costs charged to the firm are the
variable and fixed (labour) costs for the plants. The capital costs are
accounted for by the extra Debt the firm has taken on.)
3.2 Allocation of Demand
If demand equals or exceeds a vai lable production capacity, then all
plants are fully utilised.
If capacity exceeds demand, than all plants operate at the same
utilisation, such that total demand is exactly met. See Appendix 8F on
pricing for discussion of this assumption.
3.3 Gearing
EMIR is intended to be be an operational model, rather than one which
faithfully recreates the balance-sheet and accounts of the firms
simulated. It is, however, desirable to have some measures of commercial
success and failure. It should not be possible for a firm which is
consistently performing badly (having, for example, many plants with
above-average production costs) to continue to build new capacity,
especially if the new capacity is likely to embody poor technology.
Firms with below-average production costs should conversely find it
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easier to order new plants.
In order to constrain investment decisions the concept of "Gearing" is
introduced. This is defined as:
Gearing = Debt / Capital (35)
where the firm's Debt and Capital are as described above in Section 1.2.
Firms are not allowed to make investments in further plant once their
gearing has risen above a certain threshold. This threshold is set at:
Worldview Maximum Gearing
II
IV
0.5
0.7
Acceptable "real-life" gearing levels vary between industries; however
these values are not unrepresentative.
3.4 Interest and Dividends
Interest is charged on the period-end Debt at 5%. Since there is no
inflation, this is a real interest rate. It is reasonably representative
of recent history in the UK. Interest accrues on positive cash balances
at 3% per period. Thus
= Debt * 0.03
(Debt less than 0)
(Debt greater than 0) (36)
Interest = Debt * 0.05
If the firm has paid off all borrowings (i.e. has negative Debt) then it
pays di vidends. Dividends paid are 40% of the trading profit (income
less costs) and interest received, Le.
Dividend = O· if Debt is positive
= 0.4 * (Income - Costs + Interest Received) else (37)
A 40% dividend payout is equivalent to 2.5 times dividend cover, which
is considered commercially safe in many industries.
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Again, the assumption that dividends are not paid unless Debt is fully
repaid is unrealistically generous to the firms. However, it is employed
to make sure that financial factors do not dominate operational
performance in the model.
3.5 Bankruptcy
If a firm has:
(a) no plants in operation; and
(b) gearing of 80% or more;
then it is declared Bankrupt, and is removed from the simulation. (It is
not replaced.) If (a) and (b) are both true, then the firm is paying
interest and receiving no income, and its gearing means that it will
never be able to build another plant to obtain income.
3.6 Rate of Return
Rate of return is used to assess who is doing best when firms are
seeking to innovate by imitation. It is calculated as:
Rate of Return % = 100 * (Income - Costs - Interest) (38)
Capital + Debt
i.e. it is the net return this period on the total funds used in the
business. (38) defines the Rate of Return for a single period; for
choosing the "imitatee" an exponential moving average is used
(coefficient 0.5), which reduces the effect of "fluke" single-period
results.
4. DEMAND AND C~PACITY
4.1 Forecasting
Firms in EMIR are faced with uncertain future demand, which they are
obliged to forecast. Forecasts are biased towards long-term or short-
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term data, according to whether firms are IV's or II's (see section 6.2
below for full summary). To forecast future demand the firms use Holt's
Method of exponentially-weighted moving averages. Let:
met) = current estimate of level of demand
bet) = current estimate of rate of growth of demand
yet) = actual demand at time t
yet) = forecast of demand at time t made at time t-l
Then:
e(t) = yet) - yet)
met) = m(t-l) + b(t-l) + Al * e(t)
bet) = b(t-l) + A2 * e(t)
(39)
(40)
(41)
The forecast for k time periods ahead, made at time t, is given by:
Y(t,k) = met) + k * bet) (42)
The parameters Al and A2 affect the weightings given to past data. They
depend upon the worldview of the forecasting firm, and the values used
are:
Worldview Al A2
II
IV
0.4
0.2
0.15
0.08
I have tested these values for reasonableness in other forecasting
applications. The implication of the values chosen is that II's take
less account of past history than IV's, which latter tend to take a
longer-term perspective to decision-making. (See also "J. Royal
Statistical Society" 1975, p.20S.) Some sample forecasts are gi ven in
Appendix 81.
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4.2 Random Failures
Production plants do not have an infinite life. In this model they are
assumed to ha ve ten periods of trouble-free operation, and then to be
subject to a risk of catastrophic failure. In each period after the
first ten, each plant has a 10% probability of "failing". It is then
retired immediately, with no scrap value to its owner.
The 10% probability of failure implies an average life of 20 periods for
a plant (10 risk-free, and an average of 10 more before random failure).
4.3 Retiring Loss-Makers
If a plant is unprofitable and is losing money for its owner,
consideration must be gi ven to closing it down. If a plant was Loaa-
making (i.e. income was less than total costs) in the previous period it
is a candidate for closure if either
(a) total industry capacity was greater than demand last period, or
(b) this plant's production cost was more than 1.5 times the
industry price last period.
If either of these hold, then the expected financial performance over
the next two periods is calculated. Forecast demand and capacity are
used to get expected sales; last period's price is used, together with
the known costs of the plant, to determine the expected profit or loss.
The performance for each period is discounted back at the appropriate
rate. (See next section for details - the aproach is exactly as for new
builds, but only the next two periods are considered.) If the result is
negative the plant is retired, unless the firm owns more then one 10ss-
maker, in which case the plant with the largest expected loss per unit
of output is retired. Only one plant per firm per period is retired on
loss-making grounds, to share the "pain" between firms when the model
industry is in times of serious overcapacity.
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5. DECISION RULE FOR BUILDING NEW PLANTS
The approach to capacity addition and technology selection used in EMIR
has been developed by applying "common-sense" decision rules. The
algorithm described in this section is set out from the viewpoint of an
individual decision-maker operating under uncertainty.
"Common sense" in this context means an application of basic investment
appraisal techniques. A similar approach was developed by Buzacott
(1980), who derived a good description of process choice and plant scale
decisions in the Canadian steel industry over several decades. The EMIR
model is related in spirit (though not in detail) to mathematical
descriptions used by Ghemawat (1984) and by Dosi (1984, eh 3). It owes
its conceptual foundations (and this applies to all aspects of EMIR) to
O.R. and Decision Theory, rather than to traditional economic tools of
analysis.
5.1 Net Present Values
The decision process for new capacity relies upon a Net Present Value
(NPV) approach. This is generally considered superior to other
approaches to investment appraisal (both discounted cashflow and
others), particularly where there is more than one possible project.
(See Weston and Brigham (1979), Rappaport (1986).)
The idea behind the NPV is that cashflows in the future should be given
less weight than current cashfLovs. To achieve this, future cashflows
are adjusted by a discount factor (which increases the further in the
future they occur). A standard introduction to the NPV method is Brealey
and Myers (1988).
Frequently, a project will have a large negative cashf10w (i.e. an
investment) in the first year, and a-series of positive cashflows
(returns on the investment) for several years afterwards. This is
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essentially the case with plant construction decisions in EMIR. To
obtain the NPV of the project, the future cashflows must be discounted
by the appropriate factors. All cashflows, positive and negative, are
summed to find the NPV of the project. If this is posi ti ve, then the
investment is considered worthwhile at that particular discount rate.
5.2 Discount Factors
There is a considerable literature on the selection of appropriate
discount rates for investment decisions. Leaving aside academic
considerations, a wide range of discount rates is employed in practice,
depending upon the industry, cost of capital and risk-averseness of the
decision-makers. In the model this diversity is reflected by using
different discount rates for the world views.
The IV-Hierarchists have a more long-term attitude, and are less risk-
averse than the II's. A discount rate of 6% is used for assessing
investments for IV's, and 9% for the more cautious and short-term II's.
The discount rate r is applied to generate the discount factor after k
years of 1 / (1 + r)k. As an indication of the relati ve effects of the
discount factors, the value of £1000 after various periods is shown
below:
Rate 6% 9%
-----------------------------
After 0 years 1000 1000
" 5 " 747 650
" 10 " 558 422
" 15 " 417 275
" 20 " 311 178
As noted above, the expected life of plants is 20 years; all projections
therefore use a 20-year life, al though in practice the actual life of
the plant might be as low as 11 years, or as high as 40 years. (There is
about a 5% chance of a plant surviving this long.)
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5.3 Capacity - Demand Gap
The simulated firms use their knowledge of present capacity (plus
planned future additions next period of plants they and their
competitors have under construction), and their forecast of future
demand (see Section 4.1 above), to decide whether there is scope for
building a new plant.
Firms forecast the expected gap between capacity and demand 2, 3, 4, and
5 periods in the future. (Plant construction lead-time is assumed to be
2 periods, so there is no point in considering the gap 1 period ahead.)
Additionally, because plants can still operate profitably at less than
100% utilisation, an overcapacity margin is allowed. For the aggressive
IV's this margin is 15%, and for the II's it is 5%.
Define the forecast demand gap k periods ahead, forecast at time t, as
G(t,k) = Y(t,k) * D(wv) - Capacity(t,k) (43)
where
Y(t,k) is the demand forecast from equation (42)
Capacity(t,k) is existing capacity plus plants ordered by all
firms
D(wv) = 1.05 (worldview = II Sectist)
= 1.15 (worldview = IV Hierarchist)
The firm calculates the size of the gap, including planned overcapacity,
and considers the effects of constructing a plant of this output (i.e of
sizes G(t,2), ••., G(t,s». The plant might be built with anyone of
three technologies, so there are potentially 3 times 4 (different gaps)
= 12 plant projects to be considered. Construction costs, operating
costs and expected revenues are used to assess the NPV of each
construction project. Revenues for new plants are calculated on the
basis of a maximum utilisation of 90%, on the assumption that other
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plants would be built if the industry had very high utilisation levels
in the future. That is, income is based on the minimum of the forecast
gap and 90% utilisation for each of the following 20 periods. Thus the
income forecast at time t for k periods ahead for building a plant of
size G(t,j) is
I(t,k) = PRICE * MIN (G(t,k), 0.9 * G(t,j)) (44)
where PRICE is the market price.
The price used in calculating in vestment decisions is the same as the
current price. That is, it is assumed that the best estimate of the
market price of output in all future periods is the price in the period
in which the decision is being taken. This has the effect of making
firms more likely to choose to bui Id plants in periods of high
utilisation, and less likely to build when capacity is under-utilised.
If the fixed (Le. Labour) production costs of the plant are L, and the
variable costs are V per unit of output, then the profit (loss) P(t,k)
forecast at time t for k periods ahead is given by
P(t,k) = I(t,k) - L - V * MIN (G(t,k), 0.9 * G(t,j) (45)
Then if the discount factor is denoted by r, the NPV of the project,
evaluated at time t, is given by:
22
NPV(t) = 2: (P(t,k) - K(t,k)) / (1 + r)k
k = 1
(46)
where
K(t,l) = K(t,2) = half the capital construction cost
K(t,k)= o (k greater than 2)
and
P(t,l) = P(t,2) = 0 (because the plant is not finished for two
periods) ..
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5.4 Rationalising Existing Capacity
Besides building to meet future expected shortfalls, firms may build new
large plants to replace older ones. They might wish to do this either
because a better technology had become available to them, or because
they had the opportunity to replace several small and uneconomic plants
with a single large-scale plant, or both.
The procedure is similar to that followed above, except that the demand
gap (plus allowable overcapacity) is estimated on the assumption that
existing plants owned by the firm are to be retired. Building plants of
this new "gap" size is assessed in the same way as above. The difference
is that the NPV of the new plants is compared with that of the plant(s)
which are candidates to be ret.Lr ed, A project must show an NPV larger
than that of the plants to be retired (on which, of course, the capital
cost is entirely sunk) for the new plant to be ordered.
The rules for "rationalisation" building are as follows:
A) Existing plants are ranked by their average production costs, defined
as in (2). It is assumed that the firm will try to replace old plants
with the highest production costs first, so this provides an ordering
for the decision.
B) Let the capacities of the existing plants be C(l), C(2), ..., C(n),
where the n plants are in decreasing order of production cost. Then
define the future demand gap k periods ahead after j plants have been
retired by
j
G(t,k,j) = G(t,k) + 2. C(i)
i = 1
(47)
C) The "marginal" NPV of each existing plant is calculated in turn by
applying (44), (45) and (46) with G(t,k,j-l) replacing G(t,k), and
P(t,k,j-l) replacing P(t,k). That is, the NPV of the jth plant is
200
forecasted under the condition that the j-1 plants with a higher
production cost have been retired first, so allowing the plant a
higher level of sales than it might have otherwise achieved.
Since the existing plants need no further capital expenditure, the
NPV of the jth plant on retiring the j-1 higher-cost plants is
22
PV(j) = 2: P(t,k,j-1) / (1 + r)k
k = 1
(48)
D) The NPV of the proposed new plant of size G(t,k,j) is assessed
similarly to (46).Thus the NPV on retiring j plants is given by
22
NPV(t,j) = L. (P(t,k,j-l) - K(t,k» / (1 + r)k
k = 1
(49)
An additional criterion for accepting a proposal to build a plant is
that its NPV must exceed the sum of the NPVs of the existing plants
it replaces, derived as in (48). Thus
j
NPV(t,j) greater than L PV(m)
m = 1
(50)
Some comments on this condition, and other issues arising from
section 5.4, are made in Appendix 8G.
Ordering a plant based on a proposal for rationalisation does not commit
the builder to retire the old plants; that decision is taken in the
light of later conditions (demand, capacity and price) in the market, in
exactly the same way as the decision to retire (or not) any other plant.
5.5 Ordering and Building Plants
If one or more projects can be found with positive net present value,
then that with largest NPV is ordered. Only one new plant may be
constructed per firm per time period.
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The construction cost of the plant is derived from the scale of output
and technological quintuplet employed. It is charged equally over the
next two periods. The plant then begins to operate.
The construction decision is assumed to be immediately known to all
competitors. This means that all subsequent capacity decisions take the
future addition into account. The justification for this is that firms
in heavy industries such as steel production, petrochemicals, etc
frequently engage in "pre-emptive" capacity announcements. The ordering
of significant extra production capacity in such industries is generally
gi yen considerable publicity, with the deliberate intention of
dissuading competitors from expanding their own capacity. See also
Ghemawat (1984) for both a theoretical model and empirical analysis of
the capacity expansion process in the US Titanium Dioxide industry,
where the role of "pre-emptive" capacity announcements is discussed.
Firms take decisions in randomised order each period. In times of
industry growth there is an advantage in taking the first decision,
since it is likely to allow the firm to construct new capacity. In
difficu1 t times the first decision is often disadvantageous, since it
will force the firm to retire a plant, thus easing the situation for its
competitors.
An alternative would have been to allow firms knowledge only of existing
capacity. In this case they would only adjust their forecasts of future
industry capacity at the time a new plant became operational, rather
than two periods earlier when it was ordered. The main arguments for
doing this could be that
(a) it is a more realistic description of actual behaviour, and
(b) it would produce more realistic overcapacity situations in the
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model, as many firms sought to fill the same demand gap.
The objection to (a) is that there is evidence (quoted above) that in
some (or possibly many) cases future capacity intentions are
deliberately announced by firms in order to engineer a "bloodless" pre-
emption. The objections to (b) are that overcapacity is frequently
present anyway, due to the capacity - price relationship (see chapter 7
for a description of the phenomenon), and that when it was tried it gave
pathological results. For example, it commonly happens that plants of
scale at least 10% of the total industry demand are constructed. These
plants eventually fail. In the likely case where each of 16 competing
firms then builds a plant to fill this gap, their behaviour will lead to
150% overcapacity within two periods (other things being equal). This
gross level of overcapacity is less realistic than the behaviour
exhibited in the model at present.
6. SUMMARY ON BOUNDED RATIONALITY
In conclusion, two important "themes" in the structure of the model -
uncertainty, and world views - are summarised. The existence of
uncertainty, and the presence of cognitive biases, means that the model
contains a fairly sophisticated formulation of bounded rationality.
6.1 Uncertainty
By way of reminder, uncertainty plays a part in two key areas of the
model:
Firstly, the future demand is unknown and has to be forecast by the
firms.
Secondly, innovation is an uncertain process. Innovations are generated
randomly; the outcome of an attempted, technological change is never
assured. Furthermore, the properties of an innovation are not fully
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known until it has been implemented in a real plant.
6.2 Worldview
In this model two of the worldviews discussed in Chapter 6 have been
used. They are the Hierarchist (IV) worldview, and the Sectist (II)
world view. These two were selected because they have identifiable biases
for and against large scale technology.
In summary, the IV-Hierarchist worldview was characterised by: a longer-
term, optimising approach to planning, and a tendency to favour large-
scale, capital-intensive technologies.
The II-Sectist world view was in contrast based on: a cautious, shorter-
term and more risk-averse approach to planning and a tendency in favour
of smaller-scale, less capital-intensive technology.
These differences are operationalised in the model under the following
headings:
Forecasting: The IV's use parameters in the forecasting module which
mean that they take account of longer-term trends in the demand time
series. (See equations (39) to (42).)
Discount Rate: The IV's use a lower discount rate for assessing plant
construction projects. This means that they place relati vely less,
weight on the short-term payoffs, and relatively more weight on the
long-term returns, from their capacity decisions.
Overcapacity: II's cautiously plan for a lower level of overcapacity
in the industry (equation (43».
Gearing and Financial Risk: The IV's are willing to accept higher
gearing levels than the more cautious II's.
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Capital Intensity: The world views evaluate average costs in different
ways (see equations (2) and (3) above). The IV's weight capi tal costs
less heavily than II's, leading them to tend to adopt more capital-
intensive technologies.
Innovation Search: The IV's are more likely to attempt Labour-saving
incremental innovations then are II's (equations (8) to (14». They
are less likely to take the conservative route of imitating others'
successful innovations, and more likely to attempt to scaleup (see
section 2.1).
7. TECHNICAL ISSUES
7.1 Starting Values
The simulation begins with a given number of firms (usually either 4 or
16 in the experiments to be described). The simulation can be begun with
each firm in an entirely arbitrary state - i.e. with any given Capital,
Debt, World view, set of three technological options, and any number of
plants, each built using a (possibly) different technology.
For reasons of comparison, however, it was important to begin each
simulation with the same starting conditions. It was also important to
start with each firm in the same position as its competitors, so that
the asymmetries which develop between firms during the simulation could
be explained in terms of the effects of the simulation variables.
Some preliminary experimentation was done to find appropriate opening
conditions. For the runs to be described in the following chapter, an
opening Capital value of 15,000 was used. To this would be added the
value of the initial plant(s), which would be financed by Debt. This
generally produced opening Capital of 17,000 to 18,000, with Debt of
2,000 to 3,000.
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Thus opening Gearing is low, perhaps unrealistically so. The reason for
this is that EMIR is not primarily a financial model. Giving firms high
opening gearing makes the role of that constraint very important. The
intention is only to ensure that firms are not permitted to continue to
operate indefinitely when they are performing poorly. The model is about
competition through technology and scale choice, not through financial
performance ratios.
Depending upon the number of firms in the industry, all initial plants
are of size 80 units output per period (for 4-firm industries) or 40
units output (16-firm industries). The number of plants per firm depends
upon the demand series simulated.
All firms and plants start the simulation with the same production
technology. This only varies between high and low capital intensity
rUns.
For more details on initial conditions for the simulation experiments,
see the opening sections of the next chapter, and Appendix 9A.
7.2 Implementation
EMIR is written in BASIC, and runs on an Apricot PC. A full listing of
the program code is given in Appendix 8A.
A full run of the model, using 16 firms and running for 60 simulated
periods, takes several hours. This could of course be significantly
improved by transferring to a more modern machine.
Each simulation run is controlled from a data file which specifies the
demand series, number of firms, initial plants and technologies, and
other information.
The output from a model run consists of two data files which store
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details for each period of the simulation. One records the state of each
firm in each period, and the capacity and price for the industry as a
whole. The second stores details of all plants constructed.
There is also screen output from the program for each period, and while
firms are analysing their options. This allows the operator to halt the
program to investigate the state of the model at any time. (See al so
below.)
7.3 Technical Appendices
There are technical appendices which accompany the program listing. They
are as follows:
Appendix 8B Arrays used in EMIR version 3.2. This lists and describes
all array variables used in the program listing.
Appendix 8C EMIR Progxae Logical Structure. This gives a structured
English high-level "pseudocode" version of the program. It
is commented with labels which are also placed as comments
in the program listing.
Appendix 8D EMIR Previous Versions. This lists the main development
stages of the model, showing how functionality was
developed step-by-step to assist in validation and testing
of the program.
Appendix 8E Debug Output. This lists, with a brief description, the
lines of the program which send output to the PC screen
and ~ct as testing aids in validating the simulation
results.
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Chapter 9: Experimental Results with EMIR
" it is evident that the co-existence of increasing
returns and competition ...is a very prominent feature of
de-centralised economic systems but the manner of
functioning of which is still a largely uncharted territory
for the economist."
Kaldor (1972)
1. INTRODUCTION
The EMIR model was described in the preceding chapter. In this chapter
some preliminary resul ts with EMIR are outlined to show the scope of
this model, and the kinds of new results which are possible.
Section 2 below describes the basic set of runs done with the model.
Certain conclusions are produced from these runs. In sections 3, 4 and 5
these results are investigated further, highlighting particularly the
importance of gaining market share for competitive success under
increasing returns (i.e. where there are economies of scale and the
possibility of technological innovations).
The experiments examine the influence of a number of factors on the
outcome of 60-period simulation runs. Outcomes are assessed in terms of
resultant industry concentration, plants scales, production cost levels,
and cumulative technological progress. The influencing factors are such
things as the strategies (worldviews) of the firms, the growth in market
demand, the number of firms in the industry, and the characteristics of
the initial production technology. The latter is particularly important,
for it is often asserted that plants have to be built big because of the
requirements of the production processes involved.
2. THE INITIAL EXPERIMENTS
The approach was to run the model whilst varying six factors which were
expected to affect the outcome of the simulations. Five of these related
to the starting conditions of the firms in the simulated industry: the
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presence (or absence) of technical change in the simulation; the numbers
of firms in the simulated industry; the initial capital intensity of the
production process; the initial maximum scale of the production plants
in the industry; and the wor1dview (strategy) of the firms. Each of
these five experimental factors could take one of two values. The sixth
experimental variation was to alter the demand profile faced by the
industry; three different demand scenarios were used in all.
Experimental design is described in section 2.1. In sections 2.2 and 2.3
the form of the results, and the method of analysis used, are given.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the simulation results. Regression analysis
is used in section 2.6 to verify the significance of the predictors of
industry structure found in 2.4 and 2.5; these are summarised again in
section 2.7.
2.1 Experimental Design
The initial objective was to establish the essentials of how the model
behaves. The ultimate objective was to gain insight into the
determinants of industry structure and of firm and plant scale. The
method used was to study the effects of changing six important variables
in the simulated industry:
1. Number of Firms in the industry. This was set at either 4 or 16, to
represent a tightly oligopo1istic situation and a more fluid
competitive scenario.
2. Capital Intensity of the production process was set at either
"High" or, "Low" at the begining of the simulation. This was
represented by a doubling of the capital coefficient in the initial
technology gi ven to all firms at the beginning of the run. (See
Chapter 8, section 1.2.) A more capi ta1-intensi ve process might be
exp~cted to make economies of scale more significant for
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competitive success, leading to a greater degree of concentration
and larger plant sizes. (See also Appendix 9A.)
3. Technical Change was either allowed or barred. (Innovations which
allow an increase in maximum plant scale count as technical
change.) This means that the effects of economies of scale alone
can be separated from those of the other form of increasing
returns, technological learning.
4. Maximum Plant Scale at the beginning was set at either 100 or 400.
(This was therefore the permanent ceiling in the "No Technical
Change" runs.) The object was to see whether industry structure is
heavily determined by the availability of substantial scale
economies, or relatively insensitive to them. An additional
objecti ve was to investigate the factors leading to giant plant
sizes; if eventual unit scale were found to be independent of
initial technological maxima then it could be concluded that scale
in the simulated industry was not "techno!ogy-dri ven".
5. Worldview of all the firms was either II or IV in each run.
(Sectist or Hierarchist respectively - see Chapter 6.) All firms in
each run had the same worldview. IV's are expected to have a
larger-scale and more aggressive orientation compared with the more
cautious II's. The object was to see to what extent the "pure"
strategies influence outcome; does a more agressive and long-term
view on the part of the actors change the resulting industry
structure? .
6. Demand Series. Three demand series were used, designated A, Band C
- see Figure 2.1. Demand is the key exogenous input to the mode 1.
As such, it is useful to compare influences due to other
210
experimental variables between demand scenarios. It might also be
the case that plant scales (for example) are affected by the size
of the available market. Each demand series runs for 60 simulated
periods.
Demand series A and B are similar, but B has twice the rate of
growth. C starts at a higher level than either, but grows more
slowly. By using this combination, it is hoped to factor out any
resul ts which are purely the consequences of quirks in the
experimental demand scenario.
Figure 2.1: Demand Series for Simulations
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Each experimental run is identified in the results by a code e.g.
4H1IVA. This code is constructed as follows:
4 / 16 Depending on whether 4 or 16 firms used
H / L High or Low capital intensity
1 / 4 Initial plant scale maximum 100 or 400
II/IV Firm worldviews II or IV
A/B/C Demand series A, B or C
N In place
technical
only.)
of A/B/C if technical change is barred. ("No
change" runs were done with demand series A
Thus 4H1IVA denotes a run with 4 firms, High capital intensity, initial
maximum plant scale of 100, all firms having worldview IV, and using
demand series A. The absence of the "N" at the end shows that this run
was done with technical change allowed.
Each experiment was performed four times, with the random number
initialiser taking the values 1, 2, 3, 4 successively. (The order of
firms taking capacity decisions, "old-age" plant failures, and technical
innovations are determined by random numbers.) All possible combinations
of experimental variables were tried, apart from restricting "No
Technical Change" to demand series A only. This produced a total set of
256 simulation runs. Earlier experiments had indicated the kinds of
variability of results which were likely to be encountered; 256 runs
appeared to be ample to prove statistical significance for results using
only simple non-parametric tests.
The demand series, and the starting conditions for the simulations
(including technology variations for Low/High capital intensity), are
listed in Appendix 9A.
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2.2 Results of Basic Runs
The output from these 256 simulation runs consists of time-series data
files on floppy diskettes. A brief summary is difficult; the data files
take about about 8 Mb of storage space. The bulk of the results have
been placed in the Appendices. The rest of this Chapter is essentially a
summary of the detailed comparisons set out in Appendices 9D to 9K.
Appendix 9B gi ves the resul ts of all of the runs in tabular form. Key
outcome variables, representing industry structure, technology, plant
size and costs, are recorded at the end of each simulation.
The methodology for analysing the results is set out in section 2.3.
2.3 Method of Analysis
The effects of each experimental factor are assessed by pairing up
simulation runs. The pairings are arranged such that only the single
factor under scrutiny differs between the runs. For example, suppose the
factor for analysis were world view. The run 4H1IVA.1 would be paired
with 4H1IIA.1 (the ".1" denoting that the run was performed with random
number seed = 1), 16L4IVB.2 with 16L4IIB.2, 16H1IVC.3 with 16HlIIC.3,
etc. For a full analysis over all three demand series and four random
number streams, the "technical change" runs allow a total of 96
comparisons for each factor, whilst the "no technical change" runs
permit 32 comparisons to be made.
Having made the pairings, it is then possible to perform simple non-
parametric statistical tests on the results to assess the significance
of the experimental variables. For example, for comparing average plant
scale at the end of the simulations, the sign of the difference (+ or -)
between plant sizes at t=59 would be calculated for the 96 pairings.
(Cases where the differences are zerp are discarded.) The 96 + or -
differences can then be tested against the hypothesis that there is no
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difference between average plant scale for runs with world view IV and
worldview II (for example). The null hypothesis is that there are equal
numbers of + and - differences; this is tested by using the Normal
approximation to the Binomial distribution. See Appendix 9D for more
details.
Clearly, a more sophisticated statistical analysis of variance could be
performed wi th the data. However, as wi 11 be seen, this was not needed
to establish considerable statistical confidence in the results.
The output measures (all taken at period t=59) used for comparison
purposes are set out in Appendix 9B. They can be summarised under the
following headings:
A) Production Costs - average production costs, production costs of the
most efficient firm, and market price.
B) Industry Concentration - the proportion of firms still operating
plants at the end of the simulation, and the proportion of industry
capacity operated by the top quarter and top half of the firms.
C) Mortality - the proportion of bankrupt firms and, to a lesser extent,
the proportion of firms not operating any plants. (Normally only one
of the two is significant.)
D) Plant Sizes - average plant scale, and the size of the biggest plant
built.
E) Technological Progress - the average and best (Le. lowest)
technological coefficients for K (capital construction cost) and L
(fixed labour cost). Clearly there can be different biases for and
against K and L within this groupin~.
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In some of these cases, both average values and "best" or "biggest" are
referred to. In the analyses which follow, average values were gi ven
greater weight in assessing outcomes.
2.4 Analysis - Runs with No Technical Change
As stated above, a set of 64 simulation runs was performed in which
technical change was barred; firms were unable to improve upon the
production technique with which they were endowed at the beginning of
each run (see Appendix 9A for detai Is), The resul ts described in this
section, therefore, demonstrate purely the consequences of competitive
interactions between firms in which the only source of increasing
returns is the potential to gain scale economies by building plants up
to size 100 or 400 (depending upon simulation scenario).
The detailed results from these runs are given in Appendix 9B. The
statistical analysis, based upon pairings keeping all but one
experimental variable constant as described in section 2.3 above, is
given in Appendix 9D.
Table 2.4.1: Summary of Influence of Starting Configurations on Key
Industry Performance Measures - No Technical Change Runs (Demand Series
A only)
Perfol'll8D.ce
Measure:
Production Costs
Influence (alternative)
Worldview IV 16 Firms Plant Size 400
(II) (4 firms) (size 100)
High Capital
Intensity (Low)
+++ +++
Industry
Concentration
+ +++ +++
Mortality +++ +++ +++ +
Plant Sizes
(Average)
+++ +++
KEY: +++ (---) positive (negative) influence, significant at 0.1% level
+ (-) positive (negative) influence, significant at 5% level
no statistically significant influence either way
The influences on summary output measures are reported in Table 2.4.1.
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The absence of technical change in these runs means that there are no
differences in technological progress, maximum plant scale or lowest
achievable production costs.
Table 2.4.1 shows that, for example, starting a simulation run with 16
firms (instead of 4 firms) has a positive effect upon production costs
(i.e. they are higher), and a negative effect upon plant sizes (they are
lower). It has a positive effect upon industry concentration
(concentration becomes greater), and upon firms' mortality (more firms
are either Bankrupt or not operating capacity at the end of the
simulation). The reader is again directed to Appendix 9D for
explanations of the statistical significance levels quoted.
Table 2.4.1 shows that simulation scenarios with firms of world view IV
(Hierarchist), with 16 firms (instead of 4), and maximum plant scale 400
(instead of 100), all produce more competitive industries. That is, they
lead to greater concentration (more of the industry capacity in the
hands of fewer firms), higher mortality (more firms go bankrupt) and
lower production costs. (There is an exception to this last point in the
16 firms industry case, where the average plant scale is smaller than in
the 4 firms scenarios. This gives less chance of cost reduction through
static scale economies.)
An initial interpretation of these findings would be that, as expected,
the more aggressive IV strategies produce a more competitive situation
because of their greater tendency to pre-empt increases in demand. The
greater availability of scale economies when production units are
allowed to grow to output 400 explains the greater competitiveness in
these cases, and this was expected. The 16 firm cases provide greater
pressures than the 4 firm industries; this might be explained in terms
of "overcrowding", i.e. there isn't sufficient demand to allow all 16 to
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operate maximum possible scale production units, so that those who get
there first achieve cost advantages which the laggar-ds are unable to
imitate.
A slightly surprising discovery, however, is that higher industry
concentration seems to be associated with Low capital intensity. Plant
scales are unaffected. The expectation was that a more competitive
situation would arise when capital intensity was high, due to the
greater relative importance of capital scale economies. This point is
explored more deeply in section 2.5.2 below.
2.5 Analysis of Runs with Technical Change
We now move on to consider the larger body of results of simulations in
which technical change was permitted to the firms. These runs were
performed over the three different demand series (see Figure 2.1). The
results are first considered in comparison with the runs without
technical change (section 2.5.1). They are then analysed in their own
right (section 2.5.2). Finally, the differences between results for
demand series A, Band C are examined (section 2.5.3).
2.5.1 Comparison with No TC Runs
The runs in which firms were not permitted technical changes (section
2.4 above) ~ere all performed using demand series A. A comparison is
therefore possible between these runs and those which permitted
technical innovations (scaleup and cost-reduction) to the simulated
firms where demand series A was employed.
The comparison is made in Appendix 9D. The differences between runs with
and without technological improvements are easily summarised; they are
all highly significant statistically (all well above the 0.1% level).
The runs with technical change produce:
217
lower production costs and prices
- higher industry concentration
- higher levels of mortality (bankruptcies)
- larger plant sizes
These findings are as expected. The possibility of technical
improvements leads to a new source of increasing returns in the form of
cost reduction for successive plants. It also gives the potential for
ultimately bigger plants, and hence greater economies of scale, through
scale-augmenting innovations. This immediately explains the lower costs
and larger plant sizes found.
The higher industry concentration and increased incidence of
bankruptcies is a consequence of the asymmetrical nature of the sources
of increasing returns. That is, "someone always has to be first" to find
a cost-reducing improvement, or to build a bigger plant, and they gain a
differential advantage over their competitors. (This process was
described in section 2 of Chapter 7.) This is in turn due to the fact
that the model takes account of the argument of Chapter 4 that
technological innovations are in some (possibly only temporary) sense
the "property" of the innovator.
The correlation between technological progress and industry
concentration revealed by the comparison of this section is significant,
in that it confirms the so-called "Phillips hypothesis". (Phillips
(1971), Dosi (1984). See al so Chapter 2, section 7.5 above.) This says
that high levels of industry concentration should be interpreted as the
consequence of past innovatory success. It is an argument against
concluding that highly-concentrated industries lead to higher levels of
innovation, as some observers have claimed. Thus we have:
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Result 1: Technical innovation is associated with higher
levels of industry concentration. Simulation runs in which
firms were able to .ake technological innovations had .are
capacity controlled by fewer firas than runs without the
possibility of innovations.
2.5.2 Analysis of Technical Change Runs
The full listing of output measures for all technical change simulation
runs is given in Appendix 9B. The comparisons, following the methodology
of section 2.3 above, are listed in Appendix 9D.
The following Table 2.5.2.1 shows the significant effects of the key
experimental variables upon the output measures. It consolidates the
results from all three demand series. (The question of the validity of
this consolidation is addressed in section 2.5.3 below.)
Table 2.5.2.1: Summary of Influence of Experimental Variables Upon Key
Industry Performance Measures - Simulation Runs with Technical Change
Perfol1l8llce
Measure:
Production Costs
Influence (alternative)
Worldview IV 16 Firms Plant Size 400 High Capital
(II) (4 firms) (size 100) Intensity (Low)
+++
Industry
Co~centration
+++ +++ +
Mortality +++ +++ +++
Plant Sizes +++ +++
Technological
Progress - K +++ +++
- L
KEY: +++ (---)
++ (--)
+ (-)
positive (negative) influence, significant at 0.1% level
" " " " " 1% "
" " " " " 5% "no statistically significant influence
It can be seen (compare with Table 2.4.1) that the influences observed
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from the runs with no technical change are generally preserved when
technical change is allowed. That is, "competitiveness" within the
simulated industry is generally enhanced by firms with wor1dview IV, by
more firms in the industry, by higher initial plant maximum sizes and
low capital intensity production technology. By "competitive" is meant
some or all of: higher industry concentration, greater rates of
mortality, larger plants, and lower production costs.
Superior technological progress is represented by negative (-)
indicators in Table 2.5.2.1. (A smaller coefficient represents lower
costs.) Two factors seem to encourage more successful innovation. The
first is the presence of 16, instead of 4 firms in the industry. Since
innovation is a series of trials by individual firms, this effect is
explicable in terms of the greater number of seekers for innovation that
the 16 firm cases produce. The second beneficial influence on reducing K
and L is setting the initial maximum plant scale to 400. The likely
reason for this is that firms do not expend so much effort on searching
for scale-augmenting innovations; they therefore devote more effort to
reducing the cost coefficients K and L.
The bias of cost-reducing innovations is as expected i.e. IV's produce
bet ter L-reducing innovations, whilst II's reduce K more successfully.
This is in accordance with the innovation-seeking rules set out in
Chapter 8, section 2.2.
A surprise comes from the High/Low capital intensity influences. The
effects upon the output measures are not what was expected. Table
2.5.2.1 shows that there is a highly significant association between Low
capital intensity and increased industry concentration, mortality of
firms, and bigger plant sizes. (The production cost and technological
progress - K effects are both due to the doubling of capital costs in
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the High intensity runs, and are not otherwise noteworthy.)
It is worth re-stating the assumption here: the High capital intensity
scenarios start with a production technology with plant capital
construction costs the size of those in the Low intensi ty case. (Refer
to Appendix 9A.) It was expected that scale economies in construction
costs would become a more important factor in the High capital intensity
runs. To construct a new plant, a firm must forecast a positive NPV for
the project. (See Chapter 8, section 5.) If capital construction costs
are doubled, then this NPV becomes harder to achieve. Intuition suggests
that one effect of this might be to increase the viable minimum economic
scale of new plants, since firms would need to exploit the potential
economies of scale to offset the extra investment required.
Clearly this does not happen (or, if it does, it is submerged by a
stronger opposite effect). A different interpretation is possible:
because plants are less expensive to build in the Low intensity
scenarios, it is cheaper to build large plants. It might be that large
scale plants become viable at lower forecast capacity utilisation levels
than in the High cost case, and that big plants are therefore more
likely to be constructed. This would suggest that low capital intensity
encourages large scale plants, which then produce higher industry
concentration.
Scaling up plant sizes brings greater relative economic benefits to a
firm in the High capital intensity regime than in the Low. Table 2.5.2.2
shows this:
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Table 2.5.2.2: Comparative Total Costs per unit of output for High and
Low Capital Intensity Production Technology
Plant Scale
50 100 200 400 800
Costs
High K = 100 12.87 10.66 9.12 8.03 7.26
%age redn 0.0% 17.2% 29.1% 37.6% 43.6%
Low K = 50 11.33 9.41 8.10 7.20 6.58
%age redn 0.0% 17.0% 28.5% 36.4% 41.9%
Note: in accordance with Chapter 8, section 3.1, equation (34), total
production costs are given by:
(0.1 * Capital Cost) + (Labour Cost) + (Variable Cost * Output)
This Table shows that the High K technology gains a definite (if small)
relative cost advantage in scaling up production plants. It shows that
there are greater cost ad vantages for firms in the High capital
intensity scenarios in increasing plant scale. These simulation results
show conclusively that the runs in which the economic (cost) advantages
for large plants are greater are not the runs in which the largest
plants are constructed:
Result 2: The si.ulation scenarios fro. which the largest
plant scales e.erge are not those which would enjoy the
largest relative econo.ic (cost) benefits from building
bigger production units.
There is thus the possibility that non-cost factors have an important
role in determining industry structure and plant sizes. Pre-emption and
market share might be such factors. This question will be considered
more fully below. For the moment, note that Result 2 begins to cast
doubt upon the familiar argument that large production plants are built
because they are economically necessary on cost-reducing grounds. Here
we have an example in which larger plants emerge from the situations in
which the cost advantages are relatively less important.
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2.5.3 Differences between Demand Series
The analysis for section 2.5.2assumed that it was valid to consider the
resul ts from all three demand series together in assessing the
influences of the other experimental variables. There are two issues
here. Firstly, do the three different demand series give the same
results, in the sense that the same experimental variables have similar
effects upon the output measures, whichever demand series is used? Only
if this is the case is it reasonable to consolidate the results from the
three demand series. The second issue is whether there are differences
in the results when comparisons are made on pairings which contrast the
demand series and hold all other experimental variables constant. In the
first case we see whether comparing run 4H1IVA with 4H1IIA gives the
same result as comparing 4H1IVB with 4H1IIB. In the latter case we
compare 4H1IVA with 4H1IVB, 4H1IIA with 4H1IIB and 4H1IIC, and so on.
(See section 2.1 above for definitions of the run codes.)
The first question is easily answered. Appendix 9D lists the non-
parametric comparisons for each demand series, as well as for the sum of
the three. It is possible to test the differences statistically,
although an inspection of Appendix 9D by eye shows that in the majority
of cases it is obvious that there is no difference between the results
for different demand series. Appendix 9E describes the Chi-squared
goodness-of-fit test carried out to show that this is indeed the case.
The resul t is that, out of the 56 cases, only 2 failed the test at the
5% leve 1 of significance and one failed at the 1% leve 1. Gi ven that 1
out of 20 would be expected to fail the at the 5% level and lout of 100
at the 1% level by pure chance alone, it is safe to conclude that the
relationship between input experimental variables and output performance
measures is essentially independent of the demand series used.
The second question involves comparison of the output measures where the
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variable experimental factor is the demand series employed. The full
comparison is given in Appendix 9F.
(The demand series are shown in Figure 2.1 above. B is roughly twice the
size of A at all times; C starts higher than A and B, but grows slowly
so that it ends at about the same demand level as A.)
Significant differences do appear between the demand series:
Plant Scale is considerably greater in demand series B than in
either A or C. This is probably because there is more "room" for big
plants where demand is higher.
Mortality is higher in A and B than in C. This may be because less
dramatic change (growth) occurs in series C.
Costs are highest in C, then A, then B. B probably has the lowest
costs because of its larger-scale production plants.
Suggestions as to cause and effect are left intentionally tentati ve:
more work, on a wider variety of demand series, is needed before safe
conclusions can be drawn about the effects of particular demand series
upon the output measures. However, the significant differences observed
here demonstrate that industry structure is affected by market size - at
least within the EMIR simulation model.
Result 3: Plant seales and industry structure do not evolve
independently of the size of the market.
Expressed like this, the result is almost banal. It is, however,
important because of the old economic maxim, encountered in Chapter 2,
that "the di vision of labour is limited by the extent of the market".
For "division of labour" (Adam Smith's words) substitute the more
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prosaic "plant size economies of scale", and we see that EMIR is in
agreement with one of the oldest strands of classical eGonomics.
2.6 Regression Analysis of Industry Structure
The results obtained in section 2.5 have been based upon individual
comparisons, with only one influence varying at a time. A more complex
representation of influences of simulation outcomes would predict
outcomes by allowing the effects of the several factors to vary
together. This can be done by using mul tiple linear regression, with
dummy (0/1) variables for each of the experimental factors and demand
series. A simple additive linear model is used; the objective is to
confirm qualitative effects, not to find the ideal functional
relationship between inputs and outputs.
Appendix 9C reports the "best" equations derived by stepwise regression.
It presents resul ts which are in close agreement with those found by
examining single influences in section 2.5. The explanatory power of the
regression equations ranges from very respectable to disappointing (R2
of 80% to 27%); however, all reported coefficients are significant at
least at the 5% level. The signs of all significant regression
coefficients are in agreement with Table 2.5.2.1above.
The dummy variables for demand series do enter the regression equations
in some cases, confirming that there are significant differences between
results for some output measures. Again, the regression equations agree
with the findings of section 2.5.3above on this point.
It can therefore be concluded that the influences identified by looking
at the effects of changing single experimental variables are preserved
when we vary several factors simultaneously. There do not appear to be
important interaction effects between variables which have been missed
by the single-variable comparisons of section 2.5. The influences are
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summarised again in section 2.7 below.
2.7 Preliminary Conclusions
In section 2 we have looked at the main set of experiments with EMIR.
The relationship between the experimental variables and the output
performance measures are summarised below in section 2.7.1 and 2.7.2.
Some implications are briefly discussed in section 2.7.3, where some
questions for further enquiry are introduced.
2.7.1 Output Measures
The influences upon the main performance measures, taken at the end of
the simulation runs, are as follows:
Production Costs are lower where firms have adopted the more
aggressive IV-worldview, and where the initial maximum plant scale
is set at 400, allowing earlier exploitation of economies of scale.
Costs are higher in the simulated industries with 16 firms,
probably because of the existence of fewer opportunities to build
large-scale plants. (High capital intensity automatically increases
production costs.)
Industry Concentration is increased by the IV-wor1dview, and by Low
capital intensity production technology. It is also increased in
the industries with 16 instead of 4 firms; there would seem to be
less "room" for more firms.
Mortality of firms goes up with wor1dview IV, with 16 firms, and
with the starting plant scale set at 400. It is lowered with High
capital intensity, i.e. mortality is higher in the low capital
intensity scenarios.
..
Plant Sizes are found to be larger in the IV-worldview cases and,
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not surprisingly, in the runs where the initial maximum scale is at
the higher level of 400. They are lower in the 16-firm industries;
again the problem of "enough room" is a plausible explanation.
Plant scales are found to be bigger in the Low capital intensity
situations than in the High.
Technological Progress is biased towards reducing operating costs
(L) by the IV-wor1dview and towards lowering capital construction
costs (K) by the II's, as expected. In general, technological
progress is more successful in improving (lowering) both K and L in
the 16-firm, high (400) initial plant scale and Low capital
intensity cases.
2.7.2 Input Experimental Variables
The selected experimental variables have the following effects:
Technical Change has a very strong influence in increasing the
competitiveness in a simulation run. It raises plant scales, lowers
costs, and leads to higher levels of concentration and mortality.
Worldviev is also important in determining the competitiveness of a
scenario. The more agressive IV's build bigger plants, and
similarly lower their production costs, increasing concentration
and mortality among competitors.
NUJlber of fir.s in the industry has a lesser influence. The runs
with only 4 firms (instead of 16) yield larger plants, and this
accounts for their lower costs, despite their poorer progress in
improving production technology. The 16 firm cases bring about
higher relative concentration and mortality rates.
Initial Plant Scale feeds into the final plant scales observed in
these runs. The cases which start with high maximum scale end up
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with larger plants, and also lower costs. They also succeed in
improving their production technology further than in the runs with
a lower initial maximum; this may be because more innovative effort
has to be devoted to scaling up by the firms in the latter.
Capital Intensity has a paradoxical effect, in that Low intensity
starting techno logy produces more competi tive industry regimes,
with bigger plants, higher concentration and higher mortality
rates.
Demand Series do produce different effects. However, in each of the
three demand scenarios used here the influences of the other
experimental variables are invariant. Not surprisingly, it seems
that higher demand leads to larger plant scales. However, more work
would be needed before convincing conclusions about the effects of
different demand scenarios could be drawn.
2.7.3 Discussion of Results
As the simulation results have unfolded, the theme of "competitiveness"
has emerged. By a "competitive" industry scenario is meant one in which
industry concentration is high (a few firms control the market),
mQrtality rates are high (significant numbers of firms are driven out of
business), large plants are constructed, production costs tend to be
lower and the rate of technological progress tends to be quicker.
The major surprise from these experiments has been that the Low capital
intensity situations produced larger plants, despite the fact that the
High intensity technology offers greater relative economic benefits for
bud Ld Lng big production units. What seems to matter is how easy it is
for a firm to build a big plant (or several big plants), and what seems
to matter less is the total magnitude of the cost savings to be
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achieved. When capital intensity is low, big plants can be erected less
expensively, and firms which take the risk of building big are less
likely to suffer an early demise through the weight of the extra debt
burden. This, at least, is a possible interpretation.
These preliminary experiments thus lead to the hypothesis that pre-
emption and acquisition of market share are more important indicators of
a fiercely competitive industry than the existence of substantial
technological economies of scale. The emergence of a small number of
firms, or of only one, is likely to be associated with conditions where
firms engage in what might be compared to a military contest for
territory. Once territory (market share) is gained, increasing returns
will strengthen the dominant firms' position by allowing them a faster
rate of technological progress and greater relati ve exploitation of
economies of scale. The aggressi ve and successful strategies, .and those
situations and technologies which facilitate the greatest exploitation
of increasing returns, are also those which carry the highest risks and
the greatest mortality rates for the unsuccessful.
Economists have made several attempts to explain market and industry
structure in terms of economies of scale. A notable study was Scherer et
aI's (1975) analysis of industrial concentration in 12 industries across
siz different countries. Static production cost economies of scale were
found to be relatively poor predictors of concentration and of plant and
firm size. Clearly, a wide range of other factors affects concentration
in these industries. However, the EMIR simulation resul ts indicate that,
even in principle, the fact of the existence of economies of scale in
production should not be expected automatically to produce higher levels
of concentration than in industries without such scale economies.
Indeed, EMIR has shown a counterexample, in which simulated industries
with lower economies of scale yield higher eventual concentration.
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In order to further investigate the issue of "competitiveness" and the
possible role of market share as an important source of competitive
success, further analysis of the simulation data is carried out in
section 3 below.
The effects of "competitiveness" upon the individual firm are worth
investigating further. Worldview IV produce more competitive industry
scenarios; what happens when firms of world view II and IV are placed in
direct competition with one another? Section 4 examines this question.
Finally, again from the viewpoint of the individual firm, what are the
consequences of adopting a more aggressi ve strategy? The competiti ve
situations certainly produce more casualties. The effects upon the
eventual fruits for the winners of the fiercer battles are investigated
in section 5, where individual firms' profitability levels are analysed.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET SHARE
It has been suggested above that market share is an important factor in
achieving competi tive success in EMIR. High market share allows the
leading firm to build larger plants (because it can rationalise its own
capacity by replacing a number of small old plants) and thus gain cost
advantages through economies of scale. Market share also helps in
gaining technological progress; building more plants allows more
innovations to be tried out more quickly. In these complementary ways
the two sources of increasing returns in EMIR are exploited.
To confirm the hypothesis (that market share is important for
competitive success), we need to show that:
(a) runs in which there are high levels of increasing returns available
to firms (e.g. the technical change runs) show more pronounced
advantages for firms which gain market share than runs with lower
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levels of increasing returns (e.g. the no technical change runs).
(b) gains in market share tend to be maintained for long periods.
(c) passing a "threshold" market share proportion allows a firm
dominance for some time.
These points are examined below in sections 3.1 to 3.3. «b) and (c)
would be consistent with market share being a source of advantage,
although they would not prove it by themse1 ves.)
In order to compare market share effects, a number of new output
measures were paired and averaged over the runs. These were:
(i) the number of periods for which the "winner" at t=S9 (i.e. the
firm with largest market share) had been ''winning'';
(ii) the number of periods for which the winner had had either the
largest or second largest market share;
(iii) the market share which the winner needed when it first gained the
dominant ranking;
(iv) the proportion of time for which the current leading firm had
operated a larger plant than its rivals whilst it had been the
leader;
(v) the "thresholds" which firms typically needed to achieve in the
simulated industry in order to become market leader for at least
10 periods.
The motivation for choosing these measures was that (i) and (ii) give an
idea of the persistence of market share leadership. (iii) and (v) tell
us what constitutes a "significant", large market share. (iv) measures
how much of the time market share and large plant scales are associated
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for winning firms.
The full data set is given in Appendix 9G. The following is a summary of
the analysis given in Appendix 9R. Note that only simulation runs with
16 firms were considered; the 4-firm cases would have yielded more
volatile results and, in any case, would have required high market
shares for dominance, by definition.
3.1 Market Share and Technical Change Effects
As noted above, the ''NoTechnical Change" (NTC) runs were performed with
demand series A on Iy. We can compare them with the "Technical Change"
(TC) runs for series A (Table 3.1.1):
Table3.1.1: Comparison ofMarketShare EffectsWithandWithout
Technical Change
Average time at which
winner took 1st place
No Technical
Change
44
Technical
Change
32
Av. Market share of winner
on taking 1st place
21% 34%
Av. proportion of time for
which winner had biggest
plant in industry
28% 84%
Statistical significance for the averages of Table 3.1.1 is established
in Appendix 9R. The comparison shows that the winning firms in the rc
runs had been both the leader, and one of the top two firms by market
share, for signifcantly longer than the winners in the NTC scenarios.
The TC firms required significantly larger market share initially to
gain first position. The winning TC firms operated a larger plant than
any of their competitors much more frequently compared with the NTC
firms. (Too much weight should not be placed on this last result,
however; because of the limits to sc~leup in the NTC runs it is likely
that several firms would be operating maximum size plants.)
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A comparison of market share "thresholds" also showed significant
differences. Table 3.1.2 summarises the chances of a firm, having
achieved the indicated market share threshold, being one of the two
largest firms in the industry for at least the following ten periods:
Table 3.1.2: Probabilities of a Firm Being One of the Two Largest in the
Industry in the Ten Periods After Achieving a Given Market Share
(Demand Series A Only)
Market Share
Threshold %
No Technical
Change
With Technical
Change
20
25
30
35
40
33.3%
28.9%
54.3%
65.0%
83.3%
42.7%
54.4%
78.8%
88.9%
(100.0%)
Table 3.1.2 shows that TC firms which gain a market share advantage are
more likely to maintain it. A 30% market share, for example, will give
an NC firm about a half chance of being in the top two for at least ten
more periods; a TC firm will have almost a four-fifths chance. This is
in accordance with the argument that market share is important in
exploiting the increasing returns which come from technological
innovation. Once market share is gained, it is more likely to be kept if
it can be used to bring about cost reductions through additional
technical changes. (See Appendix 9H for statistical significance.)
We therefore conclude that, where there is the potential for
technological improvements, winning firms emerge sooner, and maintain
their position for longer. Obtaining a "threshold" market share is
associated with prolonged competitive success significantly more often
in the presence of technical change.
3.2 Market Share of Winning Firms
In this section we consider only simulation scenarios with technical
change present.
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Overall, the average winning firm at t=59 had already emerged at t=32,
with a market share of 29%. It had been one of the top -two firms since
t=24 (when it had a 19% market share). While it was the number one firm
by capacity, it had operated the largest plant in the market for 69.5%
of the time.
There were differences in results for different experimental scenarios.
Table 3.2.1 summarises some of them:
Table 3.2.1: Influences of Experimental Variables Upon
Market Share Effects
PerfOIWBD.ce
Measure:
Time winner emerges
Influence (alternative)
Worldview IV Plant Size 400 High Capital
(II) (size 100) Intensity (Low)
earlier same later
Winner's first mkt share higher higher same
Winner owns largest plant more often same same
Success thresholds similar higher similar
Note to Table 3.2.1: Words rather than symbols are used to avoid
confusion over the sign of effects. "Same" or "similar" means the effect
is not statistically significant; otherwise, it is significant at least
at the 5% level. Consult Appendix 9H for more details.
It is clear that the situations which were identified as "competitive"
in section 2 have common characteristics in Table 3.2.1. That is, the
worldview IV, initial plant maximum scale 400 and Low capital intensity
scenarios all tend to produce their eventual winners earlier, with
larger market share as they emerge.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, in the more "competitive"
situations, being a winner is associated with gaining a leading position
early. Once gained, market share tends to be held. The market share
required by the ultimate winner is larBer than in the less competitive
regimes.
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No significant differences were found between market share results for
the three different demand series, except that firms in A required a
higher share to first emerge as winners than firms in B. The times when
winners first appeared were similar in all cases. Threshold success and
failure probabilities were not statistically different.
This is reassuring; it might have been objected that the persistence of
market share was simply due to "natural" autocorrelation, which could be
present even if firms added capacity randomly. However, the rates of
demand growth are quite different in the three demand series A, Band C,
so the similarity of the results makes the purely "statistical"
autocorrelation argument implausible. (If the demand level is fairly
constant then plant builds occur less frequently, which under the
"random" explanation would make market share leadership much longer-
lasting than in demand scenarios with rapid growth. The absence of such
a difference undermines this explanation.)
3.3 Threshold Market Share for Success
Table 3.3.1 shows that achieving a 30% market share guarantees a spell
of market dominance for a firm about four times out of five:
Table 3.3.1: Chances of Failure and Success in Maintaining a Position In
Top Two For 10 Periods After Achieving Market Share Thresholds
Market Share
Threshold (%)
Failures Successes Percentage
Success Rate
20
25
30
35
40
45
50 +
108
56
22
10
2
1
2
102
100
86
79
60
50
65
48.6%
64.1%
79.6%
88.8%
96.8%
98.0%
97.0%
Note: Table 3.3.1 shows results for all Technical Change runs, all
demand series.
The percentage success rate shown in Table 3.3.1is very similar to that
in Table 3.1.2 (Technical change runs, demand series A only).
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3.4 Conclusions on Market Share Effects
It has been shown that a firm which obtains a market share of 30% is
very likely to remain one of the top two firms in the industry for at
least ten periods. Moreover, firms which held the dominant position at
the end of a simulation run had on average held that position for nearly
30 periods.
There is thus evidence that market share, once gained, tends to be held.
Comparison between results for No Technical Change and runs with
Technical Change demonstrates convincingly that the ability to make
technological improvements is an important cause of this (section 3.1).
Result 4: Market share is iJIlportantfor competitive success,
because it per.its greater exploitation of increasing
returns.
In scenarios identified as being more competitive the eventual winners
emerge earlier than in the less competitive situations. These
competitive situations - the IV-worldview, the starting maximum plant
scale 400, and the Low capital intensity technology - have in common
that they allow or encourage early capacity expansion. (The IV's are
.generally more aggressive, and plan for a larger margin of overcapacity;
400 initial plant scale permits larger plants to be built generally; Low
capital intensity similarly makes it easier to build large units - see
section 2.7.3.)The fact that these situations produce earlier winners
is additional support for the argument that the acquisition of market
share is a key ingredient for success under increasing returns. (The
sources of "increasing returns" in EMIR are both technological progress
and economies of scale.)
Increasing returns through technological improvements are well-known in
a slightly different form as the ''ProgressFunction" or Learning Curve;
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firms seek greater market share so as to achieve progressive cost
reductions from cumulative output from each plant. This approach to
business strategy was popularised by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG
1965). Economists have taken account of them in some relatively
sophisticated analyses of competition - see e.g. Spence (1981). However,
progress effects in capital goods and exploitation of scale economies
are not generally accounted for in microeconomic models, although they
are well known to business policy analysts (see the survey by Dutton and
Thomas, 1984). As noted in Chapter 2, increasing returns disappeared
from the analysis of almost all "political economists" after Marshall.
In support of these simulation findings, there is some evidence that
Japanese companies in particular have pursued the size/market share
route to competitive success in recent decades. There is considerable
anecdotal evidence that Japanese managers have been keen to construct
the largest possible plants even when their technical experts told them
that the available economies of scale did not warrant it (see e.g. Gold
1974). Abbeglen and Stalk (1985) report a survey of Japanese executives
in top 500 firms which found that they regarded market share as the most
important corporate objective. A comparable group of US executives rated
both return on investment and share price increase as more important.
Clearly there are many factors besides those of scale and market share
which have made Japanese companies internationally successful.
Nevertheless, these results are in encouraging agreement.
4. COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WORLDVIEWS
It has been shown that there is a strong association between
"competitiveness" and the IV-Hierarchist worldview in EMIR. It has also
been shown that simulated industries with the IV-worldview (as well as
others) are associated with the most successful firms gaining a dominant
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position early, and successfully holding it.
No strong conclusions have been drawn from the association between
competitiveness and the tendency for winners to emerge earlier. It might
be argued that this association of phenomena is spurious correlation
(despite the specific attributes of the IV-worldview strategy which make
it a plausible relationship - see Chapter 7, section 6.2). It could be
that "competitiveness" (which has been measured by looking at resultant
industry concentration, plant sizes and costs) naturally implies that
firms stay dominant for a long while. Industry concentration is
naturally highest, in the most extreme case, when only one firm
survives.
However, we can test whether the IV-worldview does indeed lead to
competiti ve success directly. By simulating an industry in which some
firms have the IV-worldview, and others the II-worldview, we can see
whether the configuration identified as more "competitive" is actually
more successful in practice.
To do this, the model was run a number of times (16 in all) with eight
firms having worldview II and eight having worldview IV. The demand
s~ries was A, and the scenarios were High and Lowcapital intensity,
initial plant maximumscale 100 and 400. Each scenario was run four
times with different random number seeds, as usual. At the end of each
run the number of firms still operating plants, not operating any
capacity, and bankrupt, were recorded (see Appendix 91). Table 4.1
summarises the results:
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Table 4.1: Results of Competitions Between the Worldviews
Run Average Nuaber of fir.s at t=S9:
Operating Not Operating Bankrupt------------------------------------------------------16 H 1 Us 0.00 5.00 3.00
IVs 3.50 1.25 3.25
16 H 4 Us 0.25 4.50 3.25
IVs 2.00 0.50 5.50
16 L 1 Us 0.00 6.25 1.75
IVs 4.00 2.50 1.50
16 L 4 Us 0.00 7.25 0.75
IVs 2.75 2.50 2.75
Table 4.1 shows very clearly that the IV's have a considerable
competitive superiority. In only one simulation out of the 16 did a
single II-firm have any operational plants at all at the end of the run.
(The probability of this happening by chance would be less than 0.0003
if there were no difference between the competitive "fitness" of the two
worldviews.)
From this, we can conclude that the greater competitiveness of the IV's,
initially measured through the industry structure observed as an outcome
of simulation runs, is a genuine behavioural trait. The tendency for
winners to emerge early and maintain their lead is thus due to their
superior ability to fight for market share, and hence exploit increasing
returns effects. Adoption of the IV-worldview by a firm does give it a
relative competitive advantage, in the sense of improving its chance of
being a winner. (It may also improve its chance of coming to an untimely
end - see section 2.5, where Mortality is shown to also increase with
worldview IV.)
Result 5: The IV-vorldviev competes aggressively (and
successfully) by encouraging firms to gain market share
early.
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5. PROFITABILITY OF FIRMS
Whilst survival may be seen as the first aim of any actor in an
industry, the profitability of a firm is the next most important thing
to consider. We can examine this in EMIR by looking at the amounts of
accumulated capital held by the firms at the end of the simulation run.
The detailed results are presented in Appendix 9J, and the paired
comparisons in Appendix 9K. They are summarised below in Table 5.1. This
shows the influences of the experimental variables upon the
profitability of the industry. The performance measures are: the total
profit (accumulated capital less any debt) of the firm with the largest
capital; the winner's percentage share of the total capital for all
firms; and the total for all firms in the industry. (NB 4/16 firms
comparison omitted, because the total profitability measure is distorted
by the number of firms - see note in Appendix 9K.)
Table 5.1: Influences on Firms' Profitability
Perfor.mce
Measure:
Winner's Total
Profit
Winner's Profit
as % of total
Total Profits of
wh,oleindustry
Influence (alternative)
Worldview IV Plant Size 400 High Capital
(II) (size 100) Intensity (Low)
KEY: +++ (---) positive (negative) influence, significant at 0.1% level
++ ( -- )" " " "" 1% "
+ (- )" " " "" 5% "
no statistically significant influence
The most competiti ve situations are those with world view IV, initial
plant scale 400 and Low capital intensity. In the first (worldview IV)
of these cases the most successful firm is shown in Table 5.1 to be
significantly less profitable than in the corresponding less competitive
case. In the other two sets of comparisons the difference is in the same
direction (i.e. the more competitive scenario yields lower absolute
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profitability for the winner more frequently - see Appendix 9K), but the
difference are slightly below statistical significance.at the 5% level.
On the other hand, the percentage share of profits gained by the winner
in the more competitive situations was significantly greater in two of
the cases (worldview IV and low capital intensity). The percentage share
in the 400-firm scenarios tended to be larger, but the difference was
again not quite significant at the 5% level.
Finally, two out of the three predictors of competitiveness (IV-
worldview, and low capital intensity) give significantly lower total
profitability for all firms in the industry.
In agreement with these results, a comparison between profitability for
runs with and without technical change (on demand series A only) shows
much higher profitability for the winner, but lower profits for the
industry as a whole. Thus the situation with the greater degree of
increasing returns gave comparatively better results for the winner, but
absolutely worse results for the industry as a whole.
Result 6: In the more competitive situations successful
firms gain a larger share of the industry profits, but these
profits are often not so great as in less competitive
situations.
So stri ving too hard for competiti ve success, as well as leading to
higher rates of bankruptcy (see section 2) may depress profitability.
Trying too hard to dominate the market may simply lead to a worse result
for everyone, including the aggressive "winner". For a good real-life
example of this effect, see Ghemawat's (1984) study of competition in
the Titanium Dioxide Industry.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The results can be considered in terms of the implications for three
perspectives: those of the Theoretician, the Policy Analyst and the
Decision-Maker.
6.1 Theoretical Implications
In summary, the key theoretical findings from these experiments with
EMIR are as follows:
1) Most importantly, part of the reason for building a model such as
EMIR was simply to show that it can be done, and to suggest that this
is the most fruitful path for further study of micro economic
interactions. The model has succeeded in that aim; its behaviour is
certainly no less realistic than any other traditional microeconomic
description, and in many ways its workings are built much more
closely upon observations of how economies of scale, technical
change, information, bounded rationality and learning actually work
in the real world.
2) Within this model, economies of scale do not automatically lead to
large plants or highly-concentrated industries by themselves. Indeed,
Result 2 shows that there are cases where the opposite is the case.
Simulation runs have shown situations in which relatively lower
degrees of static scale economies can lead to higher degrees of
industry concentration.
3) A corollary, and the most surprising discovery from the experiments
with EMIR, is that the relative magnitudes of scale economies are not
the most important determinants of industry concentration. The
conventional theorist's objection to including economies of scale in
a model at all has been that t·t would imply accepting that an
industry would have to be dominated by 'economy of scale' plants i.e.
242
by production units with the lowest possible production costs. This
does not occur in EMIR. On the contrary, the high capital-intensity
industries (which could enjoy the greatest economies of scale in
production) tend to have smaller plants on average.
4) The implication of 2) and 3) is that it is no longer especially
surprising that economists have not been very successful in
explaining industry structure in terms of static economies of scale
(e.g. the important Scherer et al (1975) study - see discussion in
section 2.7.3). EMIR provides a model which shows why such an
explanation will need to be more complex.
5) Among other infl uences (outside the scope of EMIR), industry
structure is in fact affected by other sources of increasing returns,
and especially by technological change. EMIR shows that technical
change can be at least as great an inf 1uence as static production
cost economies of scale (Result 1).The worldview of firms is another
key factor (Result 5).
6) Moreover, industry structure and plant sizes are not independent of
the size of the market (Result 3).
7) The model has provided confirmation of Phillips' hypothesis (Phillips
1971) that industry structure is a function of past innovatory
successes; this has important implications for the validity of a
number of studies of the firm size-innovation rate relationship
(Result 1).
6.2 Policy Implications
The policy analyst is most interested in those forces affecting
competition in an industry, and in underatandfng whether intervention is
needed to improve the economic system. Clearly, there is a considerable
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leap involved in going from EMIR simulation results to prescriptions for
the real world. The following is suggested as the kind of ad vice that
such a model can provide:
1) Economies of scale are not a good predictor of concentration (Result
2). It follows that, if the existence of considerable technical or
production scale economies are not automatically a compelling factor
in inducing industrial concentration, their use as arguments in
fa vour of allowing high degrees of concentration should be viewed
with suspicion. (The survey of empirical studies in Chapter 2 bears
this point out.)
2) Market share leads to market dominance. In the absence of other
influences (of which there might be many, of course), if a firm gains
a substantial advantage in market share it is likely eventually to
dominate the industry. The dominant actor can produce more frequent
technical improvements and economy-of-scale plant rationalisations,
squeezing out "marginal" competition by reducing costs. (Result 4).
Growth in this oligopolistic competition is the result of successful
move and countermove against opponents, not of the fine-tuning of
price and demand elasticity curves. A military contest for territory
is a fair metaphor for this process. Pre-emption of capacity, as
practised by the IV-strategists, seems to be an important competitive
weapon, allowing technological learning and the utilisation of static
economies of scale.
3) High degrees of competition in an industry for prolonged periods are
not good for its health (Result 6), leading to perhaps unsustainably
low profitability.
4) The theoretical points 6 and 7 above - that industry structure
244
evolves as a result of endogenous forces as well as external
influences - should be thoroughly absorbed by the policy analyst as
well as the theorist. The discovery that firms with a particular
structural characteristic (e.g. big firms) also have another
desirable characteristic (e.g. they are good at innovation) should
not lead to the automatic conclusion that policy prescriptions which
encourage the one will also stimulate the other (e.g.if we encourage
firms to merge and thus become bigger they will become better at
innovation). Past success may lead to size; it does not follow that
size causes success unless, as in 2) above, there are particular
reasons why further increasing returns are available to the larger
firm.
6.3 Implications for the Decision-Maker
The chief lessons for the decision-maker are:
1) Market share is more important than immediate profitability, because
market share will determine ultimate survival and profitability
(Result 4). Thus decisions on capacity increases, pricing, and
marketing plans should be geared to gaining long-term market share
rather than short-term returns. That is, pre-emptive building of
production capacity can payoff in the long term even though it may
not yield profits immediately. The dynamic nature of the environment
of the firm, in which other firms, their plants, and their production
technologies are all subject to change, growth and evolution, means
that it is the potential for future performance which matters.
This conclusion is reinforced in EMIR by the success of the
Hierarchist IV-strategist over the II-Sectists (Result 5). The IV's
take a much longer planning horizon, using a lower discount rate, and
"win" all the simulated industry competitions against the more
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cautious short-term II's.
2) The risk of this strategy is that over-competiti veness spoi Is the
market for everyone (Result 6). The corollary, then, is that one
should be willing to consider cutting losses and investing in other
areas once it has become clear that other firms have prevented you
from attaining a dominant position in the market.
6.4 Further Work
This chapter has concentrated on issues of cost, plant size and industry
structure. In the next chapter EMIR is used to investigate an important
issue in the development and selection of technology. In the final
chapter the broader implications of this type of model will be
discussed, and put into the context of the rest of the thesis. In
conclusion, there are areas worthy of further investigation:
1) Clearly, the particular details of the outcomes of a given simulation
run are dependent upon more than the experimental variables and
demand series which have been highlighted. The detailed description
of the model in Chapter 8 shows that a range of parameters have been
"hard-coded" into the model. They deal with things like the
probabilities of innovations, the exact specifications of the
beha viour of firms with different world views, acceptable gearing
.levels for firms, the characteristics of the technologies used, and
so on. A full understanding of the model requires further
investigation of the effects of varying some or all of these.
2) Having said that, I am confident that the generalised findings
condensed into Results 1 to 6 would be preserved under a wide range
of parameter choices. This confidence is based upon observation of
the behaviour of firms under increasing returns in hundreds of
simulation runs. This being the case, an interesting exercise would
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be to attempt to reduce this highly complex model whilst still
preserving the important facets of behaviour •.Exactly which
assumptions are important, and which can be simplified? I believe
that the innovation search and plant scale choice (investment
appraisal) processes could be considerably simplified whilst still
producing the same performance effects.
3) Finally, it has been shown that market (demand)size influences plant
scale. Further analysis with a wider range of demand series would
allow stronger conclusions to be drawn about the nature of that
relationship.
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Chapter 10: Technological "Lock-In" Through Small Events
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 9 the Evolutionary Model of Increasing Returns was used to
investigate conventional questions of industrial competition and
structure. In this chapter, the richness of the model is demonstrated by
using it to analyse the problem of increasing returns and "technological
lock-in". This important economic problem is particularly interesting
because it is not addressed at all by any existing techniques in
economics.
So far we have concentrated on scale effects to the partial exclusion of
questions about technological innovation. This chapter investigates a
particular problem in the economics of technical change, demonstrating
the power of EMIR to shed light upon a question which other models
cannot approach. The problem is first outlined.
2. THE PROBLEM
The "optimising" view of the world holds that rational economic actors
wi 11 al ways make the choices which provide the greatest payoffs for
themselves. This is a consequence of the belief that, on the average, a
group of actors will in the long run behave as if they had perfect
information (because the process of trial and error can be relied upon
to unearth the most profitable choices). The corollary is that the
technologies which exist today must, by the evidence of their very
survival, be "optimal" in some sense.
Brian Arthur has argued that this is not always the case. (Arthur 1983.)
There exist many examples of technologies which have been universally
adopted which clearly do not fulfil the criterion of optimality. A good
example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, deliberately designed to slow
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down the typist (because the earl y mechanical machines became jammed
easily). Other plausible cases include: the dominance of the FORTRAN
computer programming language over ALGOL;the widespread adoption of
light-water nuclear reactors in preference to gas-cooled; and (more
controversially) the adoption of the internal-combustion engine
automobile in preference to its steam-driven competitors in the early
20th century. (See Arthur 1983, 1987 and references therein for
documentation of these claims.)
These cases have two factors in common.One is that their fates were
determined by what seemed at the time small, even trivial, "random"
effects. (E.g. the development of the steam car in the USAwas seriously
retarded by an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 1914 which caused
all the public horse troughs to be removed, depriving the steam vehicles
of refuelling facilities.) The other commonfeature is the exf.stience of
increasing returns to adoption of the technology. This can come about
through a variety of causes, including learning through using, network
externalities (fit with existing technologies), and economies of scale.
The increasing returns aspects of the ''Lock-In'' have been investigated
mathematically by Arthur, Ermoliev and Paniovsky (1986). EMIRgives us
an alternative way of demonstrating the existence of the "Lock-In"
phenomenon. EMIR can represent technologies in evolution and
competition. It has increasing returns, both through economies of scale
in adoption (larger plants cost proportionately less), and through
learning-by-using effects. It also possesses a randomness at the micro
level, in that the incremental innovation process, and the choice of
firm to build the next plant, are both governed by chance features.
Thus it is possible to illustrate ''Lock-In'' by repeatedly simulating
the outcome of a "competition" between ··twoproduction technologies. This
can be done by gi ving one techno logy to some of the firms in the mode1
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and a different one to the others. The technologies compete through the
firms which build plants using them. "Good" technologies should prosper
as they allow their firms to lower production costs, thus permitting
them to expand output further and gain greater cost reduction through
economies of scale. More plants mean more technical experiments and more
chances to improve the favoured technology, which should strengthen its
advantage over the inferior rival. Innovation by imitation will mean
that firms with the inferior technology will switch to the superior once
they realise that better returns can be earned by changing over.
Thus it should be the case that a "superior" technology will be able to
win the technological competition of "survival of the fittest", for
there will undoubtedly be increasing returns to scale of its adoption.
The flaw in this argument, and the problem with this kind of post hoc
reasoning is well illustrated by the following experiment.
3. EXAMINING TECHNOLOGICAL LOCK-IN WITH EMIR
Two different technologies were selected. For simplicity's sake, they
were both set to have maximum scale of 100 and minimumn of 40, with
labour coefficient L set to 100. The first one (technology A) had
capital coefficient 100 and variable cost loS, whilst the other
(technology B) had K and V of 50 and 5.0 respectively. (Refer to
Chapter 7 for details of the representation of technology in EMIR.) Thus
A has high capital requirement and low variable cost, whilst B has lower
capital needs but higher variable inputs.
Bearing in mind the fact that the K and L coefficients can be al tered
quite significantly by incremental innovations, whilst V can only be
improved by very small amounts, it is,clear that A has better long term
prospects in that it is has the greater potential for overall cost
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improvements. That is, the high capital requirements of A can be reduced
more quickly than the high variable costs of B. The relative costs per
uni t of output of the two technologies at a range of sca les up to the
maximum is as follows:
Table 3.1: Comparison of Production Costs for Simulated Technologies A
and B at Differing Scales of Production
Plant Scale 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Costs per unit output:
B) K=50, V=5 10.467 9.782 9.286 8.908 8.607 8.361 8.155
A) K=100, V=1.5 12.434 11.064 10.073 9.315 8.713 8.221 7.810
Difference 1.967 1.282 0.787 0.407 0.106 -0.140 -0.345
These two technologies were set in competition six times, initialising
the random number stream with the numbers 1 to 6. There were 16 firms;
eight of them were given technology A to begin with and eight of them
technology B. The same demand sequence was run for 59 simulated periods
as in the standard experiments described above. The results for the six
runs were:
Table 3.2: Results of Technological Competitions
Random Seed 1
B A A A A A
2 3 4 5 6
Winner
The superiority of technology A at plant scales greater than 80 meant
that it was nearly always the winner of the technological competition.
That is, by t=59 (often well before) technology B had been driven out of
existence; firms operating it had been dri ven into bankruptcy, or had
avoided that fate by switching to A.
The cost advantage of A was then slightly reduced by raising its V
..
coefficient to 2.0. This implies virtually equal production cost at an
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output scale of 100 (the initial maximum for both A and B). The results
were then as follows:
Table 3.3: Results of Technological Competitions after a Small
Relative Performance Reduction in Technology A
Random Seed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Winner B A B A B = B A = B
The final tally is five ''wins''for B and three for A, with two "draws"-
cases where both technologies were still in existence at t=S9. (In both
these cases it appeared that A would ha ve been the eventual winner if
the run had continued, since it acounted for the major proportion of
production and had significantly lower costs.)
4. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITIONS
This is an extremely interesting result, despite its apparent
simplicity. Firstly, it is clear that a small change in one
technological parameter has the effect of completely altering the
competitive outcome. A small further increase in the V coefficient of B
would lead to its superiority in almost every case. Thus an incremental
change in one part of the system (the available technological
repertoire) leads to a non-linear, non-incremental jump in the system as
a whole. There is an instability near this critical point in the
uhiverse of possible technologies, and the system is clearly "non-
equilibrium" .
Thus in the presence of increasing returns it is not always true that
the chances of survival of a particular technology are directly related
to the amounts of improvements and development which they enjoy.
Relative "fitness" or potential for success is not at all proportional
to the absolute difference in performance capabilities; rather, there is
a threshold of "fitness" which is passed or which presents an
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insuperable obstacle.
In the case where two technologies appear to be balanced (such as the
second set of competitions above), the balance does not tend to result
in an outcome in which two rival technologies co-exist. Increasing
returns see to it that, in general, one succeeds at the expense of the
other. (This is a good example of what economists call a "non-
convexity".) Relatively small events are amplified in importance by the
increasing returns phenomenon. The outcome of the simulations in the
second set of competitions is quite clearly non-deterministic and rests
upon which technology first succeeds in achieving significant scaleup
and implementation at the larger scale.
It is worth repeating the comment made in describing the two
technologies Aand B used for the experiment above. A and B have similar
costs initially, but because of the structure of the technology and the
nature of the search process for improvements, the potential for
reducing costs over time is much greater for A than for B. This does
not, however, mean that A always wins the relatively short-term
technological competition; it can be completely displaced by B before
its potential is realised by the competing simulated firms.
Result: Small random events, and small differences in
technological specification, can produce co.pletely
different outco.es. The winner of a technological
competition need not be that technology which would have
been most econoadcally beneficial 10 the long run.
So the history of a system is very important in explaining and
understanding how it came to be as it is. The argument that things are
as they are because the present technology is the "optimal" choice is,
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in these situations at least, quite spurious. The argument, for example,
that paper must be manufactured in very large-scale plants rests upon
certain technological "facts" which (as we have seen in earlier
chapters) are open to dispute. However, even if we accept these "facts",
we need not abandon the possibility that it might have been more
efficient in the long-run to adopt a completely different technology
which does not require large scale for economic operation.
This argument should not be confused by the fact that, in EMIR, an
important source of increasing returns is the presence of substantial
economies of scale in every technology. It is the increasing returns
which lead to the Lock-In phenomenon, and these need not arise from
static scale economies alone. The key point is that EMIR demonstrates
that the fact of winning a technological competition for survival does
not automatically imply "optimality".
(In the real world, of course, the situation is further complicated by
the fact that institutions and individuals form "irrational" attachments
to particular technologies for a variety of reasons; this may either
reduce the chances of the "best" technical option surviving (since few
are prepared to gi ve it fair consideration) or a1 ternati ve1y keep it
ali ve longer in the face of initially adverse circumstances.)
Another consequence of the influence of small events is that prediction
of the outcome becomes very difficult. Naturally when the advantage of
one technology is overwhelming this is not the case, but when no option
is obviously superior increasing returns may secure total success for
one at the expense of all others, rather than a splitting of the spoils
in proportion to effectiveness. Increasing returns increase instability
and decrease equilibrium, rendering forecasting a more hazardous process
yet.
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Technology policy, whether of the firm, industry or Government, must
therefore take account of the problems of predicting the technological
future and of the dangers of lock-in. Increasing returns are a potential
enemy of both.
5. IMPLICATIONS
The problem of technological lock-in was examined in the last section of
this chapter. The implications of the findings - that increasing returns
mean that the competitive process can throw up a winning technology
which does not lead to the eventual maximisation of economic efficiency
- are very important, and go well beyond the realms of technology
policy.
The first consequence is that a competitive system cannot be relied upon
to produce the economically efficient outcome in every case. Traditional
theory looks at the possible outcomes of choices, and 'optimises'
between them to select the best. EMIR insists that a process of
competition has to precede an outcome - it is not instantaneous. During
the process, increasing returns may temporarily favour one 'competitor'
(whether firm or technology) over the theoretically optimal contestant.
Adam Smith's "hidden hand" gropes blind 1y, and may sometimes grasp the
Wrong solution.
Secondly, and following from this, there is a counter to the last
defence of the Neoc1assica1s. When assailed by the empirically-based
arguments that (for example) economic actors are never really in
possession of all relevant information, that markets are never perfect,
that the economy is never truly in equilibrium, they reply roughly as
follows: "Of course, that is true in a purely literal sense. But is
doesn't really matter, because the wonderful thing about the market is
that it produces the same result 'as if' we did have perfect
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information, perfect competition and perfect equilibrium. Those who try
out less than optimal solutions to economic problems will see that
others do better by choosing better solutions- even if the choice is
made by chance."
The fallacy of this argument in the presence of increasing returns has
been proved quite clearly by EMIR for technological competition; it is
not hard to see that the same argument applies to all other forms of
competition. The 'as if' argument does not stand up, because it has been
shown that competition does not always automatically select the optimal
outcome. Therefore, the whole edifice must fall: markets are not
perfect, actors not omniscient, economies not in equilibrium. Moreover,
they do not have to behave in the long run 'as if' they were.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion: Uncertainty and Increasing Returns
In this concluding chapter the arguments and results of·the work will be
summarised, and some implications will be highlighted. In the third part
of this chapter the use of models for analysing complex problems such as
scale and technology choice will be discussed. Finally, the fourth
section ends with some criticisms of the work, and suggestions for
further lines of enquiry.
1. SUMMARY
It will be useful to summarise the most important findings again under
the three main headings of "Theory", "Policy" and "Decision Aids":
1.1 Theoretical Results
(i) In Chapter 2 it was shown that the conventional theory of scale
economies was inconsistent, contradictory, and unsupported by the
available empirical evidence.
(ii) In Chapter 3 the "dynamic diseconomies" of scale were demonstrated.
"Static" construction-cost economies of scale were shown to be only one
of the elements which determine the real costs of operation with plants
of different sizes.
(iii) In Chapter 4 a new and original derivation of the principle of
"t echno Log Lca I heuristics" was produced. This argued that in an
uncertain world we should expect to find that technical progress
followed clearly-defined paths, which changed only rarely. In Chapter 5
these arguments were embodied in a computer model of progressive
technical improvements. Simulation runs from this model yield convincing
"learning curve" patterns of cost reduction.
(iv) Some highly contradictory Ld eas about optimal scale in several
large~scale production industries were presented in Chapter 6. A
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theoretical argument, borrowed from the Grid-Group theory of Social
Anthropology, demonstrates why this is to be expected. Conflicts of
"opinion" about the optimum scale are inevitable.
(v) In Chapters 7 and 8 a new model of competition under increasing
returns (EMIR) was described. This computer simulation model does not
suffer from the theoretical problems outlined in Chapter 2, and pays
close attention to the empirical research on the economics of production
and technological change.
(vi) This new model was used in Chapter 9 to study the evolution of
industry structure (production costs and firm and plant scale). Amongst
other resu1 ts deri ved from the experiments in Chapter 9, it was found
that the presence of economies of scale does not by itself lead to
concentration, and that greater scale economies do not necessarily lead
to greater concentration. It was also demonstrated that industry
structure need not be viewed as an arbitrary and exogenous factor, but
that it can be seen evolving as a result of the competitive pressures
within the market.
(vii) In Chapter 10 the model was used to show how '~echno10gica1 Lock-
in" occurs. This is particularly interesting as a theoretical
development, because it is a good exmap1e of a problem in the economics
of technology, scale and increasing returns which is not addressed by
existing models.
1.2 Results for the Policy Analyst
The policy analyst is primarily concerned with the issues of economic
efficiency: what has to be done to ensure that the industry as a whole
prospers and achieves the best possible costs and technologies?
(i) The survey of empirical studies of scale economies in Chapter 2
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showed that the largest firm sizes found in practice are not a necessary
consequence of the existence of production (or any other) scale
economies. Calculated "minimum efficient sizes" for plants are often
much smaller than the output of such firms; thus their size is not
apparently necessary in the interest of economic efficiency. There are
cases where there is confusion, doubt or dispute about the actual level
of the m.e.s.
(ii) The simple simulation model of Chapter 3 shows that systems based
on small-scale, flexible technology have better error-handling
characteristics. That is, mistakes are less likely to be made, and can
be more quickly corrected, with small, low lead-time production units
than with large, long lead-time plants.
(iii) Chapter 5 (illustrating the theoretical arguments of Chapter 4)
showed how the capability of successive process plants can exhibit
cumulative learning effects (like the "learning curve" in cumulative
output of goods from a single plant).
(iv) In Chapter 6 it was argued that people's positions in debates about
scale are shaped by cultural biases which help (or make) them see things
in particular ways. Thus it is possible to find examples of industries
where there is deep disagreement about apparently purely "technical"
questions.
(v) Chapter 9 produced several resul ts concerning the determinants of
industry concentration. Surprisingly, in view of conventional theory
(but not inconsistently with the existing empirical research), it was
found that there are circumstances in which lower scale economies
produce higher degrees of industry concentration. It was shown that
market share was the crucial factor for competitive success in EMIR. It
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was also found that over-competitive industries were less profitable,
even for the most successful firms. Concentration was associated with
past levels of competitiveness; large firms were present in an industry
because they had succeeded in the past.
(vi) In Chapter 10 EMIR was used to model the problem of Technological
Lock-in. The results show that purely market-based, competitive
selection mechanisms cannot be relied upon to select the "best"
technology in the long run.
1.3 Results for the Decision-Maker
The indi vidual decision-maker is concerned with optimising the
performance of a single firm. The perspective adopted in many of the
models, particularly in EMIR, might encourage a certain fatalism about
the possibility of aiding decisions about scale under increasing
returns. However, a number of useful insights have been gained, and
these include:
(L) The simulation of dynamic diseconomies of scale in Chapter 3 show
that small scale flexibility can be worth more than even substantial
static large scale economies under conditions of uncertain future
demand.
(ii) A new plant is an opportunity to learn and innovate. Chapter 5
showed how process change can yield cumulative learning effects; a
change in scale often implies a change in technology, and vice-versa.
(iii) The EMIR results of Chapter 9 show very clearly that gaining
market share is a more important indicator of long-term competitive
advantage than short-term profitability. That is, it is worth making
long-term investments in pre-emptive capacity additions to gain ground
on rivals. The other side of this coin is that, once it becomes clear
260
that you are not going to "win" in an industry, it may be preferable to
withdraw rather than to compete too hard; it was seen that highly
competitive industries become can unprofitable, even for the winners.
(iv) Technological "Lock-in", as demonstrated in Chapter 10, is a
serious problem for the individual economic actor. Moreover, the problem
can be generalised to any question of choice under increasing returns.
There is no easy way out of this difficulty; it is very important to be
aware of its existence.
2. DISCUSSION
In this section I will expand on some of the points summarised above,
and develop a context for them. There is a consistent theme running
through much of the thesis, and it has to do with the problem of
"uncertainty":
2.1 First Principles
To go back to the beginning for a moment: when discussing the problem of
scale with people, it quickly becomes clear that, to many, scale seems
not such a difficult thing to deal with. Two arguments are often found
to be common to those with such attitudes. Firstly, whilst wrong
decisions may have been made about scale in the past, sometimes big
mistakes, really these were due to inadequate "technique". That is, more
information, of better quality, analysed and processed in better ways,
would have averted the errors of the past. Better forecasts of future
demand and of the actual costs of constructing and running large plants
would remove the problems. Secondly, it is taken as virtually self-
evident that larger is better. For if that were not the case, how could
the larger organisations and the giant production units survive in such
a competitive world?
These two "common sense" reactions to the problem of scale - that a bit
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more information will make the problem go away, and that what is must
necessarily be the most efficient because of its very existence - are in
fact extremely common. They appear almost axiomatic in traditional ways
of looking at scale. One of the chief of these is NeoClassical
microeconomic theory.
2.2 Economic Theory
Economic theory reduces the problem of scale to the task of locating the
lowest point on a "U-shaped" cost curve. That is, engineers, accountants
and managers will be able to compare directly the total costs of
production at different scales of plant, decide which is cheapest, and
act accordingly. If they are not able to do this immediately, then
finding optimum scale is only a problem of technique; enough research
and information collection will eventually settle the question. In any
event, the workings of the economy will provide a good approximation to
the answer, for inefficient producers will inevitably be driven out of
existence. Thus the extant plants and firms in a mature industry are
unlikely to be far from optimal scale (given the technology they
employ).
This seems plausible, but closer examination has revealed some serious
problems with the economic theory (which have some far-reaching
consequences).
The difficulties originally arose from the admirable objective of
producing a watertight and consistent model of the behaviour of the
market - how is it that a stable price emerges from all the interactions
of producers and consumers? A mathematical description was devised some
fifty years ago positing an equilbrium relationship between supply and
demand. In order to do this, it was necessary to assume that costs of
production were not affected by changes in the scale of output. Another,
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better-hidden, assumption was that there was no change in scale of
production for changes in productive technology. Basically it was
necessary to do away (temporarily, it was thought at the time) with all
kinds of increasing returns to scale. If there are increasing returns
then a simple equilibrium will be unstable, for as a firm gets bigger it
will become more economically efficient and therefore it will tend to
get even bigger still, until one economic actor comes to dominate each
market.
This theory was a considerable intellectual achievement. It was
acknowledged that the assumptions were unrealistic, but it was
confidently believed that the scaffolding provided by these
simplifications could be removed in due course. Meanwhile, the
description of the economic effects of scale was left in a situation
where there were allowed to be n£ real economic effects of scale at all.
The long r~n cost curve had to ignore changes in technology and changes
in factor input proportions, whilst empirical research has repeatedly
shown that these are the very sources of reduction in production costs.
Worse was to come. Theorists had simply assumed the existence of u-
shaped cost curves, i.e. that there is some optimal scale for production
size (whether plants or firms). Empirical measurements to test the
theory were at first extremely crude and unreliable, fitting
unrealistically simple production functions to heterogenous data sets
and coming up with conf licting resul ts. As methodologies ha ve become
more sensitive, the work of the econometricians has tended to
demonstrate firstly that, in general, economies of scale tend to extend
over the whole range of firm and plant sizes, and secondly that there is
still a considerable degree of difficulty in establishing both the
sources of the economies of scale and their magnitudes. Occasional
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"pathological" cases have been found of cost curves with several minima.
A more exhausti ve review of the theory and empirical studies than any
yet published was presented in Chapter 2. It was shown that even in the
case of the mostly deeply researched industry (electricity generation)
there is room for considerable dispute over the technological and
economic "facts" of the case. (Very recent developments in the UK, where
a quarter of a century of offical statements about the true economics of
nuclear electricity have been placed in serious doubt, serve to
underline this argument.)
The economic theory of scale presents a sorry spectacle. In many areas
the empirical facts are still subject to considerable debate. The best-
established finding, that in most industries there is no necessary
maximum economic scale of operations, spells doom for the traditional
microeconomic model of the market. Increasing returns of any kinds, in
fact (including returns to technological change) present serious
problems. There is therefore no good existing explanation of how firms
come to be of a particular size, only vague assertions about the
difficulty of managing large units. These assertions are not, however,
well-substantiated either by the economics literature or by the labours
of organisation theorists.
Thus it turns out that, far from a little more information being
required, over fifty years of investigation and improvement of
econometric technique has not so far managed to equip us with definite
answers to even general questions about economies of scale. Moreover,
given that economies of scale seem to exist, and that U-shaped cost
Curves tend to be exceptions more often than rules, there is no real
explanation of how firms and plants come to be the sizes they are. No
explanation, that is, which is based uyon economic necessity alone.
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2.3 Uncertainty and Contradictory Certainties
Even supposing that the existence of economies of scale in constructing
large capital equipment is unproblematical, there are further
complications. The electricity supply industry was used as a case to
illustrate the complexities involved in assessing "static" economies of
scale, but there are additional dynamic factors to be considered. The
simple simulation model of Chapter 3 shows that influences from the
outside world can dramatically affect the cost-minimisation problem even
where the existence of the static scale economies are taken as given. In
certain scenarios it becomes more efficient to construct smaller
production units, even though these are apparently more expensive per
unit of installed capacity. The problem lies in the uncertainty of
future demand and the need to anticipate it.
(It can be noted in passing that the conceptually simple model of
Chapter 3 throws light upon diseconomies of scale which traditional
theory, the "Single Vision" of the Analytics, does not even mention.
This is another illustration of the merits of a dynamic approach to such
problems.)
The problem of scale is hedged around with uncertainties and disputes at
the theoretical level. This might appear to be mere academic quibbling;
perhaps the economists may not have a strong case, but surely the
practical people, the engineers and managers, must know the truth of the
matter? When we look at the opinions of some practitioners in industry,
however, and compare their views with those of other experts (both
"insiders" and "outsiders") we see that the theoretical uncertainties
and disputes are not necessarily resolved: there are indeed
"contradictory certainties" proposed by figures within some
traditionally very large-scale, capital intensive production industries
(e.g. paper manufacture, cement, electricity generation and brewing). In
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Chapter 6 evidence was advanced to suggest that managers sometimes adopt
"myths" of scale - convictions about the optimum size which are not
always justified by the available evidence.
It has begun to look as if the search for "a bit more information" is
rather futile, at least in some circumstances. One way out of the
impasse is to avoid deciding which of the contradictory certainties is
correct, for that is a question which seems to become more difficult to
answer the deeper one investigates. It may be more fruitful to consider
what assumptions are necessary in order to justify each of the
conflicting views about scale. Into what worldviewdoes the presence of
economies of scale most naturally fit? Why do people wish to believe
that small is beautiful?
The "grid-group" theory from social anthropology provides a context for
examining these questions. A typology has been suggested which seems to
make sense of some aspects of the debates about scale (and other issues)
which are not addressed by the usual kinds of arguments about "rational"
behaviour. There may be some ultimate truth about scale, but it is very
hard to reach. Understanding of many such policy debates will be helped
not by asserting that one or other solution must be right, but by
considering in what kind of world and for whom each proposed answer is
relevant. This way of looking at "reality" as being socially constructed
carries with it not only the possibility that there will be
contradictory views about what the "optimum" scale is, but a virtual
guarantee that there will be irreconcilable convictions.
2.4 Technical Change: Systematic Behaviour in an Uncertain World
The issues of technical change and innovation are important problems
which are closely linked to the problem of scale. Traditional
microeconomic theory assumes away the question: all economic actors are
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supposed to have perfect, instant and equal access to all technological
information. Technical change, when it occurs at all in this framework,
has to be seen as a basically arbitrary event in which the Promethean
fire of innovation strikes like lightning; apparently at random and
never in the same place twice.
I have developed a different approach in Chapter 4, assuming that we
live in an uncertain world in which the outcome of any particular action
can never be predicted exactly. The example of scale economies shows
that there can be a quite a high degree of uncertainty associated even
with hard and apparently well-behaved objects like production machinery.
This being the case, some predictions can be deri ved for the kinds of
ways in which the development of a technology should progress: generally
incrementally, and governed by rules which define the parameters within
which engineers and technologists operate. Far from being arbi trary,
technological progress can be expected to be generally quite systematic.
The existence of technological "guideposts", "trajectories" or
"paradigms" has been posited by researchers in this area who have
borrowed concepts from the philosophy and sociology of science. The
derivation employed in Chapter 4 is different and original.
The argument rests upon the ''Uncertainty Principle": that, in the face
of complex problems it will often be more effective to deliberately
restrict the set of possible actions. In the case of the cultural
theory this leads to stable configurations of social relationships,
values and ''wor1dviews". In the instance of technological heuristics it
means that particular "technological trajectories" will be followed by
intending innovators. In both cases the complexity or "scale" of the
problem demands that some kinds of. cognitive filters have to be
consciously or unconsciously donned to make sense out of uncertainty.
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The result of the sections on technical change, illustrated by the model
of Chapter 5, is that we can argue that
(a) there are systematic, rule-governed elements in the process of
technological innovation;
(b) there are also random elements, in the sense that the outcome
of a technological experiment is never guaranteed, always
containing some element of uncertainty;
(c) scale change and technical innovation are closely linked (as
implied from the survey of the economics literature).
(d) technical change is a cumulative process.
2.5 The Return of Increasing Returns
A continuing theme has been the contention that economics requires
dynamic models to truly represent certain aspects of the economic
process. This is not merely because of the extra detail which a dynamic
model would add to the economic analysis. It is because the economic
phenomena are themselves dynamic and changing; the move from economic
statics to economic dynamics involves a qualitative transition, and not
merely the addition of some extra complications to essentially the same
model. Producing a good economic model is like learning to ride a
bicycle: the nature of the task means that it is much easier to stay
upright while the thing is moving, and very much more difficult to do it
the other way round (trying to balance in stationary equilibrium and
then move off when that problem has been mastered).
The most important element left out of the static economic model of
scale choice is increasing returns. (There are said to be "increasing
returns" when the marginal benefits of some factor increase as that
factor is employed at a larger scai~; the benefits increase at an
268
increasing rate.) Economies of scale are one source of increasing
returns, and cumulative technical change and improvement another. Use of
the "Uncertainty Principle" allows us to see the technical change
process as internal to the economic system, rather than as external and
arbitrary; given this advantage it should now be possible to attempt a
new economic description.
Taking into account some well-estab 1 ished stylised facts about both
economies of scale and technical change, and assuming that firms are
faced with an uncertain environment and so have to forecast, the model
EMIR has been produced. A time-dependent model of oligopolistic
competition emerges when a computer program is substituted for a set of
equations. The novelty of EMIR lies in: its introduction of economies of
scale; its sophisticated and endogenously-generated model of technical
change; and its incorporation of plural rationalities.
The first, and perhaps most surprising, conclusion from the EMIR model
is that purely static economies of scale are not nearly so important as
we would have expected. The general tendency in every case where
significant increasing returns (economies of scale and technical change)
were available is for industrial concentration to increase over time,
.and to increase more rapidly the greater the magnitude of the "increased
returns". (In a sense the model proves the equilibrium theorists
correct, for it shows that increasing returns do lead to eventual
concentration of the industry.) In a number of cases the result of a
simulation run is that a single actor (firm) is left as the victor of
the economic competition. However, those simulation runs in which there
are high capital costs, and hence relatively greater "static" economies
of scale, lead to lower levels of concentration and competition. The
interpretation of this is that industries in which it is more difficult
to add large chunks of capacity (because of high initial costs) are less
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competitive; it takes longer for a firm or group of firms to achieve a
significant advantage through either scale of production or superior
production technology. This may explain why attempts to link industry
structure to measurements of (static) economies of scale (Scherer et al
1975) have not been markedly successful.
Secondly, it is found that competitive success does not necessarily, or
even generally, lead to higher profits during the simulation runs. That
is, there are technology/industry/strategy configurations which produce
more competitive regimes, with more firms being driven out of business
and fewer surviving to dominate the market. The victors of this
corporate warfare do not tend to show higher absolute levels of profits
than the most successful firms in less stressful environments. Thus
"survival of the fittest" can be seen to have different aspects:
aggression does not necessarily lead to prosperity. A less competitive
regime may produce more survivors, with greater individual wealth than
the winner of the more competitive regime.
The third main finding was discussed in Chapter 10. The detailed
modelling of technology and innovation permits the competitive
~evelopment of technologies to be simulated. EMIR very clearly shows
how "technological lock-in" is an important fact of economic life. Again
it is a strong example of path-dependence in economic processes - global
optimisation might favour one technological variant over another, but if
the early history does not favour the "optimal" technology, it may never
get the chance to establish itself. We cannot rely on competition alone
to select the best of a set of different technologies.
This last point is crucial, and the argument can of course be extended
from technologies to policy choices Ln- general; the statement that ''What
is, is best, and has become so because it is best" is not true. In
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particular, it should not be argued (although, as we saw in the survey
of economic theories of scale, it has been) that large firms and large
production units have emerged because they are more efficient. This may
be the case, of course; however their simple existence does not of
itself prove it.
My thesis, then, is that the two common-sense propositions with which
this chapter began are untenable. The facts simply do not support the
view that optimal scale can always be selected by getting marginally
improved information or better "technique", and the existence of
increasing returns negates the argument that whatever is most successful
at the moment is necessarily the optimum choice.
2.6 The Policy Dilemna
This concludes the discussion of the thesis. Where does this leave us?
Essentially, with a di1emna, which I will outline here but not
(unfortunately) be able to resolve. This "loose end" constitutes a whole
new area of investigation in itself, but is worth setting out because of
its importance to the issues raised above.
The argument as developed has been in some respects negative. The
economic evidence on the beneficial effects of scale has been shown to
be at best inconcl usi ve. The existence of large scale does not
demonstrate that "Big is Best", because (a) the traditional economic
data do not support this conclusion when they are carefully examined,
(b) there are areas of considerable controversy about the true nature of
"the facts" anyway, and (c) more generally, the path-dependent nature of
economic processes means that competition only brings about locally
optimal states rather than global optima, as demonstrated by the EMIR.
Furthermore, even if "the facts" are ..true, there are cases where they
overlook other influences (e.g. the dynamic diseconomies of scale) which
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negate their importance.
How, then, faced with all these negatives and uncertainties, can we
proceed? There always seem to be at least two views about what it "the
right scale". Plural rationalities says there will always be at least
two views, so allowing one rationality to choose will not necessarily be
either efficient or popular. Witness the continuing debate about nuclear
power for electricity generation in the UK; the fact that this debate is
not just about scale makes the argument even more bitter. On the other
hand, where there are increasing returns (economies of scale,
technological progress) competition cannot be relied upon to produce the
right answer.
Using the language of the cultural theory we can say that there are
difficulties with all of the solutions likely to be proposed by the
different rationalities. The Hierarchists and Sectists will wish to
impose their own solutions - the former to preserve the existing order
and cohesion of the hierarchy (e.g. the CEGB's strong organisational
commitment to large-scale nuclear energy), and the latter in order to
bring about a more just and safe world (as they see it, e.g. the Green
opposition to nuclear power on environmental and other political
grounds). The pragmatic rationality of the Entrepreneur proposes that
the market will automatically sort out the disputes; the "hidden hand"
will make the best possible choice. But when, say, nuclear technology
gets a foothold, the infrastructura1 commitments alone, such as fuel
production and waste recycling, may consume so many resources that
alternative technologies (e.g. wind and wave power) are either not tried
or are deprived of resources. (The infrastructura1 requirements are
another source of increasing returns to adoption of a technology - see
Arthur (1987).)
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The di1emna is that no single decision-maker can be relied upon to find
the best solution to the sca1e-techno10gy-po1icy question, yet neither
can the "hidden hand" of competition necessarily deliver the optimum
either. The problem lies in the fact that, where there are increasing
returns, one option may be "lucky" early on, or may have purely
temporary or short-term advantages, so that it gains an early
superiority. Increasing returns then mean that other, possibly better,
solutions may never become sufficiently well-established that a
realistic comparison of their relative merits ever becomes possible.
Through increasing returns, plurality becomes a singularity as one
option comes to dominate the whole economic system.
(The process by which plurality becomes singularity, and by which the
different views of the world come into contact with "how the world
really is'',have been investigated in another simulation model which I
call ''TheSurprise Game" - see Thompson and Tayler (1986).)
Thus, despite the theoretical developments, and the advice for the
decision-maker which can be given as a result of this work, the problem
for the policy analyst is in some ways even more difficult than before.
Not only is the "best" scale not known, but it seems to have become a
much less well-defined thing. Technique alone will not solve this
problem; a solution must take into account both plural rationality and
increasing returns.
3. PLURAL RATIONALITIES AND PLURAL MODELS
The prescription, therefore, is not that "Small is Beautiful" (or ''Big
is Best"). It is that we must guard against being dominated by a single
large scale influence, whether that influence is embodied in a firm, a
production unit, a single technology, or a single view of the world.
Efficiency may seem to be served best by singularity, but long-term
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survival demands plurality.
I will conclude briefly on how this principle relates to the modelling
and analysis of these kinds of problems.
The questions addressed here have been by any standards large and
complex in themselves. It would be difficult to produce a single all-
encompassing model to illustrate all of the factors at work, and it
would probably be foolish to try. The approach has been to use simple
models to illustrate particular aspects. The simulation of dynamic
diseconomies of scale only looks at capacity, forecasting and
utilisation problems. Another model examined technological learning in
process engineering. Yet another simple argument was the use of the
Uncertainty Principle to derive some conclusions about the likely nature
of technical change.
There is always a risk of trivialising the subject matter by doing this,
or indeed of falling into a naive reductionism. But the alternative is
to set up some giant all-encompassing model which will explain
everything, and the danger is that this giant single model will become
like the monoculture which presents such potential dangers of sub-
optimising in the economic and technological worlds.
Theories about the world, or about scale economies, can be thought of as
enjoying increasing returns to adoption: the more people adopt a
particular view the more likely others are to be swayed by it. In this
way orthodoxy becomes established as a cultural trajectory, just as
particular technological trajectories become established; this is
essentially the Kuhnian view of science.
A strong illustration of this danger is provided by the case of the
IIASA Energy Model. Several hundred person-years of effort were devoted
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to the construction of a simulation model which would predict the energy
requirements and energy usage of the whole world for the next century.
The model was for a while one of the most significant achievements of
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. But a few
people had doubts about it, and a debate started behind the scenes.
Finally, the truth came out: the model had done no more than capture a
particular set of assumptions about the world, and its conclusions were
almost completely specified by the initial assumptions which were put
into it. The whole story came to light in a special issue of "Policy
Sciences" (Keepin 1984, Thompson 1984 and Wynne 1984). It is now quite
generally accepted that the critics were correct, and that the model was
seriously flawed if it was intended to be more than a manifesto for one
particular vision of the future.
The systems movement, and the systems approach to problems, has been
criticised by some as basically a technocratic attempt to treat society
as if it were a machine (Lilienfeld 1978). The IIASA case lends some
support to this view. I believe that this need not be the case, so long
as we are aware of the dangers of single vision. The need for plurality
is just as strong in the modelling process as it is in all of the
economic and technological processes which are involved in problems of
scale. The kinds of relatively small models used here each give a
partial account of how the relevant systems behave. The argument of this
chapter is that, since only partial accounts are ever possible, we had
better take account of this fact right from the start and proceed
accordingly.
From the outset I ha ve deal t more with the questions of pre-analysis;
that is, with the inputs to the process of analysis from which scale
decisions emerge. No answer has been given to the question '~at is the
best size?". The essence of the approach used here is that it pays to be
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sceptical towards answers and to question carefully the assumptions - or
world views - which lie behind them. What we have to do is to allow the
policy debate on scale, whether it is within the upper echelons of
commercial or public organisations, or in the wider ranges of society,
to be conducted in a way which recognises the need for plural solutions.
To assist this process, it is necessary to have a plurality of views and
models to ensure the robustness of the ultimate choices which will have
to be made between the inevitably differing views of how the world is.
As Blake put it:
Now I a fourfold vision see,
And a fourfold vision is given to me;
'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
And threefold in soft Beulah's night
And twofold Always. May God us keep
From Single vision and Newton's sleep~
4. CRITICISMS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK
4.1 Criticisms
Some limitations of the work done, particularly of the restrictive
assumptions embodied in the various models described, have been
mentioned at different stages.
The simulation model of dynamic diseconomies of scale (Chapter 3) claims
some strong conclusions. However it must be stressed that this model
only looks at the situation where one single company is meeting the
demand for the whole market. It is not competi ti ve; an exploration of
dynamic diseconomies where there is also competition would require an
amended version of EMIR (for example). Thus the model of Chapter 3
represents the situation of a monopoly supplier (e.g. a utility company)
rather than that of an atomistic grabber of market share.
The major output of the work described in the thesis is EMIR, the
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dynamic model of technology and scale change. A problem, with hindsight,
is that EMIR was made too complex - there were simply too many elements
of the model which could be varied, despite the simplifications made
when the model was specified. This became clear as the results were
written up for Chapter 9; a great deal had to be placed in Appendices,
and yet the experiments described ignored a whole range of questions.
For example:
- only a limited set of parameter choices was explored;
- radical technical innovations were not used at all;
- changes in worldview were barred.
Many of the more interesting results and predictions obtained with the
model might have been found without introducing the extra complication
of mUltiple worldviews and different strategies.
Design of experiments, analysis of results and their written exposition
would all have been easier with a less complicated model.
4.2 Further Research
A corollary to this is that several avenues remain unexplored. The major
purpose has been to show that this kind of model is capable of producing
interesting and useful results, and some further areas for investigation
were mentioned at the end of Chapter 9.
Clearly the demand series used in the EMIR experiment can be a1 tered,
and it has been suggested that, since plant sizes do not appear to be
strongly influenced by the other experimental factors investigated so
far, they may be a direct function of the size of the market. This would
8i ve interesting confirmation of the "proportional growth" hypothesis,
which suggests that there is in many industries a consistent link
between market and plant scale. ,(See Chapter 2 for details and
references to the literature.)
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Innovation in EMIR has been restricted to incremental changes only.
Radical innovations are intrinsically more interesting (although more
difficult to generalise about). Their effects in EMIR were briefly
discussed in Chapter 7; further investigations would allow a study of
the technical aspects of the Product Life Cycle to be carried out. This
could be made much more useful if the EMIR were extended even further to
include product- as well as process-innovations. This extension would
require the demand "curve" to be replaced by a more complex relationship
between the producer and "consumer", reflecting preferences between
different "attributes" of different possible products.
4.3 Apologia
In conclusion, it could be argued (with some justice) that not merely
the model EMIR, but the whole project of this thesis, is over-ambitious.
It attempts to demolish the foundations of a long-established body of
work, and quite clearly there is not space in a PhD thesis to put
anything sufficiently substantial in their place.
To this criticism I would cheerfully plead guilty, but in mitigation
argue that I believe I ha ve provided a sketch of how an al ternati ve
foundation could be constructed. My case is that such redevelopment is
long-overdue. When the new edifice has been raised, I am confident that
it will include many of the elements I have dealt with here; an
appreciation of increasing returns, an acknowledgement of bounded
rationality (and perhaps of plural rationality as well), a realistic
model of technological change, and a dynamic representation of economic
processes.
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Appendix 3A: Dynamic Diseconomies Simulation Demand Series
Name of Demand Series
time RED1 BLUE2 BLUES
2 14 31 21
3 2 62 43
4 4 92 66
5 19 121 90
6 45 149 115
7 82 177 141
8 130 205 167
9 186 233 195
10 250 260 223
11 322 288 252
12 400 315 282
13 484 342 312
14 574 370 343
15 668 398 375
16 765 426 407
17 866 454 440
18 970 483 473
19 1076 512 507
20 1183 541 541
21 1291 571 576
22 1400 602 611
23 1509 633 647
24 1618 664 683
25 1726 696 719
26 1833 729 756
27 1939 763 793
28 2043 797 830
29 2145 831 867
30 2244 867 904
31 2342 903 942
32 2436 940 979
33 2527 977 1017
34 2615 1016 1055
35 2700 1055 1092
36 2781 1094 1130
37 2859 1135 1168
38 2932 1176 1205
39 3002 1218 1243
40 3068 1260 1280
41 3130 1304 1317
42 3188 1347 1354
43 3241 1392 1391
44 3291 1438 1428
45 3336 1484 1464
46 3377 1530 1500
47 3414 1578 1536
48 3447 1626 1571
49 3476 1675 1606
50 3501 1724 1641
51 3523 1774 1675
52 3540 1825 1709
53 3553 1876 1742
Al
time REDl BLUE2 BLUES
54 3563 1929 1775
55 3569 1981 1808
56 3572 2035 1840
57 3572 2089 1871
58 3568 2143 1902
59 3562 2199 1932
60 3552 2255 1962
61 3540 2312 1991
62 3525 2369 2020
63 3508 2427 2048
64 3488 2486 2076
65 3466 2546 2103
66 3443 2606 2129
67 3417 2667 2154
68 3390 2729 2179
69 3362 2792 2204
70 3332 2855 2227
71 3301 2920 2250
72 3269 2985 2272
73 3237 3052 2294
74 3204 3120 2315
75 3170 3188 2335
76 3137 3258 2355
77 3103 3329 2374
78 3069 3401 2392
79 3036 3475 2410
80 3003 3550 2427
81 2970 3626 2443
82 2938 3704 2459
83 2907 3784 2474
84 2877 3865 2488
85 2847 3949 2502
86 2819 4034 2516
87 2792 4121 2528
88 2767 4210 2541
89 2742 4302 2552
90 2720 4396 2563
91 2698 4493 2574
92 2679 4592 2584
93 2661 4694 2594
94 2644 4799 2603
95 2629 4907 2612
96 2616 5018 2620
97 2605 5133 2629
98 2595 5252 2636
99 2586 5374 2644
100 2579 5500 2651
101 2573 5630 2658
102 2569 5765 2665
103 2565 5905 2672
104 2563
105 2562
106 2561
107 2561
108 2561
109 2561
110 2560
A2
time REDI BLUE2 BLUES
111 2560
112 2558
113 2556
114 2551
115 2545
116 2537
117 2526
118 2513
119 2495
120 2473
121 2447
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Appendix 3B: Structure of Mode I Used in Simulationof Dynamic
Diseconomies of Scale (Chapter 3)
The model involves the single firm or actor forecasting future demand.
To meet this expected demand the firm builds production units, which
have lead times which increase with their scale. The financial
performance of the firm depends upon the utilisation of the units it
builds, and upon the costs of adding capacity. Bigger units costs less
to construct, because of capital scale economies.
PRODUCTION UNITS
Production units have three characteristics: size, lead time and cost.
Scale (output Lead Time Construction cost per
per period) (periods) unit of output
100 24 380
200 27 329
400 33 284
900 45 240
1500 54 215
Note: one period is intended to correspond to one month. A 54-period
lead time is thus 4-!-years, which is representative of a large
electricity generation plant (for example).
There is an additional effect upon capital costs besides the economies
of scale. A 90% learning curve effect is embodied; this means that for
each doubling of the number of units built, the costs of building a unit
decreases by 10%. This figure is consistent wi th data for electrici ty
generating units given by Kennedy and Allen (1979).
FORECASTING
The forecasting section of the program uses an exponentially weighted
moving average, involving a two-parameter formulation of local linear
growth. The parameters are the current estimates of the Leve I of demand,
met), and of the rate of growth of demand, bet). The updating equations
are:
A4
m(t) = m(t-l) + b(t-l) + Al*e(t)
b(t) = b(t-l) + A2*e(t)
e(t) = y(t) - Y(t)
where
y(t) = actual demand at time t
Y(t) = forecast demand for time t made at t-l
The forecast for k time periods ahead is given by
Y(t,k) = m(t) + k*b(t)
The values of Al and A2 may be varied to gi ve different weightings to
past data. For the purposes of this model the values used were
Al = 0.3
A2 = 0.0267
The parameters are linked by the relations
Al = 1 - ~
A2 = (1 - w)2
This defines Brown's Second Order method (Course notes on Forecasting,
Warwick MSc MSOR). The value of w was chosen by trial-and-error from
within a range of values which had proved appropriate in other
forecasting applications.
The appropriateness of this forecasting method, and its effect upon the
resul ts, might be questioned. However, it must be remembered that the
aim of the chapter is to compare the outcomes of employing units of
different scales. The same forecasts apply, whatever the unit scale.
Differences in results between different unit scales arise for two
reasons. The first is the step-fitting performance, which is a function
of unit size and little else. The second is construction lead time,
which feeds into forecast error, as forecasts have to be made further
into the future for longer lead time units. The increase in forecast
AS
error for longer lead times is a general effect, which does not depend
upon the particular method employed or the exact choice of parameters.
FINANCIAL FACTORS
Financial results are affected by the relative importance of capital
construction costs, income and other costs. The relationship could be
loosely defined as "capital intensity", and is operationalised in the
model as a ratio. This is done by setting, for each period,
Income = 15 * RATIO * MIN(capacity, demand)
Outgoings = Capital costs + 8 * RATIO * No. of units in operation
Capital cost = Total construction cost / lead time
That is, the user inputs a value for RATIO at the start of the
simulation. Then income is received on all units for which there is
demand, and costs on all units which are available (i.e. have been
constructed). Capital costs are charged on units under construction,
spread evenly over the construction lead time.
The firm's "bank balance" at period t is then given by
BANK(t) = BANK(t-1) + Income - Outgoings - Capital costs
Finally, interest is charged (or credited) on bank balances. The program
assumes a period is one month; interest is calculated at 6%, 9% and 12%
on positi ve bank balances, and at 9%, 12% and 15% on overdrafts. There
are thus three financial reports at the end of the simulation,
corresponding to three different interest rate assumptions.
Note that the bulk of the analysis in Chapter 3 concentrates upon
capacity-demand fitting performance, and not upon financial outcomes.
Financial outcomes are dependent upon the several parameters described
in this section, whilst capacity fitting does not.
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DECISION RULE - TO BUILD
The decision rule for constructing units is simple, and is based on a
breakeven calculation.
The income generated for every unit of demand supplied is set by the
model as 15 * (capital intensity RATIO). The fixed costs incurred in
each time period are set at 8 * (capital intensity RATIO) * (unit
scale). This means that the breakeven point is always
G = 8 * (unit scale) / 15
That is, if the predicted shortfall in suppply will be greater than G
(according to the forecast), then an additional unit will make a profit
if it is built, and so one is ordered.
DECISION RULE - TO RETIRE
The rule for retiring units is based on what actually happens at time t;
there is no advantage to be gained from retiring units early, as the
lead time for retiring units is zero. If supply exceeds demand by more
than 3 * G then a unit is retired. It is important to note that only one
unit may be retired in each time period, and that the interval 3 * G is
arbitrary. The reason for these choices is that more sensitive decision
rules for retiring units tended to give rise to "irrational" behaviour
Le. ordering new capaci ty and retiring uni ts at the same time. This is
because retiring is based on current demand, and bui lding on expected
future demand.
FAILURE PROBABILITIES
A feature of the model which is .!!.Q.t used in these experiments is that
plants may have a small chance of being unavailable due to failure. If
this facility is used, then the model tests each unit for failure every
period. The failure corresponds to ..downtime due to maintenance
requirements, strikes, etc, and is an important feature of industries
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such as electricity supply. The failure probabilities may be constant,
or a function of unit scale. (Again, this latter case would correspond
with the electricity generation industry).
Unit failures were not modelled in Chapter 3 because they add extra
complications; the analysis of Chapter 3 is presented for illustrative
purposes, rather than as an exhaustive exploration of the model.
THE PROGRAM LISTINGS
The program code is provided as Appendix 3C. Note that there are two
programs; the first creates a data file listing all units built and
retired, whilst the second uses this file to run the simulation and
perform the financial calculations. This split is because of the
potential use of failure probabilities - several runs could be done
using the same series of plant decisions, but with different random
number streams for plant failures.
Previous versions of the program were arranged to report period-by-
period the state of the simulation; this was used to assist in verifying
the correct operation of the program. This output is suppressed in the
listing provided.
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Appendix 3A: Program Listing for Dynamic Diseconomies of Scale
Simulation (Chapter 3)
The first program creates a data file which tells the second program
what events (unit beinng built, unit retired, etc) occur during the
simulation. The second program carries out the simulation and allocates
10 ' Creates units and events files
20 INPtIT"CODE OF UNITS TO BE CONSIDERED";K
30 OPEN "I",£1,"DATA9"
40 DIM M(120),B(120),D(5),DEM(200),P(220),E(120),UN(200)
50 IF K=l THEN 110
60 FOR 1=1 TO K-1'
70 FOR J=l TO 5'
80 INPtIT£l,Z
90 NEXT J
100 NEXT I
110 FOR J=l TO 5'
120 INPtIT£l,D(J)
130 NEXT J
135 CLOSE £1
140 D(2)=D(2)*(1-D(5»'
150 Q=D(4)'
160 INPtIT "WHICH DEMAND FILE" ;A$
180 OPEN "I",£1,A$
190 INPtIT "WHAT WILL YOU CALL EVENTS FILE";E$
200 OPEN "0",£2,E$
210 INPtIT "WHAT WILL YOU CALL UNITS FILE";U$
220 OPEN "0",£3,U$
230 PRINT £3,1
240 PRINT £3,K
250 PRINT £3,0
260 PRINT £3,1
261 Q=D(4)'
262 INPUT "Forecast horizon";FH
270 FOR r-i TO Q+1
280 INPtIT£l,X
290 NEXT T
300 CLOSE £1
310 OPEN "I",£l,A$
320 INPtIT£l,RN
330 X=FIX(X/D(2»+1'
340 DIM U(X)'
350 A1=.3
360 A2=.0268'
370 INPtIT "Starting slope";B(O)
380 FOR r-i TO FH
390 P(T)=T*B(O)
400 NEXT T
410 A=RN-Q
costs.
Input units data
- ignore first K-1 sets
Input data on type K (see line 20)
Effective capacity = capacity *
failure prob.
Q = units construction lead time
X now holds no. of units needed at
time t = Q+1
Forecasting coefficents
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420 FOR T=1 TO RN
430 INPUT £I,DEM(T)
440 E(T)=DEM(T)-M(T-l)-B(T-l)
450 M(T)=M(T-l)+B(T-l)+Al*E(T)
460 B(T)=B(T-l)+A2*E(T)
470 P(T+FH)=M(T)+FH*B(T)
480 NEXT T
490 FOR T=RN+l TO 220
500 P(T)=P(RN)
510 NEXT T
520 CLOSE £1
530 GAP=8*D(2)/15' 8/15ths of plant size is the demand
540 GAP1=D(2)-GAP' gap to be filled
550 PRINT "Pleasewait a while....."
555 N=O' N holds number of plants
560 FOR T=1 TO Q
570 G=DEM(T)-N*D(2)
580 IF G.gt.GAP TIIEN 590 ELSE 620
590 N=N+l
600 U(N)=T-l' U(N) holds time unit number N must
610 GOTO 570' be built by
620 NEXT T
630 PRINT £3,N
640 FOR 1=1 TO N
650 PRINT £3,U(I)
660 UN(U(I»=UN(U(I»+1 UN(J) holds no. of units available
670 NEXT I' at time J
680 CLOSE £3
690 N=O:T=O
700 DIM S(RN,2)
710 FOR 1=1 TO RN
720 N=N+UN(I)
730 Z=N
740 FOR J=l TO Q
750 Z=Z+UN(J+I)
760 NEXT J
770 G=DEM(I+Q)-Z*D(2)
780 G1=DEM(I)-N*D(2)
790 IF G.gt.GAPAND I.lt.RN-QTHEN 820
BOO IF -Gl.gt.3*GAP1 TIIEN 960 ELSE 880
_820 UN(I+Q)=UN(I+Q)+l
830 T=T+1
840 S(T,I)=I-1' Time build must start
850 S(T,2)=I' Code 1 = 'constructa unit'
860 2=Z+l
870 GOTO 770
880 NEXT I
890 PRINT £2,T
900 FOR 1=1 TO T
910 PRINT £2,S(I,l)
920 PRINT £2,S(I,2)
930 PRINT £2,1
940 NEXT I
950 GOTO 1010
960 N=N-1' Retiresa unit
970 T=T+l
980 S(T,l)=I' Time retiremade
990 S(T,2)=3' Code 3 = 'retirea unit'
1000 GOTO 880
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1010 PRINT "Calculating capital costs"
1020 CLOSE £2
1030 DIM Z(3)
1040 '
1060 OPEN "I",£2,U$
1070 INPUT £2,N '
1080 INPUT £2,C '
1090 INPUT £2,DUM
1180 INPUT £2,X
1190 IF X=O THEN PRINT "NO units under construction":END
1200 IF X.ne.1 THEN PRINT "ERROR"
1210 INPUT £2,N
1220 DIM UT(N),I(3)
1230 FOR J=l TO N
1240 INPUT £2,X
1250 UT(J)=D(4)-X
1260 NEXT J
1270 D(3)=D(3)/D(4)
1280 FOR I=D(4) TO 1 STEP -1
1290 FOR J=l TO N
1300 IF UT(J).ge.I THEN 1.=1.+1
1310 NEXT J
1320 SUM=L*D(3)
1330 1.=0
1340 FOR J=l TO 3
1350 Z(J)=Z(J)+SUM
1360 Z(J)=Z(J)*(1+.oo25*J)' Interest charges
1370 NEXT J
1410 NEXT I
1420 OT$=U$+".COS"
1430 OPEN "0",£3,OT$
1440 FOR 1=1 TO 3
1450 PRINT £3,Z(I)
1460 NEXT I
1470 CLOSE
1480 CLEAR
1490 END
Calculates costs before start of simulation
NO USE
CODE OF UNITS
NO. OF UNITS
This is the main simulation program:
10' disc-driven version
20' ££££££££££££££££££££
30' £ SCALE SIMULATION £
40' ££££££££££££££££££££
50 B$="-----------------------------------------------------------------------"
60 C$='" Time Period £££ Demand £££££££££ '"
70 D$='" Unit No. Failures Available' Under "'
80 E$='" type capacity Construction '"
90 F$='" ££££ ££ ££ £££££££ ££ '"
100 G$='" Total £££ ££ ££££££££ ££ '"
110 Z$='" '"
120 H$='" Income (profit on variable costs) £££££££££ "'
130 1$='" Fixed Costs £££££££££ '"
140 R$='" --------- '"
150 J$='" £££££££££ '"
160 K$='" Capital Expenditure £££££££££ "'
170 L$='" Net Change £££££££££ '"
180 M$='" Cost of Money "9% 12% 15% "'
190 N$='" Interest Credit £££££££££ £££££££££ £££££££££ '"
All
200 W$='" Interest Debit EEHEEEH H££EEEEE EEEEEE£EE
210 0$='" Current Balance EEEH£EH EE£EEEEEE EEEEEE£EE
220 S$='" ------- ------ -------
230 T$='" =========
240 FX$='" Random Seed EEE Capital IntensityLEE Run Length EEE
250 XT$='" Demand unsatisfied EEEEEEH Overcapacity EEHEHE
255 ZT$='" UtilisationH.E%
260 DIM DAT(10,5)
270 DIM COM$(4)
280 PRINT "Command file?"
290 INPUT CM$
300 OPEN "I",E2,CM$
310 FOR 1=1 TO 4
320 INPUT E2,COM$(I)
330 NEXT I
340 INPUT E2,RATIO
350 INPUT E2, FIN$
360 INPUT E2,SZS
370 INPUTE2,SZS$
380 CLOSE E2
390 DF$=COM$(l)
400 OPEN "I",£1,DF$' Input units data
410 FOR 1=1 TO 10
420 FOR J=1 TO 5
430 INPUT El, DAT(I,J)
440 NEXT J
450 NEXT I
460 GOTO 470
470 CLOSE El
480 UF$=COM$(2)
490 OPEN "I",E3,UF$
500 INPUT E3,DIFF
510 DIM Q(DIFF),N(DIFF),CAP(D1FF),FAIL(DIFF),UNITDAT(DIFF,5)
520 FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
530 INPUT E3,Q(I)
540 FOR J=1 TO 5
550 UNITDAT(I,J)=DAT(Q(I),J)
560 NEXT J
570 NEXT I
580 DS$=COM$(3)
- 590 OPEN "I",E2,DS$
600 INPUT E2,RN
610 X=RN' Length of simulation
620 DIM DEMAND(X),CAPACITY(X),OUTGO(X),INCOME(X),FORECAST(X)
630 DIM CAPEXP(X),BANK(3,X),CRED(3,X),DEB(3,X),S(3),OVER(X),UNDER(X)
640 FOR 1=1 TO X
650 INPUT E2,DEMAND(1)
660 NEXT I
670 CLOSE E2
680 FOR 1=1 TO RN
690 IF DEMAND(I).gt.DEMTHEN DEM=DEMAND(I)
700 NEXT I
710 X=DEM
720 P=UN1TDAT(1,2)
730 Q=UNITDAT(DIFF,2)
740 R=UNITDAT(1,5)
750 S=UNITDAT(DIFF,5)
760 Q1=INT(X/P+l+2.5*SQR(INT(X/P+l)*R*(1-R»)'(over-)estimatesof max.
770 Q2=INT(X/Q+l+2.5*SQR(INT(X/Q+l)*S*(1-S»)'no. of units needed
,n
'n
In
'n
II
II
II
Al2
780 IF Q1.gt.Q2 THEN N=Q1*2 ELSE N=Q2*2
790 DIM UNIT(N),BUILD(N,4),CONSTR(DIFF)
800 FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
810 INPUT £3,N(I)
820 IF N(I)=O THEN 870
830 FOR J=l TO N(I)
840 UNIT(UNITS+1)=I
850 UNITS=UNITS+1
860 NEXT J
870 NEXT I
880 INPUT £3,A
890 IF A=O THEN 1070
900 IF A.ne.1 THEN PRINT "We're in trouble here!"
910 FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
920 INPUT £3,Q
930 CONSTR(I)=Q
940 IF Q=O THEN 1060
950 FOR J=l TO Q
960 INPUT £3,BUILD(CONSTR+1,2)
970 CONSTR=CONSTR+1
980 BUILD(CONSTR,4)=I
1000 P2=N(I)~(-.152), Construction cost learningcurve
1010 IF UNITS=O THEN PRINT "(Don't Worry!)"
1020 P=P2
1030 IF P.gt.1 THEN P=l
1040 BUILD(CONSTR,3)=UNITDAT(I,3)*P/UNITDAT(I,4)
1050 NEXT J
1060 NEXT I
1070 CLOSE £3
1080 EV$=COM$(4)
1090 OPEN "I",£1,EV$'
1100 INPUT £l,E: DIM EVENT(E+1,3)
1110 FOR J=l TO E
1120 FOR 1=1 TO 3
1130 INPUT £1, EVENT(J,I)
1140 NEXT I
1150 NEXT J
1160 PRINT "Random number seed?"
1170 INPUT RAND
1180 RANDOMIZE(RAND)
1190 CLOSE £1
1200 EV=l
1210 T=O
1220 IF EVENT(EV,1)=0THEN 2010
1229 ' Beginning of main loop
1230 T=T+1
1240 IF T.gt.RN THEN 2580
1250 IF EVENT(EV,l)=TTHEN GOTO 2010
1260 FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
1270 CAP(I)=O
1280 FAIL(I)=O
1290 NEXT I
1299 '
1300
1310
Input from the events file
1320
1329 '
1330
Test units for random failure
FOR 1=1 TO UNITS
S=RND:IF S.gt.UNITDAT(UNIT(I),S)THEN CAP(UNIT(I»=l
ELSE FAIL(UNIT(I»=1
NEXT I
Decide what capacity available this period
FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
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1340 CAPACITY(T)=CAPACITY(T)+CAP(I)*UNITDAT(I,2)
1350 NEXT I
1360 PRINT
1370 PRINT "At time period ";T;"available capacity=";CAPACITY(T)
1380 PRINT "Demand=";DEMAND(T)
1390 GAP=CAPACITY(T)-DEMAND(T)
1400 PRINT "Difference=";GAP
1410 IF GAP.gt.O THEN Z=DEMAND(T) ELSE Z=CAPACITY(T)
1420 IF GAP.gt.O THEN OVER(T)=GAP ELSE UNDER(T)=-GAP
1430 INCOME(T)=Z*RATIO*15 'variable costs
1440 FOR 1=1 TO DIFF
1450 OUTGO(T)=N(I)*8*RATIO*UNITDAT(I,2)*(1-UNITDAT(I,5»+OUTGO(T)
1460 NEXT I
1470 FOR 1=1 TO CONSTR
1480 IF BUILD(I,2)=.lt.T THEN GOSUB 2460
1490 IF BUILD(I,2).gt.T THEN CAPEXP(T)=CAPEXP(T)+BUILD(I,3)
1500 NEXT I
1510 SUM=INCOME(T)-OUTGO(T)-CAPEXP(T)
1520 FOR 1=1 TO 3
1530 BANK(I,T)=BANK(I,T-l)+SUM
1540 IF BANK(I,T).gt.O THEN S(I)=1 ELSE S(I)=-1
1550 IF S(I).gt.O THEN CRED(I,T)=BANK(I,T)*(.OO25+.0025*I)ELSE
DEB(I,T)=-BANK(I,T)*(.005+.0025*I)
BANK(I,T)=BANK(I,T)+CRED(I,T)-DEB(I,T)
NEXT I
'capital charges
1560
1570
1579 '
1580 GOTO 1230
2000 '
2009 '
2010 A=EVENT(EV,2)
2020 QZ=EVENT(EV,3)
2030 EV=EV+l
2040 IF A=1 THEN GOSUB 2220
2050 IF A=2 THEN GOSUB 2090
2060 IF A=3 THEN GOSUB 2350
2070 IF T=O THEN T=l
2080 GOTO 1250
2090 '
2100 S=O
2110 FOR J=1 TO CONSTR
2120 IF BUILD(J,l).gt.S AND BUILD(J,4)=QZ THEN S=J2130 NEXT J
2140 CONSTR=CONSTR-l
2150 CONSTR(QZ)=CONSTR(QZ)-l
2160 FOR J=S TO CONSTR
2170 FOR K=1 TO 4
2180 BUILD(J,K)=BUILD(J+l,K)
2190 NEXT K
2200 NEXT J
2210 RETURN
2220 '
2230 CONSTR=CONSTR+1
2240 CONSTR(QZ)=CONSTR(QZ)+1
2250 BUILD(CONSTR,l)=T
2260 BUILD(CONSTR,2)=T+UNITDAT(QZ,4)
2270 BUILD(CONSTR,4)=QZ
2280 '
2290 P2=N(QZ)A(-.152)
2300 IF N(QZ)=O THEN PRINT "(Don't Worry!)"
End of main loop - return to 1230
If EVENT has occurred, decide which
Subroutine to cancel capacity
Subroutine - order new plant
Learning curve..construction costs effect
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2310 P=P2
2320 IF P.gt.1 THEN P=l
2330 BUILD(CONSTR,3)=P*UNITDAT(QZ,3)/UNITDAT(QZ,4)
2340 RETURN2350 ' Subroutine to retire units
2360 N(QZ)=N(QZ)-l
2370 UNITS=UNITS-1
2380 FOR J=l TO UNITS+1
2390 IF UNIT(J)=QZ THEN 2420
2400 NEXT J
2410 PRINT "No such unit"
2420 FOR L=J TO UNITS
2430 UNIT(L)=UNIT(L+1)
2440 NEXT L
2450 RETURN
2459 ' Subroutine - bring unit into service
2460 UNITS=UNITS+1
2470 X=BUILD(I,4)
2480 N(X)=N(X)+l
2490 UNIT(UNITS)=X
2500 CONSTR=CONSTR-1
2510 CONSTR(X)=CONSTR(X)-l
2520 FOR 2=1 TO CONSTR
2530 FOR Y=l TO 4
2540 BUILD(Z,Y)=BUILD(Z+l,Y)
2550 NEXT Y
2560 NEXT Z
2570 RETURN2579 ' Final analysis and results storage
2580 OPEN "O",£l,"PRINT"
2590 PRINT "Please wait a few moments while I do final summary!"
2600 PRINT £1,""
2610 PRINT £1,""
2620 PRINT £l,"Unit specifications file ";DF$
2630 PRINT £l,"Numbersof units file ";UF$
2640 PRINT £l,"Demand series file ";DS$
2650 PRINT £1, "Events from file ";EV$
2660 PRINT £l,B$2670 PRINT £l,USING FX$;RAND;RATIO;RN
2680 PRINT £l,B$:PRINT£l,M$
. 2690 PRINT £l,USING 0$;BANK(1,T-l);BANK(2,T-1);BANK(3,T-l)
2700 DIM CR(3),DB(3)
2710 FOR 1=1 TO RN
2720 OT=OT+OUTGO(I)
2730 INN=INN+INCOME(I)
2740 CAP=CAP+CAPEXP(I)
2745 IF CAPACITY(I).gt.DEMAND(I)THEN X=l ELSE X=CAPACITY(I)/DEMAND(I)
2747 UTI1=UTIL+X
2750 OV=OV+OVER(I)
2760 UN=UN+UNDER(I)
2770 FOR J=l TO 3
2780 CR(J)=CR(J)+CRED(J,I)
2790 DB(J)=DB(J)+DEB(J,I)
2800 NEXT J
2810 NEXT I
2815 UTI1=UTIL*lOO/RN
2820 PRINT £l,USING N$;CR(1);CR(2);CR(3)
2830 PRINT £l,USING W$;DB(1);DB(2);DB(3)
2840 PRINT £l,B$
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2850 PRINT £1,USING H$;INN
2860 PRINT £1,USING I$;OT
2870 PRINT £1,R$
2880 PRINT £1,USING J$;INN-OT
2890 PRINT £1,USING K$;CAP
2900 PRINT £1,R$
2910 PRINT £1,USING J$;INN-OT-CAP
2920 PRINT £1,T$
2930 PRINT £1,B$
2940 PRINT £1,USING XT$;UN;OV
2945 PRINT £1,USING ZT$;UTIL
2960 PRINT £1,B$
2970 CLOSE £1
2980 OPEN "I",£2,"PRINT"
2990 IF FIN$="S" THEN 3010
3000 IF FIN$="P" THEN 3040 ELSE 2970
3010 INPUT £2,A$
3020 PRINT A$
3030 IF EOF(2) THEN 3070 ELSE 3010
3040 INPUT £2,A$
3050 LPRINT A$
3060 IF EOF(2) THEN 3070 ELSE 3040
3070 CLOSE £2
3080 END
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Appendix 5A: Program Listing for Technological Learning Simulation
(Chapter 5)
10' ££££££££££££££££££££
20' ££ Meta learning ££
30' £EE£EEEE£E££££££££££
100 INPUf "New run or old (N/O)";A$
110 IF A$.ne."N" THEN 1000
120 'GENERATE NEW PARAMETERS
130 OPEN "O",El,"DAT01.Q"
200 K1=5OO00 +50000 *RND 'FURNACE
210 K2=400+200*RND
220 K3=2oo0+1000*RND
230 K4=7500+4500*RND
240 K5=5OO+200*RND
250 K6=85+30*RND
260 K7=1.6+.8*RND
270 K8=1.1+.6*RND
280 K9=.9S+.1*RND
300 C1=600+1200*RND 'COMPRESSOR
310 C2=30+30*RND
320 C3=12+12*RND
330 C4=1.5+RND
340 C5=200+400*RND
350 C6=9+6*RND
400 D1=4oo+800*RND 'BLENDER
410 D2=40+30*RND
420 D3=2oo0+2000*RND
500 F1=10+5*RND 'INJECTOR
510 F2=1000+2000*RND
520 F3=.8+.4*RND
600 G1=4oo0+4000*RND 'DISTILLATION
610 G2=100+80*RND
620 G3",10+4*RND
630 G4=800+400*RND
700 H1=12000+12000*RND 'EXHAUST
710 H2=300+200*RND
BOO L1=2+RND 'COSTS
810 L2=1500+1000*RND
-900 WRITE El,K1 , K2 ,K3 ,K4 ,KS ,K6 ,K7 ,K8 ,K9 'WRITE TO FILE
910 WRITE £1,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6,D1,D2,D3,F1,F2,F3
920 WRITE £1,Gl,G2,G3,G4,Hl,H2,L1,L2
930 CLOSE El
940 GOTO 2000
950 '
1000 OPEN "I",£2,"DAT01.Q" 'INPUf PARAMETERS
1010 INPur £2,K1,K2,K3,K4,K5,K6,K7,K8,K9
1020 INPUT £2,C1,C2,C3,C4,CS,C6,D1,D2,D3,F1,F2,F3
1030 INPur £2,G1,G2,G3,G4,H1,H2,L1,L2
1040 CLOSE £2
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2000 'SET UP DATA FORMAT
2010 A$="---------------------------------------------------------------------"
2020 B$='" ,"
2030 C$='" Control type ± ± Plant no. £H "'
2040 D$='" Total output ££££££££ Yield £H. £% ' "
2050 E$='" Operating Temp ££££ Operating pressure ££.££ "'
2060 F$='" Vol Thickness' Flow% Pressure% Temp% Cost '"
2070 G$='" Furnace £fE£EE EE •EE EEE •E EEE •E EEE •E £f££EEEEE ' "
2080 H$='" Blender Coeff. E.EE £EE.E EEEEEEEEE '"
2090 I$='" Injector Rate EEEEEEE EEE.E EEEEEEEEE '"
2100 J$='" DistUrs E Length EEEEEEE' EELE £ELE EEEEEEEEE '"
2110 K$='" Exhaust Capacity EEEEEEE' £E£.E £EEE££E£E "'
2120 L$='" Compo ELE£ Flow ££££EEEE' EELE £££.£ £££££E£H "'
2125 Q$='" Control unit £££££££H '"
2130 M$='" --------- '"
2140 N$='" Electricity cost ££££££H£ Capital cost E£H££££££ "'
2150 0$='" Cap. cost/Unit ££££E£EH Av. LR Cost EEE£££H££ "'
2900 ,-----------------------------------
3000 INPUf "Furnace Volume"; VOLUME 'INPUT DATA
3010 INPUf "Thickness of walls";THICK:PRINT:IF THICK.lt.l THEN 3009
3020 INPITr "Compressor pressure";COMPRESS
3030 INPITr "Compressor flowrate";FLOWCOMP:PRINT
3040 INPlIT "Blender coefficient";BLEND
3050 INPlIT "Blender flowra te" ;FLOWBLEND: PRINT
3060 INPlIT "Control option 1/2/3: manual/auto/computer";CONTROL
3070 IF CONTR01=l THEN 3080
3071 IF CONTR01=2 THEN 3080
3072 IF CONTR01=3 THEN 3080
3073 GOTO 3060
3080 PRINT
3090 INPUT "Injector rate";RATE:PRINT
3095 IF RATE.lt.2*VOLUME THEN PRINT "Too low ":GOTO 3090
3100 INPUT "Number of coolers";N
3110 INPUf "Length of each distiller";LENGTH:PRINT
3120 INPlIT "Exhaust capacity";CAPACITY:PRINT
3130 INPITr "Do you wish to alter anything (Y/N)";Z$
3140 IF Z$="Y" THEN 3000
3150 CONTROLN=.9+.05*CONTROL
-3160 PRINT: PRINT
3900
4000 FLOW=VOLUME 'OPERATING VARIABLES
4010 IF FLOW.gt.FLOWCOMP THEN FLOW=FLOWCOMP
4020 IF FLOW.gt .FLOWBLEND THEN FLOW=FLOWBLEND
4030 TEMP=1000*(I-F3*VOLUME/RATE)
4040 IF COMPRESS.gt.K7+K8*THICK THEN PRESSURE=K7+K8*THICK ELSE
PRESSURE=COMPRESS
4050 IF TEMP.gt.K5+K6*THICK THEN TEMP=K5+K6*THICK
4100 A=G3+G4*N*LENGTH 'OPTIMISE FLOW/TEMP
4110 B=1/SQR(N)
4111 F=FLOW
4112 T=TEMP
4120 X=TEMP*A/(l+B*TEMP)
4130 Y=FLOW*«A/FLOW)-l)/B
4140 IF X.gt.Y THEN FLOW=A/(l+B*TEMP) ELSE TEMP=«A/FLOW)-1)/B
4141 IF TEMP. gt.T THEN TEMP=T ..
4142 IF FLOW.gt.F THEN FLOW=F
4200 PURITY=(TEMP/1000)*(1-.5/PRESSURE)*CONTROLN*BLEND*K9
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4210 FLU=FLOW*(l-PURITY) 'EXHAUST
4220 IF FLU.gt.CAPACITY THEN FLOW=FLOW*CAPACITY/FLU:GOTO 4210
4300 ELECTR=C5+C6*FLOW*PRESSURE
4310 OUTPUT=FLOW*PURITY
4900 ,-----------------------------------
5000 FURNCOST=K1+K2*THICK*VOLUMEA.67+K3*THICK+K4*VOL~.67
5010 COMPCOST=C1+C2*COMPRESSA1.s+C3*FLOWCOMP+C4*COMPRESS*FLOWCOMP
5020 BLENDCOST=D1+D2*FLOWBLEND+D3/(1-BLEND)
5030 IF CONTR01=l THEN CONTROLCOST=5OO0
5040 IF CONTR01=2 THEN CONTROLCOST=45000
5050 IF CONTR01=3 THEN CONTROLCOST=125000
5060 INJCOST=F1*RATE+F2
5070 DISTCOST=N*(G1+G2*LENGTH)
5080 EXHCOST=H1+H2*CAPACITY
5090 CAPCOST=FURNCOST+COMPCOST+BLENDCOST+CONTROLCOST+INJCOST+DISTCOST
+EXHCOST
5100 UNCAPCOST=CAPCOST/OUTPUT
5110 RUNCOST=.1*CAPCOST+L1*ELECTR+FLOW*(1-PURITY)*L2
5120 AVCOST=RUNCOST/OUTPUT
5900 ,-----------------------------------
6000 IF CONTR01=l THEN M=20 'OUTPUT TO PRINTER
6010 IF CONTR01=2 THEN M=50
6020 IF CONTR01=3 THEN M=l000
6030 Q=lOO/M
6100 LPRINT:LPRINT
6110 LPRINT A$
6120 INPUT "Which number plant is this ";Z
6130 IF CONTR01=l THEN Z$="manual"
6140 IF CONTR01=2 THEN Z$="auto"
6150 IF CONTR01=3 THEN Z$="computer"
6160 LPRINT USING C$;Z$,Z
6170 LPRINT USING D$;OUTPUT;PURITY*1oo
6180 LPRINT USING E$;TEMP;PRESSURE
6190 LPRINT A$
6200 LPRINT F$
6210 LPRINT USING G$;VOLUME;THICK;Q*CINT(M*FLOW/VOLUME);Q*CINT(M*PRESSURE/
(K7+K8*THICK));Q*CINT(M*TEMP/(K5+K6*THICK));FURNCOST
6220 LPRINT USING H$;BLEND;Q*CINT(M*FLOW /FLOWBLEND) ;BLENDCOST
6230 LPRINT USING I$;RATE;Q*CINT(M*TEMP/(1000*(1-F3*VOLUME/RATE)));INJCOST
6240 LPRINT USING J$;N;LENGTH;Q*CINT(FLOW*M*(1+B*TEMP)/A);Q*CINT(M*TEMP*B/
«A/FLOW)-1));DISTCOST
6250 LPRINT USING K$;CAPACITY;100*FLU/CAPACITY;EXHCOST
6260 LPRINT USING L$;COMPRESS;FLOWCOMP;Q*CINT(M*FLOW/FLOWCOMP);
Q*CINT(M*PRESSURE/COMPRESS);COMPCOST
6265 LPRINT USING Q$;CONTROLCOST
6270 LPRINT M$
6280 LPRINT USING N$;ELECTR*L1;CAPCOST
6290 LPRINT A$
6300 LPRINT USING O$;UNCAPCOST;AVCOST
6310 LPRINT A$
6320 LPRINT:LPRINT
7000 INPUT "Build another unit (Y/N)";S$ 'TRY AGAIN?
7010 IF S$="Y" THEN 3000
7020 END
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Appendix 8A: EMIR Program Listing
10 '********************************************************************
20 '* Scale-Competition-Technical Change Simulation Version 3.2 Aug86 *
25 '* Forecasting added; price model *
27 '* Improved decision rules; random order; perfect capacity info *
28 '* Disc-driven; information storage Plural rationalities *
29 '* Improved technical change (C) Paul Tayler 1986 *
30 '* Variable scale and innovation strategies *
35 '* Arrays reduced to run through MSBASIC interpreter 11/11/89 *
37 '* Final changes made 07/01/90 *
40 '********************************************************************
94 '
95 '
96 '
97 '
98 '
99 '
100 OPEN "1",£2," M32A.RUN"
120 LINE INPUT £2~HEADING$
130 PRINT:PRINT HEADING$:PRINT
140 INPUT £2,OUTFlLE$
150 INPUT £2,PLANTOUT$
160 COMMENT$=HEADING$
170 INPUT £2,RSEED
180 RANDOMIZE RSEED
185 INPUT £2,GWVW
190 DIM COEF(4)
199 '
200 DEF FNPRK(PRK,X)=PRK*EXP(.7*LOG(X))
210 DEF FNPRL(PRL,X)=PRL*EXP(.4*LOG(X))
220 DEF FNPRV(PRV,X)=PRV*l
230 DEF FNINV(PRK,C)=10*INT(EXP«1/.7)*LOG(C/PRK))/10)
240 DEF FNTCOMP(X,K,L,V,WV)=FNPRV(V,X)+«FNPRK(K,X)*COEF(WV))+
(l.l-COEF(WV))*FNPRL(L,X))/X
299 '
300 INPUT£2,DEMFIL$
310 OPEN "1",£1 ,DEMFIL$
320 INPUT £l,DDAY
330 DDAY15=DDAY+15
335 DDAY20=DDAY+22
340 DIM DEMAND(95),CAPACITY(95),FORECAST(95,4),M(95,4)
345 DIM E(95,4),B(95,4)
350 FOR 1=1 TO DDAY
360 INPUT £l,DEMAND(I)
370 NEXT I
380 CLOSE £1
399 '
400 INPUT £2,FMNO
410 INPUT £2,PLNO
420 DIM PLANT(80,6),NAM$(16),FIRM(16,4),OWNER(16,80),LOSER(80)
430 DIM VALUE(80),PLANTNAME$(80),INTEREST(16),FINCOME(16)
440 DIM PLINCOME(80),PLNOS(16),FMROR(16),PLCOST(80,4)
450 DIM PLAVCOST(80,4),TMPAVCOST(80),MRK(80),ORDER(16)
460 DIM K(16,3),L(16,3),V(16,3),MAX(16,3),MIN(16,3)
470 DIM RK(16),RL(16),RV(16),RMAX(16),RMIN(16),LASTINNOV(16)
480 DIM RENEW(16),LASTWV(16),AVROR{16)
500DIM PROPOSAL (4,4),REPROP(4,4),BEST(4),MARK(4,4),REF(4),GAP(4,4),PR$(4)
510 DIM DISCOUNT(25,4),SALES(25),NO$(50)
*** Begin Section A *** (see Appendix 8C for program
structure references)
First section reads in data file called M32A.RUN, which
contains instructions to set up the run.-
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520 DIM PROPO(4),REPRO(4),SCR(3),AL1(4),AL2(4),WVIEW$(4),PRDISC(4)
530 DIM GEAR(4)
600 FOR 1=1 TO 50
610 READ NO$(I)
Q20 NEXT I
630
640
650
699 '
700 A$="£-Yr Option:Size= £££££:Tech= £: Cost= £££££U£: NPV= ££££££££££± ±"
710 LI$=" Tech K L V Max Min"
720 W$=" £ ££££.£ ££££.£ ££££.E E£EEE ££EE"
730 G1$=" T I II III IV"
740 F1$=" fEE EEEE EEEE EEEE EEEE"
797 '
798 ' Initialiseforecastingroutine:
799 '800 P=(DEMAND(10)-DEMAND(1))/10
802 FOR J=l TO 4
805 M(O,J)=DEMAND(l)
810 FOR 1=1 TO 21
820 FORECAST(I,J)=P*I+M(O,J)
830 NEXT I
840 B(O,J)=P
850 NEXT J
860 AL1(1)=.4:AL1(2)=.4:AL1(3)=.4:AL1(4)=.2'
870 AL2(1)=.15:AL2(2)=.15:AL2(3)=.15:AL2(4)=.08
880 OPEN "O",£l,PLANTOUT$
890 OPEN "0",£3,OUTFILE$
895 PRINT £3,DDAY,FMNO
899 '900 T=l
910 COEF(1)=.1:COEF(2)=.15:COEF(3)=.1:COEF(4)=.05'
999 '
1000 PRINT "Loading .... "
1010 FOR J=l TO FMNO'
1030 INPUT E2,A
1040 FIRM(J,3)=A
1045 PLNOS(J)=A
1050 IF A=O THEN 1300
1060 FOR 1=1 TO A
1070 INPUT E2,B
1080 NOPLANTS=NOPLANTS+1
1090 OWNER(J,I)=NOPLANTS
1100 PLANT(NOPLANTS,6)=J
1110 PLANT(NOPLANTS,2)=B
1120 PLANT(NOPLANTS,l)=O
1125 IF BIGGESTP.lt.BTHEN BIGGESTP=B
1130 PLANTNAME$(NOPLANTS)=NAM$(J)+"."+NO$(I)
1140 INPUT E2,PK
1150 PLANT(NOPLANTS,3)=FNPRK(PK,B)1160 INPUT £2,PL
1170 PLANT(NOPLANTS,4)=FNPRL(PL,B)
1180 INPUT E2,PV
1190 PLANT(NOPLANTS,s)=FNPRV(PV,B)
1200 FOR K=l TO DDAY20
1210 CAPACITY(K)=CAPACITY(K)+B1220 NEXT K
1221 FOR 1..=1TO 4
FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
READ NAM$(I)
NEXT I
forecastingcoeffs
capitalweights
J refersto firm number
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1223
1225
1228
1230
1300
1310
1320
1330
1340
1350
1360
13701380
1390
1499 '
1510 INPUT E2,PRK
1520 INPUT £2,PRL
1530 INPUT £2,PRV
1550 INPUT £2,MIN
1560 INPUT £2,MAX
1570 INPUT £2,PRlCE
1580 CLOSE £2
1582 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO'
1584 K(I,2)=PRK
1586 L(I,2)=PRL
1588 V(I,2)=PRV
1590 MAX(I,2)=MAX
1592 MIN(I,2)=MIN
1594 NEXT I
1599 '
1600 PRDISC(1)=1.06:PRDISC(2)=1.09:PRDISC(3)=1.09:PRDISC(4)=1.06
1605 FOR J=1 TO 4
1606 DISCOUNT(l,J)=l
1607 NEXT J
1610 FOR 1=2 TO 25
1615 FOR J=1 TO 4
1620 DISCOUNT(I,J)=DISCOUNT(I-1,J)/PRDISC(J)
1625 NEXT J
1630 NEXT I
1650 WVIEW$(1)="I":WVIEW$(2)="II":WVIEW$(3)="III":WVIEW$(4)="IV"
1660 GEAR(1)=.3:GEAR(2)=.5:GEAR(3)=.5:GEAR(4)=.7
1699 '1700 PRINT E3,HEADING$
1710 PRINT £3,COMMENT$
1800 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
1810 FIRM(I,4)=GWVW
1840 NEXT I
1850 CHNG$="N"
1860 WVCH=O
1870 PRINT
1900 GOTO 2015'
2000 T=T+1
2005 IF T=DDAY THEN GOTO 12000
2015 MARK=O
1222 PLCOST(NOPLANTS,L)=(PLANT(NOPLANTS,3)*COEF(L»+(1.1-COEF(L»*PLANT(NOPLANTS,4)
+(B*PLANT(NOPLANTS,S»
PLAVCOST(NOPLANTS,L)=PLCOST(NOPLANTS,L)/B
NEXT L
TCOST=TCOST+PLCOST(NOPLANTS,1)
NEXT I
INPUT E2,IK
IF A=O THEN 1350
FOR 1=1 TO A
IK1=IK1+PLANT(OWNER(J,I),3)
NEXT I
FIRM(J,1)=IK+IK1
INPUT £2,ID
FIRM(J,2)=ID+IK1
IK1=O
NEXT J
initial technologies
T is already = 1
A22
2020
2025
2030
2040
2045
2050
2060 '
2070 FOR J=1 TO FMNO
2072 ORDER(J)=O
2074 NEXT J
2076 FOR J=1 TO FMNO
2078 TEMP=INT(RND*FMNO)+1
2080 IF ORDER(TEMP).gt.O THEN 2078
2082 ORDER(TEMP)=J
2084 PRINT NAM$(J);TEMP
2086 NEXT J
2088 PRINT
2100 FOR FIRMTRY=1 TO FMNO
2105 K=ORDER(FIRMTRY)
2110 PRINT NAM$(K):PRINT
2112 IF FIRM(K,1)=10 THEN GOTO 4899'
2115 WVK=FIRM(K,4)' (worldview of Kth firm)
2120 FK3=FIRM(K,3)'
2125 IF FK3=0 THEN 2500
2130 '
2131 '
2132 '
2140
2150
2155
2160
2165
2170
2180
2190
2200
2201 '
2202 '
2203 '
2210
2220
2230
2232
2233
2234
2238
2240
2250
2260
2263
2265
2270
2280
2290
2300
2302
2304
FOR 1=1 TO 4
FOR J=1 TO 4
GAP(I,J)=(FORECAST(T+I+1,J)*(1.2-COEF(J»)-CAPACITY(T+I+1)
IF GAP(I,J).gt.O THEN MARK(I,J)=1:MARK=1
NEXT J
NEXT I
random order of firms
If bankrupt, ignore
Test for closures
*** Begin section B.1 ***
FOR 5=1 TO FK3
PKS=OWNER(K,S)
IF PKS=O THEN GOTO 2210
IF PLANT(PKS,1).gt.T-10 THEN 2190
IF PLANT(PKS,6).ne.K THEN 2190
CHANS=RND
IF CHANS.gt.0.9 THEN PRINT "Plant failure:":PRINT:KL1=PKS:
2=S:GOSUB 2310
NEXT S
LEAST =1000
*** Begin section B.2 ***
FOR 1=1 TO FK3
IF LOSER(OWNER(K,I»=O THEN 2290'
X=OWNER(K,I)
IF PLANT(X,1).ge.T THEN 2290
IF PLANT(X,6).ne.K THEN 2290
IF PLAVCOST(X,K).gt.1.5*PRICE THEN 2240
IF MARK=1 THEN 2500' No closure if demand.gt.capacity
F1=FORECAST(T+1,WVK)/CAPACITY(T+1)
F2=FORECAST(T+2,WVK)/CAPACITY(T+2)
LOSS =«F1/PRDISC(WVK»+(F2/(PRDISC(WVK)*PRDISC(WVK»»*
(PRICE-PLANT(X,5»
LOSS =LOSS *PLANT(X,2)/2
LOSS =LOSS -PLANT(X,4)*.5*(DISCOUNT(1,WVK)+DISCOUNT(2,WVK»
LOSS =LOSS /PLANT(X,2)
IF LOSS .It.LEAST THEN LEAST =LOSS :K11=X:2=I
NEXT I
IF LEAST .ge.O THEN 2500
GOSUB 2310
GOTO 2500
next I
A23
2306 '
2307 '
2308 '
2309 '
2310
2312
2313
2315
2316
2318
2320
2330
2340
2345
2348
2350
2355
2360
2370
2380
2382
2383
2384
2385
2386
2390
2400
2405
2410
2420
2425
2430
2435
2437
2438
2440
2442
2445
2448
2450
2455
2460
2463
2465
2470
2475 '
25002510
2520
2530
2540
2550
2999 '
*** Begin section B.3 ***
================= Beginning of subroutine =================
FIRM(K,3)=FIRM(K,3)-l' Close plant no. 'KLL'PRINT £1,T
FOR J=l TO 6
PRINT £l,PLANT(KLL,J)
NEXT J
PRINT £l,PLANTNAME$(KLL)' write details to disc
PK2=PLANT(KLL,2)
FIRM(K,l)=FIRM(K,l)-PLANT(KLL,3)
PLANT(KLL,l)=-PLANT(KLL,l)
IF PLANT(KLL,l)=O THEN PLANT(KLL,1)=-.1
TCOST=TCOST-PLCOST(KLL,1)
NOPLANTS=NOPLANTS-l
PRINT "Plant ";PLANTNAME$(KLL);" Capacity ";PK2;" Retired"FOR J=T TO DDAY20
CAPACITY(J)=CAPACITY(J)-PK2
NEXT J
FOR J=1 TO NOPLANTS+1
FOR L=1 TO FMNO
IF OWNER(L,J).gt.KLL THEN
OWNER(L,J)=OWNER(L,J)-l
NEXT L
NEXT J
FOR J=Z TO FK3
OWNER(K,J)=OWNER(K,J+1)
NEXT J
FOR I=KLL TO NOPLANTS+l
PLANTNAME$(I)=PLANTNAME$(I+1)
FOR L=1 TO 6
PLANT(I,L)=PLANT(I+1,L)
NEXT L
NEXT I
FOR H=1 TO 4
PLCOST(I,H)=PLCOST(I+1,H)
PLAVCOST(I,H)=PLAVCOST(I+l,H)
NEXT H
FOR H=l TO 4
FOR J=1 'FO4
GAP(J,H)=GAP(J,H)+PK2:IF GAP(J,H).gt.O THEN MARK=1NEXT J
NEXT HLEAST =0
RETURN
================= End of subroutine =========================PRINT:PRINT " Available technologies ":PRINTPRINT LI$:PRINT
FOR L=1 TO 3
PRINT USING LJ$;L;K(K,L);L(K,L);V(K,L);MAX(K,L);MIN(K,L)
NEXT L
PRINT
A24
3000 '3001
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007 '
3008 '
3009 '
3010
3012
3014
3015
3016
3020
3030
3040
3045
3050
3055
3060
3070
3075
3080
3090
3100
3110
3115
3116 '
3117 '
3118 '3120
3130
3140
3142
3144
3160
3170
3180
3182
3184
3186
3188
3189
3190
3199 '3200
3201 '
3202 '
3203 '
3210
3220
3230
3235 '
Additions; K is still firm
FOR 1=1 TO 4' clear out garbage
PROPO(L)=O:REPRO(L)=O:REF(L)=O
FOR J=1 TO 4
REPROP(L,J)=O:PROPOSAL(L,J)=O
NEXT J
NEXT L
*** Begin section C.1 ***
FOR 1=1 TO 4
FOR TEC=1 TO 3GOSUB 5400
IF K(K,TEC).le.O THEN 3189
PROPO(4)=TEC
PROPO(3)=0' Cleared from last time
PROPO(l)=INT(GAP(I,WVK)/10)*10
IF PROPO(l).lt.MIN THEN PROPO(1)=-10:GOTO 3189
IF PROPO(l).gt.MAX THEN PROPO(l)=MAX
PI1=PROPO(l)
IF PI1.lt.MIN OR PI1=0 THEN 3189
PROPO(2)=FNPRK(PRK,PI1)
PTEMP=(PROPO(2)+FIRM(K,2))/(FIRM(K,l)+PROPO(2))
IF (GEAR(WVK)*FIRM(K,l)-FIRM(K,2))/(1.OS-GEAR(WVK)).le.O
THEN PRINT "Gearing exceeded":GOTO 3189
IF PTEMP.gt.GEAR(WVK) THEN PROPO(l)=
FNINV(PRK,(GEAR(WVK)*FIRM(K,l)
-FIRM(K,2))/(l.OS-GEAR(WVK))):GOTO 3040
SALES(l)=O
SALES(2)=O
DUM=.9*PI1:Ll=FNPRL(PRL,PI1):V1=FNPRV(PRV,PI1)
NPV=-PROPO(2)*(DISCOUNT(l,WVK)+DISCOUNT(2,WVK))/2
*** Begin section C.2. ***
FOR J=T+3 TO T+22
1=1-T
IF FORECAST(J,WVK).gt.DUM+CAPACITY(J) THEN
SALES(L)=DUM
IF SALES(L)=DUM THEN 3160
SALES(L)=(Pl1*FORECAST(J,WVK))/(CAPACITY(J)+PI1)
NPV=NPV+DISCOUNT(L,WVK)*(SALES(L)*(PRICE-Vl)-L1)
NEXTJ
PROPO(3)=NPV
IF PROPO(3).le.PROPOSAL(I,3) THEN 3189
FOR J=1 TO 4
PROPOSAL(I,J)=PROPO(J)
NEXT J
NEXT TEC
NEXT I
TEST=l
*** Begin section C.3. ***
FOR J=l TO 4 'find best plan
IF PROPOSAL(J,3).gt.PROPOSAL(TEST,3) THEN TEST=J
NEXTJ
A25
3240
3245
3250
3260
3270
32803999 I
4000
4002
4004
4010
4015
4020
40254026 I
4027 I
4028 I
4030
4035
4040
4045
4050
4055
4060
4065
40704075 I
4076 I
4077 I
4080
4085
4090
4095
4100
4105
4110
4115
4120
4125
4130
4135
4140
4145
4150
4155
4160
4165
4170
4175
41804199 I
FOR J=1 TO 4
IF J=TEST THEN X$="*" ELSE X$=" "
PRINT USING A$;J+1;PROPOSAL(J,1);PROPOSAL(J,4);
PROPOSAL(J,2);PROPOSAL(J,3);X$
NEXT J
PRINTPRINT "Option ";TEST+1;" selected provisionally":PRINT
MARK2=0'
N=FIRM(K,3)
C1=0
replacement of existing plant
FOR M=1 TO N
TMPAVCOST(M)=PLAVCOST(OWNER(K,M),WVK)
MRK(M)=M
NEXT M
*** Begin section C.4 ***
FOR TRIAL1=1 TO NI order plants by costs
FOR TRIAL2=1 TO N-1
IF TMPAVCOST(TRIAL2).lt.TMPAVCOST(TRIAL2+1) THEN
SWAP TMPAVCOST(TRIAL2),TMPAVCOST(TRIAL2+1):
SWAP MRK(TRIAL2),MRK(TRIAL2+1)
NEXT TRIAL2
NEXT TRIAL!
FOR TRIA1=1 TO NPRINT PLANTNAME$(OWNER(K,MRK(TRIAL)));TMPAVCOST(TRIAL)
NEXT TRIAL
PRINT
*** Begin section D.1 ***
FOR TRIAL=1 TO NI find value of present plant
I=MRK(TRIAL)
NPV=O
Q=OWNER(K,I)
IF PLANT(Q,1).gt.T THEN NPV=-PLANT(Q,3)*DISCOUNT(!,WVK)/2
L=PLANT(Q,4)
V=PLANT(Q,5)
CAP=PLANT(Q,2)*.9
FOR J=T+1 TO T+22
H=J-T
IF FORECAST(J,WVK).gt.CAPACITY(J)-C1 THEN
SALES(H)=CAP:GOTO 4140
SALES(H)=(CAP*FORECAST(J,WVK))/(CAPACITY(J)-C1)
NPV=NPV+(SALES(H)*(PRICE-V)-L)*DISCOUNT(H,WVK)
NEXT J
VALUE(I)=NPV
PRINT PLANTNAME$(Q);" has marginal present value ";NPV
C1=C1+CAP
NEXT TRIAL
FeR 1.=1 TO 3
BEST(L)=O
NEXT L
A26
4200
4201 '
4202 '
4203 '
4212
4214
4216
4218
4220
4225
4227
4228
4230
4231
4232
4235
4240
4245
4250
4260
4270
4275
4280
4283
4285
4290
4300
4310
4311 '
4312 '
4313 '
4320
4325
4330
4338
4340
4350
4360
4365
4370
4380
4390
4400
4410
4415
4420
FOR 1=1 TO 4' 2,3,4,5-year plans
*** Begin section D.2 ***
FOR TEC=1 TO 3
GOSUB 5400
IF K(K,TEC).le.O THEN 4448
REPRO(4)=TEC
G=GAP( I ,WVK)
G1=0
V1=0
LIMIT=O
FOR TRIAL=1 TO N
IF LIMIT=l THEN 4425
J=MRK(TRIAL)
V1=V1+VALUE(J)
G1=G1+PLANT(OWNER(K,J),2)
IF G+G1.lt.MIN THEN 4420
REPRO(1)=INT«G1+G)/10)*10
IF G+G1.gt.MAX THEN REPRO(1)=MAX:LIMIT=1RI1=REPRO(l)
IF RIl.lt.MIN OR RIl=O THEN 4420
REPRO(2)=FNPRK(PRK,RIl)
IF (GEAR(WVK)*FIRM(K,l)-FIRM(K,2»/.7.1e.0 THEN
PRINT "Gearing exceeded":REPRO(3)=-l:GOTO 4448
IF (REPRO(2)+FIRM(K,l»*GEAR(WVK).lt.FIRM(K,2)+
REPRO(2) THEN REPRO(l)=FNINV(PRK,(GEAR(WVK)*FIRM(K,l)
-FIRM(K,2»/(1.05-GEAR(WVK»):GOTO 4270
SALES(1)=0:SALES(2)=D
DUM=.9*RIl:Ll=FNPRL(PRL,RI1)
NPV=-REPRO(2):V=FNPRV(PRV,RI1)
*** Begin section D.3.
FOR 1=T+3 TO T+22
H=L-T
IF FORECAST(L,WVK).gt.DUM+CAPACITY(L)-Gl THEN
SALES(H)=DUM:GOTO 4340
SALES(H)=(RIl*FORECAST(L,WVK»
/(RI1+CAPACITY(L)-G1)
NPV=NPV+DISCOUNT(H,WVK)*
(SALES(H)*(PRICE-V)-Ll)
NEXT L
REPRO(3)=NPV
IF NPV.lt.VL THEN REPRO(1)=-2:GOTO 4420
IF NPV.le.BEST(3) THEN 4420
FOR 1=1 TO 3
BEST(L)=REPRO(L)
NEXT L
REF(I)=TRIAL
IF LIMIT=l THEN 4425
NEXT TRIAL
A27
4421 I
4422 I
4423 I
4425
4430
4432
4433
4434
4435
4436
4437
4438
4439
4440
4442
4444
4446
4448
44494449 I
4449 I
4449 I
4450
4460
44804490 I
4500
4505
4510
45204530
4540
45504560 I
4561 I
4562 I
4563 I
4600
4602
4605
4610
4612
4613
4614
4615
4616
4617
4618
4619
4620
4625
4630
4633
46364640
4650
*** Begin section D.4 ***
VL=O
FOR 1=1 TO 3
REPRO(L)=BEST(L)
BEST(L)=O
NEXT L
IF REF(I)=O THEN 4448
FOR TRIA1=l TO REF(I)
J=MRK(TRIAL):V1=V1+VALUE(J)
NEXT TRIAL
IF VL.gt.REPRO(3) THEN REPRO(1)=-1:REPRO(3)=-REPRO(3)
IF REPRO(3).le.REPROP(I,3) THEN 4448
FOR J=l TO 4
REPROP(I,J)=REPRO(J)
NEXT J
NEXTTEC
NEXT II now choose best plan and execute
*** Begin section E.1 ***
FOR 1=1 TO 4
PRINT"Option ";1+1;"retires";REF(L);" NPV=";
REPROP(L,3);" Size ";REPROP(L,l);" Tech=";
REPROP(L,4)
NEXT L
FOR 1=1 TO 4
KEF(I)=O
IF REPROP(I,3).le.PROPOSAL(TEST,3) THEN 4550
FOR 1=1 TO 4
PROPOSAL(TEST,L)=REPROP(I,L)
NEXT L
NEXT I execution follows ....
*** Begin section E.2 ***
PRINT:PTl=PROPOSAL(TEST,l)
IF PROPOSAL(TEST,3).le.0 THEN PRINT "No builds":GOTO 4840
IF PT1.lt.MIN(K,PROPOSAL(TEST ,4» THEN PRINT "No builds":GOTO 4840
PRINT "Opt to build plant size ";PTl;" NPV = ";
PROPOSAL(TEST,3)
IF PROPOSAL(TEST,4).ne.l THEN 4620 ELSE TOGGLE=l
K(K,l)=RK(K):L(K,l)=RL(K):V(K,l)=RV(K)' insert real teChnology
MAX(K,l)=RMAX(K):MIN(K,l)=RMIN(K)
RK(K)=O:RL(K)=O:RV(K)=O
RMAX(K)=O:RMIN(K)=O
IF PT1.gt.MAX(K,l) THEN PT1=MAX(K,1):PRINT "Size reduced to ";PT1
IF PT1.lt.MIN(K,1) THEN PT1=MIN(K,1):PRINT "Size increased to ";PT1
IF PT1.le.0 THEN PRINT "Build aborted; .le.0":GOTO 4840
FIRM(K,3)=FIRM(K,3)+1
PLNOS(K)=PLNOS(K)+l
NOPLANTS=NOPLANTS+1
TEC=PROPOSAL(TEST,4)
GOSUB 5400OWNER(K,FIRM(K,3»=NOPLANTS
PLANT(NOPLANTS,1)=T+2
A28
4660
4670
4680
4690
4700
4705
4710
4720
4730
4740
4760
4765
4767
4770
4775
4777
4779
4780
4790
4800
4810
4820
4822
4825
4827
4829
4830 '
4831 '
4832 '
4840 '
4842
4843
4844
4846
4848
4850
4852
4854
4856
4860
4865
4870
4875
4877
4880
4885
4890
4899
4900
PLANT(NOPLANTS,2)=PT1
PLANT(NOPLANTS,3)=FNPRK(PRK,PT1)
PLANT(NOPLANTS,4)=FNPRL(PRL,PT1)
PLANT(NOPLANTS,5)=FNPRV(PRV,PT1)
PLANT(NOPLANTS,6)=K
IF BIGGESTP.lt.PT1 THEN BIGGESTP=PT1
FOR I=T+2 TO DDAY20
CAPACITY(I)=CAPACITY(I)+PT1
NEXT I
PLANTNAME$(NOPLANTS)=NAM$(K)+"."+NO$(PLNOS(K»
FOR 1=1 TO 4
PROPO(I)=O:REPRO(I)=O
FOR J=1 TO 4
MARK(I,J)=O
GAP(I,J)=GAP(I,J)-PT1
IF GAP(I,J).gt.O THEN MARK=1
NEXT J
FOR 1=1 TO 4
REPROP(I,L)=O
PROPOSAL(I,L)=O
NEXT L
NEXT I
FOR J=l TO 4
PLCOST(NOPLANTS,J)=(PLANT(NOPLANTS,3)*COEF(J»+
(1.1-COEF(J»*PLANT(NOPLANTS,4)
+(PLANT(NOPLANTS,5)*PT1)
PLAVCOST(NOPLANTS,J)=PLCOST(NOPLANTS,J)/PT1
NEXTJ
*** Begin section F.l ***
discard poor technology
IF TOGGLE=1 THEN TOGG1E=O ELSE 4860
Q=K
GOSUB 10070
WS=WSTECNO
K(K,WS)=K(K,1):K(K,l)=O
L(K,WS)=L(K,1):L(K,l)=O
V(K,WS)=V(K,l):V(K,l)=O
MAX(K,WS)=MAX(K,l):MAX(K,l)=O
MIN(K,WS)=MIN(K,1):MIN(K,l)=O
IF WVK.ne.3 THEN 4899
IF K(K,1).le.0 OR PLANT(OWNER(K,FIRM(K,3»,1)=T+2 THEN 4899
IF FIRM(K,1)*.4.lt.FIRM(K,2) THEN 4899
IF MIN(K,1)=0 THEN PT1=10 ELSE PT1=MIN(K,l)
IF PTl.gt.BIGGESTP*.5 THEN 4899
PROPOSAL(TEST,4)=1
PRINT:PRINT "Experimental build, size ";PT1:PRINT
GOTO 4612
PRINT" -----------------------":PRINT
NEXT FIRMTRY
A29
5000 '
5001 '
5002 '
5003 '
5010 FOR 1=1 TO NOPLANTS'
5020 PL1NCOME(I)=O
5030 LOSER(I)=O
5035 IF PLANT(I,l)=T THEN TCOST=TCOST+PLCOST(I,l)
5040 IF PLANT(I,l).le.T THEN 5090
5050 PI6=PLANT(I,6)
5060 COST=PLANT(I,3)/2
5070 FIRM(PI6,1)=FIRM(PI6,1)+COST
5080 FIRM(P16,2)=FIRM(PI6,2)+COST
5090 NEXT 1
5100 PR=DEMAND(T)/CAPACITY(T)
5110 IF PR.gt.1 THEN PR=l
5120 FOR J=l TO FMNO
5130 FINCOME(J)=O
5140 NEXT J
5142 P=DEMAND(T)/CAPACITY(T)
5144 AVCOST=TCOST/CAPACITY(T)
5146 PRICE=AVCOST*(.25+P)
5148 IF CAPACITY(T)=O THEN PRICE=35
5150 '
5160
5170
5180
5190
5200
5210
5220
5221 '
5222 '
5223 '
5230 '
5235 AVROR=O
5240
5250
5260
5265
5270
5275
5276
cashflows
*** Begin section G.l ***
building first
revenuesFOR 1=1 TO NOPLANTS
IF PLANT(I,1).gt.T THEN 5220
INCOME=PR*PLANT(I,2)*(PRICE-PLANT(I,5»-PLANT(I,4)IF INCOME.lt.O THEN LOSER(I)=1
FINCOME(PLANT(I,6»=FINCOME(PLANT(I,6»+INCOMEPLINCOME(I)=INCOME
NEXT I
*** Begin section G.2 ***
sum revenues, add interest charge
FOR J=l TO FMNO
FIRM(J,2)=FIRM(J,2)-FINCOME(J)
INTEREST(J)=FIRM(J,2)*.05
IF FIRM(J,2).lt.0THEN INTEREST(J)=FIRM(J,2)*.03
FIRM(J,2)=FIRM(J,2)+INTEREST(J)
FMROR(J)=lOO*(FINCOME(J)-INTEREST(J»/(FIRM(J,l)-FIRM(J,2»
IF FINCOME(J)-INTEREST(J).lt.OAND FMROR(J).gt.O THEN
FMROR(J)=-FMROR(J)
IF FIRM(J,2).lt.0THEN FIRM(J,2)=FIRM(J,2)
+(FINCOME(J)-INTEREST(J»*.4 'dividends5278 AVROR(J)=.5*(AVROR(J)+FMROR(J»
5279 AVROR=AVROR+AVROR(J)5280 NEXT J
5285 AVROR=AVROR/FMNO
5290 '
5300 PRINT £3,T' report to disc file
5310 PRINT £3,CAPACITY(T),DEMAND(T),PR1CE
5320 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
5330 FOR J=l TO 4
5340 PRINT £3, FIRM(I,J)
5350 NEXT J5360 NEXT I
5370 PRINT £3,-999
5277
A30
5380
5381
5382
5383
FOR K=1 TO FMNO
FOR 1=1 TO FIRM(K,3)
Y=OWNER(K,I)
IF PLANT(Y,6).ne.K THEN PRINT "Scream
"firm";K;"plant";I;" Y";Y:STP$="S"
NEXT I
";CHR$(7);
5384
5385 NEXT K
5390 GOrO 5800
5399' ================= Beginning of subroutine =================
5400 ' subroutine for considering technologies
5410 PRK=K(K,TEC)
5420 PRL=L(K,TEC)
5430 PRV=V(K,TEC)
5440 MAX=MAX(K,TEC)
5450 MIN=MIN(K,TEC)
5460 RETURN
5499 I ================= End of subroutine =========================
5800 ' general report
5810 PRINT
5820 PRINT "Time period ";T
5830 PRINT "Demand = ";DEMAND(T);" Capacity = ";CAPACITY(T)
5850 PRINT "Capacity utilisation factor = ";P
5860 PRINT "Price = ";PRICE;" Average ROR = ";AVROR
5870 PRINT
5880 STP$=INKEY$
5890 '
5895 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
5900 IF FIRM(I,2).le.0.8*FIRM(I,1) OR FIRM(I,3).gt.0 THEN 5970
5905 RENEW(I)=1
5915 LASTINNOV(I)=O
5917 FMROR(I)=O:AVROR(I)=O
5920 FOR J=1 TO 3
5925 K(I,J)=O:L(I,J)=O:V(I,J)=O
5930 MAX(I,J)=O:MIN(I.J)=O
5935 NEXT J
5940 RX(I)=O:RL(I)=O:RV(I)=O
5945 RMAX(I)=O:RMIN(I)=O
5950 FIRM(I,1)=10
5955 FIRM(I.2)=O
5960 FIRM(I.3)=O
5965 FIRM(I,4)=1
5970 NEXT I
5990 ooro 6006
5999 '
6000 PRINT: PRINT "Press any key to continue"
6002 Z$=INKEY$
6004 IF Z$="" THEN 6002
6006 PRINT "Report options"
6010 PRINT "1. Firm status and cashflows" :PRINT
6020 PRINT "2. Plant listings":PRINT
6030 PRINT "3. Available technologies":PRINT
6040 PRINT "4. Forecasts":PRINT
6050 PRINT "5. Quit- next time period":PRINT
6055 IF STP$="S" OR STP$="s" TIffiN6060 ELSE 7000
6060 INPUT "Type choice 1/2/3/4/5 ";A
6070 IF A.lt.1 OR A.gt.5 THEN 6060
6080 ON A GOTO 6100,6200,6300,6400,7000
6099 '
6100 PRINT
recycles bankrupt firms
A31
6110 D$=" Name Capital Debt Income Interest AvROR Plants VoW"
6112 E$="± ±£f££f£££ £££f££££ ££f£f££ ££f£££ £££.£ ££ ± ±"
6114 PRINT D$:PRINT
6120 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
6130 PRINT USING E$;NAM$(I);FIRM(I,I);FIRM(I,2);FINCOME(I);INTEREST(I);
AVROR(I);FIRM(I,3);WVIEW$(FIRM(I,4»
6140 NEXT I
6150 GOTO 6000
6199 '
6200 PRINT "There are ";NOPLANTS;" plants at T = ";T
6210 PRINT
6212 F$=" Name
6214 G$="±
6220 PRINT F$:PRINT
6230 FOR 1=0 TO NOPLANTS+l
6240 PRINT USING G$;PLANTNAME$(I);PLANT(I,2);PLANT(I,I);PLANT(I,3);
PLANT(I,4);PLANT(I,5);PLAVCOST(I,I);PLAVCOST(I,FIRM(PLANT(I,6),4))
6250 NEXT I
6260 GOTO 6000
6299 '
6300 PRINT
6310 PRINT "Available technologies:"
6320 PRINT:PRINT LI$:PRINT
6330 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
6340 PRINT NAM$(I)
6350 FOR J=1 TO 3
6360 IF K(I,J).le.O THEN 6380
6370 PRINT USING LJ$;J;K(I,J);L(I,J);V(I,J);MAX(I,J);MIN(I,J)6380 NEXT J
6390 PRINT
6394 NEXT I
6396 GOTO 6000
6399 '
6400 PRINT
6410 INPUT "Forecasts up to T = ";IT
6415 PRINT:PRINT G1$:PRINT
6420 FOR I=T TO IT
6430 PRINT USING Fl$;I;FORECAST(I,1);FORECAST(I,2);FORECAST(I,3);FORECAST(I,4)
6440 NEXT I
6450 GOTO 6000
6998 '
6999 '
7000 '
7005
7010
7020
7030
7040
7050
7060
7070
7080
7999 '
8000 '
8005 IF WVCH.ne.1 THEN 9000
8999 '
Capacity Built Cost L V Avc/I Avc/R"
±££££££££ ££££ ££f£f£££ £f££££ ££££.£ ££.££ ££.££"
*** Begin section H.1 ***
FOR 1=1 TO 4
E(T,I)=DEMAND(T)-FORECAST(T,I)
M(T,I)=M(T-1,I)+B(T-1,I)+AL1(I)*E(T,I)
B(T,:I;)=B(T-l,I)+AL2(I)*E(T,I)
FOR J=l TO 22
FORECAST(J+T,I)=M(T,I)+J*B(T,I)
IF J+T.gt.DDAY THEN FORECAST(J+T,I)=FORECAST(DDAY,I)NEXT J
Forecasting module
NEXT I
Change world views (not used)
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9000 ' Technical improvements
9010 PRINT:PRINT "Technical changes":PRINT:PRINT LI$
9020 FOR 1=1 TO FMNO
9034 IF K(I,I).le.O THEN CHECK=1 ELSE CHECK=O
9036 IF CHECK=O AND LASTINNOV(I)+10.gt.T THEN 9120 ELSE GOSUB 10000
9038 IF K(I,I).gt.O AND FMROR(I).gt.O THEN 9120' only innovate once
9040 PRINT:PRINT NAM$(I):PRINT
90S0 CHANS=RND
90S2 WVI=FIRM(I,4)
90S4 IF RENEW(I)=l THEN RENEW(I)=O:GOSUB 9160 ELSE 9058
9056 GOTO 9110
9058 CHANS=RND' radicals
9060 IF CRANS.le.0.05 AND WVI=1 THEN GOSUB 9480 ELSE 9064
9062 GOTO 9110
9064 IF CRANS.le.0.02 AND WVI=2 THEN GOSUB 9480 ELSE 9068
9066 GOTO 9110
9068 IF CRANS.le.0.1 AND WVI=3 THEN GOSUB 9480 ELSE 9072
9070 GOTO 9110
9072 IF CRANS.le.0.05 AND WVI=4 THEN GOSUB 9480 ELSE 9076
9074 GOTO 9110
9076 CHANS=RND' imitations
9078 IF FMROR(I).le.OTHEN ROR=1 ELSE ROR=O
9080 IF CHANS.le.0.3 AND WVI=1 THEN GOSUB 9150 ELSE 9084
9082 GOTO 9110
9084 IF CHANS.le.0.3+.2*RORAND WVI=2 THEN GOSUB 9150 ELSE 90889086 GOTO 9110
9088 IF CHANS.lt.0.2+.1*RORAND WVI=3 THEN GOSUB 9150 ELSE 90929090 GOTO 9110
9092 IF CHANS.lt.0.l+.2*RORAND WVI=4 THEN GOSUB 9150 ELSE GOSUB 9630
9110 PRINT USING LJ$;I;K(I,1);L(I,1);V(I,1);MAX(I,1);MIN(I,1)
9115 IF K(I,1).gt.0THEN LASTINNOV(I)=T
9120 NEXT I
9130 GOTO 2000
9140 '
91S0' =========--=======Beginning of subroutine =================9160 SX=I:MAXROR=-1000' imitation
9170 Q=I
9180 GOSUB 10070
9190 WS=WSTECNO
9200 IF WS=1 THEN 9260
9210 SWAP K(I,I),K(I,WS)
9220 SWAP L(I,I),L(I,WS)
9230 SWAP V(I,1),V(I,WS)
9240 SWAP MAX(I,l),MAX(I,WS)
92S0 SWAP MIN(I,l),MIN(I,WS)9260 GOSUB 10000
9270 FOR J=1 TO FMNO
9280 IF FMROR(J).gt.MAXRORTHEN SX=J:MAXROR=FMROR(J)
9290 NEXT J
9300 Q=SX
9310 IF Q=I THEN 9450
9320 GOSUB 10070
9330 BT=BSTECNO
9340 IF BT=l AND WSTECN0=2 THEN BT=3' can't imitate experiments93S0 IF BT=1 AND WSTECN0=3 THEN BT=2
9360 RK(I)=K(Q,BT):K(I,l)=RK(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»
9370 RL(I)=L(Q,BT):L(I,I)=RL(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»
9380 RV(I)=V(Q,BT):V(I,I)=RV(I)*(.97S+(.OS*RND)
9390 RMAX(I)=MAX(Q,BT):MAX(I,1)=INT«RMAX(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
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9400 RMIN(I)=MIN(Q,BT):MIN(I,1)=INT«RMIN(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9410 Q=I
9420 GOSUB 10070
9430 IF BSTECN0=1 THEN 9450
9440 GOSUB 10000
9450 RETURN9460 t ====== __ 4======== End of subroutine =========================
9470' =============--=== Beginning of subroutine ============--===
9480 ' major/radical innovation (not used)
9481 GOTO 9620
9600' ================= End of subroutine =========================
9610' ===============--= Beginning of subroutine =================
9620 ' incremental innovation
9630 CHANS=RND
9632 Q=I:GOSUB 10070
9634 BT=BSTECNO
9635 IF BIGGESTP.gt.0.2*DEMAND(T) THEN 9646
9636 IF FIRM(I,3).gt.4 THEN FM=FIRM(I,3)-4 ELSE FM=O
9638 IF WVI=l AND CHANS.lt.0.2+FM THEN 9830
9640 IF WVI=2 AND CHANS.lt.0.1+FM THEN 9830
9642 IF WVI=3 AND CHANS.lt.0.2+FM THEN 9830
9644 IF WVI=4 AND CHANS.lt.0.4+FM THEN 9830
9646 IF WVI=1 OR WVI=3 THEN 9652
9648 IF WVI=2 THEN 9658
9650 IF WVI=4 THEN 9664
9652 IF CHANS.lt.0.8 THEN INK=.2:INL=.2:GOTO 9690
9654 IF CHANS.lt.0.9 THEN INK=.05:INL=.25:GOTO 9690
9656 INK=.25:INL=.05:GOTO 9690
9658 IF CHANS.lt.0.4 THEN INK=.2:INL=.2:GOTO 9690
9660 IF CHANS.lt.0.5 THEN INK=.05:INL=.25:GOTO 9690
9662 INK=.25:INL=.05:GOTO 9690
9664 IF CHANS.lt.0.6 THEN INK=.2:INL=.2:GOTO 9690
9666 INK=.05:IN1=.25
9690 RV(I)=V(I,BT)*(.975+(.05*RND»
9700 V(I,1)=RV(I)*(.975+(.05*RND»
9710 RK(I)=K(I,BT)*«1-INK)+(2*INK*RND»
9720 K(I,1)=RK(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»
9730 RL(I)=L(I,BT)*«1-INL)+(2*INL*RND»
9740 L(I,1)=RL(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»
-9750 RMAX(I)=INT«MAX(I,BT)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9760 MAX(I,1)=INT«RMAX(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9770 RMIN(I)=10+INT«MIN(I,BT)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9780 MIN(I,1)=INT«RMIN(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9790 Q=I
9800 GOSUB 10070
9810 IF BSTECNO=l THEN 9970 ELSE GOSUB 10000
9820 GOTO 9970
9830 RV(I)=V(I,BT)*(.975+(.05*RND»' scaleup
9840 V(I,1)=RV(I)*(.975+(.05*RND»
9850 RK(I)=K(I,BT)*(.95+(.1*RND»
9860 K(I,1)=RK(I)*(.95+(.1*RND»
9870 RL(I)=L(I ,BT)*(.95+(.1*RND»
9880 L(I,1)=RL(I)*(.95+(.1*RND»
9890 RMAX(I)=INT«MAX(I,BT)*(.5+2*RND»/10)*10
9900 MAX(I,1)=INT«RMAX(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9910 RMIN(I)=10+INT«MIN(I,BT)*(.5+(4.5*RND»)/10)*10
9920 MIN(I,1)=INT«RMIN(I)*(.9+(.2*RND»)/10)*10
9930 IF MIN(I,l).ge.MAX(I,l) THEN GOSUB 10000
9940 Q=I
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9950 GOSUB 10070
9960 IF BSTECNO.ne.1 THEN GOSUB 10000
9970 RETURN9980' ---============ End of subroutine =============-=========
9990' ================ Beginning of subroutine =================
10000 K(I,l)=O:RK(I)=O' kills duds
10010 L(I,l)=O:RL(I)=O
10020 V(I,l)=O:RV(I)=O
10030 MIN(I,l)=O:RMIN(I)=O
10040 MAX(I,l)=O:RMAX(I)=O
10050 RETURN
10060 ' ================= End of subroutine ========================
10070 ' =--============== Beginning of subroutine =================
10080 ' find the best technology
10090 SCR(1)=0:SCR(2)=0:SCR(3)=0
10100 FOR M=l TO 3
10110 PRINT USING LJ$iMiK(Q,M) iL(Q,M)iV(Q,M) iMAX(Q,M) iMIN(Q,M)
10120 IF M=l THEN Y=1:Z=2
10130 IF M=2 THEN Y=1:Z=3
10140 IF M=3 THEN Y=2:Z=310150 IF K(Q,Y).le.O AND K(Q,Z).gt.O THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+5:GOTO 10560
10160 IF K(Q,Z).le.O AND K(Q,Y).gt.O THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+5:GOTO 10560
10170 '
10180
10190
10200
10210
10220
10230
10240
10250
10260
10270
10280
10290
10300
10310
10320
10330
10340
10350
10360
10370
10380
10390
10400
10410
10420
10430
10440
10450
10460
10470
10480
10490
10500
10510
10520
10530
IF MIN(Q,Y).lt.MIN(Q,Z) THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l:MINU=MIN(Q,Z)
IF MIN(Q,Z).lt.MIN(Q,Y) THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l:MINU=MIN(Q,Y)
IF MAX(Q,Y).gt.MAX(Q,Z) THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l:MAXU=MAX(Q,Z)
IF MAX(Q,Z).gt.MAX(Q,Y) THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l:MAXU=MAX(Q,Y)
MIQY=MIN(Q,Y):MIQZ=MIN(Q,Z):ZZZ=MIQY-MIQZ
IF ZZZ=O THEN 10240 ELSE 10300'avoids compiler error
MINU=MIN(Q, Y) :IF MINU=O THEN 10300
A=FNTCOMP(MINU,K(Q,Y),L(Q,Y),V(Q,Y),FIRM(Q,4))
B=FNTCOMP(MINU,K(Q,Z),L(Q,Z),V(Q,Z),FIRM(Q,4))
IF A.lt.B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l
IF B.lt.A THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l
IF A=B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+.5:SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+.5
MAQY=MAX(Q,Y):MAQZ=MAX(Q,Z):ZZZ=MAQY-MAQZ
IF ZZZ--0THEN 10320 ELSE 10380
MAXU=MAX(Q,Y):IF MAXU=O THEN 10560
A=FNTCOMP(MAXU,K(Q,Y),L(Q,Y),V(Q,Y),FIRM(Q,4))
B=FNTCOMP(MAXU,K(Q,Z),L(Q,Z),V(Q,Z),FIRM(Q,4))
IF A.lt.B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l
IF B.lt.A THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l
IF A=B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+.5:SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+.5
IF MINU=O THEN 10440
A=FNTCOMP(MINU,K(Q,Y),L(Q,Y),V(Q,Y),FIRM(Q,4))
B=FNTCOMP(MINU,K(Q,Z),L(Q,Z),V(Q,Z),FIRM(Q,4))
IF A.lt.B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l
IF B.lt.A THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l
IF A=B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+.5:SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+.5
IF MAXU=O THEN 10560
A=FNTCOMP(MAXU,K(Q,Y),L(Q,Y),V(Q,Y),FIRM(Q,4))
B=FNTCOMP(MAXU,K(Q,Z),L(Q,Z),V(Q,Z),FIRM(Q,4))
IF A.lt.B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l
IF B.lt.A THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l
IF A=B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+.5:SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+.5
MIDU=(MAXU+MINU)/2
A=FNTCOMP(MIDU,K(Q,Y),L(Q,Y),V(Q,Y),FIRM(Q,4))
B=FNTCOMP(MIDU,K(Q,Z),L(Q,Z),V(Q,Z),FIRM(Q,4))
IF A.lt.B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+l
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10540 IF B.lt.A THEN SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+l
10550 IF A=B THEN SCR(Y)=SCR(Y)+.5:SCR(Z)=SCR(Z)+.5
10560 NEXT M
10570 BSTECNO=l:WSTECN0=3
10580 IF SCR(2).ge.SCR(1) AND SCR(2).ge.SCR(3) THEN BSTECN0=2
10590 IF SCR(3).ge.SCR(1) AND SCR(3).ge.SCR(2) THEN BSTECN0=3
10600 IF SCR(1).le.SCR(2) AND SCR(1).le.SCR(3) THEN WSTECNO=l
10610 IF SCR(2).le.SCR(1) AND SCR(2).le.SCR(3) THEN WSTECN0=2
10620 PRINT SCR(1);SCR(2);SCR(3):PRINT "best=";BSTECNO;" worst=";WSTECNO
10630 RETURN
10640 ' ================= End of subroutine =========================
11000 DATA "1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9","10","11","12","13","14","15"
11010 DATA "16","17","18","19","20","21","22","23","24","25","26","27","28"
11020 DATA "29","30","31","32","33","34","35","36","37","38","39","40"
11030 DATA "41","42","43","44","45","46","47","48","49","50"
11040 DATA "ONE","TWO","THREE","FOUR","FIVE","SIX","SEVEN","EIGlIT","NINE"
11050 DATA "TEN","ELEVEN","TWELVE","THIRTEEN", "FOURTEEN","FIFTEEN","SIXTEEN"
11060 DATA "SEVENTEEN", "EIGHTEEN","NINETEEN", "TWENTY","TWENTYONE","TWENTYTWO"
11070 DATA "TWENTYFOUR", "TWENTYFIVE","TWENTYSIX", "TWENTYSEVEN","TWENTYEIGlIT"
11080 DATA "TWENTYNINE","THIRTY"
12000 FOR 1=1 TO NOPLANTS' plant data records
12010 PRINT £1,T+1
12020 FOR J=l TO 6
12030 PRINT £l,PLANT(I,J)
12040 NEXT J
12050 PRINT £l,PLANTNAME$(I)
12060 NEXT I
12070 END
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Appendix BB: Arrays used in EMIR version 3.2
Related to ti.aeseries:
DEMAND(t)
CAPACITY(t)
FORECAST(t,wv)
M(t,wv)
E(t,wv)
B(t,wv)
DISCOUNT(20,wv)
Related to Firms:
FIRM(i,4)
NAM$(i)
INTEREST(i)
FINCOME(i)
PLNOS(i)
FMROR(i)
AVROR(i)
ORDER(i)
LASTINNOV (L)
K(i,j)
L(i,j)
V(i,j)
MAX(i,j)
MIN(i,j)
OWNER(i,j)
RENEW(i)
Related to Plants:
PLANT(i,6)
PLANTNAME$ (i)
LOSER(i)
VALUE(i)
PLINCOME(i)
PLCOST(i,wv)
PLAVCOST(i)
TMPAVCOST(i)
Industry demand at period t
Industry capacity (or forecast capacity) at time t
Forecast for time t held by firms with worldviews wv
(Forecasting para-
(meters for time t,
(worldview wv
Discount factors for next 20 periods for worldview wv
Firm i's Capital (1), Debt (2), number of plants in
operation (3) and worldview (4)
Name of firm i
This period interest charge for firm i
Income this period for firm i
Number of plants operated by firm i
Rate of return for firm i this period
(Exponentially-weighted moving average) rate of
return for firm i
(Random) order in which firm i takes its capacity
decisions for this period
Time period at which firm i last found technological
innovation
(jth technology Capital coefficient for
( " " Labour " "
( " " Variable"
( " " Maximum plant scale "
( " " Minimum" " " " i
"
firm i
" i
" i
" i
Reference number (i.e. index of array PLANT below) of
jth firm owned by firm i
1 if firm i has been bankrupted, 0 else
Plant i's date of first becoming operational (1),
production capacity (2), Capital construction cost
(3), Labour cost per period (4), Variable cost per
unit of output (5), and reference number (Le. index
of array FIRM above) of owner (6)
Name of plant i
1 if plant lost money last period, 0 else
Last calculated NPV of ith plant
Income this period of plant i
Production cost of ith plant as judged by firm with
worldview wv
Actual production ..cost per unit of output of plant i
Intermediate calculating variable for ith plant
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Related to plant construction decisions:
(Used for different purposes in different places, and results not stored
- listed for completeness)
PROPOSAL(i,j)
REPROP(i,j)
BEST(i)
MARK(i,j)
MRK(i)
REF(i)
GAP(i,j)
PR$(i)
PROPO(i)
REPRO(i)
SeR(i)
GEAR(i)
MRK(i)
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Appendix BC: EMIR Program Logical Structure
Labels in the left-hand column are reproduced as comment lines in the
program listing (Appendix BA).
LABEL FUNCTION
A Declare array variables
Initialise
Read data files
FOR t = 1 to "enddate"
FOR firm = 1 to "no of firms"
B.1 Test plants owned by firm for random failure
B.2 Test plants owned by firm for retirement because loss-making
B.3 IF either test fails
Retire plant(s)
ENDIF
C.l IF future demand forecast exceeds capacity at t+2, .., t+S
C.2
FOR technology = 1 to 3
Calculate NPV over next 20 periods of building plants
of sizes (Gap at t+2), (..), (Gap at t+S)
NEXT technology
C.3 Choose best option (highest forecast NPV)
ENDIF
C.4 Rank all of this firm's existing plants in order of
production cost per unit of output - renumber in descending
order of cost
FOR plant = 1 to "no. of plants owned by FIRM"
D.l
D.2
Calculate NPV of this single existing plant
Calculate future demand gap if firm retires all plants up
to and including this one for period (t+2), (.•), (t+S)
FOR technology = 1 to 3
D.3 Calculate NPV for building plants size (Gap at t+2),
(..), (Gap at t+S)
D.4 Compare this NPV with the NPV of the plants which would
be retired to make these demand-capacity gaps
NEXT technology
NEXT plant
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E.1 Choose MAX of (all NPVs calculated above, 0)
E.2 Build the plant which has the largestNPV (or none, if no
building project has positive expected NPV)
F.1 Re-appraise this firm's portfolio of three technologies
NEXT firm
G.1 Allocate revenues and costs to Firms
G.2 Charge interest and Dividends to Firms as appropriate
G.3 Update Firms' demand forecasts
FOR firm = 1 to "no. of firms"
H.1 Attempt innovation
NEXT firm
NEXTt
1.1 END
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Appendix BD: Previous versions of EMIR
EMIR is a complex simulation. It is important to be sure that it is
working as intended. To this end, the model was developed in stages,
adding sophistication as the more basic functions were seen to be
correctly implemented.
The main stages of development, corresponding to different main versions
of the model, were as follows:
VERSION IMPORTANT FEATURES
1.0 Addition and retiring of units of capacity to meet demand
1.1 Forecasting of future demand levels
1.2
1.3
Price made a function of capacity utilisation
More complex decision rules introduced
1.39 Random order of firms' decision-making; perfect knowledge of
competitor's planned changes in capacity once build-reti.re
decision made
1.4 Model driven by command file; results saved to diskette data
file
2.0 Simple incremental technological change
2.1
2.2 Rationalisation of program structure, reduction in
unnecessary array dimensions, to speed runs
2.3 Improved techological change (including imitation and
scaleup)
3.0 Plural worldviews and strategies
3.1 Innovation and scaleup made dependent upon worldview
3.2 ''Production''version further refined for automatic operation
from batch file for multiple simulation runs
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Appendix 8E: Debug Output
To assist in validating and verifying the correct operation of the
model, "debug" statements are sent to the screen as the firms take
decisions. At the end of each time-period the user may halt the
simulation and interrogate the model about the state of the firms,
plants and technologies at that time. These print statements (and
others, since deleted) were used as successi ve versions of the model
were developed to check that the program was operating as expected.
Inspection of the program printout will show that the following lines
contain screen print statements:
File import: 1000
Retiring of plants: 2180
2355
Plant building plans:
General report each
period:
Option to inspect:
Technological change:
Plant data error:
3075
3250
3280
4060
4155
4283
4460
4605
4610
4617
4618
4885
5820
5830
5850
5860
6000 - 6050
6200 - 6250
6300 - 6394
6400 - 6440
9010
9040
9110
10110
10620
5283
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Other Checks on the Results
Further checks are made to validate the results of the simulation runs.
Two data files are saved from each run. The first records (amongst other
things) the total capacity and market price at the end of each period
modelled. The other file saves details of all plants constructed during
the run. Clearly, these variables saved on a period-by-period basis can
be recalculated from the plant data. (Price is a function of production
cost and capacity utilisation.) This is done by a separate program,
which prints out the results of each run after performing such a
reconciliation. This gives an extra assurance both that output data is
saved correctly, and that it is properly calculated in the first place.
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Appendix 8F: The EMIR Pricing Model
Economic theory often models demand as a function of price (at least for
small, local changes). In EMIR we have deliberately made demand the
crucial, exogenous parameter, so the conventional approach would not
work.
The market price in EMIR is set according to the relationship:
Price = Av. Production Cost * (0.25 + Demand / Capacity) (i)
where "Av. Production Cost" is the weighted average of the production
costs of all plants operating at that time, as defined in (34).
(i) says that, where total demand equals total supply and where all
producers have the same costs, prices will be set to recover costs and
earn a 25% return. Costs here include an 10% of construction costs - see
equation (34). Assuming a 20-year plant life, half of this 10% per
period is "depreciation", and the remainder represents financing costs.
This is obviously crude in a number of ways, but has the merit of
simplicity. Again, EMIR is not intended to be a detailed model of
pricing strategy.
To see how (L) relates to the normal price model, consider a typical
textbook relationship such as:
Demand = A * Price -B (11)
This implies that demand decreases as price increases:
Price .
\
Demand
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In the case of (i), however, if we assume that capacity is unchanging in
the short run (which it is in EMIR) we have an analogous position:
Price
Demand
It can be seen that the relationships are qualitatively similar, but in
EMIR price is driven by demand (in the short run), and in the usual
microeconomic model demand is driven by price (again, in the short run).
Bidding and Marginal Plant Pricing
Equation (i) above says that when all producers have the same costs and
demand exactly equals supply then the price will be set to make a 25%
return on costs. However, it is unlikely that all producers will have
identical costs. By setting prices as in (d), low-cost producers will
earn higher profits, and high-cost plants will make smaller profits (or
even losses).
Conventional theory states that prices should be set equal to the long-
run marginal production cost. Another way of looking at the problem (of
determining the industry price) is to consider it as a sort of reverse
auction, in which producers offer to supply at fixed prices each period.
Assuming (as is usually the case in EMIR) that total supply exceeds
total industry demand, each producer has conflicting objectives in
setting prices. A producer will wish to "bid" as high a price as
possible for sale of his output. However, he will also wish to sell as
much as he can. These two objectives resolve into the single objective
of profit-maximisation. That is, we could assume that each producer
strives to set prices to maximise sale proceeds each period.
4
However, there is another complication. Producers know that they are
invol ved in a long-term struggle for survi val and profit. After the
present time period will come another - and performance then will depend
upon the beha viour of competitors. There is an incenti ve for low-cost
producers to set prices lower than they need in order to starve
competitors of income, with the ultimate aim of putting them out of
business.
Forces acting on the pricing decision act, therefore, in two directions.
Encouraging firms to set prices high is:
- the desire to make large profit margins
Encouraging firms to set prices low is:
- the desire to sell as much as possible
- the desire to drive competitors out of business
There are clearly elements of game theory here; the price "bidding"
would make an interesting simulation model in its own right.
It is assumed that (L) represents a fair compromise, indicating a sort
of "centre of gravity" around which bids would be fixed. At this price
-level the "average" producer will make a reasonable return when capacity
and demand are in balance. In real life it might well be that not all
producers would set identical prices.
In summary, then, pricing is a very complex issue. A great deal more
detail and complex could have been put into the model. This has not been
done because price setting is not one of the important areas of enquiry
for which the model was designed. The relationship (i) encapsulates
reasonable assumptions, and is compatible with the traditional price-
demand elasticity formulation.
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Appendix 8G: Criteria for Rationalisation Projects
Some comments on section 5.4 of Chapter 8, which deals with how firms
assess whether to build new plants in anticipation of retiring old and
possibly less efficient ones, may be helpful.
Firms (in the real world) take decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. Firms in EMIR are faced with uncertainty too - they have to
forecast future demand, they are implicitly forecasting price by
assuming that it will remain constant, they are faced with technological
uncertainties, and they do not know how their competitors will behave.
Programming the model to allow the firms to make sophisticated forecasts
of all these factors would be an interesting exercise, but would result
in a simulation an order of magnitude more complex. Consequently, a
heuristic approach is used. A simple set of decision rules is produced
by using equations (47) to (50) in Chapter 8. The rules are designed to
provide "reasonable" behaviour, allowing firms to invest in new capacity
when appropriate, but not encouraging them to be too aggressive in the
face of all their uncertainties.
The approach, as outlined in section 5.4, is:
A) Rank existing plants in order of their average production costs (as
percei ved by the firm - equation (2».
Comment
This heuristically assumes that ordering by costs will give a correct
ordering by NPV. This is almost, but not quite, always true. It could
be untrue when a larger plant has slightly higher costs per unit of
output than a smaller plant, but has a higher NPV due to greater
expected sales. Due to the existence of economies of scale in fixed
operating (Labour) costs, this happens rarely. (Only when the small
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plant has been the beneficiary of significant technological progress
compared with the large plant.)
B) Consider the demand gap to be met in the future by subtracting the
capacities of the firm's own plants, in order, from the available
capacity.
Comment
This assumes that the less efficient (more expensive to run) plants
actually will be retired. This is likely, but need not be the case.
C) Calculate the Net Present Value of each existing plant. Do this by
assuming that all other plants owned by this firm which have higher
average production costs have been retired.
Comment
As B) above. Note that the capital costs of existing plant are sunk,
and do not have to be subtracted. The NPV is therefore the discounted
value of the next 20 periods of operations. Note also that this makes
the generous assumption that existing plants will actually last
another 20 periods; they may have used up part or all of their "risk-
free" 10 periods, so their expected remaining life could be as low as
10 more periods. (See Chapter 8, section 1.2.)
D) Calculate the NPV of the proposed new plant, of size defined in B)
above, in this case allowing for the capital costs of construction.
The criterion for accepting the project is then that its NPV is
greater than the sum of the NPVs of the plants to be retired, each
calculated as in C) above.
Comment
This is a strong condition to meet; the "true" expected NPV of the
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plants to be retired, considered together, is always less than the
sum of the individual NPVs as calculated in C). This is because
retiring the first plant increases the NPV of the second (by
increasing its expected sales), etc. Imposing this rule means that
there has to be a strong economic case for building plants based only
or partly upon scrapping other capacity, rather than to meet forecast
extra demand in the market.
It will be seen that the odds are weighted against rationalisation
building; this is deliberate. In the face of the uncertainties mentioned
above, firms should not be allowed to indulge in ''kamikaze''construction
projects. Nevertheless, in all simulation runs there are significant
numbers of "rationalisation" plants buil t. These happen because old,
small plants become relatively unprofitable, and hence have low NPVs.
When a firm acquires a superior technology, plus the capability to build
larger production units, the scope for a new, large and low-cost plant
may be created.
One final comment: in order to partly redress the intentional stacking
of the odds against "rationalisation" projects, a compensation has been
made. Plant construction projects based on extra future demand may have
been generated (see Chapter 8, section 5.3). Such projects have an NPV
associated with them. Rationalisation projects, generated as above, will
almost always have larger NPVs (because they will almost always be for
larger plants - although the possibility that different technologies,
and gaps from 2, 3, 4, or 5 years ahead, might have been used, means
that this is not absolutely guaranteed). The best rationalisation
project is then chosen in preference, without allowing for the NPV(s) of
the plants assumed to be retired. However, examination of a few runs
(using the screen output - see Appendix 8E) shows that in about 90% of
all rationalisation builds, the decision would have been unchanged. The
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other 10% would have given marginally different conclusions. Given the
weighting against rationalisations in all other respects, this is
reasonable.
In conclusion, it should be re-emphasised that the approach taken is
deliberately heuristic and not optimising. "Optimisation" would require
price forecasting, more complex calculations of plant NPVs based upon
expected lifetimes, calculation of NPV's which took account of retiring
several simultaneously, and perhaps some forecasting of competitor
behaviour too. The complexity of the model has to be cut off at some
point, and section 5.4 represents a compromise between detail and
pragmatism. It also gives sensible behaviour.
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Appendix 8H: The Formulation of Technology in EMIR
Section 1.3 of Chapter 8 describes the modelling of technology in EMIR.
This description is expanded here.
A technology in EMIR is defined by a quintuplet (K, L, V, MAX, MIN):
K = Capital cost coefficient
L = Labour " "
V = Variable " "
MAX = Maximum plant scale for which this technology is usable
MIN = Minimum " " " " " " " "
A firm may build a plant of scale X. (X is measured in potential output
- e.g. in tons/day. In the simulations, its value ranges from 40 to over
3000.) A plant of size X has the characteristics:
Scale lies between MIN and MAX
Capital construction cost = K * XO.7 (units - currency e.g. £)
Labour fixed cost = L * XO.4 (units - currency)
Variable cost per unit
produced
= V (units - currency)
The justification for these relationships is quoted in Chapter 8, and is
derived from Chapter 2. The Capital and Labour cost relationships
represent significant economies of scale. They resemble the familiar
Cobb-Douglas production function formulation (Walters 1960, and Chapter
2 section 4.4). They are, however, based upon the specific cost-scale
relationships empirically determined in the references quoted. Clearly,
using these relationships is tantamount to adopting the "two-thirds
power law", which was discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, section 5.
It is a simplification with limitations; however, the model of
technology is already complex enough, and could only be made more
realistic by introducing detail in the fashion of Chapter 4. This was
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felt to be both infeasible and unnecessary.
Example
Consider a technology T in EMIR defined by the quintuplet
T - (K = 100, L = 50, V = 5, MAX = 400, MIN = 40)
With T we can construct a plant of scale X, where X is anywhere between
40 and 400 units of output per period. The capital construction cost of
a plant scale X is
Capital cost = 100 * XO.7
For example, a plant of scale 80 units output/period will cost
100 * 80°·7 = 100 * 21.486 = 2148.6 (£, say)
The capital construction cost per unit capacity is thus
2148.6/80 = 26.86 per unit.
Each period it operates, it will be charged a fixed overhead, and a
variable production cost based upon its output. So if it produces 70
units the costs per period will be
Overhead = L * XO.4 = 50 * 800.4 = 288.54
Variable = V * X = 5 * 70 = 350
This assumes less than full utilisation of the plant. The full overhead
cost is charged for each period the plant is in operation, but the
variable cost is charged only in proportion to the output actually
achieved. It is assumed that the production process requires a fairly
constant labour input (see Gold's (1981) comments on "capital-dominated"
industries). Any other plant overheads are subsumed into the L
coefficient. The variable costs represent energy costs,materials, any
additional labour, etc.
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Economies of Scale
Now if a plant of scale 200 were built using this technology, the
capital construction cost would be
Capital cost = 100 * 2000.7 = 4080.6
The capital construction cost per unit of capacity would be
4080.6 / 200 = 20.40 per unit
which is significantly lower than for the plant of scale 80 units output
per period calculated above. A similar relationship (with even greater
economies of scale) holds for the fixed overhead cost (based upon the L-
relationship).
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Appendix 81: Forecasting Routines in EMIR
The forecasting used by firms in EMIR (see Chapter 8, section 4.1) is
based upon Holt's method of exponentially-weighted moving averages. Let:
met) = current estimate of level of demand
bet) = current estimate of rate of growth of demand
yet) = actual demand at time t
yet) = forecast of demand at time t made at time t-1
Then:
e(t) = yet) - yet)
met) = m(t-1) + b(t-1) + A1 * e(t)
bet) = b(t-1) + A2 * e(t)
(39)
(40)
(41)
The forecast for k time periods ahead, made at time t, is given by:
Y(t,k) = met) + k * bet) (42)
In the simulation program, the forecasting routine is initialised by
setting
m(O) = Y(l)
b(O) = (Y(10) - Y(l)) / 10
The parameters A1 and A2 affect the weightings given to past data. They
depend upon the world view of the forecasting firm, and the values used
are:
Worldview A1 A2
II
IV
0.4
0.2
0.15
0.08
I have tested these values for reasonableness in other forecasting
applications. The implication of the values chosen is that II's take
less account of past history than IV's, which latter tend to take a
longer-term perspective to decision-making. (See also "J. Royal
AS4
Statistical Society" 1975, p.205.)
It is not claimed that this forecasting technique gives optimal results
for any gi ven demand series. (It could not be optimal for both world-
views.) Its function is to introduce uncertainty into EMIR, whilst
giving the simulated firms a plausible foundation on which to base
capacity decisions. To the (inevitable) extent that forecasts are
defective, the defects are shared by all firms in a particular scenario.
To gain an impression of how the forecasting model works, some results
are gi ven below, relating to the three demand series used in the runs
described in Chapter 9. The five-period ahead forecasts are given,
because those represent the maximum horizon firms look ahead to estimate
a demand gap to be filled by constructing new capacity.
Note that the II-world view tends to slightly superior performance,
probably due to its quicker responses to changes in underlying trend in
the demand series. The average absolute errors in the five-period ahead
forecasts are respectable compared with (say) the five-year ahead
forecasts of the C.E.G.B. from 1947 to 1970 (Abdulkarim and Lucas 1977),
which made errors ranging from -11.3% to +28.8%.
DEMAND SERIES A
Forecast Five-period ahead forecast Outcome
made at: W'view II W'view IV
4 517 621 746
9 879 735 1173
14 1535 1398 1627
19 2261 2282 2298
24 2721 2830 2844
29 3200 3263 3049
34 3792 3722 3505
39 3972 3918 3812
44 3888 4052 3837
49 4205 4235 3920
54 4477 4352 4093
Av. abs. error 190 195
ASS
DEMAND SERIES B
Forecast Five-period ahead forecast Outcome
made at: W'view II W'view IV
4 1035 1242 1491
9 1758 1471 2347
14 3070 2795 3253
19 4522 4564 4596
24 5442 5659 5687
29 6400 6525 6097
34 7584 7444 7009
39 7944 7835 7623
44 7775 8105 7674
49 8410 8471 7839
54 8954 8705 8187
Av. abs. error 380 391
DEMAND SERIES C
Forecast Five-period ahead forecast Outcome
made at: W'view II W'view IV
4 1547 1616 1700
9 1789 1693 1986
14 2228 2136 2290
19 2715 2729 2740
24 3023 3096 3105
29 3344 3386 3243
34 3741 3694 3548
39 3861 3825 3754
44 3805 3915 3771
49 4017 4038 3826
54 4199 4116 3943
Av. abs. error 127 131
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Appendix 9A: Demand series and initial conditions for EMIR experiments
DEMAND SERIES
tAB C
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
538.3
484.9
479.3
518.0
540.7
567.2
652.4
714.0
745.6
822.7
878.8
965.4
1096.9
1173.4
1304.4
1426.7
1432.8
1638.9
1626.5
1859.8
1927.8
1968.8
2108.6
2298.1
2366.6
2342.1
2645.0
2554.8
2843.6
2703.9
2998.6
2973.3
3216.0
3048.5
3193.7
3308.5
3337.4
3544.5
3504.7
3711.2
3664.8
3639.3
3602.2
3811.6
3798.0
4081.1
3887.6
3907.7
3836.8
3981.5
4090.8
4117.9
4202.4
1076.7
969.8
958.6
1036.0
1081.3
1134.5
1304.8
1427.9
1491.3
1645.5
1757.5
1930.8
2193.8
2346.7
2608.7
2853.4
2865.6
3277.9
3253.1
3719.7
3855.6
3937.6
4217.3
4596.2
4733.3
4684.2
5289.9
5109.6
5687.2
5407.7
5997.2
5946.7
6432.0
6097.0
6387.4
6617.1
6674.8
7088.9
7009.4
7422.4
7329.6
7278.5
7204.4
7623.3
7596.0
8162.2
7775.1
7815.4
7673.6
7962.9
8181.6
8235.8
8404.8
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1560.7
1524.9
1521.1
1547.0
1562.2
1580.0
1637.1
1678.4
1699.6
1751.2
1788.8
1846.8
1934.9
1986.2
2073.9
2155.9
2160.0
2298.1
2289.8
2446.1
2491.6
2519.1
2612.8
2739.7
2785.6
2769.2
2972.1
2911.7
3105.2
3011.6
3209.1
3192.1
3354.7
3242.5
3339.8
3416.7
3436.0
3574.8
3548.1
3686.5
3655.4
3638.3
3613.5
3753.8
3744.7
3934.3
3804.7
3818.2
3770.7
3867.6
3940.8
3959.0
4015.6
54 3919.5 7839.1 3826.1
55 4148.2 8296.3 3979.3
56 4253.8 8507.6 4050.0
57 4202.6 8405.2 4015.7
58 4213.2 8426.5 4022.9
59 4093.3 8186.5 3942.5
Initial conditions
Initial conditions are completely defined by the starting state of the
firms, all having initial Capital of 15,000 and Debt of O. (See Chapter
8, section 7.1) These values are selected to allow firms to build
several plants without encountering early gearing problems.
The demand series have different starting levels - Band C have higher
opening demand than A. The number and capacity of plants owned by each
firm for each series therefore varies, and varies further depending upon
the number of firms modelled in the industry, as follows:
Table 9A.1: Initial number and size of Plants owned by each Firm for
Simulations with each of the Demand Series
Demand Series
ABC
4 firms 2 * 80 4 * 80 4 * 80
16 firms 1 * 40 1 * 80 1 * 80
It was desirable to have the same plant sizes for comparisons both
between demand series, and between the 4 and 16 firm cases for the same
demand series. This was not feasible without using all plants of scale
40, which would have led to too many small plants starting in runs with
demand Band C. Table 9A.1 therefore represents a compromise.
There are four different opening configurations of technology, depending
on whether High or Low capital intensity is simulated, and whether
initial maximum plant scale is 100 or 400. The opening technological
quintuplets (I, L, V, MAX, MIN) are. therefore:
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Table 9A.2: Initial Technological Coefficients
Capital Intensity
Maximum Scale
High
100 400
Low
100 400
Coefficient K
L
V
MAX
MIN
100 100
50 50
5 5
100 400
40 40
50 50
50 50
5 5
100 400
40 40
See Chapter 8, section 1.3, for details of the model of production
technology and the quintuplet (K, L, V, MAX, MIN). K relates to capital
construction cost of the plant, L and V to its operating costs, and MAX
and MIN to the size range within which it is feasible to construct the
plant.
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Appendix 9B: EMIR Results
The output measures (all taken at period t=59) used for comparison
purposes are as follows. The headers from the data listing are given in
brackets:
1. Price (PRICE): the market price for the output from plants. (Note
that this is a function both of average production costs, and of
capacity utilisation in the period in which it is measured).
2. Average Production Cost (PRODN COST): the average, weighted by
plant scale, of·the production cost for of all plants in the
industry. Defined as in Chapter 8, section 1.2, equation (2).
3. Lowest Production Cost (BEST COST): the production cost, averaged
over all of its plants, of the most efficient (Le. lowest cost)
firm.
4. Ruaber of finis Operating (OP.): the number of non-bankrupt firms
which are still actively operating at least one production plant.
5. Ruaber of finis Not Operating (NOP.): the number of firms not
operating any production plants, but who are not bankrupt.
6. Ruaber of fir.s Bankrupt (BKPT): the number of firms driven out of
business (see Chapter 8, section 3.5 for the conditions which
produce bankruptcy).
7. Top 25% (TOP 25%): the proportion of the total production capacity
held by the largest 25% of firms (Le. by the biggest single firm
in the 4-firm industries, by the biggest 4 firms in the 16-firm
industries).
8. Top 50% (TOP 50%): as Top 25%, but for the largest 50% (2 or 8
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firms) .
9. Largest Plant Scale (MAXPLANT):the biggest plant which has been
built in the industry up to that time (NB it does not have to be
sti 11 operating).
10. Average Plant Scale (AV. PLANT): the average size of plant in
existence at that time.
11. Best ( (BEST K): the best (Le. smallest) value of K (capital
construction cost parameter) in a technology which has actually
been used to construct a plant up to that time.
12. Best L (BESTL): as Best K, for Labour (fixed) cost technological
parameter.
13. Average ( (AVERAGEK): the average K value in all plants currently
in operation.
14. Average L (AVERAGEL): as Average K, for L coefficient.
The run codes (see Ch 9, section 2.1) represent (4 or 16) firms, (high
or low) capital intensity, (100 or 400) initial maximumplant scale, (ii
or i v) world view, (a, b or c) demand series ("n" representing no
technical change, with demand series a) and (.1,2,3,4) random seed.
RUN
4hlivn.1
4hlivn.2
4hlivn.3
4hlivn.4
4hliin.1
4hliin.2
4hliin.3
4h1iin.4
PRICE BESTCOST NOP.
PRODNCOST OP. BKPT
11.58
13.01
12.71
12.16
14.36
13.22
13.07
12.92
10.67 10.67
10.70 10.67
10.69 10.67
10.67 10.67
10.75 10.67
10.70 10.67
10.76 10.67
10.77 10.67
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
TOP25%
TOP50%
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
0.306 0.592
0.281 0.540
0.296 0.567
0.304 0.609
0.308 0.554
0.265 0.528
0.292 0.571
0.262 0.515
RUN PRICE BEST COST NOP. TOP 25%
PRODN COST OP. BKPT TOP 50%
4h4ivn.l 8.81 8.24 8.03 3 0 1 0.550 0.9504h4ivn.2 9.67 8.23 8.03 3 0 1 0.470 0.8194h4ivn.3 10.74 8.10 8.03 3 0 1 0.597 0.805
4h4ivn.4 8.82 8.25 8.03 3 0 1 0.348 0.678
4h4iin.1 12.05 8.25 8.03 4 0 0 0.621 0.858
4h4iin.2 10.27 8.32 8.03 3 0 1 0.651 0.8394h4iin.3 9.36 8.34 8.03 4 0 0 0.409 0.757
4h4iin.4 8.91 8.27 8.03 3 0 1 0.383 0.729
411ivn.l 10.95 9.49 9.41 4 0 0 0.300 0.53641livn.2 10.78 9.46 9.41 4 0 0 0.363 0.59641livn.3 10.75 9.45 9.41 4 0 0 0.317 0.61241livn.4 10.78 9.46 9.41 4 0 0 0.341 0.589
41liin.1 12.80 9.42 9.41 4 0 0 0.325 0.569411iin.2 11.99 9.45 9.41 4 0 0 0.299 0.560411iin.3 12.02 9.50 9.41 4 0 0 0.290 0.531411iin.4 11.99 9.49 9.41 4 0 0 0.309 0.597
414ivn.l 7.74 7.24 7.20 2 0 2 0.920 1.000414ivn.2 7.95 7.34 7.20 3 0 1 0.371 0.727414ivn.3 9.04 7.27 7.20 3 0 1 0.461 0.806414ivn.4 8.04 7.35 7.20 3 0 1 0.384 0.759
414iin.1 8.76 7.31 7.20 4 0 0 0.431 0.676414iin.2 8.56 7.42 7.20 4 0 0 0.316 0.625414iin.3 8.63 7.36 7.20 3 1 0 0.480 0.851414iin.4 8.20 7.42 7.20 3 0 1 0.376 0.731
16hliin.1 14.52 10.78 10.67 15 0 1 0.413 0.68116hliin.2 15.15 10.72 10.67 14 2 0 0.528 0.77616hliin.3 13.46 10.87 10.67 16 0 0 0.384 0.70816hliin.4 13.33 10.76 10.67 13 2 1 0.452 0.807
16h4ivn.1 9.95 8.28 8.03 9 3 4 0.705 1.00016h4ivn.2 10.20 8.31 8.03 6 4 6 0.847 1.00016h4ivn.3 10.09 8.11 8.03 8 4 4 0.842 1.00016h4ivn.4 8.98 8.29 8.03 7 4 5 0.735 1.000
16h4iin.1 10.11 8.46 8.03 10 6 0 0.568 0.89116h4iin.2 9.87 8.33 8.03 7 6 3 0.801 1.00016h4iin.3 11.19 8.59 8.03 10 3 3 0.668 0.92316h4iin.4 10.59 8.54 8.03 9 2 5 0.673 0.969
1611iin.1 12.27 9.54 9.41 14 2 0 0.506 0.7921611iin.2 12.15 9.56 9.41 14 2 0 0.536 0.798161liin.3 11.68 9.55 9.41 16 0 0 0.456 0.720161liin.4 11.65 9.51 9.41 15 1 0 0.483 0.762
1614ivn.l 8.90 7.33 7.20 6 9 1 0.830 1.0001614ivn.2 8.47 7.27 7.20 7 7 2 0.775 1.0001614ivn.3 8.46 7.27 7.20 7 8 1 0.790 1.0001614ivn.4 9.34 7.31 7.20 9 6 1 0.766 1.000
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RUN PRICE BEST COST NOP. TOP 25%
PRODN COST OP. BKPT TOP 50%
1614iin.1 9.04 7.41 7.20 6 9 1 0.900 1.000
1614iin.2 10.01 7.54 7.20 5 10 1 1.000 1.000
1614iin.3 8.95 7.47 7.20 7 9 0 0.803 1.000
1614iin.4 9.09 7.48 7.20 8 8 0 0.835 1.000
1611ivn.l 11.45 9.48 9.41 14 2 0 0.522 0.822
1611ivn.2 11.81 9.46 9.41 IS 1 0 0.554 0.790
1611ivn.3 10.78 9.49 9.41 14 2 0 0.561 0.848
1611ivn.4 11.17 9.50 9.41 15 1 0 0.486 0.765
16hlivn.1 12.69 10.73 10.67 14 1 1 0.421 0.733
16hlivn.2 13.32 10.72 10.67 12 2 2 0.500 0.813
16hlivn.3 12.23 10.76 10.67 14 0 2 0.461 0.766
16hlivn.4 12.14 10.70 10.67 13 0 3 0.464 0.810
4hliva.1 7.09 7.13 6.38 3 0 1 0.885 0.9494hliva.2 7.59 6.98 6.60 4 0 0 0.740 0.881
4hliva.3 7.87 7.27 6.49 1 1 2 1.000 1.0004hliva.4 8.06 6.98 6.59 2 0 2 0.874 1.000
4hliia.l 8.51 7.37 6.63 4 0 0 0.501 0.792
4h1iia.2 9.66 8.05 7.22 4 0 0 0.445 0.828
4hliia.3 7.61 7.24 6.53 3 1 0 0.724 0.9244hliia.4 9.31 7.52 6.76 4 0 0 0.377 0.669
4h4iva.l 8.02 6.66 6.18 3 0 1 0.762 0.9144h4iva.2 8.75 6.50 5.83 2 0 2 0.646 1.000
4h4iva.3 6.91 6.33 6.14 1 1 2 1.000 1.000
4h4iva.4 5.65 6.22 5.72 2 0 2 0.887 1.000
4h4iia.l 12.06 6.72 6.29 2 0 2 0.698 1.0004h4iia.2 8.95 7.23 6.79 2 0 2 0.816 1.0004h4iia.3 8.81 7.12 6.62 3 0 1 0.458 0.8124h4iia.4 8.98 7.23 6.69 2 0 2 0.574 1.000
41liva.l 7.53 6.98 6.41 2 0 2 0.654 1.000411iva.2 7.31 5.98 5.78 2 1 1 0.739 1.000
411iva.3 6.60 5.88 5.80 1 0 3 1.000 1.00041liva.4 5.47 6.43 5.82 1 1 2 1.000 1.000
411iia.l 8.25 7.04 6.55 4 0 0 0.849 0.928411iia.2 7.22 6.42 6.18 2 2 0 0.850 1.000411iia.3 6.56 6.07 5.69 2 1 1 0.759 1.000411iia.4 8.69 7.19 6.51 4 0 0 0.461 0.799
414iva.l 5.26 5.12 4.99 1 1 2 1.000 1.000414iva.2 5.99 5.66 5.49 1 0 3 1.000 1.000414iva.3 6.16 5.62 5.42 2 0 2 0.948 1.000414iva.4 6.17 5.65 5.44 1 0 3 1.000 1.000
414iia.1 5.41 5.77 5.37 1 2 1 1.000 1.000414iia.2 8.92 6.65 5.98 3 0 1 0.461 0.872414iia.3 8.38 6.77 6.37 3 0 1 0.676 0.923414iia.4 7.47 5.66 5.56 2 1 1 0.567 1.000
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RUN PRICE BEST COST NOP. TOP 25%
PRODN COST OP. BKPT TOP 50%
16hliva.1 8.59 7.02 6.54 2 7 7 1.000 1.000
16hliva.2 7.12 6.44 6.17 3 3 10 1.000 1.000
16hliva.3 7.75 7.07 6.61 3 5 8 1.000 1.000
16hliva.4 8.15 6.69 6.01 3 7 6 1.000 1.000
16h1iia.1 10.05 8.94 7.57 9 7 0 0.748 0.983
16hliia.2 10.77 8.37 7.63 9 6 1 0.863 1.000
16h1iia.3 8.63 7.27 6.59 6 9 1 0.883 1.000
16hliia.4 11.42 8.81 7.41 12 2 2 0.683 0.910
16h4iva.1 8.60 5.96 5.76 2 4 10 1.000 1.000
16h4iva.2 6.64 6.26 5.89 4 1 11 1.000 1.000
16h4iva.3 7.72 7.11 6.50 6 4 6 0.892 1.000
16h4iva.4 7.37 6.90 6.68 4 4 8 1.000 1.000
16h4iia.1 9.81 7.84 7.36 8 3 5 0.765 1.000
16h4iia.2 8.43 7.41 6.49 8 5 3 0.790 1.000
16h4iia.3 8.19 7.26 6.71 6 5 5 0.908 1.000
16h4iia.4 7.46 5.53 5.39 2 8 6 1.000 1.000
1611iva.1 5.57 5.11 5.06 1 9 6 1.000 1.000
1611iva.2 6.92 6.14 5.86 3 6 7 1.000 1.000
1611iva.3 6.73 6.16 5.99 2 7 7 1.000 1.000
1611iva.4 7.14 5.65 5.30 3 11 2 1.000 1.000
1611iia.1 6.45 5.90 5.68 2 13 1 1.000 1.000
1611iia.2 7.83 6.89 5.81 8 8 0 0.903 1.000
1611iia.3 9.05 7.49 6.54 7 7 2 0.930 1.000
161liia.4 8.42 6.80 6.41 4 9 3 1.000 1.000
1614iva.1 6.10 5.81 5.64 2 4 10 1.000 1.000
1614iva.2 6.14 5.60 5.49 1 9 6 1.000 1.000
1614iva.3 8.25 5.97 5.59 5 6 5 0.917 1.000
1614iva.4 6.82 6.28 5.83 4 9 3 1.000 1.000
1614iia.1 8.64 7.41 6.76 6 10 0 0.834 1.000
1614iia.2 6.90 5.98 5.83 4 10 2 1.000 1.000
1614iia.3 6.99 6.39 6.07 3 10 3 1.000 1.000
1614iia.4 6.77 5.57 5.35 1 12 3 1.000 1.000
4hlivb.1 8.73 6.88 6.34 3 0 1 0.606 0.925
4hlivb.2 6.42 6.03 5.84 2 1 1 0.549 1.000
4hlivb.3 6.95 6.36 6.02 2 0 2 0.953 1.000
4h1ivb.4 7.14 6.60 6.39 2 0 2 0.639 1.000
4hliib.1 10.02 7.93 7.45 4 0 0 0.338 0.639
4hliib.2 9.63 6.50 6.33 1 1 2 1.000 1.000
4hliib.3 7.06 6.15 5.49 4 0 0 0.789 0.884
4hliib.4 10.03 7.60 6.96 4 0 0 0.579 0.886
4h4ivb.1 6.44 5.78 5.62 1 0 3 1.000 1.000
4h4ivb.2 5.26 5.66 5.34 1 0 3 1.000 1.000
4h4ivb.3 7.99 6.50 6.06 3 0 1 0.516 0.837
4h4ivb.4 7.51 6.46 6.11 1 0 3 1.000 1.000
A64
RUN PRICE BEST COST NOP. TOP 25%PRODN COST OPe BKPT TOP 50%
4h4iib.1 7.17 6.22 6.04 3 0 1 0.636 0.968
4h4iib.2 11.86 6.21 5.46 2 0 2 0.507 1.000
4h4iib.3 6.44 5.76 5.47 2 1 1 0.943 1.000
4h4iib .4 7.01 6.33 5.92 2 0 2 0.622 1.000
411ivb.1 6.01 5.52 5.22 1 0 3 1.000 1.000
411ivb.2 6.69 5.69 5.53 1 1 2 1.000 1.000
411ivb.3 7.37 7.24 6.31 3 0 1 0.490 0.831
411ivb.4 7.50 6.39 5.87 3 0 1 0.416 0.770
411iib.1 8.20 6.28 6.14 2 0 2 0.705 1.000
411iib .2 6.49 6.18 5.72 4 0 0 0.560 0.740
411iib.3 7.04 6.29 5.96 4 0 0 0.629 0.79641liib.4 6.36 5.12 4.84 1 1 2 1.000 1.000
414ivb.1 6.39 5.91 5.56 1 0 3 1.000 1.000414ivb.2 6.24 6.04 5.70 1 0 3 1.000 1.000414ivb.3 6.20 5.71 5.34 2 0 2 0.514 1.000414ivb.4 5.80 5.43 5.32 2 0 2 0.902 1.000
414iib.1 7.06 6.25 5.70 3 0 1 0.708 0.970414iib.2 6.98 5.98 5.65 3 0 1 0.851 0.955414iib.3 7.62 5.54 5.45 2 0 2 0.893 1.000414iib .4 6.56 5.59 5.57 3 0 1 0.433 0.778
16hlivb.1 7.44 7.03 6.24 4 6 6 1.000 1.00016hlivb.2 8.09 7.23 6.18 9 4 3 0.890 0.98616hlivb.3 6.98 6.56 6.38 1 8 7 1.000 1.00016hlivb.4 7.04 6.74 5.84 7 3 6 0.911 1.000
16hliib.1 9.38 7.98 7.18 14 1 1 0.636 0.86016hliib.2 11.00 8.51 7.18 14 0 2 0.605 0.84616hliib.3 9.95 7.18 6.23 11 3 2 0.753 0.97416hliib.4 11.05 7.81 6.75 12 4 0 0.711 0.922
16h4ivb.1 8.33 6.58 6.10 5 4 7 0.954 1.00016h4ivb.2 7.57 7.30 6.73 11 1 4 0.675 0.88916h4ivb.3 8.02 6.84 6.42 6 0 10 0.871 1.00016h4ivb.4 7.59 6.84 6.53 7 2 7 0.862 1.000
16h411b.1 8.69 6.56 5.81 6 5 5 0.899 1.00016h4i1b.2 9.13 7.63 7.05 14 0 2 0.557 0.77116h4i1b.3 7.58 6.58 6.12 7 5 4 0.892 1.00016h4i1b.4 10.09 7.55 6.69 11 2 3 0.668 0.946
1611ivb.1 6.07 5.46 4.96 6 4 6 0.940 1.0001611ivb.2 7.54 5.13 4.92 2 7 7 1.000 1.0001611ivb.3 6.39 5.81 5.36 4 7 5 1.000 1.0001611ivb.4 7.55 6.17 5.91 4 6 6 1.000 1.000
1611i1b.1 6.39 5.43 5.36 2 12 2 1.000 1.0001611i1b.2 6.74 5.97 5.52 5 8 3 0.968 1.0001611iib.3 14.59 5.61 5.41 1 13 2 1.000 1.00016111ib .4 8.67 6.73 5.82 8 5 3 0.910 1.000
A65
RUN PRICE BEST COST Nap. TOP 25%
PRODN COST OP. BKPT TOP 50%
1614ivb.1 6.19 5.80 5.41 5 3 8 0.947 1.000
1614ivb.2 5.27 5.19 4.99 3 5 8 1.000 1.000
1614ivb.3 6.42 5.95 5.80 4 4 8 1.000 1.000
1614ivb.4 5.80 5.32 5.15 1 5 10 1.000 1.000
1614iib.1 8.65 5.59 5.51 1 12 3 1.000 1.000
1614iib.2 7.03 6.31 5.63 10 5 1 0.795 0.948
1614iib.3 6.58 5.63 5.39 2 11 3 1.000 1.000
1614iib.4 8.16 6.73 6.14 7 8 1 0.848 1.000
4hlivc.1 7.28 6.61 6.37 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
4hlivc.2 8.84 6.48 5.90 2 2 0 0.845 1.000
4hlivc.3 7.31 7.19 6.64 4 0 0 0.718 0.893
4hlivc.4 8.97 6.22 5.97 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
4hliic.1 7.63 6.50 6.31 2 2 0 0.862 1.000
4hliic.2 10.79 7.95 7.10 4 0 0 0.427 0.801
4hliic.3 8.69 7.45 6.83 4 0 0 0.665 0.860
4h1iic.4 7.12 6.46 6.18 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
4h4ivc.1 8.32 6.70 6.23 3 0 1 0.603 0.827
4h4ivc.2 7.79 7.12 6.80 3 0 1 0.493 0.944
4h4ivc.3 6.00 5.53 5.49 1 2 1 1.000 1.000
4h4ivc.4 9.20 6.90 6.55 2 2 0 0.794 1.000
4h4iic.1 8.30 6.89 6.38 4 0 0 0.421 0.734
4h4iic.2 8.10 6.16 5.99 3 1 0 1.000 1.0004h4iic.3 6.82 6.48 6.07 2 2 0 0.593 1.000
4h4iic.4 7.36 6.29 5.87 2 2 0 0.930 1.000
411ivc.1 8.10 6.25 5.77 2 0 2 0.756 1.000
411ivc .2 8.30 6.68 6.47 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
411ivc.3 6.43 5.51 5.23 1 3 0 1.000 1.000411ivc.4 6.80 5.82 5.59 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
41liic .1 8.31 6.34 6.17 2 2 0 0.944 1.000
411iic.2 10.56 8.25 8.01 4 0 0 0.653 0.851
411iic.3 7.46 6.17 5.75 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
411iic.4 6.28 6.04 5.74 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
414ivc.1 6.45 5.90 5.73 2 1 1 0.771 1.000
414ivc.2 5.74 5.29 5.17 1 2 1 1.000 1.000
414ivc.3 6.04 5.54 5.48 1 2 1 1.000 1.000414ivc.4 7.18 6.02 5.93 3 0 1 0.682 0.943
414iic.1 7.00 5.70 5.38 2 2 0 0.742 1.000414iic.2 8.74 5.77 5.69 1 3 0 1.000 1.000414iic.3 7.62 6.53 6.16 4 0 0 0.565 0.777414iic.4 6.98 5.98 5.92 1 3 0 1.000 1.000
16hlivc.1 8.89 7.89 7.26 8 8 0 0.724 1.00016hlivc.2 8.60 7.64 6.71 7 9 0 0.907 1.00016hlivc.3 10.03 7.84 6.86 7 9 0 0.770 1.00016h1ivc.4 8.14 7.39 6.64 8 8 0 0.873 1.000
A66
RUN PRICE BEST COST Nap. TOP 25%
PRODN COST OP. BKPT TOP 50%
16hliic .1 10.73 9.05 7.83 13 3 0 0.603 0.865
16h1iic.2 11.62 9.22 8.02 14 2 0 0.567 0.815
16hliic .3 10.06 8.63 6.73 13 3 0 0.619 0.844
16hliic.4 11.87 9.55 7.73 13 3 0 0.577 0.866
16h4ivc.1 6.49 6.17 5.88 3 9 4 1.000 1.000
16h4ivc.2 8.53 7.10 6.51 5 11 0 0.930 1.000
16h4ivc.3 8.53 6.79 6.32 3 12 1 1.000 1.000
16h4ivc.4 7.29 6.54 6.10 3 12 1 1.000 1.000
16h4iic.1 9.31 7.04 6.24 6 10 0 0.859 1.000
16h4iic.2 8.81 7.37 6.73 8 8 0 0.707 1.000
16h4iic.3 8.91 7.83 7.30 8 8 0 0.727 1.000
16h4iic.4 10.11 7.57 6.37 7 9 0 0.879 1.000
1611ivc.1 10.31 6.27 6.02 3 13 0 1.000 1.000
1611ivc.2 7.52 6.31 6.03 1 15 0 1.000 1.000
1611ivc.3 7.27 6.62 6.27 4 12 0 1.000 1.000
1611ivc.4 5.85 5.83 5.61 1 15 0 1.000 1.000
1611iic.l 7.53 6.35 5.94 4 12 0 1.000 1.000
1611iic.2 9.38 7.60 6.88 8 8 0 0.791 1.0001611iic.3 9.47 8.12 7.13 13 3 0 0.619 0.893
1611iic .4 10.32 8.08 7.10 12 4 0 0.667 0.906
1614ivc.1 6.20 5.75 5.66 1 15 0 1.000 1.000
1614ivc.2 6.88 6.31 5.91 5 11 0 0.915 1.000
1614ivc.3 5.84 5.69 5.43 2 13 1 1.000 1.000
1614ivc.4 8.73 6.37 5.92 6 10 0 0.750 1.000
1614iic.1 7.58 6.35 5.97 4 12 0 1.000 1.000
1614iic.2 8.07 6.91 6.56 6 10 0 0.840 1.000
1614iic.3 5.32 5.30 5.06 1 15 0 1.000 1.000
1614iic.4 7.29 6.30 5.92 4 12 0 1.000 1.000
RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE KAV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
4hlivn.1 100 100 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4hlivn.2 100 99 100.00 50.00 100 .00 50.00
4hlivn.3 100 99 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004hlivn.4 100 100 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4hliin.l 100 97 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4hliin.2 100 99 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004hliin.3 100 96 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004hliin.4 100 96 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4h4ivn.1 400 333 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004h4ivn.2 400 341 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004h4ivn.3 400 380 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.004h4ivn.4 400 333 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00..
A67
RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE KAV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
4h4iin.l 400 338 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4h4iin.2 400 320 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4h4iin.3 400 313 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4h4iin.4 400 329 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
411ivn.l 100 96 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411ivn.2 100 98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411ivn.3 100 98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411ivn.4 100 98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411iin.l 100 100 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411iin.2 100 98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411iin.3 100 96 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
411iin.4 100 96 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414ivn.l 400 385 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414ivn.2 400 351 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414ivn.3 400 375 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414ivn.4 400 346 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414iin.l 400 360 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414iin.2 400 324 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414iin.3 400 342 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
414iin.4 400 319 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l6hliin.l 100 96 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h1iin.2 100 98 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6hliin.3 100 92 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6hliin.4 100 96 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4ivn.l 400 331 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4ivn.2 400 322 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4ivn.3 400 375 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4ivn.4 400 327 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4iin.1 400 289 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
16h4iin.2 400 313 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4iin.3 400 259 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l6h4iin.4 400 275 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
l611iin.l 100 94 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l611iin.2 100 93 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l611iin.3 100 94 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l611iin.4 100 95 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l614ivn.l 400 353 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1614ivn.2 400 373 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1614ivn.3 400 373 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1614ivn.4 400 362 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l614iin.l 400 325 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l614iin.2 400 292 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
l614iin.3 400 309 50.00 ..50.00 50.00 50.00
1614iin.4 400 303 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
A68
RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE K
AV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
161livn.1 100 97 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1611ivn.2 100 98 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1611ivn.3 100 96 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
1611ivn.4 100 96 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
16hlivn.1 100 98 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
16hlivn.2 100 98 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
16hlivn.3 100 96 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
16hlivn.4 100 99 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00
4hliva.1 1160 500 85.85 36.03 96.04 44.60
4hliva.2 730 445 64.49 34.17 76.75 35.42
4hliva.3 1180 447 95.43 26.91 104.67 27.71
4hliva.4 1100 503 85.06 23.16 95.75 28.60
4h1iia.1 950 348 52.26 40.59 69.04 45.19
4hliia.2 620 308 65.82 44.19 91.18 48.65
4h1iia.3 880 393 69.83 30.58 83.59 41.31
4hliia.4 820 318 48.27 41.56 69.54 50.25
4h4iva.1 810 536 74.12 22.08 86.36 26.92
4h4iva.2 1280 622 67.73 15.65 74.31 26.22
4h4iva.3 920 810 70.53 29.33 71.71 32.58
4h4iva.4 2150 889 74.12 22.16 88.51 26.22
4h4iia.1 920 442 33.29 34.78 40.88 36.96
4h4iia.2 890 518 78.51 41.99 88.91 43.48
4h4iia.3 640 415 50.25 34.79 64.10 44.584h4iia.4 690 413 66.29 45.61 69.11 50.27
411iva.1 540 260 42.03 24.23 48.10 27.53
411iva.2 1470 842 42.39 27.36 46.14 30.60
41liva.3 990 938 39.13 21.68 45.91 26.61
411iva.4 1780 682 46.12 46.50 49.75 47.48
41liia.1 870 370 41.46 35.26 48.25 48.43
411iia.2 880 585 37.97 39.22 47.31 40.3941liia.3 1430 704 32.56 39.26 46.01 40.13
411iia.4 740 328 40.59 36.61 42.63 49.16
414iva.1 1620 1054 29.10 10.38 30.80 11.89414iva.2 1180 845 32.82 17.06 35.32 19.42
414iva.3 890 605 35.91 12.17 41.70 12.45414iva.4 1530 1215 45.38 20.93 47.64 25.27
414iia.1 1530 990 26.20 37.53 33.91 39.30414iia.2 1070 375 24.29 36.57 37.53 40.58414iia.3 880 376 28.41 39.12 33.40 42.41414iia.4 870 638 29.26 31.70 31.65 33.33
16hliva.1 980 601 90.69 33.05 99.29 42.61
16hliva.2 820 598 67.27 21.89 75.81 27.0916hliva.3 870 439 76.71 23.33 87.82 34.6016hliva.4 1130 604 72.66 25.21 83.88 40.58
A69
RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE KAV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
16hliia.1 250 151 53.77 37.49 80.18 46.50
16hliia.2 300 172 64.98 39.31 75.32 41.40
16h1iia.3 410 273 39.88 29.86 57.54 37.25
16hliia.4 340 140 57.53 30.24 84.08 41.23
16h4iva.1 890 686 63.35 24.03 66.40 27.84
16h4iva.2 1100 561 56.84 17.65 76.54 24.26
16h4iva.3 900 377 69.52 25.31 78.09 32.47
16h4iva.4 760 500 73.21 24.06 82.85 33.41
16h4iia.1 420 292 52.34 41.95 74.44 47.63
16h4iia.2 730 329 49.59 32.19 71.22 39.56
16h4iia.3 670 358 49.83 36.12 55.97 40.07
16h4iia.4 1030 622 26.39 23.01 31.29 26.05
161liva.1 1650 1623 23.87 24.80 24.24 30.02
161liva.2 1420 778 41.82 31.84 55.19 34.66
161liva.3 1540 972 42.70 27.21 51.48 44.15
161liva.4 960 673 43.97 14.97 51.85 21.21
161liia.1 840 608 33.07 34.41 33.39 35.94
161liia.2 1020 201 24.63 26.27 36.04 35.19
161liia.3 630 214 40.10 35.32 50.70 37.76
161liia.4 760 376 39.60 40.39 41.06 42.94
1614iva.1 790 465 37.79 14.97 40.25 16.66
1614iva.2 2080 1208 33.94 20.12 37.43 22.72
1614iva.3 940 453 38.49 10.73 44.55 14.15
1614iva.4 770 445 45.25 15.24 48.00 23.52
1614iia.1 430 263 31.50 39.94 44.69 47.67
1614iia.2 840 566 27.75 28.50 32.04 29.28
1614iia.3 830 539 31.35 41.75 36.73 50.36
1614iia.4 1020 848 22.04 35.19 26.65 37.79
4hlivb.1 1700 730 91.10 41.64 97.02 44.86
4hlivb.2 3160 2010 89.92 29.44 98.32 39.34
4hlivb.3 1870 1215 84.11 44.32 88.36 44.95
4hlivb.4 1460 984 94.43 41.10 97.24 42.45
4h1iib.1 560 351 74.56 46.86 85.60 51.34
4hliib.2 1910 1328 67.71 45.18 82.80 47.36
4h1iib.3 2350 912 61.28 39.36 70.86 45.70
4h1iib.4 1210 450 80.14 47.76 89.48 49.22
4h4ivb.1 2330 1578 82.66 23.19 87.07 24.34
4h4ivb.2 3570 2007 66.04 26.27 69.51 35.61
4h4ivb.3 1850 1045 69.01 30.71 87.87 39.92
4h4ivb.4 1600 997 63.20 30.87 75.26 35.43
4h4iib.1 1660 1134 41.02 34.90 57.42 42.08
4h4iib.2 2220 986 58.64 36.36 68.49 43.94
4h4iib.3 1690 1347 28.81 27.74 36.62 39.30
4h4iib.4 2330 1060 59.83 36.36 70.25 55.21
A70
RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE KAV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
411ivb.1 3280 1627 44.33 44.25 45.34 44.36
411ivb.2 1540 1264 41.82 32.03 48.23 40.71
411ivb.3 940 296 44.64 35.10 46.92 44.68
411ivb .4 1400 682 47.52 40.09 52.95 46.50
411iib.1 1070 862 41.82 43.43 45.50 47.78
411iib.2 1290 683 29.13 46.23 36.66 47.98
41liib.3 1440 724 35.58 44.47 37.44 47.57
411iib .4 2250 1377 37.86 30.05 39.84 31.49
414ivb.1 2350 1096 41.42 21.59 57.75 30.70
414ivb.2 1160 803 47.43 31.45 53.56 35.31
414ivb.3 1550 817 24.28 23.51 39.06 30.41
414ivb.4 3110 2503 40.07 25.44 48.73 39.26
414iib.1 1610 775 35.30 42.32 44.28 47.02
414iib.2 1860 992 37.16 38.75 43.78 41.08
414iib.3 1810 1212 34.37 32.56 43.18 33.51
414iib.4 1970 1772 29.66 47.93 30.21 51.91
16hlivb.1 2130 633 87.19 33.45 98.21 44.50
16hlivb.2 1370 377 84.24 28.46 92.86 35.51
16hlivb.3 1940 1439 77 .03 35.05 98.28 40.59
16hlivb.4 1790 490 66.33 17.22 82.67 30.25
16hliib.1 500 221 49.84' 32.90 70.36 43.77
16hliib.2 420 191 52.94 37.50 80.00 46.98
16hliib.3 730 327 59.67 31.44 73.54 39.94
16hliib.4 770 270 52.82 34.22 77 .08 46.35
16h4ivb.1 1390 806 63.09 36.62 77.36 41.53
16h4ivb.2 1010 433 77 .22 25.03 87.83 35.51
16h4ivb.3 1470 682 75.32 32.32 88.64 37.63
16h4ivb.4 1520 680 80.99 28.13 91.79 33.30
16h4iib.1 1770 761 46.52 37.89 72.10 45.10
16h4iib.2 790 376 37.96 30.80 71.40 48.64
16h4iib.3 1380 698 55.26 38.24 65.76 41.15
16h4iib.4 430 314 50.74 33.84 76.90 42.15
161livb.1 2190 792 41.31 22.31 43.58 25.19
161livb.2 1910 1342 21.59 25.91 28.57 29.26
1611ivb.3 2320 689 38.26 21.83 48.31 26.86
1611ivb.4 1460 700 40.66 25.63 46.36 38.44
1611iib.1 1770 1472 21.95 40.11 26.81 47.94
161liib.2 1510 621 25.97 27.75 34.39 31.64
161liib.3 3130 1740 25.47 37.37 26.78 41.68
1611iib.4 1230 376 32.55 39.05 37.21 46.01
1614ivb.1 1930 910 36.04 21.46 43.07 25.14
1614ivb.2 2690 1783 32.44 21.28 38.40 25.31
1614ivb.3 1360 896 40.07 ..28.03 55.55 29.31
1614ivb.4 1880 1623 38.35 20.12 40.36 24.26
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RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE K
AV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
1614iib.1 2690 2103 31.45 40.10 37.40 48.22
1614iib.2 1570 526 22.52 31.95 40.71 39.32
1614iib.3 2660 1271 16.91 38.68 27.32 41.93
1614iib.4 880 447 30.42 37.17 39.70 47.78
4hlivc.1 1710 1158 95.70 34.18 107.94 43.43
4hlivc.2 1510 885 72.80 47.04 85.45 49.71
4hlivc.3 1070 571 83.48 41.01 97.36 45.83
4hlivc.4 1350 1103 82.21 32.26 88.10 39.57
4hliic.1 1070 854 63.07 44.06 69.74 49.36
4h1iic.2 810 324 77.52 45.63 92.54 47.13
4hliic.3 710 331 74.07 36.83 79.51 41.78
4h1iic.4 1330 926 58.88 34.49 75.41 42.62
4h4ivc.1 1240 569 68.93 27.15 82.69 31.80
4h4ivc.2 840 519 72.00 24.16 83.84 37.26
4h4ivc.3 1620 1577 48.46 34.03 49.32 35.70
4h4ivc.4 1030 607 60.23 22.37 85.34 37.20
4h4iic.1 730 344 57.39 30.53 59.74 32.38
4h4iic.2 1310 925 41.89 39.01 50.45 43.80
4h4iic.3 1240 818 51.64 37.93 58.16 45.17
4h4iic.4 1210 713 47.58 30.87 72.89 38.13
411ivc.1 1470 628 48.78 33.51 54.86 35.11
411ivc.2 690 567 45.00 37.50 47.01 45.31
411ivc.3 970 860 29.97 21.32 37.41 27.67
41livc.4 860 858 34.44 34.29 40.02 38.95
411iic.1 810 620 40.72 40.90 44.67 42.77
41liic.2 220 167 39.51 36.84 48.17 46.78
411iic.3 1590 822 41.25 34.86 52.97 48.76
41liic.4 1170 713 23.79 37.62 31.03 40.77
414ivc.1 1330 778 45.04 18.29 52.11 21.89414ivc.2 1240 944 24.84 12.19 29.73 14.82
414ivc.3 1360 1175 47.92 12.83 54.79 16.13
414ivc.4 750 523 39.56 18.99 45.19 22.12
414iic.1 790 576 15.39 35.17 21.31 38.86
414iic.2 1170 1040 33.07 30.46 34.56 31.30414iic.3 860 430 26.48 31.90 38.03 40.33
414iic.4 1030 860 24.04 50.00 26.90 53.06
16hlivc.1 460 300 87.83 22.94 99.48 35.2416hlivc.2 670 265 74.54 28.98 80.68 35.4016hlivc.3 600 239 77.73 23.82 92.09 33.1616hlivc.4 690 386 77.43 33.75 95.00 40.38
16hliic.1 390 145 52.81 38.81 75.20 46.1316h1iic.2 190 103 45.92 26.11 76.39 40.0316hliic.3 600 143 49.46 34.83 77.04 43.1016hliic .4 330 110 52.04 33.18 83.51 44.48
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RUN MAXPLANT BEST K AVERAGE K
AV. PLANT BEST L AVERAGE L
16h4ivc.l 1000 614 53.66 12.64 61.56 20.32
16h4ivc.2 910 518 76.60 31.21 91.34 37.36
16h4ivc.3 920 560 78.30 27.90 82.44 33.45
16h4ivc.4 760 507 47.66 25.38 63.52 30.00
16h4iic.l 890 335 52.64 30.14 61.99 33.11
16h4iic.2 550 298 61.81 37.92 69.45 42.53
16h4iic.3 420 261 44.47 26.90 75.67 41.38
16h4iic.4 910 279 49.03 35.07 65.53 44.74
1611ivc.1 990 566 39.63 26.81 46.49 31.14
161livc.2 1120 838 47.21 34.26 52.76 42.61
161livc .3 700 465 38.96 32.85 44.59 39.11
1611ivc.4 1430 1308 46.01 31.38 56.22 35.58
1611iic.l 800 526 28.82 37.59 36.28 45.16
1611iic.2 340 174 30.14 36.10 47.57 41.06
1611iic.3 230 148 32.41 35.45 43.16 44.63
1611iic.4 300 116 26.28 31.36 37.65 39.20
1614ivc.l 1130 952 47.03 20.59 50.86 23.74
1614ivc.2 900 426 35.17 27.66 40.64 30.68
1614ivc.3 1190 724 33.67 19.60 50.32 21.01
1614ivc.4 730 391 39.18 22.11 44.77 27.23
1614iic .1 840 523 23.03 36.48 35.48 45.61
1614iic.2 400 287 23.69 35.57 30.94 41.81
1614iic.3 1400 1046 20.49 38.03 24.56 41.86
1614iic.4 750 483 28.72 33.78 33.76 39.64
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Appendix 9C: Regression Analysis of EMIR Results
The resul ts obtained in section 2.5 of Chapter 9 ha ve been based upon
indi vidual comparisons, with only one inf 1uence varying at a time. A
more complex formulation should predict outcomes by considering the
effects of the several factors varying together. This can be done by
using multiple linear regression, with dummy (0/1) variables for each ot
the experimental variables and demand series. A simple additive linear
model is used; the objective is to confirm qualitative effects, not to
find the ideal functional relationship between inputs and outputs.
Table 9C.1 reports the "best" equations derived by stepwise regression.
It is a summary of the remainder of this Appendix. Each row gi ves the
coefficients of the predictor variables (and constant) for the dependent
variable (output measure), which is in the left-hand column.
Table 9C.1:Regression Analysis of Determinants of Industry Structure
(Technical Change Runs}
N = 196 Predictor Variable
Output NFIRMS CAPINS MSIZE WVIEW DUM-B DUM-C CONSTANT ~dj.Measure R
(Dependent v'ble)
PCOST 0.3674 0.9155 -0.5379 -0.5405 -0.3610 6.600 54.56
TOP25 0.1160 -0.0956 0.1239 0.7629 27.44
AVPLANT -220.4 -183.6 140.6 228.1 388.6 591.6 37.56
MAXPLANT -280.7 -175.7 122.6 326.6 786.1 947.1 48.09
PR-OPS -0.2005 0.1589 -0.0938 -0.2083 0.6289 39.16
PR-NOPS 0.2676 -0.1530 -0.0830 0.2383 0.2044 51.60
PR-BKPT -0.0671 0.1152 0.2116 -0.2813 0.1934 62.38
BEST K -4.563 29.935 -8.078 14.655 33.786 78.87
BEST L -3.555 1.595 -4.728 -9.937 2.995 38.960 49.11
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Key to Predictors:
NFIRMS = 1 if 16 firms in simulation, 0 else
CAPINS = 1 if Capital Intensity if High, 0 else
MSIZE = 1 if initial max. plant size is 400, 0 else
WVIEW = 1 if worldview is IV, 0 else
DUM-B = lif demand series is B, 0 else
DUM-C = lif demand series is C, 0 else
Key to Performance Measures (Dependent Variables):
PCOST Average production cost
TOP25 Top quartile industry concentration
AVPLANT Average plant size
MAXPLANT Maximum plant size
PR-OPS Proportion of firms still operating capacity
PR-NOPS " " " not " "
PR-BKPT " " " bankrupt
BEST K Best (lowest) Capital coefficient discovered and used
BEST L" " Labour" " ""
(All performance measures taken at t=59; see also Appendix 9B.)
Table 9C.l presents results which are in close agreement with those
found by examining single influences in section 2.5. Some of the R2
values are disappointing; however, all reported coefficients are
significant at least at the 5% level. The dummy variables for demand
series do enter the regression equations in some cases, confirming that
there are significant differences between results for some output
measures. Again, the regression equations agree wi th the findings of
section 2.5.3 above on this point.
It can therefore be concluded that the influences identified by looking
at the effects of changing single experimental variables are preserved
when we vary several factors simultaneously.
The full regression outputs are given below.
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Experimental dummies as predictors of production cost
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: pcost
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 186) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms .3674 .0846 18.874 .00002 .0921capins .9155 .0846 117.199 .00000 .3865msize -.5370 .0846 40.318 .00000 .1781wview -.5405 .0846 40.852 .00000 .1801dum b -.3610 .0897 16.199 .00008 .0801CONSTANT 6.6002
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .5859
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .5446
R SQUARED = .5566
MULTIPLE R = .7460
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
80.1369 5
63.8508 186
143.9876 191
MEAN SQUARE
16.0274
.3433
F RATIO PROB.
46.688 .OOOE+OO
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum_c
PARTIAL r-2
.0060
TOLERANCE F TO ENTER
.7500 1.125 PROB..2901
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----------------------REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of top 25% concentration - all demand series
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: top25
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
nfirms .1160
capins -.0956
wview .1239
CONSTANT .7629
STD. ERROR
.0225
.0225
.0225
F(1, 188)
26.689
18.123
30.434
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .1556
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .2744
R SQUARED = .2858
MULTIPLE R = .5346
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
1.8220 3
4.5522 188
6.3742 191
MEAN SQUARE
.6073
.0242
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
msize
dum_b
dum c
PARTIAL r-2
.0058
.0097
.0006
PROBe
.2956
.1779
.7343
TOLERANCE
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
F TO ENTER
1.100
1.829
.116
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PROBe PARTIAL r-2
.00000 .1243
.00003 .0879
.00000 .1393
F RATIO PROBe
25.082 4.000E-14
---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of average plant scale - all demand series
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------DEPENDENT VARIABLE: avplant
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 186) PROBe PARTIAL r-2nfirms -220.3958 49.0380 20.200 .00001 .0980capins -183.5417 49.0380 14.009 .00024 .0700msize 140.6458 49.0380 8.226 .00461 .0424wview 228.0625 49.0380 21.629 .00001 .1042dum b 388.6406 52.0126 55.831 .00000 .2309CONSTANT 591.5990
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 339.7450
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .3756
R SQUARED = .3919
MULTIPLE R = .6261
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
13839108.6563 5
21469361.1562 186
35308469.8125 191
MEAN SQUARE
2767821.7313
115426.6729
F RATIO PROBe
23.979 6.000E-14
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum_c
PARTIAL r-2
.0017
TOLERANCE F TO ENTER
.7500 .318 PROBe.5734
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26 .
Predictors of maximum plant scale - all demand series
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: maxp1ant
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(1, 186) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms -280.7292 65.5049 18.367 .00003 .0899capins -175.7292 65.5049 7.197 .00796 .0373msize 122.6042 65.5049 3.503 .06282 .0185wview 326.5625 65.5049 24.853 .00000 .1179dum b 786.0938 69.4784 128.011 .00000 .4077CONSTANT 947.0833
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 453.8312
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .4809
R SQUARED = .4945
MULTIPLE R = .7032
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
37471078.1250 5
38309079.6875 186
75780157.8125 191
MEAN SQUARE
7494215.6250
205962.7940
F RATIO PROB.
36.386 7.000E-14
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum_c
PARTIAL r-2
.0025
TOLERANCE F TO ENTER
.7500 .463 PROB•.4969
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 ~ER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of proportion of firms still in business at t=59
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: pr-ops
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(1, 187) PROB. PARTIAL r-2
nfirms -.2005 .0304 43.382 .00000 .1883
capins .1589 .0304 27.226 .00000 .1271
msize -.0938 .0304 9.483 .00239 .0483
wview -.2083 .0304 46.829 .00000 .2003CONSTANT .6289
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .2109
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .3916
R SQUARED = .4043
MULTIPLE R = .6359
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
5.6465 4
8.3193 187
13.9658 191
MEAN SQUARE
1.4116
.0445
F RATIO PROB.
31.730 .000E+OO
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum b
dum c
PARTIAL r-2
.0086
.0000
TOLERANCE
1.0000
1.0000
F TO ENTER
1.619
.002
PROB.
.2049
.9640
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of proportion of firms not in business at t=59
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: pr-nops
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 187) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms .2676 .0285 87.883 .00000 .3197capins -.1530 .0285 28.731 .00000 .1332dum b -.0830 .0350 5.638 .01858 .0293dum-c .2383 .0350 46.461 .00000 .1990CONSTANT .2044
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .1978
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .5160
R SQUARED = .5262
MULTIPLE R = .7254
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
8.1207 4
7.3127 187
15.4334 191
MEAN SQUARE
2.0302
.0391
F RATIO PROB.
51.915 .OOOE+OQ
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
msize
wview
PARTIAL r-2
.0030
.0001
TOLERANCE
1.0000
1.0000
F TO ENTER
.565
.013
PROB.
.4531
.9096
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
----------------------------------------------------------------
Predictors of proportion bankrupt
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: pr-bkpt
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 187) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms -.0671 .0204 10.856 .00118 .0549msize .1152 .0204 32.059 .00000 .1464wview .2116 .0204 108.087 .00000 .3663dum c -.2813 .0216 169.755 .00000 .4758CONSTANT .1934
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .1410
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .6238
R SQUARED = .6317
MULTIPLE R = .7948
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.6.3772 4
3.7179 187
10.0950 191
MEAN SQUARE
1.5943
.0199
F RATIO PROB.
80.190 .OOOE+OO
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
capins
dum b
PARTIAL r-2
.0004
.0064
TOLERANCE
1.0000
.7500
F TO ENTER
.082
1.205
PROB.
.7743
.2738
A82
---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of lowest (best) production cost
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: bppc
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 186) PROBe PARTIAL r-2
nfirms .1819 .0653 7.764 .00588 .0401capins .6627 .0653 103.088 .00000 .3566
msize -.3421 .0653 27.468 .00000 .1287wview -.3583 .0653 30.140 .00000 .1394dum b -.3280 .0692 22.453 .00000 .1077CONSTANT 6.1533
STD. ERROR OF EST. = .4522
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .4933
R SQUARED = .5065
MULTIPLE R = .7117
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
39.0404 5
38.0356 186
77.0760 191
MEAN SQUARE
7.8081
.2045
F RATIO PROBe
38.183 8.000E-14
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum c
PARTIAL r-2
.0078
TOLERANCE F TO ENTER
.7500 1.458 PROBe.2288
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
----------------------------------------------------------------
Predictors of best (lowest) K value achieved
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: best k
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(1, 187) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms -4.5630 1.2919 12.475 .00052 .0625capins 29.9347 1.2919 536.894 .00000 .7417msize -8.0780 1.2919 39.097 .00000 .1729wview 14.6547 1.2919 128.674 .00000 .4076CONSTANT 33.7857
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 8.9506
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .7887
R SQUARED = .7932
MULTIPLE R = .8906
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
57452.2061 4
14981.1118 187
72433.3179 191
MEAN SQUARE
14363.0515
80.1129
F RATIO PROB.
179.285 .OOOE+OO
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum_b
dum_c
PARTIAL r-2
.0045
.0034
TOLERANCE
1.0000
1.0000
F TO ENTER
.832
.634
PROB.
.3630
.4268
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of best (lowest) L value achieved
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: best 1
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 186) PROB. PARTIAL r-2nfirms -3.5545 .8728 16.584 .00007 .0819capins 1.5949 .8728 3.339 .06926 .0176msize -4.7280 .8728 29.343 .00000 .1363wview -9.9368 .8728 129.608 .00000 .4107dum b 2.9946 .9258 10.463 .00144 .0533CONSTANT 38.9601
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 6.0471
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .4911
R SQUARED = .5044
MULTIPLE R = .7102
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
6923.6585 5
6801.6096 186
13725.2682 191
MEAN SQUARE
1384.7317
36.5678
F RATIO PROB.
37.868 .OOOE+OO
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME
dum c
PARTIAL r-2
.0144
TOLERANCE F TO ENTER
.7500 2.700 PROB..1020
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of average K (capital) coefficient achieved
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: av k
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
36.7124
-8.8980
11.3914
40.2440
STD. ERROR
1.3561
1.3561
1.3561
F(1, 188)
732.929
43.055
70.565
PROB. PARTIAL r-2
.00000 .7959
.00000 .1863
.00000 .2729
capins
msize
wview
CONSTANT
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 9.3951
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .8154
R SQUARED = .8183
MULTIPLE R = .9046
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES D.F. MEAN SQUARE F RATIO PROB.REGRESSION 74723.4112 3 24907.8037 282.1831.700E-13RESIDUAL 16594.4332 188 88.2683
TOTAL 91317.8444 191
VARIABLES NOT IN EQUATION:
NAME PARTIAL r-2 TOLERANCE F TO ENTER PROB.nfirms .0051 1.0000 .968 .3265dum b .0059 1.0000 1.112 .2929dum-c .0001 1.0000 .010 .9222
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---------------------- REGRESSION ANALYSIS ----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Z2 LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 ~ER OF VARIABLES: 26
Predictors of average L (labour) coefficient achieved
F TO ENTER = 3, F TO REMOVE = 3, TOLERANCE = .001
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: av 1
VAR. REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR F(l, 185) PROBe PARTIAL r-2nfirms -2.0013 .8923 5.030 .02610 .0265capins 3.5925 .8923 16.208 .00008 .0806msize -5.4927 .8923 37.888 .00000 .1700wview -10.3104 .8923 133.501 .00000 .4192dum_b 4.8750 1.0929 19.897 .00001 .0971dum c 2.5917 1.0929 5.624 .01875 .0295CONSTANT 42.2702
STD. ERROR OF EST. = 6.1824
ADJUSTED R SQUARED = .5196
R SQUARED = .5347
MULTIPLE R = .7312
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
SOURCE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
TOTAL
SUM OF SQUARES D.F.
8124.0233 6
7070.9806 185
15195.0039 191
MEAN SQUARE
1354.0039
38.2215
F RATIO PROBe
35.425 .OOOE+OO
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----------------------- CORRELATION MATRIX -----------------------
HEADER DATA FOR: B:RES Zl LABEL: EMIR results 1990
NUMBER OF CASES: 192 -NUMBER OF VARIABLES: 25
----------------------------------------------------------------
Industry structure variables - all demand series
nfirms capins msize wview rseed demser price pcostnfirms 1.00000
capins .00000 1.00000
msize .00000 .00000 1.00000
wview .00000 .00000 .00000 1.00000
rseed .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 1.00000
demser .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000 1.00000
price .18014 .39567 -.23468 -.41873 -.02228 .08892 1.00000
pcost .21213 .52860 -.31004 -.31208 .00024 .05178 .73376 1.00000bppc .14353 .52298 -.26996 -.28278 -.02669 .06212 .69873 .95538
top25 .31841 -.26238 .06463 .34002 .00648 -.02377 -.44491 -.51700top50 .24038 -.16170 .18021 .29317 .00789 -.03233 -.31716 -.43271maxplant -.22342 -.13986 .09758 .25990 -.02703 -.03554 -.43962 -.63963
avplant -.25697 -.21400 .16399 .26591 -.00728 .03231 -.50498 -.73394best k -.11746 .77059 -.20795 .37725 -.00995 -.01310 .20534 .39936
best 1 -.21020 .09432 -.27960 -.58763 -.02822 .08443 .31938 .29446av k -.03059 .84170 -.20400 .26117 .00113 .01541 .32782 .55824
av 1 -.11248 .20191 -.30871 -.57949 .03375 .11894 .40897 .44384
pr-ops -.37175 .29450 -.17380 -.38623 -.02375 .04435 .42276 .58073pr-nops .47189 -.26982 -.03789 -.00574 .04467 .34311 -.10734 -.22988
pr-bkpt -.14622 -.01278 .25127 .46138 -.02730 -.47640 -.36453 -.39881
bppc top25 top50 maxplant avplant best k best 1 av kbppc 1.00000
top25 -.49409 1.00000
top50 -.41951 .76203 1.00000
maxplant -.66730 .27473 .23916 1.00000
avplant -.68099 .36340 .29233 .85698 1.00000
best k .42984 -.14018 -.06075 .00100 -.09725 1.00000
best 1 .31638 -.32953 -.31344 -.03861 -.06051 .03020 1.00000
av k .56197 -.22715 -.14030 -.09199 -.20927 .94914 .04744 1.00000av 1 .44880 -.39663 -.35989 -.08032 -.12453 .08966 .90469 .16123
pr-ops .54984 -.83983 -.78361 -.31253 -.43948 .17845 .36313 .27391pr-nops -.21577 .58494 .48586 -.08289 .07633 -.27936 -.07227 -.29508pr-bkpt -.37994 .26455 .32093 .47009 .42254 .13551 -.33775 .04268
av 1 pr-ops pr-nops pr-bkpt
av 1 1.00000
pr-ops .41908 1.00000
pr-nops -.07937 -.65744 1.00000
pr-bkpt -.39478 -.36330 -.46317 1.00000
CRITICAL VALUE (I-TAIL, .05) = + Or - .11910
CRITICAL VALUE (2-tail, .05) = +/- .14164
N = 192
A88
Appendix 9D: EMIR Simulation Results Summary
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARISON
The effects of each experimental factor are assessed by pairing up
simulation runs. The pairings are arranged such that only the single
factor under scrutiny differs between the runs. For example, suppose the
factor for analysis were world view. The run 4HlIVA.I would be paired
with 4HIIIA.I (the ".1" denoting that the run was performed with random
number seed = 1), 16L4IVB.2 with 16L4IIB.2, 16HlIVC.3 with 16HIIIC.3,
etc.
For a full analysis over all three demand series and four random number
streams, the "technical change" runs allow a total of 96 comparisons for
each factor, whilst the "no technical change" runs permit 32 comparisons
to be made.
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Having made the pairings, it is possible to perform a simple statistical
test on the results to assess the significance of the experimental
variables. For example, for comparing average plant scale at the end of
the simulations, the sign of the difference (+ or -) between plant sizes
at t=S9 would be noted for the 96 pairings. The 96 + and - differences
can then be tested against the hypothesis that there is no difference
between average plant scale for runs with worldview IV and world view II
(for example). Cases when the resul ts are equal i.e. the difference is
0, are discarded, leaving fewer pairings.
The null hypothesis is that there are equal numbers of + and _
differences; this is tested by using the Normal approximation to the
Binomial distribution. We assume that the probability of a + difference
is p = 0.5. The probability of a - d·ifference is then I-p = 0.5 also. If
there are n trials, we can approximate the Binomial with the Normal
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distribution, with
Mean = n * p
and
Variance = n * p * (l-p)
provided that n * p and n * (l-p) are both greater than 5. In these
cases p = 1-p = 0.5, and n is normally (much) greater than 20, so these
conditions hold. (In cases where n is less than 10, the probabilities
can be calculated exactly without the Normal approximation.)
Since we are testing the hypothesis that "there is no difference", a
two-tailed test is employed. Confidence intervals are therefore drawn by
looking at intervals representing 1.96 standard deviations (5% level),
2.576 s.d.'s (1%) and 3.29 s.d.'s (0.1%) from the mean. A "continuity
correction" must be made (to allow for the fact that scores can only be
integers i.e. a score of 40 is equivalent to the range 391 to 401 on the
continuous Normal distribution). The following table gi ves the
"critical" results at 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels for various
values of n:
n mean s.d.
Significance Level
5% 1% 0.1%
----------------------.-----------------------------
32 16 2.828 (22 , 10) (24 , 8) (26 , 6)
48 24 3.464 (31 , 17) (33 , 15) (36 , 12)
64 32 4.000 (40 , 24) (43 , 21) (46 , 18)
96 48 4.899 (58 , 38) (61 , 35) (65 , 31)
The above table shows, for given n and significance level, the scores
required to disprove the null hypothesis. In the tables of results
below, 1 "point" is awarded for a positive difference.
The comparisons are tabulated below. They are based on the same output
measures, in the same order, as listed at the beginning of Appendix 9B.
The entries count the number of times the given measure was larger for
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each of the experimental influences. Thus, for the runs with no
technical change (see first line of first table below), the market price
at t=59 was higher for simulation runs with wor1dview II on 28
occasions, and higher for runs with world view IV 4 times.
Note that not all rows add up to 32 (or 64, or 96). This is because
comparisons where the outcome was identical are ignored. (For example,
for the "no technical change" runs no non-zero comparisons are made on
the technical change measures.)
RUNS WITH NO TECHNICAL CHANGE
Comparisons at t=59 (no technical change)
Compared on WORLDVIEWS - II IV
Price 28 4 ***
Average prodn cost 28 2 ***
Lowest prodn cost 0 0
Proportion of firms:
Operating 12 3 *
Not Operating 8 4
Bankrupt 0 14 ***
Market share of:
Top 25% 11 21
Top 50% 7 20 *
Plant scale:
Largest 0 0
Average 2 27 ***
Technology:
Best K 0 0
Best L 0 0
Average K 0 0
Average L 0 0
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
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Comparisons at t=59 (no technical change)
Compared on If(). FIRMS - 4 16
Price 9 23 *
Average prodn cost 4 26 ***
Lowest prodn cost 0 0
Proportion of firms:
Operating 30 0 ***
Not Operating 0 27 ***
Bankrupt 6 12
Market share of:
Top 25% 2 30 ***
Top 50% 0 31 ***
Plant scale:
Largest 0 0
Average 27 3 ***
Technology:
Best K 0 0
Best L 0 0
Average K 0 0
Average L 0 0
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level
Comparisons at t=59 (no technical change)
Compared on MAX PLANT - 100 400
Price 32 o ***
Average prodn cost 32 o ***
Lowest prodn cost 32 o ***
Proportion of firms:
Operating 28 o ***
Not Operating 0 16 ***
Bankrupt 1 24 ***
Market share of:
Top 25% 0 32 ***
Top 50% 0 32 ***
Plant scale:
Largest 0 32 ***
Average 0 32 ***
Technology:
Best K 0 0
Best L 0 0
Average K 0 0
Average L 0 0
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
A92
Comparisons at t=59 (no technical change)
Compared on CAP IlTENSITY - Low High
Price 2 30 ***
Average prodn cost 0 32 ***
Lowest prodn cost 0 32 ***
Proportion of firms:
Operating 6 9
Not Operating 13 2 **
Bankrupt 2 14 **
Market share of:
Top 25% 23 9 *
Top 50% 18 9
Plant scale:
Largest 0 0
Average 14 14
Technology:
Best K 0 32 ***
Best L 0 0
Average K 0 32 ***
Average L 0 0
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
COMPARISON BETWEEN RUNS WITHOUT AND WITH TECHNICAL CHANGE
Comparisons at t=59
Price
Average prodn cost
Lowest prodn cost
Proportion of firms:
Operating
Not Operating
Bankrupt
Market share of:
Top 25%
Top 50%
Plant scale:
Largest
Average
Technology:
Best K
Best L
Average K
Average L
Tech Change No Tech Change
3 61 ***o 63 ***o 64 ***
1 54 ***
33 6 ***
49 2 ***
61 2 ***
49 1 ***
64 0 ***
63 1 ***
5 59 ***
3 61 ***o 64 ***o 64 ***
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level
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RUNS WITH TECHNICAL CHANGE
Comparisons at t=59
DEMAND SERIES A B C TOTAL
Compared on WORLDVIEW II IV II IV II IV II IV
Price 27 5 25 7 24 8 76 20 ***
Average prodn cost 29 3 19 13 25 7 73 23 ***
Lowest prodn cost 27 5 21 11 23 8 71 24 ***Proportion of firms:
Operating 22 4 24 7 20 3 66 14 ***Not Operating 15 5 11 6 8 17 34 28
Bankrupt 2 26 2 28 0 12 4 66 ***Market share of:
Top 25% 5 21 8 22 5 20 18 63 ***Top 50% 1 11 2 16 2 11 5 38 ***Plant scale:
Largest 5 27 10 22 8 23 23 72 ***Average 4 28 11 21 6 26 21 75 ***Technology:
Best K 11 21 4 28 7 25 22 74 ***Best L 30 2 28 4 29 3 87 9 ***Average K 3 29 2 30 5 27 10 86 ***Average L 29 3 26 6 25 7 80 16 ***
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
Comparisons at t=59
DEMAND SERIES A B C TOTAL
Compared on 10. FIRMS 4 16 4 16 4 16 4 16
Price 14 18 9 22 12 20 35 60 *Average prodn cost 15 17 11 21 7 25 33 63 **Lowest prodn cost 13 18 17 15 12 19 42 52
Proportion of firms:
Operating 26 2 22 10 21 8 69 20 ***Not Operating 0 29 1 28 7 22 8 79 ***Bankrupt 16 12 19 10 7 1 42 23 *Market share of:
Top 25% 4 22 10 20 11 15 25 57 ***Top 50% 0 12 6 12 5 8 11 32 **Plant scale:
Largest 20 12 19 13 25 7 64 32 **Average 19 13 22 10 26 6 67 29 ***Technology:
Best K 16 16 19 13 17 15 52 44Best L 17 15 24 8 17 15 58 38 *Average K 19 13 25 7 19 13 63 33 **Average L 17 15 25 7 19 13 61 35 **
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
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Comparisons at t=59
DEMAND SERIES A B C TOTAL
Compared on PLANT SIZE 100 400 100 400 100 400 100 400
Price 21 11 18 14 23 9 62 34 **Average prodn cost 25 7 18 13 22 8 65 28 ***Lowest prodn cost 24 8 19 13 22 10 65 31 ***Proportion of firms:
Operating 15 10 17 20 17 9 49 29 *Not Operating 16 8 15 4 11 8 42 30
Bankrupt 5 21 5 24 1 10 11 55 ***Market share of:
Top 25% 10 13 11 14 11 15 32 42
Top 50% 4 8 6 11 5 10 15 29 *Plant scale:
Largest 16 16 14 18 13 19 43 53Average 10 22 9 23 11 21 30 66 ***Technology:
Best K 29 3 20 12 27 5 76 20 ***Best L 22 10 20 11 23 9 65 30 ***Average K 24 8 26 6 24 8 74 22 ***Average L 21 11 24 8 24 8 69 27 ***
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
Comparisons at t=59
DEMAND SERIES A B C TOTAL
Compar edon CAPITAL Low: High Low: High Low :High Low: High
DITElISITY
Price 4 28 7 25 7 25 18 78 ***Average prodn cost 2 30 5 27 4 28 11 85 ***Lowest prodn cost 1 31 5 27 5 27 11 85 ***Proportion of firms:
Operating 3 20 8 18 4 21 15 59 ***Not Operating 20 3 14 5 21 4 SS 12 ***Bankrupt 10 15 13 12 2 2 25 29Market share of:
Top 25% 18 5 19 10 20 5 57 20 ***Top 50% 10 1 13 6 10 2 33 9 ***Plant scale:
Largest 22 10 20 12 13 19 SS 41Average 24 8 21 11 20 12 65 31 ***Technology:
Best K 0 32 1 31 1 31 2 94 ***Best L 10 22 13 19 10 22 33 63 **Average K 1 31 1 31 0 32 2 94 ***Average L 12 20 17 15 12 20 41 55
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
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Appendix 9E: Comparison of output measures between runs with demand
series A, Band C
A casual inspection of the latter four tables of Appendix D shows that
the resul ts for each of the three demand series demonstrate the same
qualitative effects for the input experimental variables. In only four
cases out of the 56 does a result for one demand series indicate an
inf 1uence in one direction whi Le the other two suggest the opposite.
Moreover, in only one of these four cases are the results for any single
demand series statistically significant anyway.
The conclusion that there is no difference between the effects of the
experimental influences on the outcome variables for the three demand
series can be considerably strengthened by showing that, in the majority
of cases, there are no significant differences between the numerical
counts from the non-parametric tests of Appendix D for the three demand
series.
There are 32 paired comparisons for each demand series wi th technical
change allowed, a total of 96 in all (Appendix D). Suppose that the
observed frequencies of an output measure (e.g. "plant scales are
larger") for a given input variable (e.g, ''wor1dview = IV") are PA, PB,
and Pc respectively for demand series A. Band C. Suppose also that the
observed frequencies of the opposite result (e.g. "plant scales are
smaller") are QA' QB and QC' Then we can test the observed frequencies
against the null hypothesis that they are all drawn from the same
population,
There are six categories for which we have expected and observed
frequencies. A Chi-quared goodness-of-fit test can be carried out to
test the assumption that there is no significant difference between the
results for the three demand series A. Band C. Defining:
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P = (PA + PB + Pc)
Q = QA + QB + Qc
we will expect to observe the following proportions E, on the assumption
that there is no difference between the three demand series:
(series A:)
- and similarly for demand series Band C, and for the proportions of
"non-occurences" (Q's), etc.
For example, consider the runs with technical change, output measure
'Price at t=59', compared on worldview II vs. worldview IV (see Appendix
9D). For demand series A the II's ha ve higher prices at t=59 in 27 out
of 32 cases. For B the II's are higher in 25 out of 32, and for C they
are higher in 24 out of 32. Is the difference significant?
The expected number of higher cases is (27 + 25 + 24) * 32/96 = 25.333.
The expected number of lower cases is (5 + 7 + 8) * 32/96 = 6.667. Then
the situation is as follows:
CASE EXPECTED OBSERVED (0 - E)2
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY / E
A higher 25.333 27 0.110
A lower 6.667 5 0.417
B higher 25.333 25 0.004
Blower 6.667 7 0.017
C higher 25.333 24 0.070
Clower 6.667 8 0.267
--------
Sum of squared differences = 0.885
So long as the expected frequency cells all exceed 5, the sum of squared
differences will follow a Chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of
freedom. 0.885 lies between the 70% and 50% points of that distribution,
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so there is no reason to conclude that there is any difference between
the results for the three demand series on this measure.
This calculation was applied to all of the resu1 ts listed for three
demand series in Appendix 9D. There are 56 sets of paired comparisons
(14 output measures compared for 4 input influences). Of these 56 sets,
19 could not be tested by using the Chi-squared because the procedure
outlined above yielded classes with fewer than five expected
observations. Of the 37 remaining testable sets, 2 were found which
exceeded the 5% point of the Chi-squared distribution; one exceeded the
1% point. However, 2 out of 40 would be expected to fail at the 5%
significance level by chance alone; 1 or more out of 37 would fail at
the 1% level about one time in three by pure chance alone. This finding
is therefore not remarkable. Hence we can reasonably conclude that there
is no important difference between the results for the three demand
series.
(The reader may be concerned that the 19 cases which could not be
formally tested in this way may hide the exceptions. He or she is
invited to study Appendix 9D briefly again. For example, see the
comparisons on "World view"; the proportions for 'Bankrupt' are 2:26,
2:28, 0:12. Those for 'Top 50%' are 1:11, 2:16, 2:11. For 'Best L' 30:2,
28:4, 29:3. For 'Average K' they are 3:29, 2:30, 5:27. For 'Average L'
29:3, 26:6, 25:7. Etcetera.)
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Appendix 9F: Comparison of EMIR Output Measures By Demand Series
Performance measures and method of comparison are as in Appendix 9D.
Comparisons at t=59
Demand series - A B
Price 34 30
Average prodn cost 42 22 *
Lowest prodn cost 46 18 ***
Proportion of firms:
Operating 20 31
Not Operating 28 12 *
Bankrupt 20 22
Market share of:
Top 25% 34 19 *
Top 50% 19 10
Plant scale:
Largest 8 56 ***
Average 11 51 ***
Technology:
Best K 29 35
Best L 17 47 ***
Average K 33 31
Average L 17 47 ***
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level
-----------------------------------------
Comparisons at t=59
Demand series - A C
Price 24 40 *
Average prodn cost 29 35
Lowest prodn cost 24 40 *
Proportion of firms:
Operating 22 31
Not Operating 9 43 ***
Bankrupt 51 0 ***
Market share of:
Top 25% 30 20
Top 50% 15 8
Plant scale:
Largest 35 28
Average 33 31
Technology:
Best K 31 33
Best L 25 39
Average K 32 32
Average L 23 41 *
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1~ level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
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Comparisons at t=59
Demand series - B C
Price 21 42 **Average prodn cost 25 39
Lowest prodn cost 20 44 **
Proportion of firms:
Operating 28 24
Not Operating 4 47 ***
Bankrupt 57 0 ***
Market share of:
Top 25% 26 28
Top 50% 13 17
Plant scale:
Largest 57 7 ***
Average 49 15 ***
Technology:
Best K 34 30
Best L 39 25
Average K 34 30
Average L 40 24 *
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level-----------------------------------------
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Appendix 9G: Market Share Results
WINNER Tl Time at which winner (firm at t=59 operating the largestcapacity) first occupied first place
PI Market share (%) of winner at T1
T2 Time at which winner first occupied either first or second
place
P2 Market share (%) of winner at T2
SECOND T3 Time at which second firm (ranked second by capacity at
t=s9) first occupied either first or second place
P3 Market share (%) of second firm at T3
MAXPLANT Percentage of time since Tl for which winner has operated
PROPORTION the largest plant in the industry
RUN ------- WINNER ------ -SECOND- MAXPLANT
Tl PI T2 P2 T3 P3 PROPORTION
16hlivn.l 21 13.7 15 16.3 56 10.0 17.9
16hlivn.2 59 13.8 59 13.8 43 11.9 0.0
16hlivn.3 58 13.1 51 14.3 58 12.8 100.0
16hlivn.4 53 16.3 36 13.7 55 11.5 28.6
16hliin.1 58 9.9 55 9.2 59 10.7 0.0
16hliin.2 59 16.8 48 15.2 55 14.0 100.0
16hliin.3 53 13.8 52 12.8 59 9.7 57.1
16hliin.4 59 12.1 59 12.1 55 13.4 0.0
16h4ivn.1 45 17.3 45 17.3 53 16.9 0.0
16h4ivn.2 33 27.4 33 27.4 59 20.3 11.1
16h4ivn.3 50 25.4 12 25.8 54 22.7 30.0
16h4ivn.4 50 20.1 41 21.7 59 18.5 0.0
16h4iin.1 59 19.4 59 19.4 10 26.5 0.0
16h411n.2 55 31.1 44 22.6 56 23.4 0.0
16h4iin.3 49 20.6 44 24.6 58 14.4 45.5
16h4i1n.4 57 25.0 56 20.5 59 17.9 0.0
161livn.1 59 14.1 59 14.1 25 13.5 0.0
161livn.2 59 17.1 32 15.8 39 15.0 0.0
161livn.3 20 18.8 19 13.6 57 11.1 17.5
1611ivn.4 27 18.7 24 16.0 57 13.0 9.1
1611iin.1 58 14.2 39 15.2 57 12.8 50.0161111n.2 15 19.2 10 18.4 56 12.9 11.1
1611iin.3 59 13.8 34 11.7 17 15.5 0.0
1611iin.4 36 17.8 14 14.8 56 10.4 25.0
1614ivn.1 47 34.9 43 17.6 10 36.6 0.0
1614ivn.2 44 22.5 25 27.2 47 22.1 87.51614ivn.3 35 28.8 20 27.5 10 37.0 32.016141vn.4 6 41.3 I 6.3 52 17.9 53.7
1614iin.l 23 30.0 16 14.2 50 17.8 64.9161411n.2 56 31.9 49 23.1 15 16.6 25.01614i1n.3 26 34.9 23 24.0 29 24.2 58.81614i1n.4 21 30.9 15 13.6 43 19.7 53.8
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RUN ------- WINNER ------ -SECOND- MAXPLANT
Tl PI T2 P2 T3 P3 PROPORTION
l6hliva.l 44 44.1 28 10.5 17 20.2 100.0
16hliva.2 6 33.3 3 16.7 49 11.0 92.6
16hliva.3 19 22.8 3 16.7 39 19.1 58.5
16hliva.4 44 24.0 44 24.0 53 15.1 81.3
16hliia.l 50 20.8 48 13.9 30 11.0 100.0
16hliia.2 44 20.7 23 11.4 56 19.9 100.0
16hliia.3 47 36.5 35 19.8 14 16.0 0.0
16hliia.4 42 13.6 36 10.8 55 16.2 94.4
16h4iva.l 24 22.5 24 22.5 53 6.0 94.4
16h4iva.2 31 30.3 30 29.2 56 18.2 100.0
16h4iva.3 49 39.5 3 29.4 29 20.1 63.6
16h4iva.4 25 41.4 12 27.7 31 26.3 100.0
16h4iia.l 59 32.8 58 24.3 48 24.6 0.0
16h4iia.2 54 24.9 54 24.9 56 22.1 83.3
16h4iia.3 24 38.7 14 20.5 56 17.0 75.0
16h4iia.4 18 45.5 11 22.7 56 3.6 83.3
1611iva.1 37 42.6 34 25.6 48 0.0 100.0
1611iva.2 21 39.0 15 13.9 53 10.3 100.0
1611iva.3 49 54.1 18 13.9 10 39.0 100.0
1611iva.4 4 21.9 3 19.4 53 11.8 83.9
1611iia.l 46 46.5 10 18.4 36 19.8 85;7
1611iia.2 39 42.2 30 13.6 55 20.8 100,0
1611iia.3 58 41.0 13 17.7 14 17.6 100.0
1611iia.4 11 23.8 10 20.6 39 23.5 83.7
1614iva.l 9 34.6 1 6.3 58 4.1 84.3
1614iva.2 19 56.0 5 17.4 55 0.0 61.0
1614iva.3 6 38.1 5 18.5 58 10.0 87.0
1614iva.4 8 38.0 5 11.4 31 9.4 92.3
1614iia.l 59 22.6 54 25.8 59 22.4 100.0
1614iia.2 18 35.9 16 30.5 55 12.1 100.0
1614iia.3 18 26.8 18 26.8 55 23.1 100.0
1614iia.4 34 24.7 34 24.7 56 0.0 76.9
16hlivb.1 33 31.5 28 19.0 18 16.4 100.0
16hlivb.2 54 28.5 53 22.6 35 12.8 66.7
16hlivb.3 4 15.4 4 15.4 34 13.0 50.0
16hlivb.4 54 38.7 51 23.1 27 15.6 100.0
16hliib.1 38 14.5 35 11.8 47 12.4 36.416hliib.2 14 12.1 14 12.1 56 15.5 76.1
16hliib.3 49 20.7 43 19.6 58 22.3 0.016hliib.4 54 33.7 43 17.4 28 12.9 0.0
16h4ivb.1 49 40.7 43 18.0 55 29.5 100.016h4ivb.2 58 20.5 58 20.5 53 22.2 0.016h4ivb.3 13 34.4 13 34.4 55 20.2 87.216h4ivb.4 54 31.3 29 24.4 58 26.3 0.0
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RUN ------- WINNER ------ -SECOND- MAXPLANT
T1 PI T2 P2 T3 P3 PROPORTION
16h4iib.1 19 21.2 19 21.2 43 6.4 100.0
16h4iib.2 32 18.1 17 22.9 56 16.2 100.0
16h4iib.3 25 26.8 10 28.9 55 9.4 77.1
16h4iib.4 55 14.4 SS 14.4 48 12.2 0.0
1611ivb.l 4 18.4 4 18.4 55 9.4 100.0
161livb.2 8 28.8 7 19.1 51 7.7 98.1
16Uivb.3 26 27.9 3 11.0 56 31.1 8.8
1611ivb.4 31 18.3 31 18.3 49 8.3 100.0
161liib.1 35 26.1 34 20.7 39 26.5 76.0
1611iib.2 46 35.5 38 12.4 14 18.3 42.9
16Uiib.3 35 27.6 35 27.6 48 0.0 100.0
1611iib.4 48 39.3 24 11.1 17 10.6 100.0
1614ivb.1 24 37.9 6 25.3 39 10.3 100.0
1614ivb.2 3 28.6 3 28.6 56 10.6 96.5
1614ivb.3 24 30.0 18 22.8 53 8.2 100.0
1614ivb.4 16 25.6 15 19.9 58 0.0 77 .3
1614iib .1 10 23.7 1 6.3 41 0.0 68.0
1614iib.2 35 15.9 35 15.9 54 15.4 76.0
1614iib.3 19 15.8 19 15.8 26 8.9 95.1
1614iib.4 32 24.8 30 15.4 56 19.2 32.1
16hlivc.l 50 24.3 13 18.8 47 25.9 100.0
16hlivc.2 20 17.6 15 13.2 47 16.7 35.0
16hlivc.3 45 31.2 43 21.2 59 15.7 13.3
16hlivc.4 16 16.6 14 12.3 49 21.4 97.7
16hliic .1 43 18.5 41 17.3 53 15.6 5.9
16hliic.2 47 13.3 46 13.2 58 13.1 0.0
16hliic.3 27 14.7 17 11.8 55 12.2 72.7
16hliic .4 17 15.4 14 13.5 59 13.6 60.5
16h4ivc.1 32 43.1 23 16.4 57 9.9 100.0
16h4ivc.2 56 30.0 53 26.0 55 32.4 0.0
16h4ivc.3 23 28.0 23 28.0 49 14.1 64.9
16h4ivc.4 42 33.3 40 21.2 31 37.8 0.0
16h4iic.1 49 29.1 44 23.2 52 22.5 36.4
16h4iic.2 49 23.9 32 19.8 58 17.8 0.0
16h4iic.3 3 26.2 3 26.2 57 19.7 100.0
16h4iic.4 48 31.2 3 26.2 21 22.1 100.0
161livc.1 34 62.0 27 13.9 58 7.9 100.0
161livc.2 14 17.1 14 17.1 49 0.0 100.0
161livc.3 26 54.8 15 8.5 12 17.7 23.5
161livc.4 25 30.7 19 12.1 46 0.0 94.3
161liic .1 21 10.9 21 10.9 41 12.7 92.3161liic.2 15 11.9 15 11.9 53 13.5 28.9
1611iic.3 58 17.8 56 15.8 41 10.1 0.01611Uc.4 SO 14.0 SO 14.0 55 12.1 60.0
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RUN ------- WINNER ------ -SECOND- MAXPLANT
Tl PI T2 P2 T3 P3 PROPORTION
16l4ivc.l 3 24.0 3 24.0 27 0.0 98.2
16l4ivc.2 54 42.9 21 22.4 14 28.6 66.7
16l4ivc.3 32 39.5 14 32.3 51 0.0 100.0
16l4ivc.4 25 49.8 14 18.3 59 20.7 5.7
16l4iic.1 35 29.5 35 29.5 56 17.3 100.0
16l4iic.2 55 28.0 45 17.2 55 21.6 0.0
16l4iic.3 14 31.4 11 12.3 42 0.0 71.7
16l4iic.4 32 32.3 24 15.1 27 23.0 100.0
Market Share Thresholds
F20 - the number of times a firm in the simulation achieves 20% market
share, but fails to hold either first or second place for at least
ten subsequent periods.
S20 - the number of times a firm in the simulation achieves 20% market
share, and then holds either first or second place for at least
the next ten periods.
F25, S25 etc - as F20, S20 but for 25% market share threshold. F30, ..
etc defined similarly.
RUN F20 S20 F25 S25 F30 S30 F35 S35 F40 S40 F45 S45 F50 S50
16hlivn.1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hlivn.2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hlivn.3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hlivn.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliin.l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hliin.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hliin.3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016hliin.4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4ivn.l 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 116h4ivn.2 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
16h4ivn.3 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 116h4ivn.4 2 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4iin.l 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 016h4iin.2 5 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 016h4iin.3 3 1 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 016h4iin.4 3 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16llivn.1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016llivn.2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 016llivn.3 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0161livn.4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
161liin.l 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01611iin.2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 01611iin.3 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 016Uiin.4 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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RUN F2a S2a F25 S25 F3a S3a F35 S35 F4a S4a F45 S45 F5a S5a
1614ivn.l 1 2 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 1 a 1 a 1
1614ivn.2 3 a 2 1 1 1 a 2 1 a 1 1 a 0
1614ivn.3 a 0 1 a 2 0 1 2 0 a a 1 0 2
1614ivn.4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a 1
1614iin.l 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1614iin.2 5 a a 1 0 2 0 a 0 2 a 1 0 1
1614iin.3 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 1 a 2 1 1 0 1
1614iin.4 3 a a 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 a 0 0 1
16hliva.l 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 a 2 0 2
16hliva .2 3 1 1 0 a 1 a 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
16hliva.3 2 0 a 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 a 0 0 1
16hliva.4 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 a a a 0 0 a 0
16hliia .1 a 2 0 1 0 0 a 0 0 a a a 0 0
16hliia.2 1 2 a 2 0 a 0 0 0 a a a 0 0
16hliia.3 2 2 a 2 a 2 0 1 a 1 a a 0 a
16hliia.4 1 1 1 a 0 0 0 a a a a 0 a 0
16h4iva.l 2 1 1 0 a 1 1 1 0 0 a 1 0 1
16h4iva.2 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 a 1 a 2 a 1
16h4iva.3 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 a 0 1
16h4iva.4 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 2 a 1 0 1 a 1
16h4iia.l 3 a 2 a 1 2 1 1 a 1 a 1 a a
16h4iia.2 1 1 2 0 a a 0 a a 1 a a a a
16h4iia.3 4 1 4 0 1 a a 1 a a a 1 0 a
16h4iia.4 a 1 1 a 0 1 0 1 a a a 2 a 2
161liva.l 1 0 1 2 a a 0 a 0 1 a 2 a 2
161liva.2 a 1 a a a 1 0 2 0 1 a 0 0 2
161liva.3 a 1 1 1 0 a a 2 a 1 0 2 a 2
161liva.4 a 1 1 a a a 0 1 a 1 a a 0 1
1611iia .1 2 1 a 1 a 2 0 2 0 1 a 1 0 2
1611iia.2 a 2 a 2 a 1 a 1 a 1 a a a 1
1611iia.3 2 2 a 2 a 2 0 1 a 1 a 1 0 1
1611iia.4 2 2 a a 0 1 a 2 a 1 a 1 0 1
1614iva.l a a 1 0 a 1 0 0 0 a a a 0 1
1614iva.2 a 1 a 1 0 1 a 1 0 a a 1 a 2
1614iva.3 a 1 1 a a a 0 a a a a a a 1
1614iva.4 a a 1 1 0 a a 2 a 0 a a a 1
1614iia.l 3 2 a 3 a a a a a 1 a a a a
1614iia.2 0 a 1 a 1 1 a 1 a a a 1 1 1
1614iia .3 3 1 2 1 1 a 0 1 a a a 1 0 1
1614iia.4 4 a 2 1 1 1 a 3 a 1 a 1 1 1
16hlivb.l 1 2 0 0 a 2 0 a a 1 a 1 a 1
16hlivb.2 0 2 1 1 a a 0 0 a a a a a a
16hlivb.3 a 1 0 1 0 a a 1 0 a a a a 1
16hlivb.4 1 a a a a 1 a a a 1 a a a a
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RUN F20 S20 F25 S25 F30 S30 F35 S35 F40 S40 F45 S45 F50 S50
16hliib.l 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliib.2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliib.3 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliib .4 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 O· 0 0 0 0
16h4ivb.l 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1
16h4ivb.2 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4ivb.3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
16h4ivb.4 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
16h4iib.l 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
16h4iib.2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4iib.3 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
16h4iib.4 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1611ivb.l 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1611ivb.2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
161livb.3 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0
161livb.4 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
161liib.l 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1
161liib.2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1
161liib.3 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
161liib.4 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
1614ivb.1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1614ivb.2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1614ivb.3 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1614ivb.4 2 0 1 3 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1614iib.l 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1614iib.2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1614iib.3 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1
1614iib.4 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hlivc.l 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hlivc.2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
16hlivc .3 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hlivc.4 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
16hliic .1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliic.2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h1iic.3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16hliic.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4ivc.l 3 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1
16h4ivc.2 2 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4ivc.3 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
16h4ivc.4 2 2 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0
16h4iic.1 3 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4iic.2 3 1 3 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16h4iic.3 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
16h4iic.4 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
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RUN F20 S20 F25 S25 F30 S30 F35 S35 F40 S40 F45 S45 F50 S50
1611ivc .1 1 2 1 4 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2
1611ivc.2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1611ivc.3 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2
1611ivc .4 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1611iic .1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1611iic .2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
161liic.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1611iic.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1614ivc.l 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1614ivc.2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1614ivc.3 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1614ivc.4 3 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1
1614iic .1 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
1614iic.2 0 3 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1614iic.3 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1614iic.4 1 2 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
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Appendix 9H: Market Share Results Analysis
This Appendix gives the detailed analysis of the market share results.
The output performance measures used are as follows:
Winner 1st since
with mkt share %
Winner in top 2 since
with mkt share %
Winner max. plant %
20% threshold - Fail
The time (simulation period) at which the firm
with the largest market share at t-59 first
occupied the leading position, and then kept it
The percentage market share the winner had at
that time it first emerged
As above, but the period at which the winner
first occupied either first or second place
Market share on occupying first or second place
The proportion of the time that the winner has
been in first place for which it has operated a
bigger plant than all its competitors
Counts the number of times firms gain 20%
market share, but do not hold either first or
second place for at least the ten subsequent
periods
20% threshold - Succeed Counts the number of times firms gain 20%
market share, and go on to hold either first or
second place for the next ten periods or more.
NB "threshold" statistics are actual total frequencies, not comparisons.
The motivation for these measures is to give an idea of the persistence
of market share leadership. A "Shapshot" at t=59 shows how long the
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successful firms at that period have been in leading positions. The
threshold measures give incidences of success and failure in market
dominance for firms which have already acheived a particular market
share level.
Measurement of threshold results is only begun at t=10 within the
simulations. In the early stages of the simulations, small capacity
additions can lead to relatively big market share swings, so market
share thresholds are only assessed after the first ten simulated periods
have elapsed. Only 16-firm scenarios are used, as explained in Chapter
9, section 3.
The tables below report the resu1 ts in three ways. Firstly, under the
columns marked "counts", they count the number of times the particular
output measure was larger at t=59 for runs with the relevant
experimental variable. Secondly, under "averages", they report the
average value of the output measure. So, for example, the first table
below, where technical change is the experimental influence for
comparisons, reports that 25 times out of the 32 the winning firm
emerged later for runs with no technical change allowed. The average
time at which winners in the no technica 1 change runs emerged was t =
44, whilst for runs with technical change the average was at t = 31.8.
The third way results are reported is in the "thresholds" section. The
table below shows, for example, that over the 32 runs with no technical
change, there were 5Q occasions when a firm reached a 20% market share
and then did not stay in the top two for ten periods. There were 25
occasions when a firm reached a 20% threshold and then did succeed in
holding one of the two leading positions. For runs with technical change
allowed, the proportions were 43 fail ures and 32 successes at the 20%
threshold.
AI09
COMPARISONS ON TECHNICAL CHANGE (TC) VS. NO TECHNICAL CHANGE (NTC)
(Demand series A only)
Counts Averages
NTC TC NTC TC
Winner 1st since 25 6 *** 44.0 31.8with mkt share % 6 :26 *** 21.4 33.7Winner in top 2 since 25 : 7 ** 35.4 21.8
with mkt share % 9 :23 * 17.5 19.7
Winner max. plant % 3 :27 *** 27.5 83.8
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% l~vel (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
NTC TC
Fail Succeed Fail Succeed
20% threshold 50 25 43 32
25% threshold 32 13 26 31
30% threshold 16 19 7 26
35% threshold 7 13 4 21
40% threshold 2 10 0 21
45% threshold 2 9 0 22
50% threshold 0 10 2 30
NOTE: It may seem surprising that the TC resul ts show 30 successes at
the 50% threshold but only 22 at the 45%'. It is, however, correct, and
is the product of two factors:
(i) adding a large plant can increase market share significantly, in
some cases by as much as 20%. Thus a firm can "skip" thresholds.
(Lf ) as noted above, measurement is only started at t=10. A firm can
thus start at a high threshold, without having been counted at
lower thresholds.
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THRESHOLDS FOR NTC AND TC RUNS
The proportions of firms reaching a gi ven market share threshold and
then either succeeding (holding a top-two posi tion for ten periods or
more) or failing appear to differ between runs with and without
technical change allowed. This observation can be checked by applying a
Chi-squared test to the relative proportions for each of the thresholds
separately.
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The hypothesis that "there is no difference between the chances of
success and failure at the X% threshold for firms in simulations with
and without technical change allowed" was tested, where X was equal to
20%, 25%, 30%, and 35% and above. With one degree of freedom, the Chi-
squared statistic was acceptable for X ...20% only. For X at 25% and at
35% and above the hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level; at X of 30%
it was rejected at the 5% level.
It was therefore conc luded that the chances of fai lure and success at
different thresholds is significantly different for simulations with and
without technical change.
COMPARISONS ON WORLDVIEW II VS. IV
(All demand series)
Counts
II : IV
Averages
II IV
Winner 1st since 32 :15 *
with mkt share % 11 :37 ***
Winner in top 2 since 30 :17
with mkt share % 20 :27
Winner max. plant % 14 :27 *
36.0 2B.1
25.3 33.0
2B.6 19.B
1B.3 19.B
64.4 74.6
* - significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
20% threshold
25% threshold
30% threshold
35% threshold
40% threshold
45% threshold
50% threshold
over all runs):
Worldview II
Fail Succeed
5B 5B
27 SO
12 40
2 36
o 20
o 22
2 21
Worldview IV
Fail Succeed
SO 44
29 50
10 46
8 43
2 40
1 28o 44
Thresholds (totalled
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COMPARISONS ON INITIAL MAXIMUM PLANT SCALE 100 VS. 400
(All demand series)
Winner 1st since
with mkt share %
Winner in top 2 since
with mkt share %
Winner max. plant %
Counts
100 : 400
24 :22
18 :30
25 :22
9 :39 ***
21 :20
Averages
100 400
33.4
27.4
25.4
16.1
69.1
30.7
30.9
23.0
22.0
69.9
* = significant at 5% level; ** a 1% level; *** a 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
Plant scale 100 Plant scale 400Fail Succeed Fail Succeed
20% threshold 32 63 76 39
25% threshold 11 52 45 48
30% threshold 3 38 19 48
35% threshold 0 37 10 42
40% threshold 0 27 2 33
45% threshold 1 20 0 30
50% threshold 0 32 2 33
COMPARISONS ON CAPITAL INTENSITY LOW VS. HIGH
(All demand series)
Counts
Low : High
Averages
Low High
Winner 1st since 14 :33 ** 27.6 36.5
with mkt share % 29 :19 31.4 26.9Winner in top 2 since 18 :30 20.0 28.4
with mkt share % 20 :28 18.1 20.0
Winner max. plant % 25 :15 78.5 60.5
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
Low cap. intensity
Fail Succeed
48 45
26 48
9 48
3 53
2 35
1 29
2 47
20% threshold
25% threshold
30% threshold
35% threshold
40% threshold
45% threshold
50% threshold
High cap. intensity
Fail Succeed
60 57
30 52
13 38
7 26o 25
o 21o 18
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COMPARISONS ON DEMAND SERIES A VS. B
Winner 1st since
with mkt share %
Winner in top 2 since
with mkt share %
Winner max. plant %
Counts
A : B AveragesA B
15 :17
25 : 7 **
11 :20
19 :13
17 :11
31.8
33.7
21.8
19.7
83.8
31.3
25.8
25.6
19.2
67.6
* = significant at 5% level; ** = 1% level; *** = 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
Demand Series A Demand Series BFail Succeed Fail Succeed20% threshold 43 32 35 3625% threshold 26 31 15 3030% threshold 7 26 10 2635% threshold 4 32 4 2340% threshold 0 21 1 2045% threshold 0 22 1 1350% threshold 2 30 0 18
COMPARISONS ON DEMAND SERIES A VS. C
Winner 1st since
with mkt share %
Winner in top 2 since
with mkt share %
Winner max. plant %
Counts
A : C
Averages
A C
17 :14
21 :11
17 :15
19 :13
15 :13
31.8
33.7
21.8
19.7
83.8
33.1
27.9
25.3
18.2
57.1
* = significant at 5% level; ** - 1% level; *** = 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
Demand Series A Demand Series CFail Succeed Fail Succeed20% threshold 43 32 30 3425% threshold 26 31 15 3930% threshold 7 26 5 3435% threshold 4 32 2 2440% threshold 0 21 1 1945% threshold 0 22 0 1550% threshold 2 30 0 17
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COMPARISONS ON DEMAND SERIES B VS. C
Counts
B : C
Averages
B C
Winner 1st since
with mkt share %
Winner in top 2 since
with mkt share %
Winner max. plant %
14 :16
13 :19
17 :15
22 :10
17 :19
31.1
25.8
25.6
19.2
67.6
33.1
27.9
25.3
18.2
57.1
* = significant at 5% level; ** - 1% level; *** = 0.1% level (see
Appendix 9D for details)
Thresholds (totalled over all runs):
Demand Series B Demand Series C
Fail Succeed Fail Succeed
20% threshold 35 36 30 34
25% threshold 15 30 15 39
30% threshold 10 26 5 34
35% threshold 4 23 2 24
40% threshold 1 20 1 19
45% threshold 1 13 0 15
50% threshold 0 18 0 17
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Appendix 91: Results of Competitions Between Wor1dview II and IV
The 16-firm runs using demand series A were repeated. 8 firms were given
wor 1d view II and 8 were gi ven wor 1d view IV. The resu1 ts obtained for
these 16 runs are listed below. They show the numbers of firms left
operating. bankrupt. and "not operating" (Le. running no plants, but
not bankrupt) at the end of each of the runs for each wor1dview. They
a1so show the percentage of the total capital of all firms held by each
wor1dview.
RUN -------- WORLDVIEW II -------- -------- WORLDVIEW IV --------
No. of firms No. of firms
Oper- Not Oper- Bank- % of Oper- Not Oper- Bank- % of
ating ating rupt capital ating ating rupt capital
16H1A.1 0 6 2 38% 6 0 2 62%
16H1A.2 0 5 3 28% 4 2 2 72%
16H1A.3 0 6 2 38% 2 1 5 62%
16H1A.4 0 3 5 22% 2 2 4 78%
16H4A.l 0 6 2 31% 2 0 6 69%
16H4A.2 0 4 4 26% 1 0 7 74%
16H4A.3 0 5 3 40% 2 1 5 60%
16H4A.4 1 3 4 27% 3 1 4 73%
16LIA.1 0 6 2 28% 6 2 0 72%
16L1A.2 0 7 1 20% 5 1 2 80%
16LIA.3 0 5 3 29% 4 2 2 71%
16LIA.4 0 7 1 31% 1 5 2 69%
16L4A.l 0 7 1 36% 3 2 3 64%
16L4A.2 0 6 2 16% 2 3 3 84%
16L4A.3 0 8 0 25% 4 3 1 75%
16L4A.4 0 8 0 25% 2 2 4 75%
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Appendix 9J: Profitability Results
WINNER'S ABSOLUTE - Total profit of firm with largest profit
" PERCENT - same expressed as percentage of total for all firms
TOP QUARTILE - both measures as for WINNER, but for best 25% of
firms
INDUSTRY TOTAL - Sum of all firms' profits
"Profit" here means total accumulated Capital - Debt at t=59. (Note Debt
can be negative Le. it can be a positive cash balance. See Chapter 7.)
RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE
ABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT
4hlivn.1
4hlivn.2
4hlivn.3
4hlivn.4
87260
86244
89679
80783
102404
111510
112356
102410
92590
102676
85046
71796
123507
157232
122376
122395
55665
64307
61389
64315
82341
96295
90715
91739
119168
45779
60632
69648
67729
71334
96162
72139
4hliin.1
4hliin.2
4h1iin.3
4hliin .4
4h4ivn.1
4h4ivn.2
4h4ivn.3
4h4ivn.4
4h4iin.1
4h4iin.2
4h4iin.3
4h4iin.4
411ivn.1
411ivn.2
411ivn.3
411ivn.4
411iin.1
411iin.2
411iin.3
411iin.4
4l4ivn.1
414ivn.2
414ivn.3
414ivn.4
4l4iin.1
414iin.2
414iin.3
4l4iin.4
30.90
31.20
32.20
29.50
26.20
27.40
27.90
25.90
58.80
50.80
48.00
40.90
41.10
53.50
41.80
41.60
27.10
31.10
28.40
30.40
26.50
30.60
28.90
29.40
95.40
34.10
43.10
49.20
31.30
32.30
43.50
36'.20
87260
86244
89679
80783
102404
111510
112356
102410
92590
102676
85046
71796
123507
157232
122376
122395
55665
64307
61389
64315
82341
96295
90715
91739
119168
45779
60632
69648
67729
71334
96162
72139
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30.90
31.20
32.20
29.50
26.20
27.40
27.90
25.90
58.80
50.80
48.00
40.90
41.10
53.50
41.80
41.60
27.10
31.10
28.40
30.40
26.50
30.60
28.90
29.40
95.40
34.10
43.10
49.20
31.30
32.30
43.50
36.20
INDUSTRY
TOTAL
282146
276465
278700
273527
391534
407674
402773
394908
157450
202310
177129
175460
300244
293705
292781
294364
205099
207052
216418
211574
311062
314288
313436
311653
124918
134139
140761
141515
216105
220715
220932
199229
RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRYABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
16hlivn.l 47876 12.70 150486 39.90 377599
16hlivn.2 49698 14.30 171736 49.50 347148
16hlivn.3 46638 12.60 166487 44.80 371253
16hlivn.4 42061 11.00 161765 42.50 381045
16hliin.l 50239 9.00 186724 33.30 560892
16hliin.2 64408 11.40 214498 37.80 567409
16hliin.3 59258 10.50 202540 35.70 566671
16hliin.4 69158 12.70 216714 39.90 542492
16h4ivn.l 54774 19.60 156940 56.10 279570
16h4ivn.2 81014 28.00 196192 67.80 289581
16h4ivn.3 69890 24.10 168330 58.00 290077
16h4ivn.4 46986 16.30 171930 59.70 288073
16h4iin.l 108882 22.20 222608 45.50 489504
16h4iin.2 87659 19.70 244579 55.00 444823
16h4iin.3 64322 14.90 251111 58.20 431423
16h4iin.4 78892 18.60 271926 64.00 424942
161livn.1 32810 9.80 121360 36.30 334202
161livn.2 33102 10.50 123729 39.30 315004161livn.3 46974 15.40 130291 42.60 305548
161livn.4 45998 14.80 130856 42.10 310726
1611iin.1 54538 11.20 194070 39.80 487965
161liin.2 78723 15.90 206904 41.80 494658161liin.3 66447 13.80 184528 38.30 482316
161liin.4 64028 13.10 195682 40.20 487187
1614ivn.l 60859 29.00 136479 65.10 209631
1614ivn.2 45504 21.80 141069 67.60 2085451614ivn.3 46625 24.10 141491 73.10 1936061614ivn.4 62405 26.10 141284 59.00 239520
1614iin.l 98150 28.00 223797 63.90 3500381614iin.2 78457 21.50 222103 61.00 364310
1614iin.3 87164 23.50 216683 58.50 3701311614iin.4 82084 23.30 205273 58.30 352197
4hliva.l 119563 70.70 119563 70.70 1690424hliva.2 98149 74.20 98149 74.20 1322984hliva.3 186178 92.60 186178 92.60 2009764hliva.4 125684 73.70 125684 73.70 170571
4hliia.l 134636 50.90 134636 50.90 2644284hliia.2 100246 31.60 100246 31.60 3173294hliia.3 171275 60.10 171275 60.10 2849794hliia.4 127525 46.10 127525 46.10 276570
4h4iva.l 114829 106.00 114829 106.00 1083684h4iva.2 65183 51.80 65183 51.80 1257814h4iva.3 86202 95.80 86202 95.80 899704h4iva.4 116253 91.00 116253 91.00 127691
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RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRYABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
4h4iia.l 141911 74.00 141911 74.00 191727
4h4iia.2 140059 59.80 140059 59.80 234138
4h4iia.3 85210 38.40 85210 38.40 222011
4h4iia.4 109035 50.60 109035 50.60 215331
411iva.1 107033 71.70 107033 71.70 149320
411iva.2 76370 70.80 76370 70.80 107817
41liva.3 58355 99.90 58355 99.90 58385
411iva.4 58319 69.90 58319 69.90 83470
41liia.1 126905 69.60 126905 69.60 182371
41111a.2 129205 81.50 129205 81.50 158545
411iia.3 92604 58.80 92604 58.80 157537
41liia.4 134577 53.90 134577 53.90 249613
414iva.1 37213 71.60 37213 71.60 51979
414iva.2 77738 100.00 77738 100.00 77768
414iva.3 96184 83.60 96184 83.60 115058
414iva.4 83783 100.00 83783 100.00 83813
414iia.1 76965 50.90 76965 50.90 151210
414iia.2 109459 66.60 109459 66.60 164240
414iia.3 114588 69.60 114588 69.60 164548
414iia.4 79642 50.90 79642 50.90 156515
16hliva.1 70039 30.00 174678 74.70 233774
16hliva.2 103617 69.60 145401 97.70 148852
16hliva.3 97936 43.60 171526 76.40 224451
16hliva.4 59397 26.70 150254 67.60 222327
16h1iia.1 78411 14.70 233841 43.90 532700
16h1iia.2 78000 15.80 245651 49.80 493399
16hliia.3 98738 23.10 226322 53.00 427171
16hliia.4 66340 13.40 216078 43.60 495854
16h4iva.l 88019 59.40 135482 91.40 148165
16h4iva.2 78161 45.80 152852 89.60 170612
16h4iva.3 75681 36.30 166466 79.90 208453
16h4iva.4 106432 46.10 193859 83.90 230991
16h4iia.1 85051 20.70 257446 62.50 411807
16h4iia.2 68253 17.10 219032 54.80 399908
16h4iia.3 99778 26.80 219684 59.10 371778
16h4iia.4 113839 43.00 177786 67.10 264889
161liva.1 34610 34.60 78257 78.20 1000641611iva.2 75846 39.30 134861 69.90 193059
1611iva.3 43756 32.60 103668 77.20 1342901611iva.4 77464 41.50 126833 67.90 186657
1611iia.1 66657 19.70 181335 53.50 3388381611iia.2 95555 25.60 197019 52.90 3727591611iia.3 95022 24.50 226352 58.40 3876191611iia.4 113611 35.30 213806 66.40 321957
AIl8
RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRY
ABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
1614iva.l 97379 71.00 131431 95.80 137177
1614iva.2 41398 46.30 70837 79.20 89489
1614iva.3 80184 43.30 135589 73.30 185060
1614iva.4 75269 42.90 141775 80.80 175367
161411a.1 65166 17.40 191016 51.10 374073
1614iia.2 111526 40.80 174090 63.60 273628
161411a.3 100501 32.20 182253 58.40 312001
1614iia.4 62237 24.50 157336 61.90 254367
4hlivb.1 152205 58.50 152205 58.50 260309
4hlivb.2 107284 57.40 107284 57.40 187068
4hlivb.3 234516 103.80 234516 103.80 225992
4hlivb.4 157230 59.80 157230 59.80 263102
4hliib.1 178709 32.80 178709 32.80 544354
4hliib.2 343118 90.70 343118 90.70 378182
4hliib.3 187091 52.90 187091 52.90 353846
4hliib.4 314409 63.00 314409 63.00 498938
4h4ivb.1 208318 100.00 208318 100.00 208348
4h4ivb.2 172880 100.00 172880 100.00 172910
4h4ivb.3 112100 45.00 112100 45.00 249021
4h4ivb.4 237731 100.00 237731 100.00 237761
4h4iib .1 190967 68.80 190967 68.80 277561
4h4iib.2 197387 57.00 197387 57.00 346158
4h4iib.3 204616 71.40 204616 71.40 286690
4h4iib.4 212752 62.20 212752 62.20 342315
41livb.l 112493 100.00 112493 100.00 112523
41livb.2 144718 96.10 144718 96.10 150623
41livb.3 367820 78.50 367820 78.50 468683
41livb.4 74454 40.10 74454 40.10 185666
41liib .1 180062 60.60 180062 60.60 297197
411iib.2 123979 36.50 123979 36.50 339626
411iib.3 114498 40.40 114498 40.40 283557
41liib.4 212895 91.00 212895 91.00 233992
414ivb.1 193526 100.00 193526 100.00 193556
414ivb.2 213462 100.00 213462 100.00 213492
414ivb.3 88385 60.60 88385 60.60 145924
414ivb.4 54494 66.40 54494 66.40 82050
414iib.l 172699 56.20 172699 56.20 307530
414iib.2 175119 70.80 175119 70.80 247240
414iib.3 221010 84.10 221010 84.10 262725
414iib.4 106874 48.30 106874 48.30 221164
16hlivb.1 133758 35.50 282424 75.00 376814
16hlivb.2 95416 21.30 284599 63.50 448069
16hlivb.3 208415 59.00 271988 76.90 35347716hlivb.4 108714 30.10 288532 79.90 361187
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RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRY
ABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
16h1iib.1 163220 21.50 364471 48.00 759223
16h1iib.2 165132 21.80 365839 48.20 759060
16hliib.3 125837 19.20 387624 59.30 653957
16h1iib.4 127412 17.30 380169 51.50 738171
16h4ivb.1 90569 27.80 264118 81.10 325644
16h4ivb.2 99134 23.80 261689 62.90 415760
16h4ivb.3 130027 42.30 269430 87.70 307292
16h4ivb.4 97323 28.30 231551 67.30 343920
16h4iib.1 293544 53.40 402176 73.20 549415
16h4iib.2 127761 19.20 303283 45.50 667061
16h4iib.3 174830 30.60 350538 61.40 570862
16h4iib.4 106059 15.50 341237 50.00 682904
1611ivb.l 143229 52.50 212025 77 .80 272669
1611ivb.2 141389 60.90 187036 80.50 232231
161livb.3 82851 28.30 207411 70.90 292415
161livb.4 134580 47.70 203774 72.30 281911
1611iib.1 119689 28.50 257809 61.40 419565
1611iib.2 149082 30.70 318477 65.60 485795
1611iib.3 106712 26.70 223530 55.90 400069
1611iib.4 151881 28.00 328060 60.60 541547
1614ivb.1 100475 42.80 199537 85.10 234593
1614ivb.2 107640 63.50 143878 84.90 169464
1614ivb.3 155067 59.60 228056 87.70 259996
1614ivb.4 134059 60.70 201799 91.40 220786
1614iib.1 141930 39.30 218251 60.40 361195
1614iib.2 130387 24.10 253896 47.00 540660
1614iib.3 194529 42.80 309517 68.10 454410
1614iib.4 102289 18.00 314502 55.30 569140
4hlivc .1 131156 58.20 131156 58.20 225369
4hlivc.2 112693 48.20 112693 48.20 233666
4hlivc .3 94684 36.80 94684 36.80 257283
4hlivc.4 110288 52.80 110288 52.80 208850
4hliic.1 178962 55.60 178962 55.60 321938
4hliic.2 185405 45.10 185405 45.10 411240
4hliic .3 186382 47.90 186382 47.90 388922
4hliic.4 218046 67.40 218046 67.40 323631
4h4ivc.l 81207 43.00 81207 43.00 188656
4h4ivc.2 107617 50.90 107617 SO.90 211250
4h4ivc.3 101311 65.70 101311 65.70 154184
4h4ivc.4 121654 64.00 121654 64.00 190223
4h4iic.1 113005 38.70 113005 38.70 2917214h4iic.2 151947 50.40 151947 SO.40 301454
4h4iic.3 116132 37.00 116132 37.00 3140644h4iic.4 198174 64.90 198174 64.90 305565
A120
RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRYABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
41livc.1 139720 83.80 139720 83.80 166745
41livc.2 82074 55.20 82074 55.20 148814
41livc.3 120559 72.90 120559 72.90 165443
41livc.4 40609 32.10 40609 32.10 126602
41liic.1 176734 61.30 176734 61.30 288498
41liic.2 192945 49.30 192945 49.30 391058
411iic .3 185669 66.50 185669 66.50 279275
41liic .4 161509 73.70 161509 73.70 219078
414ivc.l 99140 64.20 99140 64.20 154503
414ivc.2 67970 51.30 67970 51.30 132552
414ivc.3 110854 80.90 110854 80.90 137110
414ivc.4 99241 68.20 99241 68.20 145466
414iic.l 126399 66.10 126399 66.10 191359
414iic.2 152643 73.80 152643 73.80 206740
414iic .3 125748 47.60 125748 47.60 264337
414iic.4 118797 63.40 118797 63.40 187472
16hlivc .1 71536 15.20 210142 44.60 470836
16hlivc.2 116926 25.10 231380 49.60 466216
16hlivc.3 86024 17.70 236324 48.80 484710
16hlivc.4 118135 24.50 250038 51.80 482311
16h1iic .1 96805 14.70 291051 44.10 659522
16hliic.2 83492 12.10 254489 36.80 691542
16hliic .3 96372 14.60 247113 37.50 659476
16hliic.4 90756 13.20 278936 40.50 688313
16h4ivc.l 92771 26.60 206014 59.00 34926116h4ivc.2 66948 15.40 201555 46.30 43504716h4ivc.3 112955 28.40 247907 62.20 39834816h4ivc.4 85288 23.30 201292 54.90 366828
16h4iic .1 85694 15.10 283619 49.90 568872
16h4iic.2 76351 13.50 273538 1>8 .50 56388716h4iic.3 156381 26.10 306956 51.20 599078
16h4iic.4 151784 26.70 326820 57.40 569460
161livc.l 90634 24.70 162309 44.30 366230161livc.2 76186 23.10 132758 40.20 330216161livc .3 75912 20.50 179516 48.40 370740161livc.4 31461 12.10 90083 34.70 259961
161liic.1 137076 26.90 237989 46.60 510226161liic.2 112585 19.60 260782 45.40 573817161liic.3 54172 9.20 197064 33.50 588305161liic.4 56527 9.70 200052 34.30 583458
1614ivc.1 111189 33.50 163434 49.30 3318401614ivc.2 54599 16.10 166434 49.10 3392541614ivc.3 73687 22.90 174979 54.40 3219441614ivc.4 84113 21.80 190517 49.30 386108
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RUN WINNER'S TOP QUARTILE INDUSTRYABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT TOTAL
1614iic.1 76009 15.40 257301 52.20 492864
1614iic.2 76619 15.40 222408 44.60 498885
1614iic.3 133320 31.60 228378 54.10 422469
1614iic.4 86336 18.20 245696 51.70 474852
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Appendix 9K: Profitability Paired Comparisons
The tables report the frequency of the particular comparison showing a
larger value. Thus, for the comparison on technical change, the total
profit of the biggest firm was larger for no technical change (NTC) runs
in 16 cases, and smaller in 48 cases.
COMPARED ON TECHNICAL CHANGE (TC) vs NO TECHNICAL CHANGE (NTC)
NTC TC
Total profit of biggest firm 16 48
Profit of biggest firm as 5 59
%age of industry total
Total profit for all firms 63 1
COMPARED ON WORLDVIEW
II IV
Total profit of biggest firm 72 24
Profit of biggest firm as 18 78
%age of industry total
Total profit for all firms 95 1
COMPARED ON INITIAL MAXIMUM PLANT SCALE
100 400
Total profit of biggest firm SS 41
Profit of biggest firm as 39 58
%age of industry total
Total profit for all firms 77 19
COMPARED ON CAPITAL INTENSITY
Low High
Total profit of biggest firm 40 56
Profit of biggest firm as 66 30
%age of industry total
Total profit for all firms 9 90
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Significance levels are as in Appendix 9D. (N = 64 for the technical
change comparisons; N = 96 for other comparisons.)
Note: the comparison between 4-firm and 16-firm simulation scenarios is
not reported. This is because total industry capital will tend to be
higher where more firms are operating, and the industry share of the
largest will not be comparable when the number of firms varies.
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